THE ARAB NATIONALISTS MOVEMENT 1951-1971:
FROM PRESSURE GROUP TO SOCIALIST PARTY

by

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PREFACE

This is a descriptive and analytical study of the
Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM). A distinction must be
made between the Arab Nationalists Movement, which is the
name of a particular political party, and the Arab national
movement in general.

The ANM is one of the leading political parties in
the Arab World and one of few with a pan-Arab scope and
dimension. Yet, no comprehensive study has been made on
the ANM, and what little has been published is not reliable.

The study of Arab political parties should be of
concern to all students of Arab politics. Recent studies
on the Muslim Brotherhood, the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party,
the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and various other
political groups, have proved to be useful in understanding
Arab politics. This study on the ANM should fill a gap;
it will help to provide a better understanding of the politics
of violence in the Arab World, and it will help to explain
some present trends toward Marxism-Leninism.

In order to place the ANM in its right historical
perspective, the author surveys in Chapter 1 the origins and
development of the Arab national movement in general.
Chapter 2 traces the origins and studies the development
of the ANM. An attempt is also made to establish the

relationships of the ANM to other groups, parties, and regimes in order to place the ANM in the wider context of Arab politics.

Since the ANM has allied its fortunes to the fortune of the July 23 Revolution for many years, an attempt is made in Chapter 3 to draw the relationship between the ANM and the Egyptian Revolution through the different phases of their development.

Chapter 4 investigates each of the component parts which make up the ANM; the organizational structure, the membership, and the leadership. This is done in order to give a precise view of the functioning of the organization. Chapter 5 discusses the ideology of the ANM through different stages of its development.

In conducting this study, the author has utilized original sources and documents and, most important, personal interviews with party leaders, members, and keen observers.

The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance and assistance of the members of the dissertation committee; Professor Harry Howard, Professor Abdul Said, and especially Professor Alan Taylor, the Chairman. Further appreciation is extended to all persons interviewed and cited in the dissertation, without whose help this study may not have come to light.

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Chapter 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

During the latter part of the nineteenth century and
the beginning of the twentieth centruy the Arab provinces
of the Ottoman Empire stood on the threshold of significant
change. The Ottoman Empire was rapidly declining and the
impact of the West was felt stronger than ever. The process
of national formation was gaining momentum while Ottomanism
was loosing ground. In this chapter the author intends to
shed light on the origins and development of the Arab national
movement from its beginnings in the nineteenth century up to
the present time. This survey of the national movement is
deemed necessary in order to place the Arab Nationalists
Movement in its right historical perspective.

THE GENESIS OF ARAB NATIONALISM

The process of national formation in the Arab
provinces of the Ottoman Empire may be attributed to several
factors, the most important of which are:

First, the deteriorating conditions of the Ottoman
Empire which were leading to the breaking away of its
component parts. The triumph of nationalism in the Balkans
reverberated amongst the subjects of the sultan in the Arab

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provinces, particularly amongst Christians.[1] The setting
of a separate administration under Mohammed Ali in Egypt
and the meddling of the European powers in the internal
affairs of the Empire were further signs that Ottoman rule,
after all, was not as impregnable and lasting as it was
once thought to be.

Second, the defensive modernizers such as
Selim III (1789-1807), Mahmud II (1808-1839) and Mohammed
Ali (1805-1849), in their effort to resist the threat of
modern powers, embarked on extensive programs of reform.
European military techniques were adopted, for Ottoman
rule had rested traditionally on military superiority.
A new life was also infused into the internal organization
and administration of the Empire as from the first quarter
of the nineteenth century which rejuvenated old and out-
dated institutions. This was the period of the Tanzimat-i-
Khayriyah or beneficent reforms. It is noteworthy that the
basic reform measures were not carried out in full,[2] and
what was actually achieved left the central problem untouched,
namely the moral and legal foundations of the Empire. Once
these reforms were introduced a whole series of transformations

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[1]See Majid Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab
World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 14;
and Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age
1798-1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 262.

[2]Khadduri, loc. cit.; see also Zeine N. Zeine, The
Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), p. 35.

[3]Hourani, op. cit., p. 45.

had to take place in the traditional Ottoman society. It is true that in their endeavor to strengthen their own positions the Ottoman Sultans and Mohammed Ali were selective in choosing the Western tools, but because of the very nature of those tools it was impossible to utilize them without the rejuvination and the reformation of the social structure of the traditional society. Thus the borrowing of modern technology and know-how from the West generated a self-propelling dynamism which was indeed conducive in disseminating the values and objectives of the Western world. Officers and cadets who were trained under the European military instructors became devoted not only to the modern technology of warfare and industry but also to the political, economic and social institutions which rendered the West superior.

Third, the impact of Western expansion, which was first felt during the French occupation of Egypt in 1789, awakened what one might call the political consciousness of modern Egypt. French rule allowed a share of political power to be exercised by some enlightened indigenous elements, namely the learned shiekhs. Rudiments of orderly administration were learned through working in the Diwan of the new government. The printing press of Cairo and the Institute of Egypt opened up new fields of learning. True that these institutions were more concerned with the ancient legacy of Egypt than with the enlightening of Egyptians, but they were deeply appreciated by, and left a profound

impression upon, even the most malicious of learned Egyptian observers, such as al-Jabarti. They also aroused among a small group of shiekhs from al-Azhar a genuine eagerness to learn, a craving which was not, however, satisfied until the reign of Mohammed Ali.[4] It was through such channels that the idea of nationalism, which had much earlier become the dominant political theme in Europe, found its way, for the first time into the Arab world. This initial impact of modern political thought and administration was nurtured by Western-educated Arabs and Western institutions at a later stage.

European and American missionaries played an increasing role in meeting the demand for education and learning in the Arab provinces of the Empire. The Syrian Protestant College (later the American University of Beirut) and the University of St. Joseph founded in 1866 and 1875, respectively, assumed an important role in transmitting the ideologies and techniques of the West.

Students and graduates of the above institutions were very active in the literary clubs and learned societies which played a role in the development of nationalism by reviving the language and history of the Arabs. These

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[4]Jamal Mohammed Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 2-8.

societies introduced political overtones, and George Antonious maintains that the Syrian Scientific Society, founded in 1857, uttered the first cry of Arab nationalism.[5]

The foregoing factors, i.e., the deteriorating conditions of the Ottoman Empire, the introduction of defensive reforms and the impact of the West had a lasting effect upon the traditional social structure and political system of the Empire. The educated Arabs were compelled to react to the demands and pressures of the new age. Through their literary clubs and learned societies they played an important role in awakening the national consciousness of the Arab subjects of the Empire. In this period, which runs from around the middle of the nineteenth century to about 1870, the seeds of national thinking were sown in the midst of a general environment which was far from absorbing the real dimensions of the nationalist thought which was still foreign to the Islamic community.

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[5]George Antonius, The Arab Awakening. (New York: Capricon Books, 1965), p. 54. For other views see Hourani, op. cit., pp. 260-323; Sylvia G. Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism: An Authology (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 3-72; Hazim Zaki Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), and Zeine, op. cit. Dr. Nuseibeh traces the roots of Arab nationalism to pre-Islamic sources while Prof. Zeine traces them to the years 1909-1914 when the Young Turks became increasingly nationalists. The author does not intend to indulge in this controversy which is not within the scope of this study.

The upheaval of 1860, when fighting broke out between Druzes and Christians and the death toll of lives reaching the appalling total of 11,000, aggrevated sectarian hatred,[6] and it may have in one way or another offered secular nationalists another reason and justification to challenge the traditional elements in the society which still adhered to the concept of Islamic community and unquestioned Ottoman allegiance. There were already several factors fostering anti-Turkish sentiments in Lebanon: Western education, the political ideas of the French Revolution, revival of the Arabic language, the printing press and the publications of Arabic newspapers, travel abroad and the return of emigrants from the United States of America.[7] However, the immediate result of the increasing activities of the Arab nationalists was the suppression of the literary clubs and other organized groups whose activities were held inimical to the Ottoman dynasty. By 1870 almost every Arab association was dissolved by the Ottoman authorities.

The secret political associations which were founded in Beirut, Damascus, Cairo and Constantinople during the period 1870-1908 were more precise than their forerunners in formulating their demands and defining their objectives.

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[6]Antonius, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

[7]Zeine, op. cit., p. 41.

Instead of the vague and general demands for administrative and political reforms they stressed the desire for autonomy and eventual separation from the Ottoman Empire.[8] It is significant to note that the evolution of the Arab nationalist doctrine in this period was greatly influenced by the Christian Arabs of Lebanon who had more contacts with the West than the rest of the population. As recipients of modern Western culture, the Arab Christian intellectuals did not feel "at home" under traditional Ottoman rule.[9] Thus they stressed the nationalist bond as the most fundamental factor in building up a modern state.

The seeds of nationalism that were sown earlier by the literary clubs accomplished a considerable amount of growth by the turn of the century: From an idealistic movement confined to a small elite of intellectuals nationalism evolved into a liberal movement joined by an increasing number of people. However, this should not lead us to imagine that the nationalist movement came to include the largest segment of the population or that its thought held sway amongst them.

In spite of the evolution of the nationalist movement, the tenents and traditions of Islam continued to shape the political and intellectual life of this period.

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[8]H. B. Sharabi, <u>Governments and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century</u> (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 110.

[9]Zeine, loc. cit.

Nevertheless, within the general Islamic environment there emerged a new school of thought which was in favor of settling the Arab question by creating an autonomous Arab province within the Ottoman Empire on the basis of decentralization. This school which originated outside the main stream of Arab national thought and in opposition to the latter's call for separation from the Ottoman Empire had indirectly served the national movement by drawing into its ranks larger segments of the population who refused to associate themselves with the national separatist movement owing to the religious bond. However, they welcomed the new trend in the national movement which introduced the concept of decentralization and worked within the common framework of the existing Islamic society. Thus the call for autonomy contributed to the awakening of the national consciousness, for by merely putting forward the idea of autonomy it became a factor that awakened and uncovered the distinct identity of the Arab nation.

It might be useful to mention here that the period during which the trend which called for decentralization was gaining momentum coincided with the activities of the Young Turks against the reign of Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), one of the most reactionary rulers of the Ottoman Empire. The Committee of Union and Progress which eventually brought down the despotic rule of Abdul Hamid II had early in its history approached the Arab organizations

and offered in return for their cooperation the fulfillment
of their national aspirations by granting Arab provinces
self-rule within the framework of the Ottoman Empire.[10]
Thus when Abdul Hamid was deposed and the Young Turks
assumed power, that trend of the Arab national movement
which called for decentralization and for cooperation
between Arabs and Turks within the common framework of
the Ottoman Empire flourished. Furthermore, the restora-
tion of the constitution and the good will shown to the
Arabs by the Committee of Union and Progress immediately
after their coup have dealt a temporary blow to the school
of thought advocating complete independence.

However, soon things started to develop in another
direction. The Young Turks revealed their real intentions
soon after they were invested in power. They broke the
promises they had made to the Arabs at the Paris Congress
of 1907. No provinces on the basis of decentralization
and autonomy were to be created in the Arab regions. The
principle of self-rule to which the Young Turks subscribed
before the revolution was altogether abrogated after the
revolution. These developments have disappointed all those
who counted on the good will of the Young Turks and
hoped to solve the national issue within the common framework

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[10]V. Lutsky, <u>Modern History of the Arab Countries</u>
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), pp. 335-336.

of the Ottoman Empire. Thus the conciliatory approach
which held sway before the 1908 coup had to yield the way
for another trend which called for the separation of the
Arab provinces from the Ottoman Empire and the establishment
of an independent Arab national state.

A number of Arab societies and political parties
were formed in the aftermath of the 1908 coup to defend
the Arab cause and protect Arab rights. One of these
organizations, <u>Jam'iyah al-'Arabiyah al-Fatat</u> [The Young
Arab Society] which was found in Paris in 1909 is of
particular significance to our study. Its ultra secret
nature, its main objectives, (the liberation of the Arab
lands from foreign rule and the creation of an Arab
national state) and its hard core militants, (mostly Arab
students from the Fertile Crescent), did not only provide
the model for many political organizations of the time,
but also provided the model for the Arab Nationalists
Movement about half a century later. Indeed since the
foundation of <u>al-Fatat</u> the Arab national movement has
accomplished a victory over all conciliatory trends and
the Arab national doctrine betrayed signs of firmness
and singleness of purpose.

The Arab struggle for liberation and national
independence culminated in the Arab Revolution of 1916
which transformed the Arab provinces of the Ottoman
Empire from a state of vassalage to a state of independence,
semi-independence or dependence. The paradox of the whole

episode is that the most backward of the Arab regions,
i.e., the Arabian Peninsula, got the better deal according
to which independent states were created, whereas Syria
and Iraq by far much more developed were yet to experience
foreign rule under different forms for years to come.

It is important to note that in its formative
years the Arab national movement was essentially an eastern
Arab movement. This phenomenon was mainly due to the fact
that at an early stage the African part of the Arab world
was separated from direct Ottoman rule either by the acts
of its Walis, who opted for independence, or by the encroach-
ments of Western powers. In either case political movements
in the African part of the Arab world were pushed along
completely different paths.

Having surveyed the history of the Arab national
movement and traced the development of that movement from
its beginnings in the nineteenth century down to the early
twenties, we have now to survey the political and social
thought that was introduced in the period under discussion.
It is deemed necessary to engage in such a discussion so
as to understand in depth the social and intellectual
developments of the forthcoming period.

At the outset one may single out two streams of
thought: Islamic reformation and secular nationalism. In
their search for identity the new generations that took it
upon themselves to establish a new political order were
more or less influenced by these main streams of thought.

The movement for Islamic reformation initiated by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), Muhammed 'Abduh (1849-1905) and 'Abdul Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849-1903) was a radical departure from the attitude of the traditional leaders of Islam.[11] While the latter demanded a return to the original form and spirit of Islam the movement for Islamic Reformation took cognizance of the emerging forces in the Islamic community and the world at large and stressed the necessity of reinterpreting Islamic teachings in the light of new conditions. The movement for Islamic Reformation was particularly interested in proving the compatibility of Islam with modernity. In order to uphold Islam's ability to adapt itself to modern life, the movement encouraged free inquiry and reasoning and abjured outdated beliefs and superstitions.[12]

Though the movement for Islamic reformation considered religious doctrines as its main and primary theoretical source, and though it upheld the institutions of the Caliphate and the Islamic Empire, it nevertheless was a progressive movement in essence. It was greatly influenced by the French Revolution and Western civilization and thus it aspired to restate the social principles of

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[11]Haim, op. cit., p. 18.

[12]Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 25.

