

increasing in recent years, owing to labor shortages (as kibbutznics constitute the core of Israel's defense army), as well as to the tendency of kibbutz capital to concentrate for economies of scale and other considerations.

Kibbutznics as wage earners outside their own kibbutz represent a very complex phenomenon. Simultaneously, they form a part of the bourgeoisie/petty bourgeoisie as members in their kibbutz and perhaps part of the proletariat outside its boundaries. Their situation presents a challenge to the accepted criteria of class determination. The apparent ambiguity in their class-location may simulate what Olin Wright refers to as "contradictory location between the petty bourgeoisie and proletariat in the process of the proletarianization of the petty bourgeoisie." If so, it refutes our argument regarding the immunity against proletarianization implied in kibbutz membership. Otherwise, it raises questions regarding the ceasing of the kibbutz to be; that is, regarding the withering-away of the kibbutz essence and the remaining of its mere appearance.

The latter is not a question to remain in the realm of theoretical debate. In reality, specifically following the 1967 War, employment of kibbutz labor by another kibbutz has been widely practiced in the context of two modes of inter-kibbutz cooperation:

- (1) cooperation based on manpower and capital investment;
- (2) inter-kibbutz cooperation based on manpower alone.

Both forms of inter-kibbutz manpower-based cooperation are to be viewed as the result of the increased industrialization of the kibbutz, and/or the concentration of kibbutz industrial capital in the post-1967 period.

A concrete example of the first type of cooperation is the Hazore'a wood industry in kibbutz Hazore'a. It started in partnership with a private