

The same can be said of the demand for citizen-Arab labor in Israel. In the period of rapid economic growth following the War, distinguished by a persisting shortage of Jewish labor, the demand for Arabs increases in occupations that are becoming less desirable or undesirable by Jews. The traders and salesmen labor market is a case in point. Such is also the service labor category in Table J.2, where demand for Arab labor grew at a disproportionate rate (182 percent) compared to a rate of 1 percent for Jewish labor. These figures may sound confusing, knowing how desirable the service sector is becoming to Jewish, specifically Oriental, labor. Later on, however, in analyzing the industrial structure of employment, we realize that this growth in the demand for Arabs is restricted mainly to personal services that Jews are leaving and moving more into public/community service, in the case of Oriental-Jews, and business/financing services, in the case of Western immigrants. Arabs are thus in many cases moving into subemployment conditions, a much more subtle phenomenon than unemployment, per se.

Statistically speaking, unemployment rates seem always higher among Israel's Jews than non-Jews, in periods of crisis as well as booms. An average of 1965-1974 indicates the unemployment rate for Jews (3 percent) compared with non-Jews (2.8 percent); furthermore, it seems to hit Israeli-born Jews the highest (4.3 percent); then come Asia-Africa immigrants (3.2 percent); and the least affected are Europe-America immigrants (1.9 percent).⁹ The latter is accurate, given the reality that this labor force usually immigrates only on the basis of demand for its labor power, as we explained in an earlier chapter.