Islam with reference to Western ideals and concepts. Indeed the movement for Islamic reformation represented a genuine attempt within the framework of Islam to absorb the liberal thought which originated in the West. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, one of the outstanding pioneers of the movement, equated national solidarity with religious solidarity. Moreover, he was prepared to give preference to national solidarity should it prove to be more effective than religion as a unifying force.[13] Likewise, Muhammad 'Abduh, a close friend and follower of al-Afghani, asserted that love of the fatherland is a religious duty.[14] Abdul Rahman al-Kawakibi, another prominent figure of the movement, clearly distinguished between the Arabs and non-Arabs in the Islamic community.[15] It goes without saying that the Islamic reformists were quite aware of nationalism as a force to be reckoned with; hence their endeavor to relate the Islamic revival to Arab nationalism.

Although they maintained that the community of believers is the basic political unit, they nevertheless gradually moved from pan-Islam toward the concept of an Arab caliphate. While the Islamic reformists expected the purification of religion from outdated beliefs and

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[13]Haim, op. cit., p. 15.

[14]Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 71.

[15]Haim, op. cit., p. 26.

superstitions to lead to an Islamic revival, secular
nationalists, such as Ibrahim al-Yaziji and Negib Azoury,
aimed at the removal of religion altogether from the realm
of national action. Christian intellectuals, being the
readiest to respond to the new forces from the West and
therefore the vanguard of change, naturally desired to
establish a national state without any reference to Islam.
Christian Arab thinkers, in their role as the best
interpreters of Western values and political thought, were
the first to advocate the idea of Arab nationalism devoid
of any Islamic implications.[16] A modern state, they
emphasized, cannot have equal and less equal second-class
citizens like the _dimmis_ of classical Islam.[17] The
separation of religion from the state, they argued, was
in the interest of both Islam and the Arab nation.[18]
However, in their endeavor to build up a modern state on
the principle of nationality and in imitation of Western
political organization, the secular nationalists were

[16]Hisham Sharabi, _Arab Intellectuals and the West:
The Formative Years, 1875-1914_ (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 17.

[17]In an Islamic state the _dimmis_ or the protected
possessors of a revelation (_ahl al-kitab_) while adequately
safeguarded by human rights they nevertheless are subject
to certain inequalities concerning their duties. Cf. E.I.J.
Rosenthal, _Islam in the Modern National State_ (Cambridge:
The University Press), pp. 107-108.

[18]Haim, op. cit., p. 30.

inclined to reduce religion "to the role of mentor of the individual conscience and a medium of personal relationship with the divinity."[19]

The secular nationalists developed a positive program based on the ideals of Anglo-Saxon liberalism. This involved, apart from the separation of religion from state: the introduction of modern technology; the propagation of education; the encouragement of local initiative in the exploitation of the nation's resources; broadening the extent of political, social and intellectual liberties; and the reform of administrative procedures.[20]

Besides the above nationalist program which was supported by a substantial middle class of professionals, officials and intellectuals, symptoms of socialist thinking began to appear in the Arabic periodical press as early as the late nineteenth century. Such thinking was again for the most part spread by Christian intellectuals who were usually the product of Western education. They maintained that national independence was of no value in itself, to be meaningful it should be combined with social change.[21]

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[19]Safran, op. cit., p. 85.

[20]R. Bayly Winder (Trans.), The Meaning of Disaster, by Constantine K. Zurayk (Beirut: Khayat's College Book Cooperative, 1956, pp. 39-42.

[21]Hourani, op. cit., p. 339.

Dr. Shibli Shumayyil (1860-1916) was perhaps the first Arab intellectual who introduced the concept of _ishtirakiyah_ [socialism] to the Arab world. To him socialism meant the intervention of the state in the social process "to bring about co-operation in pursuit of the general welfare."[22] He rejected all kinds of exclusive solidarity whether they be religious or nationalist. "National fanaticism was as bad as religious, and sooner or later loyalty to the limited _watan_ must give way to the _wataniyya_ of the world."[23] Other forerunners of the socialist trend were Farah Antun, Nicola Haddad and Amin al-Rihani. The three of them utilized the Arab Writers Association which was founded in New York in 1910 to further their objectives. They also contributed to _al-Jami'ah_, a socialist review, to expound their ideas on society and government. Unlike the main stream of liberal nationalists who put their faith in the initiative of the private entrepreneur to achieve national development along capitalist lines, these writers opted for a democratic socialist program carried by socialist parties through democratic means. At about the same time Salama Musa returned to Egypt from Britain where he received his education. He was keenly aware of the unpriviledged position of his people, so he embarked on selling the ideas

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[22]Ibid., pp. 252-253.

[23]Ibid., p. 252.

of George Bernard Shaw and the Fabians to his people. Musa was also credited with having written the first study on socialism in Arabic.[24]

An attempt was made above to explore the principal current of thought of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Before proceeding to the post World War I, it might be useful to state the following observations:

First, the movements for Islamic reformation and secular nationalism which were singled out as the two major streams of thought that engaged the Arab theatre in the period under discussion were both influenced by the liberal thought of the West. The Islamic reformists attempted to reinterpret Islamic doctrines to make them more compatible with the liberal ideals of the superior West. The secular nationalists adopted the liberal doctrines of the West stock and barrel.

Second, both the Islamic reformists and the secular nationalists were engaged first and foremost in setting the framework for future development. Both movements were concerned with defining the relationship between the Arab provinces and the Ottoman Empire. In other words the political problem came first while the social problem was relegated to the background.

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[24]Al-Ishtirakiyya [Socialism], (Cairo: al-Matba'ah al-Ahliyya, 1913).

Third, the socialist trend represented by few intellectuals failed to break ground. Its failure was due to the fact that the early socialists introduced a variant of socialist thought that was closely modeled on Western institutions. It was unrealistic to expect democratic socialism to work in a completely alien environment. Furthermore, the early Arab socialists failed to reconcile socialism with Arab nationalism, and that was a serious drawback especially in a period marked by growing nationalist fervent.

THE ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT BETWEEN
THE TWO WORLD WARS

The Arab revolt of 1916 and World War I had a profound impact on the course of the Arab national movement. The defeat and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and the emergence of a constellation of Arab states thereafter could not have passed without engendering important transformations in Arabic political thought.

In the first place, the conflict between the Islamic reformists and the secular nationalists was resolved in the latter's interests. The establishment of secular Arab states under the mandatory powers on the one hand, and the abolishion of the Caliphate on the other hand, destroyed the hopes of the larger segments of the Islamists who challenged the secular nationalists before the war. Although a second generation of Islamic reformers such as Rashid Rida, a

disciple of Muhammad 'Abduh, tried to restore confidence
in Islam by presenting certain practical steps to revive
the Caliphate, the new elite which emerged after the war
was not the least interested in the re-establishment of an
Islamic State.

In the second place, the struggle to achieve complete
independence and to build viable political and social
structures rendered the emergence of a new ideology, more
thorough-going than that of the pre-War generation,
indispensable. The leadership of the nationalist movement
which assumed power under the tutelage of the mandatory
powers after the war sought in vain to relay the liberal
tradition of the West and its economic systems to the Arab
world through the medium of nationalism. The manifold
problems of social and economic change rendered the
establishment of liberal democracy unfeasible.

Insofar as the political traditions of the West were
alien to the Arabs, it was unrealistic to expect liberalism
to function in the Arab world. For centuries the Arabs
have lived under authoritarian governments. There was a
wide elite - mass gap both in power and attitudes.[25] It
goes without saying that the Arabs were not yet ready to
accept the political innovations and institutions of the
West because they were inconsistent with their established
cultural patterns.

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[25]Elie Salem, "Emerging Government in the Arab World",
Orbis, VI (Spring, 1962), p. 104.

In the third place, the socialist thought began to gain momentum in the Arab World immediately after the war. One reason for its growing impact was the victory of the October Revolution in Russia. Lenin's theory of "imperialism the highest stage of capitalism" appealed to many Arab intellectuals who embraced the idea of an alliance between their people and the Soviet Union. The first decade after the war witnessed the spread of revolutionary socialist cells in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. The emerging socialists repudiated altogether the democratic ideals of the pre-war generation. Instead they applied Marxism to the study of Middle Eastern society.

It is significant to note that while Marx and Engels threw light on the process of social evolution and investigated pre-capitalist historic stage, Arab Marxists and especially communists gave only little consideration to the understanding of the Arab nationalist movement and its socio-economic formations. They hastely embarked on a program befitting an industrial nation. They tried to organize proletarian mass parties in countries without an industrial proletariat.[26] Moreover, they failed to understand Arab nationalism in the context of the wider struggle for national independence and social advancement of the colonial peoples. In fact they alienated the Arab nationalists by assuming that the nation

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[26]Walter Z. Laqueur, _Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East_ (New York: Praeger, 1956), p. 271.

was a social phenomenon produced by the national bourgeoisie to serve their best interests.[27] On the whole the intewar Arab Marxists could not properly understand and interpret the problems of the Arab national movement. Therefore, they were inclined to apply definitions and generalizations far from being relevant to Arab life.

The failure of the doctrinaire Marxists to present an objective scientific analysis of the concrete problems facing the Arab national movement led to the emergence of a number of socialist circles which disclaimed the uncritical way in which the doctrinaire Marxists applied their doctrines. The most prominent of these circles was the "Ahali" association, a group of Iraqi intellectuals who began their political agitation in the early 1930's. In contrast to the doctrinaire Marxists, they did not admit the existence of class struggle in their society and recognized the institutions of religion and family.[28] However, the Ahali group which opted to follow a different approach from that of the doctrinaire Marxists failed to take an independent stand on the issue of nationalism. Following the footsteps of the Communists the Ahali group repudiated nationalism which they associated with

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[27]Al-Hakam Darwaza, Al-Shuyu'iyah al-Mahaliyah wa M'arakat al-'Arab al-Qawmiyah [Local Communism and Arab National Struggle], (Beirut: Dar al-Fajr, 1961), pp. 41-42.

[28]Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics from 1932-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 71.

tyranny and hypocrisy.[29] It is the conviction of this author that had the Ahali group and other independent socialist trends responded favorably to nationalism they would have carried the Arab national movement to new horizons by inculcating it with their progressive ideas. However, by opting to favor regional nationalism against Arab nationalism these socialist trends have to share part of the responsibility with the Communists and other separatist groups in the disintegration of the unitary Arab national movement in the interwar period. Indeed, apart from other factors, the programs and activities of these groups accentuated the drift into iqlimiyah [regionalism].

The Arab national movement had to undergo a process of complete transformation structurally as well as ideologically, in order to adjust itself to the new circumstances. Before the war a more or less unified movement was struggling to assert the rights of Arab provinces to secession and independent national development. Their struggle was essentially against the religiously legitimized political institutions of the Ottoman Empire. After the war the national movement broke down into a number of political organizations each preoccupied in its struggle towards the independence of that particular state in which the organization was established. Moreover, the

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[29]Ibid.

`emerging political parties have valued the problem of integrating the social groups within each political entity more than they valued the ultimate national objective of creating a single national Arab state.[30] This does not mean that they have abandoned the national doctrine altogether. In fact they continued to consider unity as their ultimate goal, albeit the idea of unity, at this stage, was embodied in the call for a Syrian unity, which they envisaged as the first practical step.

In the midst of the fragmentation of the Arab national movement there emerged an organization of a new type: the League of National Action. This organization which started in the early thirties by a group of young intellectuals singled out itself as the only national organization in this period which did not only refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the regional boundaries set by foreign powers but also worked whole-heartedly to erase them. For that end they opened branches in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine and produced a comprehensive program for national action not only in the Arab East but also in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab World. They also tried to formulate a systematic national doctrine by clearly defining the meaning of nationalism and nationhood and setting a definite scheme of procedure for the establishment

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[30]Karpat, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

of a modern state system with viable political, social and economic structures.[31]

The founders of the Arab Nationalists Movement were very much impressed, as we shall see in the next chapter, by the role which the League has played in the thirties. Indeed they give the League the credit of having upholded the national movement at a time when other nationalist groups and political parties were drifting away from their national ideals. This may be an exaggerated statement, yet the League of National Action no doubt represented a unique phenomenon in that period. Unlike the "bloc" parties that opted to work within the framework of the status quo regimes, the League refused to make any compromises to the detriment of the national objective. Moreover, it manifested, in thought and action, the genuineness of the Arab nationalist doctrine.

THE ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT DURING
AND AFTER WORLD WAR II

Beginning with World War II, Arab national thought entered a new stage of its development - the stage of comprehensive nationalism. The writings of Sati' al-Husry were instrumental in expounding and defending the concept of

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[31]Hourani, op. cit., p. 308; see also A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 197-198.

nationalism which stressed the absolute sovereignty of the
national state. He advocated the fusion of the individual
into the nation, to the extent of sacrificing the individual's
freedom.[32] He also repudiated all sorts of regional
nationalisms in the Arab World by extending the concept of
the Arab nation to include Egypt and North Africa.
Al-Husry based his theory of nationalism on the predominant
factor of language to include all those who speak the
Arabic language. His definitive studies on Arab nationalism
helped straighten many misconceptions on Arab nationalism
and rendered the existence of one Arab nation an accomplished
fact. That is why al-Husry was considered by many writers as
the philosopher of Arab nationalism.

Al-Husry's writings on nationalism stopped short of
dealing with the socio-economic aspects of nation-building.
Thus his ideas tended to be more successful in the stages of
national protest than in the tasks of national construction.
It was another intellectual, however, Dr. Constantine Zurayk,
who came to grips with the fundamental tasks of nation-
building. Dr. Zurayk urged the Arabs to adopt the institutions,
characteristic of the West as the first step in meeting the
challenge of the modern age. His was perhaps the most
systematic attempt to formulate a program based on the ideals
of Anglo-Saxon liberalism. Nevertheless, his ideas did not
appeal to the new generation which grew to maturity in the
1940's. For one thing, they identified Zurayk's program with

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[32]Haim, op. cit., p. 44.

the ill-fated constitutional order that was introduced by the
mandatory powers between the two World Wars.

The transition from a theory of "pure" nationalism,
or nationalism with no content, to a theory of comprehensive
nationalism with a socio-economic content depended largely
upon the doctrines of the Ba'th [Arab Socialist Resurrectionist
Party]. Indeed the advent of this party in the early 1940's
represented a landmark in the history of the Arab national
movement.

In the first place, the Ba'th should be credited with
coming to grips with the socio-economic problems facing the
development of the Arab states. It was the first Arab party
which found in the manipulative character of socialism a
means of providing a social content to Arab nationalism.[33]
This alliance between socialism and Arab nationalism gave
new impetus to the national movement which was circumscribed
until the 1940's by regional nationalisms and local socialism
which failed to adapt to the peculiar circumstances of Arab
society. The socialization of Arab nationalism appealed to
larger segments of the Arab people who believed that
socialism was the best solution for their economic problems.[34]

In the second place, the Ba'th represented a radical
departure from previous national parties in terms of

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[33]Kamel S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party:
History, Ideology, and Organization (Syracuse, New York:
Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 147.

