

Arab citizens in Israel.

In the industrial structure of employment, however, the 1973 War does not seem to have the same effect the 1967 War has had as far as narrowing down the differentiations in the industrial structure of Arab versus Jewish citizens. Quite the contrary, indeed, figures in Column B point out the widening of industrial differentiation between Israeli-Jews and Israeli-Arabs in 1973. This finding is of a special significance, and likely to be interpreted most accurately in light of the increased militarization of the economy and the closer articulation between military and civilian industries following the 1967 War, documented in a previous chapter; the presence of Arab labor in military-related industries is likely to present a more serious risk during war than "peace" time. This point is also relevant to the question of replacement/joining trends in industrial Arab/Jewish labor mobility indirectly related to the prospects for cross-national proletariat alliance.

Furthermore, notice how the narrowing of the gap in the occupational structures of Israeli-Jews and that of Palestinian-Arabs who are citizens of Israel, does simultaneously intensify the gap in the occupational differentials between the latter and non-citizen Palestinian-Arabs (Column D2-3, second row); that is to say, as wars increase the integration of citizen Palestinian-Arabs into the Israeli-Jewish occupational structure, it in the meantime disintegrates and removes the Palestinians within the green-line borders from the non-citizen Palestinians from across the green-lines employed in Israel. This can be seen as being, at least in effect, a political control strategy to prevent alliances between the two