

imperative underlying the emphasis on Jewish, or at least non-Arab, labor force.

It is in the latter sense that subcontracting to factories located in Arab villages seems related (although indirectly) to the militarization of the kibbutz industry; it helps avoid the exposure of military production to Palestinian-Arabs, because through subcontracting, Arab labor stops commuting into the kibbutz and continues to productively labor for the kibbutz capital in the Arab village itself. The transfer of the traditional industries of the kibbutz into Arab villages does, in effect, release the kibbutznic labor force for managing the new and more strategic industry. Traditional kibbutz industries, which are mainly related to agricultural produce and generate only unskilled, low-paid labor categories, can no longer attract Israeli-Jewish labor. Maybe in this sense such work is "not appropriate to the character of the kibbutz" and is therefore subcontracted to factories in Arab villages.

In this sense, appropriate to the character of the kibbutz is only work that has potential to attract Jewish labor. Of course, neither agriculture nor agricultural produce has such potential. Only skilled labor in strategic, i.e., military, industries is likely to redirect Jewish labor mobility from services into industries. Military production is thus most promising as far as the hiring of Jewish labor, which conforms with the principle of self-labor, the ideological basis of the kibbutz, that gives it its peculiar socialist-Zionist character. Without the subcontracting of unskilled industrial work to factories situated in Arab villages, massive penetration of Arab labor into the kibbutz would result, as has been happening on a wide scale since 1967. This way, the kibbutz violates not only its principle of