[34]Zeine, op. cit., p. 153.

organization set up and social structure. Unlike the loosely
formed bloc parties which were usually dominated by big
families, the <u>Ba'th</u> introduced a centralized organizational
structure based on a system of underground cells.[35] In
addition to that the <u>Ba'th</u> attempted to place its organization
on a working class foundation. If it met little success in
that respect, it nevertheless spread among students,
intellectuals and petty bourgeois elements.

In the third place, the <u>Ba'th</u> rejected the "regional
approach" assumed by the old guard nationalists in their
endeavor to struggle for complete independence within each
Arab state. Instead the <u>Ba'th</u> advocated a "national approach"
according to which all nationalist forces in the Arab World
should wage a common struggle against their enemies. In
fact the <u>Ba'th</u> looked upon itself as the embodiment of
nationalism in the Arab World.

The advent of the <u>Ba'th</u>, therefore, opened new
vistas for the Arab national movement. Far from accepting
the <u>status quo</u>, the <u>Ba'th</u> triggered a whole set of issues
and problems relating to the Arab national movement. In
theory and practice, the <u>Ba'th</u> have helped speed up the
political and social synthesis in the Arab World. It is
perhaps not incorrect to assume that the alliance between
socialism and Arab nationalism which was first advocated by

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[35]Abu Jaber, op. cit., pp 139-144.

the <u>Ba'th</u> has radically altered the composition and goals of the Arab national movement. It is to be recalled that the motto of the party: "Arab Unity", "Freedom" and "Socialism" are the present symbols of Arab nationalism.

Chapter 2

THE EMERGENCE OF THE ARAB

NATIONALISTS MOVEMENT

The development of events in the Arab East following
the partition of Palestine was dominated, in the political
sense, by three factors. The first of these was the
fundamental resistance of the Arab masses to the establish-
ment of the State of Israel, a resistance which expressed
itself in a growing hostility towards the West, largely
passive, but marked by occasional outbreaks of anti-West
demonstrations in the principal cities. The second was the
steadily deteriorating prestige of the governing elite
whose actual performance during the Arab-Israeli War was
very poor. The third was the emergence of a new and more
conscious movement of resurgence, inspired by a determination,
on the part of the Arab youth, to face the challenge.

In this chapter the author intends to trace the
origins and study the development of the Arab Nationalists
Movement (henceforth, ANM) from its earliest beginnings in
the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War to the mid-'fifties.
In order to place the ANM in the wider context of Arab
politics an attempt will be made to establish the relationship
of that particular institution to other groups, parties, and
regimes dedicated to the pan-Arab ideal. The Ba'th as a

parallel institution will serve our purpose best whenever the need arises to set up relevant relationships.

KATA'IB AL-FIDA' AL-'ARABI [PHALANGES
DE LA REDEMPTION ARABE]

Just as men bear all their lives the mark of their childhood, so parties are greatly influenced by their origins.[1] Hence it is essential to dig deep into the roots of the ANM to understand some present trends in the organization.

Although the ANM disclaims any relationship to the Kata'ib Al-Fida' Al-Arabi (henceforth Kata'ib) there is a reasonable evidence in the writings of former members of the ANM, and of political opponents to establish the relationship between the two organizations.[2] Indeed it is hardly possible to disavow the impact of the Kata'ib on the organizational structure and the ideology of the ANM especially during the formative years of the latter. It suffices to know that Hani al-Hindi and George Habash the

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[1] Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley, 1955), p. xxxii.

[2] It is significant to note that the documents and literature of the ANM make no mention whatsoever of the Kata'ib. However, Muhsin Ibrahim, a former member of the Political Bureau of the ANM reveals the well-kept secret in his edited work, Limatha Munathamat al-Ishtirakiyeen al-Lebnaniyeen? [What For is the Organization of the Lebanese Socialists?], (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1970), p. 16. The Ba'th, too, believes that the kata'ib has provided the nucleus around which the ANM was organized, statement by Abdul Fatah al-Zalat, personal interview, November 5, 1968.

two prominent leaders of the ANM were themselves among the
founding leaders of the Kata'ib. Whether the Kata'ib was
the precursor of the ANM or only the training ground for the
latter's future leaders is of little significance.

But what is the Kata'ib? In what circumstances did
it emerge? And what is its contribution to Arab politics?

The Kata'ib or the terrorist organization which was
brought to light for the first time following the abortive
attempt to assassinate Col. Adib Shishakli, Assistant Chief
of Staff of the Syrian Army, on October 11, 1950, was an
outgrowth of the Palestinian nakbah [disaster]. As the
Arab-Israeli War of 1948 drew to a disastrous close for the
Arab states, popular resentment against the governments
manifested itself in strikes and demonstrations and it was
obvious that major changes were inevitable. At this time,
the radical Arab youth especially among the Palestinian
refugees who were ejected from their home in Palestine looked
about desperately for signs of change in the Arab World.
The Ba'thists hopefully offered themselves as the instrument
of this change but their reformist ideas failed to fulfill
the expectations of the masses who went into the streets
seeking a more militant leadership. In these circumstances
a group of young radicals who had severe misgivings about the
gradualist tactics of the opposition parties, including the
Ba'th, were meeting in Damascus, Beirut and Amman to put the
founding stone of the Kata'ib, a clandestine paramilitary
organization, dedicated to the liberation of Palestine.

The founding leaders of the Kata'ib were young men in their early twenties. They were imbued with extreme political ideas during their bitter experience as volunteers fighting side by side with the regular Arab armies in Palestine. On the battleground they viewed with alarm the contrast between Israel's strength and the miserable weakness of the divided Arab armies. The forceful evacuation of Palestinians from their rightful realm exasperated their painful experience. Dr. George Habash, later recalled:

> I was humiliated by the events of 1948. The Israelis came to Lydda and forced us to flee. It is a picture that haunts me and that I'll never forget. Thirty thousand human beings walking, weeping ... screaming in horror ... women with babies in their arms and children tugging at their skirts ... and the Israeli soldiers pushing them with their guns. Some people fell by the wayside, some never got up again. It was terrible. Once you have seen this, your heart and your brains are transformed ... what's the point of healing a sick body when such things can happen? One must change the world, do something, kill if necessary, kill even at the risk of becoming inhuman in our turn.[3]

The author has no means to verify the authenticity of the above reminiscence, but this is beside the point. The important thing we are concerned with here is to understand the psychological impact of the Zionist occupation of Palestine and the humiliating defeat of the Arab armies on the Arab youth who later raised to defend their homeland with vigour and enthusiasm. Hani al-Hindi

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[3]Oriana Fallaci, "A Leader of the Fedayeen: 'We Want a War Like the Vietnam War'" in _Life_, June 12, 1970, p. 34.

and Jihad Dhahi among the other founding leaders of the
Kata'ib confirmed to this author the profound impact of
the Palestinian nakba on their behavior and system of
thought.[4] To them, as to other members of their organiza-
tion, the loss of Palestine marked the turning point in
their lives. No more would they lead the life of ordinary
men. They were possessed with the idea of revenge. The
Palestinian War aggravated and complicated the tensions
which have mounted in the Arab World for some time. It
was the fear of the danger of Zionist expansion that
prompted those young revolutionaries to act and act fast
before it was too late! They saw in Israel a constant
threat to the realization of their national objectives,
and nothing was more important to them at this time than
to achieve those objectives.

The young Arab radicals were not unnaturally
attracted to the various revolutionary doctrines of Western
Europe to which their education had given them access.
However, in choosing their strategy and tactics, the
founding leaders of the Kata'ib did not neglect to study
the experience of Arab revolutionary movements.[5] The result
was a curious amalgam of revolutionary thought based on a
strong anti-Zionist, anti-foreign emotionalism that
sanctified political violence. At this time Giuseppe
Garibaldi, the Italian patriot and guerrilla leader of the
Risorgimento, became their idol. They drew comparisons

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[4]Personal interview, June 30, 1970.

[5]Ibid.

between the problems and obstacles he had to face to help deliver Italy from a state of weakness and division, and their own problems. They were particularly impressed by Garibaldi's extraordinary courage, power of leadership and his determination to defend Rome, at a time when other "revolutionaries" were offering little resistance to the return of the old regime. They likened their tasks to that of Garibaldi's "Red Shirts".[6] The masses clamored for a decisive break with the past and the Italian experience seemed to provide guides for action.

In Guiseppe Mazzini the revolutionary Italian leader they found another example. They read him in depth studying his activities as a member of the patriotic secret society, the Carbonari, and as founder of Young Italy. From their reading of the Carbonari they learned the use of pseudonyms, passwords and other essential features of clandestine organizations. The experience of Young Italy confirmed their convictions that the means to be used for the fulfillment of their national objectives were education and armed struggle.[7] Furthermore, Mazzini's stress on the unifying virtures of nationalism and his repudiation of class struggle had a lasting effect on the Kata'ibists.[8]

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[6]Ibid.

[7]Interview with Hani al-Hindi, June 30, 1970.

[8]Interview with Jihad Dhahi, June 30, 1970.

Likewise the Kata'ibists were impressed by the statesmanship of Cavour and Bismarck who gave clear priority to the issue of national unification over that of constitutional reforms and thus succeeded in combatting the forces that checked the national development of Italy and Germany. Doubtless the union issue which occupied the thinking of the founding leaders of the Kata'ib was substantially nourished by Pan-Germanism and Italian unification.[9]

Some of the leaders of the Kata'ib, especially the Egyptians among them, had prior experience with Ahmed Husayn's Green Shirts.[10] It was, therefore, not unnatural that these leaders would introduce the ideological doctrines and organizational structure of their former paramilitary youth organization which was modelled after the S. A. and the Fascist phalanges. Indeed in choosing their strategy and tactics, the Kata'ib leaders have copied from Ahmed Husayn's program and fundamental principles. Beside other things the Kata'ib adopted the organizational framework of the Green Shirts apparatus which was particularly useful for clandestine combat. Following the footsteps of the Green Shirts the founding leaders of the Kata'ib started to build their own armed units based on a system of vertical links and very strict discipline.

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[9]Ibid.

[10]Al-Hindi, loc. cit.

It goes without saying that the Kata'ib was influenced by many ideas propagated by Ahmed Husayn. But whereas Ahmed Husayn emphasized the fatherland in terms of Egypt, the Kata'ib was an Arab organization of wider scope. To this extent the Kata'ib had a supra-national dimension and pretension. In fact the Kata'ib recruited among its members militants from Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Egypt.[11]

It is true that other influences entered into the formation of the Kata'ib, in particular the retreat of the "old Guard" nationalists parties and the increasing strength of some militant parties whose ideologies were considered prejudicial to the Arab cause by the Kata'ibists such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, this was of little significance to the young radicals who plunged into clandestine revolutionary groups immediately after the defeat of 1948. It is this author's assumption that none of the founding leaders of the Kata'ib was concerned at the time with playing politics let alone competing with existing parties. The Kata'ib was envizaged by its founders as a sort of "pressure group" whose function was to bring pressure on the ruling elite, by intimidation if necessary, so as to reject any peace with the State of Israel as a first step, and prepare for another Jawlah [round] to liquidate that state.[12] They were convinced that

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[11]Interview with George Habash, June 24, 1970.

[12]Dhahi, loc. cit.

nothing is to be achieved by the protests and demonstrations
of the opposition parties. Hence they envisaged that nothing
could work better than acts of violence against the
defeatists and collaborators in the ruling elite.
Hani al-Hindi later recalled:

> We were naive to believe that it takes only a few
> bullets in the heads of King Abdulla and other
> traitors to engender a revolutionary situation.
> However, the group was ready to make use of any
> weapon which might serve to develop to a greater
> degree the spirit of defiance on the part of our
> people.[13]

So the story goes that in those fateful years and
by shear coincidence three small groups each comprising a
handful of young Arab radicals were plunged into clandestine
revolutionary activities of the same nature.[14] The first
group consisted wholly of young revolutionary intellectuals
who were either students or recent graduates of the American
University of Beirut. This group genuinely represented the
unity of the Arabs in their struggle against Zionism in the
sense that it included militants from several Arab states.
They were bourgeois by formation, yet revolutionaries by
conviction. The two main leaders of this group were
George Habash and Hani al-Hindi. They succeeded in forming
the Kata'ib in their own image. Habash had apparently been
overflowing with an inborn exuberant energy when he joined
the American University of Beirut as a medical student. He

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[13]Al-Hindi, loc. cit.

[14]Unless stated otherwise, all the facts in the
following paragraphs of this section are based on state-
ments made by Habash, Al-Hindi and Dhahi in the above
interviews.

was always the first in his class, yet he was also an activist and a student leader. When the Arab-Israeli War broke out he did not hesitate to join forces with the irregular Palestinian army. One of the grave problems he had to face was to tend patients he was ill-equipped to handle. Though he was still a medical student he treated his patients sympathetically making their sufferings his own. "It was a depressing and desperate task" later he recalled. When Habash returned to the University after the war, his friends noticed that he was not anymore the happy young man they used to know. Indeed he was less concerned with their conventional pursuits which provided little or no sacrifice. He was astir with new ideas that he wanted to expound. In Hani al-Hindi he found a man who needed a cause, a cause exacting sacrifice; and once they got together the plan for the future terrorist organization was spelled out.

In tracing the roots of the ANM the author has found the background of Hani al-Hindi very illuminating. He was born in 1927 in Baghdad where his father, Liet. Col. Mahmoud al-Hindi, a Syrian, was serving with the Iraqi army. Hani was raised in an intensely nationalistic home. In the best Arab tradition, Col. al-Hindi, a zealous nationalist, wanted to build Hani in his own image. Thus at an early state Hani was acquainted with the ideas of Arab nationalism. Furthermore, Hani was carried by his father's revolutionary activities against the British and the monarchy to experience,

at a very early age, the ups and downs of the revolutionary
movement. When his father was expelled from the Iraqi army
following the abortive coup of 1941, Hani moved with his
family to Damascus. Upon completion of his secondary school
at the National College, Shwafat (Lebanon) he joined the
American College at Aleppo, Syria. Though only a young man
of 19, Hani distinguished himself as a serious and industrious
student admired and respected by his fellow students. His
friends were impressed by his former experiences in Iraq.
Hani's knowledge of the Arab national movement in general
and of Iraqi politics in particular was "just great",
according to Dr. Nadim al-Bitar, then a fellow student at
the American College.[15] It is believed that Hani's "vivid
reminiscence" of the Arab national movement in Iraq and the
activities of the Arab officers there have induced many
students who were excited by his stories to join his group
of activists on campus. Jihad Dhahi, one of Hani's class-
mates admits that he among others was inspired by Hani's
enthusiasm and devotion for the Arab cause. "We were
undoubtedly indebted to Hani, whose faith, eloquence, and
personal example cast a spell on us all."

