

differential locations of the various segments of the labor force in the technical and social divisions of labor, the subject of the following chapter.

This analysis suggests that the growing demand for Palestinian labor in the productive sectors of the Israeli economy is not accidental. It corresponds to structural transformations in the social and technical organization of production. Therefore, it is more likely to be a permanent, not a temporary, phenomenon -- as was the case in previous historical phases. This point has special bearing on the national proletarian alliances, as it is only conceivable to discuss the possible development of common proletarian class interest, hence the potential for cross-national proletarian alliance, when Palestinian masses are allowed to labor productively (to exchange their labor power against Israeli capital) on a long-term basis. Occupying a permanent place in the labor process is a prerequisite for class formation as a social force with distinct interest and mission.

Another evidence from this chapter that suggests more favorable material conditions for proletarian alliance is the following:

The shift into military production is the most optimal strategy for furthering the development of the productive forces at the disposal of the post-1967 Israeli society; for reasons repeatedly elaborated in this chapter, and for market considerations. Given its settler-colonial nature, Israel cannot afford (if for nothing more than security reasons) to employ Palestinian labor in this economically strategic and politically sensitive sector. These considerations urge the Israeli ruling class to maintain a core Jewish proletariat and to appeal to it as its ally. The