

(d) gets access to Arab female labor, whose mobilization into capitalist production in Jewish work places may otherwise be impossible, owing to their subjection to patriarchal oppression. This implies, therefore, an access to a more vulnerable labor force, hence conducive to the creation of higher surplus value;

(e) moreover, by investing its small capital in Palestinian-Arab communities, the Israeli national bourgeoisie temporarily avoids the competition with the compradore and international bourgeoisie, whose merging big capital is invested in Jewish rural and urban communities and mainly in high technology products for export. That is why (as we have documented in a previous chapter) Israeli small capital is reviving indigenous traditional industries like olive oil soap and other small-scale manufacturing.

The industrialization of traditional rural settlements is, therefore, consistent with the survival and profit imperatives of the Israeli national bourgeoisie. Whether or not it leads to economic development of the "traditional" Arab sector depends not on the employment multiplier effect such investment generates in these localities, but rather on the extent to which the inhabitants of these villages share in the economic ownership of these enterprises, hence the extent to which they exercise control over their own sources of employment. The central issue, however, is to emphasize that the considerations identified above can promise only to enlarge the size of the proletariat, even though the penetration of non-citizen Palestinians across the Green Line border seems to be declining.

Further enlargement in the size of the proletariat is expected to be the result of capitalist transformation of agriculture.