It was only natural that a man of the above stature
would not hesitate to interrupt his studies in order to serve
his cause. Indeed Hani was the first among his group to volunteer

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[15]Statement by Dr. Nadim al-Bitar, personal
interview, July 28, 1968.

for service with the irregular Arab forces when the Arab-Israeli War broke out. On the battleground he discovered how unserious the Arab leaders were and how inefficient their divided armies were. Being single-minded and resolute in his patriotism, Hani would not give up after the humiliating defeat of the Arabs. In fact, he was determined now more than ever that the Arabs could and should win the next jawlah.

It was on the campus of the American University of Beirut that George Habash and Hani al-Hindi began to sort out their plans for the organization of a terrorist group. Their minimal program included the assassination of those Arab leaders who were conciliatory in their attitude towards the new state of Israel such as King Abdullah of Jordan and Nouri al-Sa'id, then Prime Minister of Iraq; the attack on Zionist and Western interests; and the sabatage of the armistice with Israel. They did not think of themselves as adventurers, but a vanguard when they took it upon themselves to arouse public opinion by "deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice" which would focus attention on the Palestinian problem.

In the meantime the disappointment of the Arab youth in the Arab regimes were greatly enhanced by the failure of the League of Arab States to pull together its member states in order to cope with the Israeli threat. As the Arab youth encountered the stubborn resistence of the Arab regimes to

any such development, they turned to more radical paths. These were the circumstances in which Habash and al-Hindi started recruiting members for their conspiratorial organization.

By the end of 1948 the above group was all set for immediate action when al-Hindi discovered through his contacts in Syria that two similar groups were founded in Damascus. The first included Jihad Dhahi, al-Hindi's friend and classmate at the American College of Alleppo. The second was found by some Egyptian political refugees. The Beirut-based group thought it might be wise to hold themselves from engaging in any violent acts until they pull together the three groups. Al-Hindi was asked to enter into discussions with the other two groups aiming at pooling the resources of the three groups into one formidable organization.

Al-Hindi did not find any significant differences between his group and the "Syrian Group". The latter, not unlike the Beirut-based group, consisted almost exclusively of young militants in their early twenties, most of whom were students at the Syrian University. Their founding leaders were all Syrians, none of whom had a working-class origin. They belonged to the middle and lower middle classes. Their revolutionary convictions coincided with the birth of Israel. They were too proud to acknowledge defeat. Their organization was, therefore, a commitment

on their part to challenge the Israeli threat. Needless to say that this group was more than willing to merge their forces with the Beirut-based group.

The next move in the process of regrouping the terrorist organizations was somewhat more difficult. Al-Hindi was dealing now with professional terrorists who had had previous experience in Egypt. It is this fact that made the "Egyptian Group" the whole more important to the amateur terrorists of the former two groups. Al-Hindi approached this group through Husayn Tawfiq, a young terrorist who had been accused of the murder of a former Egyptian Minister, 'Uthman Amin'.[16] Husayn was a single-minded patriot who felt ill at ease with men of ideas. Al-Hindi had a hard time convincing him of the need to work out a political program for the prospective organization. Instead he proposed a series of projects to be undertaken jointly by the combined forces of the three groups. The discussions between the two dragged on for sometime until it was decided that a joint meeting between the representatives of the three groups should be called to resolve the differences.

The representatives of the three groups met in March 1949. Al-Hindi and Habash represented the Beirut-based group, Jihad Dhahi represented the "Syrian Group"

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[16]Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 98.

and Husayn Tawfiq represented the "Egyptian Group". All
pending issues were resolved and a new leadership of three:
Al-Hindi, Dhahi, and Husayn were elected and empowered to
take the necessary steps to unite the three groups under the
name of Kata'ib Al-Fida' Al-'Arabi. This leadership was
later enlarged to include George Habash and Abdul Kader Amer.
The latter had been accused of throwing grenades at the
British Club in Alexandria, he escaped with his companions,
Mustafa Kamal al-Thafrawi and Abdul Rahman Marsi, from jail
and all three took refuge in Syria.

The Kata'ib adopted the political program of the
Beirut-based group stressing the issues of Arab unity and
the liberation of Palestine as its ultimate objectives.
The "Egyptian Group" which was more experienced in
clandestine activities provided the new organization, as
mentioned earlier, with a set of tools and organizational
concepts that proved to be invaluable.

It took the new leadership about four months before
it could launch its first attack. On August 5, 1949, armed
men of the Kata'ib unfortunately attacked a synagogue in
Damascus killing 12 and injuring 27. It was believed that
the Kata'ib carried out its assault on the synagogue to
protest the Palestine peace negotiations conducted by the
United Nations Conciliation Commission in Lausanne,
Switzerland. The leadership of the Kata'ib had ordered
the bombing on the assumption that the outrage would perhaps
check the Lausanne peace negotiations, Syria's provisional

negotiations regarding the settlement of Palestinian refugees and the other developments that had indicated that the period of conflict was drawing to an end.[17] Later the Kata'ib claimed that one of the reasons for staging the attack on the Syrian Synagogue was that the latter was used as a meeting place for an underground Zionist organization and for hiding weapons.[18]

On November 6, 1949, Liet. Col. W. F. Stirling, a correspondent of The Times and former British political agent for tribal affairs was attacked at home by the Kata'ib men and wounded in the chest.[19] The Kata'ib leadership explained the attempted murder on the grounds that Liet. Col. Stirling was one of the most important British intelligence officers in Syria during the Hinnawi regime.[20]

Other acts of violence committed by the Kata'ib include the placing of bombs in an alliance school in Beirut at the same time the Syrian Synagogue was bombed and for apparently the same reasons; the throwing of hand grenades more than once at the United States and British legations in both Damascus and Beirut as an expression of

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[17]Albian Boss, "Syrian Synagogue Bombed", The New York Times, August 7, 1949, p. 1.

[18]Al-Hindi, loc. cit.

[19]Seale, loc. cit.

[20]Al-Hindi and Dhahi, loc. cit.

growing hostility towards the Western powers; and the
bombing of the United Nations Works and Relief headquarters
in Damascus for its endeavors to resettle the Palestinian
refugees in the Arab states. Plans for the assassination
of King Abdullah and Prime Minister Nouri al-Sa'id, who
were held responsible for the defeat of the Arab armies
more than other leaders, never materialized.

All of the above ventures were agreed upon unanimously
by the Kata'ib leadership as legitimate targets within the
scope of the organization. However, by the summer of 1950
a struggle had developed within the organization concerning
the role of violence in the national struggle. Husayn Tawfiq,
Abdul Kader Amer and the other Egyptian terrorists who had
a history replete with various kinds of violence insisted
that the Arab masses were not ready for revolution and would
not be for years to come. "In these circumstances", they
figured, "the only appropriate and available means of struggle
is political violence." The other members of the group agreed
that the masses were not ready for revolution but refused to
rely completely on conspiratorial methods. Instead, they
wanted to raise the consciousness of the masses so as to take
their part in the struggle for their liberation. In fact,
they have resorted to violence only to dramatize the political
issues at stake. They sought to awaken the masses by setting
an heroic example. "We did not intend to replace the movement
of the masses by a handful of conspirators" insisted

Dr. George Habash. To prove this, Dr. Habash confessed that at one point he approached Michel Aflaq, the Ba'th leader, with the idea of accepting the Kata'ib as the armed arm of the Party. "We wanted to give the Ba'th teeth but its leadership turned us down. Aflaq asked us to join the party first and only then he would entertain our suggestions!"[21] Having observed the futility of political action through the channels of a system where the rules of the game have been set to perpetuate the men in power, the Kata'ib refused to dissolve itself.

The conflict between the main body of the Kata'ib and the Egyptian faction came to a climax when the latter group was induced by some Syrian politicians to plan the assassination of Col. Adib Shishakli and Akram al-Hourani. The majority of the Kata'ib leadership was alarmed by the misdirection and naiveté of their fellow partners. They rejected the suggestion off hand and called upon those who made the arrangements with the Syrian politicians to account for their undisciplined conduct. Indeed they believed that such indiscriminate acts of terror would endanger their cause and render their organization reckless and self-destructing. In the face of this opposition, the Egyptian faction of professional terrorists withdrew from the mother organization in order to be free to practice their

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[21]Based on personal correspondence between Dr. George Habash and the author.

"philosophy" which called for "violence for the sake of violence". Few months later they executed their plan to assassinate Col. Shishakli. The abortive attempt on the life of the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army lead to the uncovering of the underground organization.[22]

THE INFANT MOVEMENT: 1951-1954

It is hardly to be denied that the _Kata'ib_ did succeed as an agitational device in focussing greater public attention on the Palestinian problem. Furthermore, it helped to a certain extent, in checking the demoralizing effects of the defeat of the Arab armies in Palestine. Apart from that, its achievements had not been up to the expectations of its founding leaders. The attempt of the break-away splinter group on the life of Col. Shishaki was indeed suicidal not only to that group but also to the mother organization which was exposed to the police as a result of a full confession by Husayn Tawfiq who was one of the men arrested and charged with the attempt on the life of Col. Shishakly.[23]

It was a new and painful experience for the few remaining leaders who escaped the watching eyes of the police to cope with the new situation. For one thing, terrorist politics demands a high level of secrecy and with the

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[22]Seale, loc. cit.

[23]"Syria Accuses 21 of the Terrorist Acts", _The New York Times_, November 13, 1950, p. 11.

organization's apparatus exposed to the police they could hardly make any move. Therefore, they had to choose between two alternatives: either to start building the organization anew or to switch from terrorist politics to mass struggle. The issue was finally settled in favor of the latter against the protests of a couple adventurers who still insisted that reprisals should be carried against the oppressive authorities.[24] It is significant to note here that George Habash was the first among his companions to repudiate the old line once he preached. It is believed that this change of heart did not come all of a sudden. Habash was having some second thoughts about the activities of the Kata'ib as early as Summer 1950. In one of the meetings of the leadership, according to Jihad Dhahi, Habash complained that the movement was making only little headway among the masses. Indeed he went so far as to ask if there was not opportunity for greater success by other means.[25]

It was only natural with the underground organization exposed and the hard core militants detained that George Habash should repudiate terrorist adventurism in favor of the organization of mass struggle. By no means all of the Kata'ibists went that route. The political views of the adventurers pulled them in a different direction which need not concern

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[24]Statement by anonymous, personal interview, June 28, 1970.

[25]Statement by Jihad Dhahi, personal interview, December 28, 1968.

us here. The important thing to know is that the activities of the <u>Kata'ib</u> came to a halt after the abortive attempt on the life of Col. Shishakli and the organization was altogether dissolved later in 1950.

With the disintegration of the <u>Kata'ib</u>, George Habash was all set for the organization of mass struggle. The campus of the American University of Beirut became once again his workshop. There he was known and respected for his deeds, and there were a number of old friends whom he could trust and depend on. Indeed in a matter of a few weeks he succeeded in establishing the desired contacts to enter one of the most heated campaigns for the election of the Executive Committee of <u>Jam'iyat al-Urwah al-Wathqa</u> (henceforth, <u>al-Urwah</u>).* To the surprise of everyone, George Habash and his team of Arab Nationalists outran both the Communists and the Syrian Nationalists. From there on Habash was to be watched for his iron-bound determination to build an effective political organization.

There were several important groups operating on the campus of the American University during the period the Arab Nationalists started their activities. First of all there were the Communist students, a well-organized and disciplined group. The Arab Nationalists entertained for some time the idea of making a common front with this group. They were impressed by the leading role played by the Iraqi Communists in the 1948 national uprising which forced the resignation

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*<u>Al-Urwah al-Wuthqa</u> [The Firm Bond] was established in the early thirties as a literary association but was later turned into a national society.

of Salih Jabr and the abolition of the Portsmouth Treaty.[26]
Moreover, their interest in change was stirred by the smashing
success of the Communists in China. Hence they saw in the
Communists a revolutionary force that should not be ruled out
of the national struggle. On this premise the Arab
Nationalists entered into discussions with the Communists
with the objective of working out a formula for cooperation.
However, the discussions broke out very soon because the
Communist group would not waver on the Palestinian problem.
Following the official line of the Communist parties the
Communist students were all in favor of the United Nations
Partition Plan. The Arab Nationalists who were adament on
this issue could hardly find any common ground to share with
the Communists.[27]

The Syrian Social Nationalists were the second most
important group on campus. The Arab Nationalists ruled out
the possibility of working with this group off-hand. They
regarded the doctrine of Syrian nationalism as utterly
incongruent with their national ideology. In fact they
viewed Syrian nationalism as the most "sinister" manifestation
of racial and cultural anti-Arab thought [Shu'ubiyah] which
threatens the drive of the Arabs toward total unity.[28]

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[26]See Walter Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1956), p. 193.

[27]Statement by Dr. George Habash, personal interview, June 24, 1970.

[28]See Labib Zuwiyya Yamak, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 3.

The Ba'thists were the third significant group on campus. It was only natural that the Arab Nationalists would join forces with this like-minded group. But the Arab Nationalists had their own misgivings about the Ba'th. In the first place, the Arab Nationalists were impressed with the need to formulate their own policies and tactics with direct reference to the Palestinian problem. They wanted to give the union issue a priority in the order of things. Palestine was lost because of the weakness and division of the Arab states. It was only natural for those who wanted to challenge the Israeli threat to seek strength through union. Albeit the Ba'thists did not respond favorably to the Arab Nationalists demand that the national struggle should be first concentrated on the union issue. They insisted that the issue of socialism was equally important and therefore a combined action against both foreign influence and local exploiters should be carried at one and the same time.[29]

The Arab Nationalists were also disturbed about the increased involvement of the Ba'thists in the local politics of the Arab states. The full entry of the Syrian Ba'th into parliamentary politics angered the Arab Nationalists who did not believe that anything fruitful would come out of the

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[29]Nessim Rejwan, "Arab Nationalism in Search of an Ideology", in Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), The Middle East in Transition (New York: Praeger, 1958), pp. 155-157.

discredited parliamentary system. By taking part in those "facade institutions", the Ba'th, in the view of the Arab Nationalists, was doing a disservice to the revolutionary cause. It was only diverting those who should know better from the difficult work of reaching people, organizing them and building with them a solid movement of struggle.[30] The Arab Nationalists have also noted the fundamental incompatibility of socialism with the Ba'th liberal doctrine. There can be no socialism in the Arab World, they claimed, until the landlords and the bourgeoisie have been decisively crushed.[31]

Although the Ba'th represented a radical departure from previous national parties in terms of organizational structure, the Arab Nationalists still did not think that the Ba'th has really solved the organizational crises of the Arab national movement. They could easily point to more than one faction within the party. Indeed the Ba'th had more than its share of divisions based upon both ideological and personal geographical factors. Besides the "main school", or the "national school" of Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar there was a Marxist faction led by Jamal Atasi and a Jordanian faction led by Abdulla al-Rimawi.[32] These divisions

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[30] Opinion expressed by Dr. George Habash in a training course for the advanced members of the ANM, December 22, 1959.

