

1967 class transformation of Palestinian-Arabs, among Israeli-Jews it is rather transformation from the traditional petty bourgeoisie into the new petty bourgeoisie that predominates.

(e) Military high technology industrialization seems positively correlated with Palestinian proletarianization replacing Jews in the technical but not social division of labor.

Fourth, as far as the magnitude of proletarianization and effects on the objective conditions for potential cross-national proletarian alliances. Findings that are based on the most conservative criteria of proletarian locations indicate that the great majority (an average of 70 percent) is entering proletarian class locations, and that they represent an increase in the number of proletarian locations shared by Arabs and Jews. These findings thus suggest that the integration of Palestinians into Israel's employment structure tends to promote, not impede, the development of commonality of proletarian class interest.

More than 30 percent of the proletarian employees in Israel in 1974 were Palestinians. These are underestimates of the actual size of the Palestinian proletariat. One can then say that the massive penetration of Palestinians into Israel's labor market represents predominantly a proletarianization process. Can one conclude from this chapter that the formation of a Palestinian working class is essentially a post-1967 phenomenon?

The answer to this question is positive, despite the absence of detailed data to estimate the number of Palestinian citizens who occupied, on a non-temporary basis, proletarian class locations. This answer depends at least on three facts: (1) that in 1963, only 39 percent of the