

security and compensatory social benefits for work injuries. Of course, the physically tough nature of work in this economic branch makes it only rational for Jews who are the less vulnerable not to be attracted to this industry, thus when demand emerges, the abundantly available Arab labor is the more likely to move in.

Fourth, although during some periods Israel has had the highest rates of building in the world, the construction industry in Israel is yet not a stable one. In fact, it can be accurately described as a "seasonal" employment-generating industry; expanding and declining in response to dramatic events such as wars and immigration. The latter are themselves seasonal in the sense that they seem historically to be linked with Israel's economic and political business cycles. It is in this sense of uncertainty that the construction labor force ought to be a vulnerable one. The layoff of Arab labor in periods of decline does not inflict as equally high a stress on the Israeli society.

In addition to construction and agriculture, industry comes as the third of productive economic branches penetrated by non-citizen Palestinians in Israel. As demonstrated by the figures in Table F, in 1975 industrial employment does for the first time since occupation exceed the agricultural employment of the labor imported from the territories. The latter is due not to an increase in the percentage of industrial workers among non-citizen Palestinians (which, in fact, has remained constant from 1973 through 1975), but, simply, to the dramatic decline witnessed in agricultural employment (from 19 percent in 1974 to 15 percent in 1975).

The October War seems to intensify the penetration of non-Palestin-