[31] Ibid.

[32] The Administration Committe, ANM, "Ta'mim Houl al-Tatawurat al-Akhirah Fi Hizb al-Ba'th" [Circular About the Latest Developments in the Ba'th], September 1959, pp. 1-4.

undermined the authority of the party leadership. Hence the party failed to set an example of superior performance in work and in the fulfillment of political tasks.

Finally, the Arab Nationalists were suspicious of the personality cult practiced by the Ba'thists. They believed, not incorrectly, that the glorification of any leader would inevitably push the people and the party into the background. The Arab Nationalists were also suspicious of Aflaq's attempt to raise the Ba'th to the dignity of an end in itself.[33] They insisted that the party or any organization for that matter should remain in the domain of ways and means.

Having observed the above drawbacks in the Ba'th, the Arab Nationalists finally decided to form their own independent organization. George Habash took the initiative early in 1951 to propose to the members of the Executive Committe of al-Urwah that a new nationalist organization be set in secret and, that the Executive Committee of al-Urwah be its nucleus. Everyone in the group responded favorably to the proposal.[34] They had all felt the need to establish a clandestine revolutionary organization to carry on the fight outside and against the established order for the achievement of the national objectives.

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[33]See Michel Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'th [Toward Resurrection], (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1959), p. 299.

[34]Hani al-Hindi who was then serving a prison term for his activities in the Kata'ib joined the group upon his release from prison in May 1951.

The new movement had neither sufficient ideological preparation before its foundation nor adequate time after its foundation for theoretical study as it immediately plunged itself into the organization of mass struggles. As such the new movement and its leadership have run into many difficulties in their work, and have taken quite a few unnecessary detours. In the first place, the founding leaders, under the pressure of circumstances, hastely formulated a political program divided into two phases. The first phase was that of the political struggle which would eliminate Zionism and imperialism from the Arab World and create a united Arab state embracing the Arab people from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. The second phase would be that of a socio-economic struggle which would usher in "Arab socialism" and democracy.[35] This simplistic program failed to appease the prevalent craving for an "Arab ideology", and demonstrated the immaturity and weakness of the new movement.[36] The Ba'thists among others were especially critical about having the struggle divided into distinct phases one leading to the other. They insisted that the political and social objectives could not be achieved apart from each other, and as such the fight should be carried at the same time on two fronts externally, against Zionism and imperialism, and internally,

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[35]Al-Hakam Darwaza and Hamed al-Jibouri, Ma'a al-Qawmiyah al-Arabiyah [With Arab Nationalism], (Beirut: Dar al-Fajr al-Jadid, 1960), pp. 178-186.

[36]Rejwan, op. cit., p. 157.

against the traditional political and social structures and their defenders.[37]

It is obvious that the Arab Nationalists have adopted an idealist ideology that was peculiary vulnerable and open to criticism on the score of self-contradiction and of failure to reckon with the objective facts of the Arab situation. In their enthusiasm to achieve the political goals, they failed to see what social forces must be organized and what opponents they would have to defeat. No wonder that Muhsin Ibrahim, a former leader, admits that the Arab Nationalists had no conception of the laws of social change at this time.[38]

Furthermore, the evolution and development of the above ideology did not proceed according to a preconceived plan. It was conditioned by a number of exceptional historical circumstances beyond the control of the founding leaders. After the initial cadres had accustomed themselves to withstand the attacks of a constellation of political forces, including the Ba'th, the Arab Nationalists began to adjust themselves to the objective facts of the political struggle. As early as 1954, the Arab Nationalists have been at great pains to show that their two-phase program was misunderstood because of the mechanical separation envisioned between the political phase and the social phase. Instead

[37]See Munif al-Razzaz, Limatha al-Ishtirakiyah al-An? [Why Socialism Now?].

[38]Muhsin Ibrahim (ed.), Limatha Munathmat al-Ishtira-kiyeen al-Lebnaniyeen?, [What for is the Organization of the Lebanese Socialists?], (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1970), pp. 17-18.

they suggested an interlocking relationship between the two phases where the first phase would permit the national movement to strive for economic and social reforms while still emphasizing the political struggles.[39] They went one step further following the formation of the union between Egypt and Syria. They approved Nasser's preoccupation with the economic and social transformation of the United Arab Republic on the understanding that the Egyptian-Syrian union was to be the nucleus of the future unified Arab state and as such the new society of the U.A.R. should evolve to appeal to the Arab people everywhere for its positive attractions. The ANM was to remain faithful to its two-phase program elsewhere where the main character-istics of struggle would still be political.[40] However, it repudiated that program altogether after the setback of September 1961, when Syria broke away from the U.A.R. with the encouragement of the bourgeoisie whom the Arab Nationalists did not want to alienate in the first phase of their political program.[41]

The founding leaders of the incipient movement had the good fortune to find a number of the American University

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[39]ANM, "al-Marhalah al-Qawmiyah al-Hadhirah wa Ahdafuha" [The Present National Phase and its Objectives], pp. 1-4.

[40]ANM, "Al-Marhaliyah 'ala Dhou' al-Tatawirat al-akhirah Fi al-Bilad al-Arabiyah", [The Two-Phase Program in the Light of the Latest Development in the Arab Countries], pp. 1-4.

[41]The Political Bureau, ANM, "Al-Taqrir al-Siyasi", [The Political Report], 1961, pp. 1-10.

students ready and willing to participate in their political activities. Most of these had been active participants in the study groups of Dr. Constantine Zurayk, the distinguished professor at the American University of Beirut. Dr. Zurayk, a "consulting done to a whole generation of nationalists",[42] started in 1947 to hold discussion circles for the university students. In these discussion circles, Dr. Zurayk expounded his ideas on nationalism and the Arab national movement. The students who attended these circles got a better understanding of the rise and development of the Arab national movement. They became especially aware of the Zionist threat to which Zurayk addressed himself in his classical work Ma'na al-Nakba,[43] which appeared in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. Dr. Zurayk favored an almost complete scrapping of traditional culture and the substitution of Western culture in its scientific aspects. He called upon his students to work for the creation of a unified Arab state. He also urged them to place their faith in a dedicated _elite_ to bring about the required transformation in Arab society.[44] As Dr. Zurayk confined himself to

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[42]See Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 309.

[43]See R. Bayly Winder (trans.), The Meaning of Disaster, by Constantine K. Zurayk (Beirut Khayat's College Book Cooperative, 1956).

[44]The information on Zurayk's circles is based on the author's personal interviews with a number of A.U.B. graduates who insisted that their names should not be revealed.

the expounding of his nationalist doctrines with no attempt

on his part to engage his students in political activities,

the Arab Nationalists seized the initiative to invite the

more energetic and promising participants in the discussion

circles to take part in their political activities.

In the course of the next few months and before the

end of the university year, the Arab Nationalists started

their own study groups and enrolled many of Zurayk's

students who have proved, in the meanwhile, to be serious

and active. The Arab Nationalists did not confine them-

selves only to explaining the ideas of Arab nationalism to

those who attended their study groups but also engaged them

in the political struggle. Everyone belonging to these

groups was expected to be an active member in al-Urwah and

to take a leading part in its activities. Everyone was

also expected to participate in other political activities

conducted by the Arab Nationalists.[45]

It is pertinent to recall here that Dr. Zurayk

acted as the advisor to the Executive Committee of al-Urwah

during the year 1950-1951, and as such he was in close con-

tact with the founding leaders of the movement. His

influence must have been great on the Arab Nationalists

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[45]Unless otherwise pointed out, the information on
the formative years of the ANM is based mainly on the author's
personal interviews with Dr. George Habash, June 24, 1970;
Hani al-Hindi, June 22, 1970; Dr. Wadi' Haddad, June 21, 1970;
Dr. Ahmed al-Khatib, November 12, 1968 and Hamid al-Jibouri,
March 6, 1968 and other members of the original leadership
who wished their names to be kept in secret.

youth at this time. Indeed his collected essays on al-Wa'y al-Qawmi [National Consciousness] and his work on Ma'na al-Nakbah [The Meaning of the Disaster] were a must on the list of readings in the study groups of the Arab Nationalists. Moreover, George Habash in his capacity as vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of al-Urwah often consulted Dr. Zurayk on the work of the society, but apart from that there is no evidence whatsoever that Dr. Zurayk commanded anything more than a moral authority on the Arab Nationalists. It is very important to emphasize this point on the relation-ship between Dr. Zurayk and the founding leaders of the ANM because it has been often said that the latter movement was an outgrowth of a former nationalist organization, Jama'at al-Qawmiyeen al-Arab [The Arab Nationalists Group] which Dr. Zurayk helped organize in the later 1920's. It is beyond the scope of the present dissertation to trace the development of this group. It is, however, pertinent to recall that Jama'at al-Qawmiyeen al-Arab have played an important role in the establishment of more than one nationalist organization such as the Arab Party of Palestine and the influencial League of National Action whose impact on the Arab national movement was discussed in the first chapter.

Ali Naser al-Din, one of the original leaders of the League of National Action entered more intimately into the life of the Arab Nationalists at this time. So far as the power of example went, his was perhaps the most effective

single influence exerted by any "outsider" on the political
development of the movement in its infancy stage. In
Naser al-Din the Arab Nationalists saw a man of high intel-
lectual honesty and intense moral austerity who practiced
what he preached with effortless consistence and with the
serenity of disinterested conviction. His preoccupation
with the Arab cause in general and the Palestinian problem
in particular made him their favorite politician. They
listened to him earnestly and longed for his advice. In
fact, this author is led to assume, on the basis of mounting
evidence, that Naser al-Din acted as the "spiritual guide"
to the Arab Nationalists in the early 1950's. It is
believed that he incited the Arab Nationalists in those
early years to support and endorse any plan for Arab unity
irrespective of the forces working for such plans.
Following Naser al-Din's counsel the Arab Nationalists
did not object to the British sponsored "Greater Syria" and
the "Fertile Crescent" plans on the assumption that should
such plans materialize they would hasten the elimination of
foreign influence by creating a formidable Arab state!![46]
It is also believed that Naser al-Din was the original
initiator of the movement's sponsored campaign to boycott

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[46] See Akram Zu'ayter, "Fi Mawdou' al-Ittihad"
[About the Unification Question], a series of articles
published in al-Ra'i, April 26, May 17 and May 24, 1954.

foreign goods which singled out the Arab Nationalists as the most fanatic group on the campus of the American University of Beirut.

Without doubt Naser al-Din's example and precept were behind the founding leaders' attempt to create a close community impermeable to outside influences. It is significant to note that the establishment of such a community have helped develop l'esprit de corps among the Arab Nationalists more than anything else. No wonder that many "old timers" look back with pride to those formative years when every Arab Nationalist was "a crusader in the purification of national life".[47] The founding fathers of the movement strived to create a better community for their followers. In fact they aspired to develop a model to be employed as a guide for planning work on a larger scale. In other words they likened their small "community of believers" to that of the future Arab society. They envisioned every member in the movement as a model for the future Arab-citizen. "We should practice what we preach" demanded a directive issued by the Arab Nationalists' leadership in the early days of the movement.[48]

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[47]Statement by Thabet Mahayni, personal interview, November 11, 1968.

[48]"Ma'alim al-Hayat al-Hizbiyah al-Selimah" [The Features of the Correct Party Life], p. 1.

This was, in barest outline, the impact of Ali Naser al-Din on the Arab Nationalists in their early beginnings. It is essential at this point to present the main characteristics of the movement as it took shape at this time:

1. A Doctrinal Movement -- The Arab Nationalists based their foundation on the "doctrine" of Arab nationalism. This should not give the impression that the Arab Nationalists owned a theory based on carefully worked out principles. Far from that, the Arab Nationalists at this time had nothing more than a nationalist outlook as opposed to class outlook. But they were aware of the need for a theory to guide their actions.[49] Several studies were undertaken by the founding leaders at this time but nothing more than a general account of the nature of the Arab World and of the Arab's place and destiny in history was produced.[50]

2. A Revolutionary Movement -- The Arab Nationalists believed in a complete and drastic change in the institutions of the Arab states. Therefore, they rejected piece-meal reforms and called for the overthrow of the ancien régime in its entirety.[51] A strong impetus to their revolutionary

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[49]ANM, Fi al-Tathqif al-Qawmi, [About the Nationalist Education] (Beirut: n.p., n.d.), pp. 107-108.

[50]See the editorials of al-Ra'i, April 26, May 31, June 7, 14, and 21, 1954.

[51]ANM, Fi al-Tathqif al-Qawmi, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

thinking had come when the ruling class and its State power
lost legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of people after
the humiliating defeat of the Arabs in Palestine.

3. An _Elite_ Group -- The Arab Nationalists have been
more or less an _élite_ group of students, intellectuals, and
petty-bourgeois elements in their early days. But in spite
of that they believed in the Arab masses as the force that
will carry on the struggle to its ultimate end. Thus they
sought to raise the consciousness of the masses, enhance
their energies and gulvanize them into action.[52]

4. A Monolithic Organization -- The Arab Nationalists
were adament on having a single and uniform organization
which speaks in one voice. Aware of the shortcomings of the
_Ba'th_ in this respect, the founding leaders emphasized the
importance of having a monolythic organization which pro-
hibits factions and insists on unity of action.[53]

THE ORGANIZATION FOR RESISTING
PEACE WITH ISRAEL

It would be well, before discussing the next move made
by the Arab Nationalists, to cast a retrospective glance at
the political fortunes of the Arab East in the years which
followed the Arab-Israeli War of 1948.

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[52]ANM, "Harakatuna" [Our Movement], p. 3.

[53]ANM, _Fi al-Tathqif al-Qawmi_, op. cit., pp. 111-113.

The period was one of general restlessness and confusion, punctuated by outbreaks of disturbance. In Iraq the opposition parties that proved their mettle in the 1948 national uprising were growing in strength and threatening the _ancien régime_. In Syria, the army which overthrew the civilian government in 1949 was setting a fashion for military intervention in politics. In Egypt, anti-British sentiment was intensified because of the failure to reach an agreement on the withdrawal of British forces from Egyptian soil. In Jordan, the Palestinians were getting restless under the autocratic rule of the old King. The whole area seemed unstable and the Arab people were clamouring for change.

