

less economically strategic occupations, while Jews are moving from the least and less into the more economically strategic occupations.<sup>3</sup> This pattern of mobility seems likely to generate a contradiction, in the sense that Jewish mobility into economically more strategic positions is resulting in Arab mobility into politically more strategic positions. The potential for such contradiction can be exemplified by the following trend: the higher ratio of professionals/scientists to managers/administrators after than before 1967 among Jews, and the higher ratio of managers/administrators to professionals/scientists after than before 1967 among Arabs.<sup>4</sup> It can be seen as evident also in the mobility of Arab labor from occupied territories into Jewish agriculture, a trend that is discussed later on.

Looking at the average structure instead of the occupational distribution in the individual years, although clarifying general comparative patterns, it can also obscure important facts. This point is especially significant in periods of crisis like 1966 and the first half of 1967, when the Israeli economy was passing through severe recession. During this period, for example, laid-off Arab construction workers seem to have been pulled back into farm work. The proportion of the Arab labor force in farming, an occupation that is constantly shrinking all along the years, prior to and after that crisis, seems suddenly to expand during recession and absorb Arab lay-offs back into the soil when the economy does not need them elsewhere in this case (i.e., when the first construction boom reached its limit and unemployment seemed widespread).<sup>5</sup>