

the intensification of the penetration and integration of the citizen-Palestinians within the green-line border into Israel's modern economy, specifically services and industry; concomitant with the irreversible rendering of the indigenous traditional sector which can no longer re-absorb Arabs, once released into the modern labor force.

Third, the availability of a rather more vulnerable (both politically and economically) Arab labor force through the integration of territories occupied in the 1967 War into the Israeli economy. A labor force that is therefore more conducive to the displacement of economic flexibility. Does the availability of this labor force make it economically possible and politically necessary to integrate the citizen-Arabs into the Israeli economy on a more firm employment basis, hence undermining the conditions for its vulnerability and reinforcing its bargaining power?

Of course, the latter depends very much on the way the Palestinian question is to be settled in the near or far future; specifically, whether or not the inflow of Palestinian workers across the green-line borders stops or continues and under what terms of trade! Assuming the non-withdrawal from the occupied territories as an irreversible political fact, then on the basis of data we already have (such as those in Table A, for example), we can compute and identify the possible trends. However, one cannot comfortably make such an assumption. We already know that the use of migratory labor from Mexico and Puerto Rico was not to improve the conditions of black labor; at best, it was to discipline the latter. Although, in effect, black occupational mobility and improvement in income status was promoted by the penetration of alien migratory labor, the latter