The Arab Nationalists who have in the meanwhile built their hard core nucleus and succeeded in organizing many underground cells mostly among the students of the American University found the political climate especially appealing for the organization of mass struggles in the Fall of 1951. Working under the cover of _al-Urwah_ the Arab Nationalists organized a mass demonstration in support of Egypt when that country's Parliament abrogated the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty and called for the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone. As hundreds turned out to take part in that unlawful demonstration which involved serious clashes with the police, many members of the emerging movement were arrested and several of its student leaders were dismissed from the University.

Rather than subdue the Arab Nationalists, the above
measures prepared the stage for them to carry on their
political activities. Indeed they lost no time in inaugurating
a propaganda campaign alleging that the administration of the
American University was attempting to suppress Arab nationalist
opinion. Since the political climate in Lebanon as elsewhere
in the Arab World was essentially anti-West the agitation
against the above administration rallied larger segments of
the student body around the Arab Nationalists and strikes
broke out in that university and many other educational
institutions in Lebanon demanding the return of the expelled
students to the university. The administration had no
alternative but to back down and withdraw its disciplinary
measures against the students.

The Arab Nationalists were so excited by their success
in defying both the Lebanese authorities and the administration
of the American University that they decided to extend their
political activities far beyond the university campus. To
this end they engaged in propaganda and agitation among the
masses. They found in the Western attempt to organize a
Middle East defense organization a favorite target to arouse
public opinion at this time. In a public lecture sponsored
by al-Urwah, Dr. George Habash attacked the Western proposals
for the defense of the Middle East alleging that the concept
of an Allied Middle East Command was designed to preserve
Western dominance in the Middle East and to use the Arab

countries as pawns for Western purposes.[54] He also attacked

the proposals on the assumption that they were aimed at

diverting the Arabs from their main objective of liberating

Palestine and to force their acceptance of the status quo

with Israel. In answering the challenges of the cold war,

Dr. George Habash opted for "armed neutrality" by which he

reflected the desire of the militant nationalists not to

pursue a traditional policy of neutrality in which a state

would be content by merely withholding its power from others,

but a positive neutrality in which the state seeks to prevent

the extension of hostilities to its territory and be ready

to defend its territory by force of arms if the need arises.

This well-publicized lecture was part of an intensive campaign

directed by the Arab Nationalists against western positions

in the Arab World. In order to communicate their message to

the largest audience possible, the Arab Nationalists had to

put out leaflets setting forth their views on the important

national issues. They also made use of another medium to

deliver their messages: wall-writing.

By 1952 the Arab Nationalists had progressed far

enough to establish a front organization, Hay'at Muqawamat

al-Sulh Ma' Israel [The Organization for Resisting Peace

with Israel]. As its name implied, this organization was

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[54]See Dr. George Habash, Mashrou' al-Difa' al-Mushtaraq
[The Proposal for a Common Defense], (Beirut: al-Urwa al-
Wuthqa, n.d.).

intended to mobilize all forces against a peaceful settlement with the State of Israel. The establishment of this organization was deemed necessary in view of the efforts made at that time by both the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the United States government to resettle the Palestinian refugees in the neighboring Arab states by reclaiming arid land and establishing modern living conditions there. The Arab Nationalists have rejected such projects off-hand for two reasons:[55] First, they presuppose cooperation with Israel. Secondly, they would help to remove the tension across the borders between the Arab states and Israel.

The above organization found a way to wider circles by putting out an eight page weekly bulletin called al-Tha'r [The Vengeance]. This bulletin which became very popular especially among the Palestinian refugees took it upon itself to expose all efforts to make peace with Israel. It made a consistent effort to build up the Palestinian resistance against all and every program set for the improvement of the living conditions of the Palestinian refugees. It categorically rejected the Proposals of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East which under Chairman Gordon R. Clapp of the United States' T.V.A. came out with a detailed program early in 1950, of relief and public works in various Arab countries for the benefit of the Palestinian

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[55]Statement by Dr. Wadi' Haddad, personal interview, June 21, 1970.

refugees. It severely attacked British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison for his peace proposals, and later in 1953 it unequivocally rejected the proposals put forth by Mr. Eric Johnston, President Eisenhower's personal representative in the Middle East. Al-Tha'r insisted that Mr. Johnston's proposals for developing the irrigation and hydro electric resources of the Jordan Valley was designed to benefit the Israelis on the expense of the Palestinians.

It is beyond the scope of the present dissertation to explore in depth the above proposals. It is, however, pertinent to recall that the Arab Nationalists were concerned with the national rights of the Palestinians and as such they rejected all proposals that stopped short of dealing with their natural right to return to Palestine. In fact the Arab Nationalists were suspicious of any attempt to resettle the Palestinian refugees in the neighboring Arab states. They saw in these attempts "ulterior designs to liquidate the Palestinian problem".[56]

The Arab Nationalists efforts to mobilize the refugees and rally their opposition to the resettlement proposals was, again, testimony to the Habash leadership ability. At this time Wadi' Haddad, a Palestinian refugee from Safad who was then in his final year at the Medical College of the American University and one of the original leaders of the ANM used to spend his week-ends along with

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[56]See Ali Naser al-Din, Al-Tha'r aw Mahu al-'Ar [Vengeance or the Erasing of Disgrace], (Beirut: n.p., n.d.).

Dr. George Habash at the refugee camps in the outskirts of
Beirut or far away in Southern Lebanon. They used to take
care of the sick but more importantly they held political
discussions through the night with the front-rank refugees.
Among the latter group was Ahmed al-Yamani, who subsequently
became an outstanding leader in the ANM and its off-shoot
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Wadi' Haddad worked with diligence and perseverance
to show the Palestinian refugees that the battle against
the enemy can and should be won through the combined effort
of the Arabs. "The way to Tel Aviv", he used to tell them,
"is through Damascus, Baghdad, Amman and Cairo." By stating
the Strategy and tactics of the ANM in simple terms he was
inducing the Palestinian refugees to assimilate their
fortunes with the fortunes of the Arab masses and in fact
was calling upon the Palestinians, who were in a state of
disarray, to pull themselves together and to join the struggle
with the Arab revolutionaries against the corrupt political
order which was to blame in the first place for the loss of
Palestine.

In its role of resistance leader, the Organization
for Resisting Peace with Israel attracted to its ranks a
large number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. These new
recruits gave the Arab Nationalists the possibility of
expounding their activities. At the same time the integra-
tion of the Palestinian refugees in the ANM brought into the

organization fresh elements from the lower classes, hence
the radicalization of the movement.

Having established itself among Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon, the Organization for Resisting Peace with Israel
began to approach other Palestinians across the border.
Early in 1953 the organization dispatched a handful of
Palestinian activists to mobilize the Palestinian refugees
in Syria and Jordan. In a matter of few months they built
a number of clandestine cells to carry the work of the
organization in those countries. This step was, of course,
taken in co-ordination with the mother organization which
was then dispatching its own militants to neighboring Arab
states to expand its activities.

To sum up, it may be said that the Kata'ib was the
earliest precursor of the ANM. The Kata'ib was envisaged
by the forerunners of the ANM as a political weapon designed
to bring pressure on the Arab rulers, by terrorist
intimidation if necessary, in order to prepare for another
jawlah to liquidate the state of Israel. Having failed to
achieve their objectives by those unconventional means,
the future leaders of the ANM repudiated the terrorist
organization in favor of the organization of mass struggle.
The Urwah, a student organization on the campus of the
American University of Beirut, became their workshop during
this transitional stage. In the Urwah their vague and
general ideas on Arab nationalism and revolutionism were

developed and expounded, and their militant students found
an outlet to engage in political activities and mass
struggles.

Having established themselves among the student
body of the American University and other institutions,
the Arab Nationalists turned towards the Palestinian
refugees who were living in anger, despair, and humiliation
in Lebanon and other neighboring states. The ANM singled
out a number of its most active and experienced members
to mobilize the disgruntled Palestinian refugees against
a peaceful settlement with the state of Israel. The
Organization for Resting Peace with Israel was but a front
organization of the ANM which was especially concerned with
the plight of the Palestinians.

As the ANM spread to other Arab states, it felt
the pressure of a variety of political forces. However, it
was drawn into the orbit of Nasserism early in its develop-
ment. In the following chapter an attempt will be made to
draw the relationship between the ANM and the Nasser-led
revolution.

Chapter 3

THE JULY 23 REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT

ON THE ARAB NATIONALISTS MOVEMENT

The July 23 Revolution has been called by many Arab
nationalist groups, including the ANM, the mother revolution.
Indeed the impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the ends and
means of the Arab national movement was so great that every
national party with a pan-Arab objective had at one time or
another sought to ally its fortune to the fortune of the
Nasser-led revolution. The ANM in particular was immensely
influenced by the July 23 Revolution. However, its relation-
ship to this revolution did not run on one continuum, rather
it had its ups and downs. In this chapter an attempt will
be made to draw the relationships between the ANM and the
Egyptian Revolution through the different phases of their
development:

Phase I (1952-1954) -- The ANM hailed the overthrow
of the corrupt monarchy with its facade institutions and
welcomed the land reform measures decreed by the revolutionary
leaders soon after assuming power. However, it remained
skeptical of the Egyptian military leaders for the following
reasons:

1. Theoretically speaking the ANM was, at this time,
against all forms of military interference in politics. It

should be recalled that the Arab Nationalists had just repudiated terrorist adventurism in favor of the organization of mass struggle. This recent change of heart made them all the more adament on their stand. They feared the privileged position of the military élite in the state and furthermore they believed, not incorrectly, that once the military assumes power its activities can hardly be controlled.[1]

2. The ANM viewed with alarm what it considered to be a special relationship between the leadership of the Egyptian Revolution and the United States. This may be attributed to the excellent relations Ambassador Jefferson Caffery had established at this time with the new military leaders of Egypt.[2] Furthermore, the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954 was not to the liking of the ANM. In fact the ANM called the negotiated agreement a sell-out to the imperlialists.[3] It is to be remembered that this was taking place at a time when the CIA was especially concerned in the arrangement or rather rearrangement of political forces in

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[1]ANM, "Mawqifuna min al-'Askariyeen" [Our Attitude Towards the Military].

[2]Peter Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt (Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1965), p. 84.

[3]"Hukumat Masr Tusafi Mushkilat al-Jala'" [The Egyptian Government Liquidates the Evacuation Problem], al-Ra'i, August 9, 1954, p. 1.

the Middle East.[4] The Arab Nationalists had their doubts about the honesty of the Syrian Generals and Colonels who were then ruling Syria and were questioning the honesty of the Egyptian military rulers in turn.

3. The ANM was not at all impressed by the new rulers' emphasis on the internal problems of Egypt. They would rather have liked to see the new revolutionary leaders assume their responsibility in Arab politics early in the game. The Arab Nationalists were especially disturbed following the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement when it appeared as though the Egyptians were going to resign their duties toward their sister Arab states.[4]

4. The ANM, though not particularly keen on the preservation of the former political parties in Egypt, was not quite happy to see them dissolved by a government decree. The Arab Nationalists were all the more disappointed to learn that the alternative to the former political parties was a feable organization, the Liberation Rally, whose leadership was more or less an adjunct of the establishment.[6]

For the above reasons no healthy relationship could have developed between the ANM and the Egyptian Revolution. However, the Arab Nationalists remained on the whole reserved in their criticism of the Revolution. It is to be

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[4]See Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969).

[5]Al-Ra'i, loc. cit.

[6]Statement by Dr. George Habash, personal interview, July 16, 1967.

remembered that this was the formative years of the ANM whose minimal program then called for the alliance of all nationalist forces against the Western sponsored schemes to resettle the Palestinian refugees in the neighboring Arab states. As such the Arab Nationalists were concentrating their own forces and seeking the alliance of other parties in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan in the common struggle against the above schemes. Rather than open a new front with the military rulers of Egypt the Arab Nationalists confined themselves to the above struggle.

Phase II (1954-1958) -- This period in the history of the ANM can be described as the take-off period during which the activities of the Arab Nationalists spread to Amman, Damascus, Kuwait, Baghdad and Cairo. This was also the period during which the July 23 Revolution had developed from one of Egyptian national liberation and limited social objectives to one of wider scope and dimension. This was the period in which the July 23 Revolution stressed its Arabism and revolutionism by fighting for the liberation and unity of all the Arab countries.

Roughly speaking, the battle over the Baghdad Pact between Nasser and his supporters on one side and the powers initiating the defensive organization on the other side marked the beginning of a new era of understanding between the ANM and the Egyptian Revolution. It was the ANM which took the lead in the mid-fifties in attacking the U. S. initiated defensive arrangements for the Middle East. Upon

hearing that Iraq was being pressed to join the Turco-Pakistani pact the Arab Nationalists called upon the students of the American University and other institutions in Beirut to demonstrate against Iraq's participation in the military pact. Late in March 1954 hundreds of students marched from the campus of the American University to clash with the police which was blocking the university gates. Hassan Abu Isma'il, a militant member of the Progressive Socialist Party was killed and twenty-nine other students were hurt.[7] This incident had serious repercussions in the Lebanese National Assembly and the mass media were the government of Abdullah al-Yafi was strongly attacked for opening fire on a peaceful demonstration.

The American University expelled five of the student leaders who were held responsible for the whole affair. This disciplinary measure was taken in July 1954, that is during the summer vacation. However, when the University opened its gates for the Fall Semester, disturbances errupted once again by the ANM activists on campus, and this time the university authorities took the unprecedented measure of expelling seventeen students at one stroke.[8]

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[7] The New York Times, March 28, p. 6.

[8] Al-Ra'i, January 24, 1955, p. 1.

The above affair, that is the demonstration of the
Arab Nationalists against the Baghdad Pact and the expulsion
of their activists from the American University brought the
ANM closer to the young officers of Egypt. On the one hand,
Egypt was now hardening its position on the Western-initiated
defensive pacts and as such was seeking the alliance of all
revolutionary forces in its forthcoming battle against the
Baghdad Pact. On the other hand, the admittance of the
Arab Nationalists students, who were expelled from the
American University of Beirut, in the Egyptian universities
by order of Premier Nasser himself was greatly appreciated
by the ANM and its members.[9]

A number of the Arab Nationalists who were admitted
to Cairo University ranked high in the ANM's hierarchy.
As such, they were well-prepared to perform two important
tasks. First, they established a channel of communication
between the ANM and the Egyptian departments responsible for
Arab affairs. In time, these students had a better under-
standing of the workings of the Egyptian machinery which
they conveyed to their leadership. Second, they opened new
horizons for the ANM by recruiting a number of Arab students
from more than one Arab state. In the later 'fifties, the
ANM dispatched these students to build its organizations in

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[9]This and the information which appear in the following
paragraph is mainly based on the author's personal interviews
with two leading members who played an important role in the
activities of the ANM during the period under discussion,
July 17, 1967.

