

The absence of such data for following years makes it difficult to know whether this decline is temporary, the result of the long-lasting military mobilization that distinguished the October War from the Six Day War, or that it signifies a more permanent tendency of the size of the Jewish proletariat to decline.

During this year, the relative size of the Arab proletariat almost levels up with the pre-war estimates. This, however, is despite the fact that the size of the Arab proletariat grew at a lower rate between 1973-1974 than between 1972-1973. This may imply that Arab labor continued then to replace Jewish labor only in proletarian, but not other labor categories. It may thus signify a Jewish deproletarianization tendency concomitant with Arab proletarianization. Despite the latter, however, shared proletarian locations continue to increase owing to the relatively very small size of the Arab labor force in Israel compared to the Jewish.

(g) Even these most conservative estimates based on Poulantzas' criteria show that the great majority (more than 60 percent) of citizen Palestinian wage-earners in Israel occupy proletarian locations in the production process. Among Jewish wage-earners, the proletarians are the minority (around 35 percent). Together, citizen Arab and Jewish proletariats constitute, as of 1974, 36.3 percent of all wage-earners. Still a small minority. In the United States, for example, and by the same criteria, this compares to 19.7 percent.⁶⁰

Can the minority size of the proletariat be simply attributed to the criteria used? Insofar as the United States is concerned, a more satisfactory explanation lies in the internationalization of capital and the oneness of the international division of labor, only segmented on national