

of community and public services (a decline from 16.6 percent in 1974 to 14.5 percent in 1975) to make room for Jews released from industry as well as military mobilization (an increase from 27.1 percent in 1974 to 28.3 percent in 1975).

This pattern of labor mobility across economic branches promises a greater number of citizen and non-citizen Palestinians to be sharing proletarian class locations. The fact that in 1975 the same pattern of labor mobility implies that Palestinian-Arabs are replacing Israeli-Jews in class location cannot yet undermine the material conditions for cross-national proletarian alliance. We must remember that the Palestinian-Arab labor force in Israel constitutes only 15 percent of the total employed persons, and around 25 percent of those employed in productive labor categories.³³ In this sense, Palestinian-Arab proletariat can, at the most, replace one-third of the Jewish productive labor force, and in that case, will join the two other thirds remaining in proletarian class locations. Unless the latter are replaced by an alternative source of immigrant workers which is neither Palestinian nor Jewish, the material conditions for cross-national proletarian alliance are not likely to become seriously disrupted.³⁴

For that matter, given the relative weight of both national groups in Israel's labor force, it is the mobility of Palestinians into, and not the mobility of Jews off, productive labor categories that makes the most crucial difference. In this regard it is important to remember that non-citizens, in addition to being already more highly represented in industry than citizen Palestinians, in Israel's employment structure, are also