

services, or for that matter, in industry itself. In the former case, the replaced and the replacing workers are, indeed, joining each other in the social division of labor--both falling within the boundaries of the proletariat class; in the latter, however, the replacement is not only in the technical division of labor but also in class location. The former is likely to promote the prospects for proletariat alliance between those moving into and those moving out of the construction labor force, while the latter case is likely to impede such alliance between a becoming-proletariat and those moving into (or out of and into) non-proletariat class locations. It is hard to tell, since both the service and the industrial labor force of Arab and Jewish citizens seem to expand in 1974.

Summing up the employment dynamics in the construction industry is also raising questions regarding the political/economic rationale behind the existence of the highest demand for Palestinian-Arab labor (both citizens and non-citizens) in construction work. The official and popular liberal Israeli views are often heard to attribute this disproportionately high demand for Arab hands in construction to their being traditionally skilled in this trade, pointing out as evidence the sophistication and beauty of the indigenous traditional Arab house. This rationale loses its validity in light of the rather much higher demand in this branch for labor force specifically from the occupied territories in the unskilled and, at best, semi-skilled construction labor categories.

For a more accurate answer, therefore, it is worth pointing out the following:

First, the average wage in construction is relatively high. In 1974,