Libya, the Sudan, the Yemen and South Arabia. It goes without saying that the expulsion of the Arab Nationalists from the American University and the crack down on their hard-core militants had turned out to be beneficial for the ANM which may not have had the opportunity otherwise to build its bridges with the July 23 Revolution in such a short time.

Henceforth, the ANM was drawn closer and closer to the July 23 Revolution. Egypt's adoption of an uncompromising policy of neutralism; the Nasser arms deal with the USSR; the proclamation that Egyptians were "an Arab people" and part of a wider "Arab nation" in the constitution of 1956; and the nationalization of the Suez Canal following the withdrawal of the American offer of aid to build the Aswan Dam were landmarks in the history of the Egyptian Revolution. They were also the instruments which have brought up greater affinity between the ANM and Nasser-led revolution.[10] Indeed, the Arab Nationalists who were reserved in their appraisal of the Egyptian Revolution up to the mid-'fifties, turned fully in support of Nasser's leadership late in 1955, when they learned of the "Czech" arms deal.[11]

In the following years the Arab Nationalists found themselves, whether by design or sheer coincidence, fighting

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[10]Statement by al-Hakam Darwaza, personal interview, December 29, 1968.

[11]"Masr Tunhi Akhta' Arba'in 'Aman" [Egypt Ends the Mistakes of Forty Years], al-Ra'i, October 3, 1955, p. 1.

the same battles with the Nasser-led revolution. This was especially true in Jordan where the two parties fought together to win the Hashemite Kingdom for the Syrian-Egyptian camp which was heading for union.

Al-Ra'i, the official organ of the ANM, played an important role in propagating the ideas of the Arab Nationalists concerning a wide spectrum of issues including Arab unity, political freedoms and national action. Dr. George Habash, who was then the editor-in-chief of the weekly magazine, made it a special point to concentrate on the most pressing political issues. Thus, by attacking the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and by calling for its abrogation in practically every issue of the magazine, the message was well communicated and the paper became very popular among larger segments of the population. The Jordanian government could not stand that any more. Hence the magazine was suppressed in August 1955 after only eight months of publication. Nevertheless, it appeared after three months under the same name in Damascus calling for the destruction of the "reactionary regime" in Jordan.

The crack down on the Arab Nationalists in Jordan pushed militant elements in the movement to the fore and consequently led to the radicalization of the movement. Dr. George Habash went underground once again to direct the activities of the ANM and lead the struggle against the government in power.

The Jordanian opposition parties, including the ANM, found in the "Voice of the Arabs", a special radio program monitored from Cairo, a useful instrument in their political agitation against the government of Haza' al-Majali which was drawing Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. Without the "Voice of the Arabs" they could hardly have reached their potential supporters in Amman, Jerusalem, Jericha, Bethlehem, Hebron, etc. in those fateful days of December 1955, when thousands of demonstrators took the streets of the above cities, protesting the visit of General Sir Gerald Templer, the Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, who was presenting proposals involving the strengthening of Middle Eastern defense by Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact. The ANM and the other parties which took part in those mass demonstrations demanded the immediate resignation of Hazza' al-Majali and the formation of a national unity government. The King conceded to the first demand but wavered on the second. Later, the Jordanian Free Officers "advised" the King to accept the demands of the opposition parties as formulated in a popular conference held in December 1955. The King followed the advice of "his" officers. Early on March 2, 1956, the King issued a decree ' ordering the immediate dismissal on pension of Lieut. General John Bagot Glubb, the British Commander of the Jordanian Army. This was followed by the formation of a caretaker government to arrange for a new general election.

The ANM participated in the elections which were held in October 1956. Dr. George Habash and two other ANM candidates ran for the elections on a platform calling for the immediate abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and the elimination of all traces of foreign influence in Jordan. Their platform also called for total reform in economic and social life. In their election campaigns, they concentrated on the issue of Arab unity, which in their view was the panacea for all ills and problems confronting the small kingdom.[12]

The ANM did not fare well in the elections, as far as the results of the elections are concerned. But nevertheless, the occasion was a good opportunity to create new relations with the masses and make special effort to build up a grass root movement. This they did indeed demonstrate in the forthcoming days when unexpectedly the King dismissed the nationalist government of Sulaiman al-Nabulsi on April 10, 1957. Following the King's coup the ANM took the lead of the underground movement which stubbornly fought the King and his government for many months. To begin with, they participated in the national conference which was held in Nablus on April 22, 1957. Dr. George Habash was elected to the executive committee which included National Socialists, Ba'thists and Communists. The conference called

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[12]Habash, loc. cit.

for the rejection of the Eisenhower Doctrine; the upholding

of positive neutrality and the formation of a federation

with Egypt and Syria.[13]

The attempts by the opposition parties which

participated in the above conference to further their cause

by fomenting strikes and leading demonstrations against the

King's government led the King to invite his Bedoin

Legionaires to deal with the situation. Facing the ruth-

lessness of the Bedoins, many of the opposition leaders

resigned to their homes or escaped to Damascus or Cairo.

In these intolerable circumstances, the ANM proved its

mettle by turning to more violent paths in meeting the

challenge of the state. Its militants carried a well-drawn

plan of bomb throwing with the deliberate aim of keeping the

revolutionary spirit alive. The Arab Nationalists also

distributed leaflets and published an underground paper,

al-Sha'b Aqua [The People are Stronger], to focus greater

public attention on the resistance to the King's government.[14]

The activities of the ANM in Jordan especially its

stubborn resistance to the government following the dismissal

of the Nabulsi cabinet earned her the respect of larger

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[13]"Qararat al-Mu'tamar", [The Resolutions of the
Conference], al-Ra'i, April 29, 1957, p. 10.

[14]Al-Munadhil al-Thawry, [The Revolutionary Militant],
November 1957, p. 7.

segments of the population. Its exceptional deeds did not
pass unnoticed by the Egyptian, or for that matter, the
Syrian authorities. The latter took special interest in the
activities of the Arab Nationalists. Colonel Abdul Hamid
al-Sarraj, then the strongman of Syria, trained and equipped
members of the ANM from Syria, Lebanon as well as Jordan,
to join the underground movement against the Hashemite
monarchy of Jordan.[15]

As the Jordanian "battle" dragged on through 1958,
the Arab Nationalists were confronted by more urgent problems
elsewhere. In the first place, the emergence of the United
Arab Republic mobilized a host of political forces ranging
from the extreme left to the extreme right against the newly
created state. In the second place, the political conflict
over Lebanon's stand in Arab and world affairs was dangerously
dividing the Lebanese, and the country was on the verge of
civil war. These cardinal problems, in addition to some
lesser ones dealing with the situation in Iraq and Kuwait,
were the subject of serious discussions by the national
leadership of the ANM early in summer 1958. It was resolved
in the above discussions that Lebanon should be given the
priority over Jordan on the agenda of the national leadership
because of the deteriorating situation there. The ANM feared
that the government of the United States was trying to build
a pro-Western bloc against the United Arab Republic by
inducing Lebanon and Saudi Arabia to co-operate with Jordan

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[15]Statement by anonymous, personal interview,
July 21, 1967.

and Iraq. Thus the ANM switched its emphasis from Jordan to Lebanon. Again the move coincided with the shift in Nasser's strategies.

Phase III (1958-1961) -- The formation of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) in February 1958 initiated a new phase in the development of the Arab national movement. The emergence of a unitary state after many years of separate national existence was celebrated by all pan-Arab movements including the ANM. The latter hailed the event as a second Arab awakening and thus associated itself with the emerging unitary state.

The Arab Nationalists viewed the U.A.R. as the nucleus of a wider Arab national state that would create a better life for future generations. As such, they came to be the willing tools of the U.A.R. The national leadership of the ANM which moved its headquarters to Damascus early in 1958, found itself almost in complete harmony with the policies pursued by the unitary state.

The reorganization of the political institutions and the gradual extension of state control in the Northern Region (i.e., Syria) were favorably viewed by the Arab Nationalists as "measures designed to strengthen and pull together the new state".[16] Moreover, they regarded the decree of March 12, 1958 which dissolved all political

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[16]ANM, "al taqrir al-shahri" [The Monthly Report], June 1958, p. 2.

parties in the Northern Region as "an important step to build a viable political organization to defend the union".[17] The Arab Nationalists may have not been as naive as the Ba'thists have been in supporting the decree which brought an end to party life in Syria. After all they had very little to lose and much to gain. Unlike the Ba'th, the ANM never had the opportunity to build a grass root movement in Syria before the establishment of the Union. They were latecomers to the scene, and their general ideas did not attract more than a few high school and university students. With the dissolving of the Ba'th and the other major political parties, the Arab Nationalists dynamic youth could stand on a par with the elder politicians. Surprisingly, few of them rose to the higher organs of the newly found National Union.

If the domestic policy of the U.A.R. was favorable to the ANM, its Arab and foreign policy was even more so. Indeed the late 'fifties could be described as the heyday of the Arab Nationalists for they could depend on the support of the U.A.R. whether they were fighting the pro-West government of Sham'un in Lebanon or the Communist supported regime of Kassem in Iraq. Thanks to Col. Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj, the Arab Nationalists did not lack the weapons needed in those hot spots. Moreover, the Northern Region became a sanctuary and a training ground for ANM members from the neighboring Arab states.[18]

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[17]Ibid.

[18]Statement by Col. Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj, personal interview, June 28, 1970.

Following the lead of the U.A.R., the Arab Nationalists entered fully in the dispute between the pro-West government of President Sham'un and the pro-U.A.R. politicians who feared the reelection of Sham'un. In the ensuing civil war the Arab Nationalists singled out themseleves as a well-disciplined and organized group. Their organizations in the poor quarters of Beirut, Sidon and the port of Tripoli played an increasingly important role in the civil war as the battles against the government forces dragged on through the summer of 1958.

It was most unfortunate for the ANM to place their forces under the leadership of the traditional politicians, who were themselves part of the old establishment, for these politicians were inclined to accept a compromise, which they did, with the other faction of the establishment. Indeed the formula "no victor, no vanquished" reached by the major contenders in the civil war settled a "family affair" between the traditional leaders to the dissatisfaction of the ANM and its followers. It is believed that if it were not for the U.A.R., the Arab Nationalists would not have followed the lead of the traditional Lebanese politicians. Indeed the latter used them to settle their disputes with each other in the same way they used their own followers. Again, could the ANM have done otherwise? It is rather difficult to answer in the affirmative, for on the one hand, the Arab Nationalists were trained, equipped and supported by the U.A.R., and on the other hand, their followers were fighting for Nasser and

the U.A.R., and as such, they were conditioned to accept whatever Nasser accepted. But still not a few of ANM militants find reason to question the ANM tactics if not the strategy. They believe that the ANM should never have accepted to join forces with the discredited traditional leaders. Instead they suggest that the ANM could have fought independently or in conjunction with the Ba'th and other progressive forces.[19]

As the hostilities between the warring factions came to an end in Lebanon with the election of a new president on July 31, the ANM prepared itself for yet another battle, the battle over Iraq.

The July 14 Revolution was expected to lead Iraq to join the union. However, Brig. Kassem, supported by the Communists, chose to defend Iraq's independence by welcoming friendly relations with all countries. The arrest of Col. Arif who had supported a policy of immediate union with the U.A.R. exposed the intentions of Brig. Kassem, and split the Iraqis into two factions: the unionists and the anti-union.

Soon after the July 14 Revolution, the national leadership of the ANM dispatched Hani al-Hindi, one of its most experienced and able leaders, to Iraq to help the ANM leadership there in drawing a new plan of action for the region. Al-Hindi's presence in Iraq was instrumental in bringing the Arab Nationalists to the fore. In the first

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[19]Based on personal interviews with a number of former ANM members, December 20 and 21, 1970.

place, he sanctioned a recommendation made by the ANM leaders
to give the Arab Nationalists a definite and precise name.
Thus the Arab Nationalists who have been quite often mistaken
for the followers of the Istiqlal Party in Iraq took the name
of the "Arab Nationalists Movement" for the first time. This
was the first concrete step that helped the emerging movement
to establish itself as a political party. In the second place,
al-Hindi was really the architect of al-tajamu! al-Qawmi
[The National Gathering] which brought up an alliance between
the unionist forces in Iraq, and precipitated a show-down
with the Kassim regime. In the third place, al-Hindi sanc-
tioned a recommendation made by the ANM leadership in Iraq
calling for the infiltration of the Army. This by far was
the most important step taken by the delegate of the national
leadership. Henceforth, the Arab Nationalists would not
refrain from recruiting members of the Armed Forces. On the
contrary, they increasingly relied on their officer corps to
bring about the desired change in government.[20]

It is interesting to note here that once the ANM won
over a few army officers, the U.A.R. became more interested
in its activities. Indeed, it was this added weight to the
ANM, that made the organization all the more important.
President Nasser himself began now to receive and discuss
with the delegates of the national leadership of the ANM
different aspects of the Arab national struggle.

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[20]Statement by Hamid al-Jibouri, personal interview,
March 6, 1968.

The ANM campaigned vigorously against the inroads

of communism in Iraq. In al-Wuhdah [The Union], a clandestine

paper, which al-Hindi helped put out, the Arab Nationalists

denounced the activities of the Communist party, accusing it

of working against the principles of Arab nationalism and

Arab unity. Since the issue of unity was paramount at this

time, the ANM published a number of studies designed to

re-enforce the drive for Arab unity.[21] The United Arab

Republic which was engaged in an intensive press and radio

campaign was more than happy to propagate some of these

studies. Thus it reprinted and widely circulated al-Hakam

Darwaza's celebrated book on communism.[22]

Al-Huriyah [Freedom], the national organ of the ANM

took the opportunity in its first issue which appeared on

January 4, 1960 to define the ANM stand in the ensuing con-

flict. It said: "We are ideologically inclined to wage a

war on all forces considered to be inimical to our [national]

movement ... no matter whether they be Eastern or Western ...

rightist or leftist." This middle-of-the-way stand was

reiterated once and again by al-Huriyah and the other organs

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[21]ANM, al-Wuhdah Tariquna [The Union is Our Path],
1958; al-'Iraq wa a'ada' al-Wuhda [Iraq and the Enemies of
Union], 1959; Ayuha al-Shyu'iyun ayn iymanukum bil-itihad
al-fidrali [You Communists Where is Your Faith in Federation],
1959; al-Wuhdah Thawrah wa Mas'uliyah [The Union: Revolution
and Responsibility], 1959.

