

already demonstrated in Table A.

It is possible that non-citizen Palestinian labor had replaced citizen Palestinian labor in unskilled labor categories, allowing the latter to move into better positions in skilled labor categories. But it is not clear whether citizen-Arabs can be again de-skilled in the case of withdrawal from occupied territories or any other adjustment that may block the inflow of "unskilled" labor from the territories. We only know that it is inherent in the essential unevenness of capitalist accumulation to generate simultaneously skilled and unskilled labor categories. Labor is, if necessary, de-skilled in order to match the labor category most in demand. In light of this theoretical understanding as well as the indices of differentiation preserved in Table B, it seems not unlikely that Arab citizens be de-skilled again. Further, it seems very unlikely that in the present conjuncture Palestinian workers from occupied territories can join Jewish workers in more than unskilled locations within the technical division of labor. They are likely to replace Oriental-Jewish workers and citizen Palestinian labor or join the latter in unskilled industrial and agricultural production work. With the persistence of the economic crisis following the 1973 War, the index demonstrates a tendency towards growing differentiation in the occupational structures of Israeli-Jews and non-citizen Palestinian labor employed in Israel.

In conclusion, although revealing of some significant trends, this index of differentiation does not provide any specific information regarding differential location in a particular occupation and/or industry. It is computed from the average occupational and/or industrial structure