

employed by Israeli industrial capital and/or joint manufacturing ventures in the territories themselves. The latter reinforces the point made above. In fact, it can add to the number of Palestinian-Arabs and Israeli-Jews who share proletariat class locations within the boundaries of "Greater Israel". In this sense, the more Israeli capital moves into occupied territories (the very site of reproduction of Palestinian labor), the less visible becomes (in the case that it occurs) the replacement of Jews by Palestinians in the social division of labor; yet, the greater continues to be the number of Palestinians joining Jewish proletariats. To the extent that Israeli national capital running into Palestinian communities within and/or across the Green-line boundaries is being invested in industries capable of generating demand exclusively for Arab, but not Jewish, labor, this mobility of capital is likely to reduce the possibility for replacement of Jews by Arabs, and to increase the number of both groups, in proletariat class locations. It is, indeed, the latter that is prevalent; the reviving of indigenous Palestinian production and the transferring of work inappropriate to Jewish localities into Arab ones (recall examples from Chapter IV, pp. 47, 49).

Summing up the industrial structure of employment of the non-citizen Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories prior to, and after, the 1973 War, we must point out the following:

(a) We have intentionally focused merely on the productive segment of the labor force, neglecting those active in the sphere of circulation. At first glance, one may expect that this petty bourgeois segment of the labor force that is likely to prosper under occupation through trade