

joinings in proletariat locations are increasing. Again, given the proportional size of Palestinians in Israel's labor force, it is the penetration of the former into proletariat class-locations that makes a more crucial effect on the prospects for cross-national proletariat alliances.

The militarization of Israel's civilian industry, and the security considerations implied makes it even more imperative that Jews remain to form the core of Israel's industrial labor force, especially in the sphere of high technology production. Security considerations will constitute a serious barrier for the penetration of Palestinian-Arabs into Israeli military production, becoming politically and economically the most strategic branch in the economy. Furthermore, Israel commits a political mistake if it continues to import non-Jewish European labor to replace Jews on a massive scale in military production related labor categories that are unattractive to the Jewish labor force. Such considerations are likely to prevent large-scale deproletarianization of the Jewish industrial proletariat.

The questions that remain to be posed and examined here regard the extent to which high technology industry (being the main form of military industrial production prevalent in Israel today), including software production, involves productive labor despite the predomination of the mental element. This question is relevant to our analysis only in so far as it helps in identifying the class-location of the employees who perform these labor categories. In this sense, the formulation is incomplete. We need to examine not only the extent to which high technology industry generates productive labor categories, but also the extent to which productive laborers in high technology production belong to the working