

unlike the case in 1967, is evident again in 1973.

The tendency towards equalization in the occupational structures of Israeli-Jews and Arabs in war-time must not be understood only in terms of increasing penetration of Arabs into higher labor categories in order to temporarily replace Jewish labor upon military mobilization, but also in terms of the very absorption by the military of Israel's most qualified manpower from the civilian economy. The latter, in effect, results in the degrading of the civilian Jewish occupational structure, hence contributing to the apparent equalization tendency mentioned above. This is to say, the decline in Arab/Jewish occupational differentiation witnessed during both the 1967 and the 1973 wars can be more accurately interpreted as a result of upgrading in the Arab occupational structure (not exceeding, however, the level of clerical and public service labor categories), on the one hand, and the degrading of the Jewish occupational structure in response to military mobilization, on the other. The latter factor is likely to be even more acute in the 1973 War, after the shifting of the economy towards high technology military production.

The narrowing of the gap in the Arab/Jewish occupational structures is closely reflected in the second row of Columns D2-4, D2-5, D2-6, and D2-7. Notice how the gap narrows down during military mobilization for the October War, but unlike the case following the 1967 War, the gap widens again after the War (most evident in Row 4, Column D2-4). The latter difference is significant, and it is to be interpreted in terms of the differential effect the economic boom versus the economic crisis inflicted on the upgrading/degrading of the occupational structure of the