[22]al-Shuyu'iyah al-mahaliyah wa ma'rakat al-arab
al-Qawmiyah [Local Communism and Arab National Struggle],
(Beirut: Dar al-Fajr, 1962).

of the ANM during the period in which the U.A.R. was challenging Kassem and his communist-supported regime.

It is interesting to note that although the ANM was establishing itself as a unionist force in the area, it never contemplated the feasibility of any union taking place outside the framework of the U.A.R. for fear that such a union might offset the structure of power in the area to the disfavor of the U.A.R. Thus, it defended the independence of Kuwait in 1961, when the Kassem regime laid claim to the newly independent sheikhdom as an integral part of Iraq.[23]

In brief, the ANM has followed, during this phase of its struggle, a program presented by its Executive Committee in 1959. This program included: The concentration on the issue of Arab unity; the struggle against the local communists and the reactionary forces in the Arab World; the emphasis on the policy of positive neutralism; the support for the Algerian Revolution; and last but not least, the support for the U.A.R. internally and externally.

Phase IV (1961-1967). This was the most unpredictable period in the life of the ANM. In order to understand the zig-zag path travelled by the ANM during this period, we have to investigate the internal struggle which inflicted the ANM following the July 1961 socialist decrees.

It was previously indicated that the ANM have found in Abdul Nasser a leader of a new type. From 1955 onwards,

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[23]ANM, "Nahnu wa azmat al-Kuwayt" [We and the Kuwaiti Crises], July 1961.

they have followed his lead in every battle. It was only
natural that they would continue to do so when Nasser, in
his endeavor to build a unified economic and social structure,
extended in July 1961 his socialist decrees to the Syrian
Region. These decrees, and the Syrian secession of the
following September engendered a serious dialogue within
the ANM. On the one hand stood the "traditional leadership"
represented by Dr. George Habash, Hani al-Hindi, Dr. Wadi'
Haddad and Dr. Ahmed al-Khatib. This group did not only
accept and defend the socialist decrees, but also agreed that
such decrees could and should be carried peacefully within the
framework of a broad alliance between the working-classes,
the intellectuals, and the national capitalists. On the
other hand stood Muhsin Ibrahim, the editor of al-Hurriyah
and a small but vigorous group composed mainly of a younger
generation of Arab Nationalists. This group accepted the
socialist decrees in principle, but questioned the possibility
of carrying out such drastic measures in the absence of a
socialist party. They rejected the theory of peaceful
transition to socialism as inappropriate.[24]

The secession of Syria from the U.A.R. which was
prompted by the feudalist-bourgeois alliance proved the
argument made earlier by the Ibrahim group. Hence a new
program, which accepted the thesis of class struggle, was

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[24]Muhsin Ibrahim, "Arab Socialism in the Making" in
Kemal H. Karpat (ed.) Political and Social Thought in the
Contemporary Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 213.

adopted in 1962 by the ANM at the instigation of Muhsin
Ibrahim. The "traditional leadership" was prepared to accept
the revision of its basic program for two reasons.[25] First,
the bitter experience of the rise and fall of the U.A.R., an
experience which ruled out the bourgeoisie as a unionist
force. Second, the impact of the ideological dialogue that
took place between the Nasserites and the other unionist
forces after the Syrian secession. Nasser's role in this
respect was very great, for he opened new vistas in Arab
socialist thought by presenting the National Charter.

Apart from the ideological debate that was engulfing
an increasing number of members, the ANM was involved in a
militant, patriotic, and class oriented battle to reinstate
the U.A.R. in Syria. Its persistent fight to overthrow the
secessionist regime in Syria, and its continued struggle in
Iraq under the banners of union and socialism was highly
appreciated by President Nasser who took special interest in
the activities of the ANM at this time.[26]

The failure of the Ba'th leaders to honor the unity
agreements which they signed with Nasser soon after they
assumed power in Iraq and Syria, accentuated the rift between
the U.A.R. and the Ba'th. The ANM, which had tried but failed
to overthrow the Iraqi Ba'th in the meantime, was happy to
hear of Nasser's denunciation of the Ba'th on the 11th

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[25]Statement by Hani al-Hindi, personal interview,
June 22, 1970.

[26]Ibid.

Anniversary of the July 23 Revolution. Nasser's call for

"a Unified Arab Nationalist Movement which would incorporate

all the nationalist movements of the Arab World"[27] was

especially appealing to the ANM which was then thinking on

similar lines. In fact, a special session of the National

Congress of the ANM which met in the aftermath of the Ba'th

coups in Iraq and Syria, addressed itself wholly to the crisis

of the Arab national movement which was experiencing regional

and ideological fragmentation. Moreover, the ANM decided in

that same congress that the issue of uniting the revolutionary

forces in the Arab World should be further explored with

Nasser himself.[28]

It was only natural, therefore, that the ANM would

hasten to dispatch a delegation to Cairo to meet with Nasser

in order to pursue the problem. The Arab Nationalists'

delegation conveyed to President Nasser the ANM's hope that

the U.A.R. would act to bring about an alliance between the

Egyptian Socialist Union, the Algerian National Liberation

Front, the ANM, and other revolutionary forces as a first

step towards the establishment of a single Arab socialist

movement. Nasser agreed that the Arab national movement was

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[27]"The Speech of President Jamal Abdul Nasser on the
11th Anniversary of the 23rd of July Revolution", Cairo,
July 22, 1963, (Official Pamphlet) in Walid Khalidi and
Yosuf Ibish (eds.) Arab Political Documents 1963 (Beirut:
The American University, n.d.), p. 333.

[28]Statement by Muhsin Ibrahim, personal interview,
November 16, 1968.

in a state of disarray and that an alliance of the progressive
forces should be accomplished.[29]

The Nasserite coup, which overthrew the Ba'thist
regime in Iraq on November 18, 1963, opened the door to test
the plans put jointly by Nasser and the ANM. Indeed, on
July 14, 1964 four "socialist" organizations, the ANM, the
Arab Socialist Party, the Socialists Unionists Movement and
the Democratic Socialists Unionists, announced the dissolution
of their organizations and their incorporation into the Arab
Socialist Union.[30] Five days later the unionist forces in
Syria including the ANM, the Socialists Unionists Movement,
the United Arab Front, the Syrian Arab Socialist Union
dissolved their organizations and announced their merger
into the Arab Socialist Union.[31] At about the same time
the ANM took the initiative in Aden and the occupied south
to form the National Front for the Liberation of South Yemen.
The Nasserite Front, the Revolutionary Organization for the
Liberation of South Yemen, the Tribal Organization, the
Organization of Free Officers and Soldiers, the Yafi'i
Reform Front and the National Front all dissolved their

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[29]Ibid.

[30]Political Studies and Public Administration Dept.,
A.U.B., Chronology of Arab Politics July-September 1964,
II, No. 3 (Beirut: The American University, n.d.), p. 243.

[31]"Statement by the Unionist Groups" Damascus,
July 19, 1964 in Walid Khalidi and Yusuf Ibish (eds.), Arab
Political Documents 1964 (Beirut: The American University,
n.d.), p. 314.

organizations and entered the new front whose backbone was the ANM. Later, the Revolutionary Vanguard, the Secret Organization of South Yemen Liberals, and the Mahrah Youth joined the Front.[32] In the U.A.R. the ANM hardcore nucleus was put at the disposal of Nasser and the Arab Socialist Union as a sign of faith in Nasser's leadership.[33]

Throughout 1964 and 1965, the ANM was in close contact with Nasser and the process of uniting the Nasserite groups at the regional level seemed to be working fairly well. As a matter of fact, the Ibrahim Group took the initiative at the National Congress of 1965 to propose the merger of the ANM into Nasserism at the national level. The Ibrahim group carried the majority of the Congress members with them and thus embarked on an ambitious program whose objective was the creation of a new Arab socialist movement based on a working-class structure, a clear socialist ideology and a unified organization. Nasser was approached with this idea by Muhsin Ibrahim himself who was overwhelmed to see the President ready and willing to start on this common venture. However, this happy pursuit did not last very long for though Nasser was receptive to the idea from the very beginning, Zakariya Muhyi al-Din, his right-hand man, and other members of his entourage were not so sympathetic.[34] Besides, it was

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[32]Maktab al-amanah al-'amah [The General Secretariat Office], Taqrir 'an al-jinub al-'arabi, [Report on South Arabia], pp. 1-2.

[33]Ibrahim, loc. cit.

[34]Ibid.

very naive of the ANM leaders to expect this undertaking to work, for after all Nasserism outside the U.A.R. was a political trend and not a party. For the Arab Nationalists to merge into Nasserism outside the U.A.R. meant to dissolve their organizations and serve as agents of the U.A.R. intelligence network, or in the best circumstances to bring those organizations under the control of Nasser's intelligence service. In fact this is how Nasser's bureaucratic machinery interpreted the "new deal" with the ANM.

It was in the Yemen that the clash between the ANM and the Egyptian bureaucratic machinery first errupted. On January 13, 1966, the Egyptian officers responsible for South Arabia affairs carried a coup against the ANM-led National Front for the Liberation of South Yemen to impose a forceful union with the moderate Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY).[35] Although the Ibrahim group sanctioned the Egyptian coup as an important measure to unify all nationalist forces in the struggle against British imperialism, the Arab Nationalists on the spot refused any reproachement with the mellowed Asnaj-Makkawi group who were inclined to negotiate with the British government at a time when the Front's revolutionary forces were forcing a showdown with the imperialist forces. Both Nasser and the national leadership of the ANM tried to intervene in the dispute but little could be done, for the Arab Nationalists in Aden announced on October 14, 1966 their withdrawal from FLOSY

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[35] ANM, "Houl al-ilaqat bayn al-harakah al-wataniyah bil-jinub" [The Relations Between the Arab Nationalist Movements in the South], p. 4.

to carry on the armed struggle against the British under their reorganized National Front.[36]

As the ANM was disengaging from Nasserism in the South because of its failure to reach an understanding with Nasser's bureacratic machinery, the Arab Nationalists in Iraq and Syria were finding it extremely difficult to work with their brother Nasserites. In Iraq they were disenchanted with Arif's regime which wanted the Arab Socialist Union to serve as an adjunct to the State machinery. Therefore, they withdrew from the official organization and went underground to fight the "deviationist leadership".[37] Likewise, they were disappointed by their experience in the Syrian Arab Socialist Union. They did not find their fellow Nasserites radical enough to start a new beginning.[38]

It was not very long before both Nasser and the ANM discovered that their common venture has come to a dead end. The Executive Committee of the ANM which met in July 1966 agreed that in analyzing the Nasserite movement one should make the distinction between its different forces, especially between its "right", represented by its bourgeois bureacratic agents and their class, ideological and organizational

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[36]Statement by Qahtan al-Sha'bi, personal interview, July 16, 1967.

[37]Statement by Hashim Ali Muhsin, personal interview, June 24, 1970.

[38]Statement by anonymous, personal interview, November 18, 1968.

extensions in the Arab states and its "left", represented in the progressive elements and forces which exist within the mainstream of Nasserism.[39] The Executive Committee demanded that the "Nasserite Left" should ascertain its ideological, political and organizational "independence" so as to avoid the encroachment of the "right".[40] To implement this new strategy the national leadership called upon the Arab Nationalists to withdraw from the Arab Socialist Union in Iraq and Syria, so as to lead the "Nasserite Left".[41] Surprisingly, the ANM believed that they could by-pass Nasser's bureaucratic machinery without affecting their good relations with Nasser. However, subsequent events proved how wrong they were. Indeed as the year 1967 approached, their relations with Nasser reached a very low ebb.

Phase V (1967 and after) -- The setback of the June War engendered changes of anormous proportions in the Arab World. It was not unnatural, therefore, that it would constiture a turning point in the life of the movement whose <u>raison d'être</u> was the Palestinian question in the first place.

It is to be recalled that the ANM has followed the lead of Nasser from 1955 onward on the assumption that his revolution is destined to unite the Arabs and liberate their usurped lands. The ANM, in other words, has travelled Nasser's

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[39]Muhsin Ibrahim (ed.), <u>Limatha munathamat al-Ishtirakiyeen al-Lebnaniyeen</u>, [What For is the Organization of Lebanese Socialists], (Beirut: Dar al-tali'ah, 1970), p. 77.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Ibid.

path only to get the prize, and the prize was Palestine, before anything else. When Nasser failed to deliver the prize (i.e., Palestine), the ANM lost its faith in him and in his system.

A series of conferences were held by the organizations of the ANM in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 to study and analyze the causes that led to the defeat of the Arab armies. The end result of these conferences was a complete divorce from Nasserism which was denounced by the Arab Nationalists as "a petty bourgeois movement doomed to failure".[42] Instead they called for a "new beginning" which would transform the ANM from a petty bourgeois organization into a Marxist-Leninist party.[43]

Over the past four years, we have been witnessing an attempt on the part of the left, which emerged as the predominant force in the ANM, to integrate Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of the Arab World. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), both off-shoots of the ANM, are today vigorously upholding the political formulas of the Communist parties without losing their organizational independence. It remains to be seen if Marxism-Leninism will serve them as a vehicle to liberate Palestine.

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[42] Al-harakah al-ishtirakiyah al-arabiyah, [The Arab Socialist Movement], "Al-thawrah al-arabiyah wa madlulat khamsa huzayran" [The Arab Revolution and the Lessons of June 5], Baghdad, 1968, p. 2.

[43] Ibid.

To sum up, it may be said that the ANM has developed, in the course of the past two decades, from a small group of young revolutionaries aspiring to play a role in the Arab national liberation movement to a full-fledged political party upholding the political formulas of Marxism-Leninism. A host of political and social forces present on the Arab scene had, in one way or another, effected this radical transformation in the life of the ANM. However, the experience of the July 23 Revolution and the special relationship that developed between the leadership of the ANM and President Nasser himself, was a decisive factor in bringing about this change in the ideals and objectives of the Movement. Initially, the Nasser-led revolution inculcated the ANM with its progressive and socialist ideas. But in the course of its development the ANM was more prepared to go on experimenting with the prevailing socialist trends. Nasser as a responsible statesman sitting at the apex of a big bureaucratic machinery was inclined to be more cautious in employing the tools of Marxist analysis.

Chapter 4

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE

ARAB NATIONALISTS MOVEMENT

It takes three component factors to make a political
party: an organizational structure of some sort; members who
play certain roles in the organization; and leaders who are
mainly concerned with the making of decisions in the
organization. The scheme of this chapter is to investigate
each of the component parts which make up the Arab Nationalists
Movement. This will give a precise view of the workings of
the organization under investigation.

THE ORGANIZATION

According to the ANM statutes, "flexible centralism"
is the guiding principle underlying the Movement's organization
and its inner life.[1] The founders of the ANM believed that
it was necessary for a movement which is destined to remold
Arab society through revolutionary means to create a political
organization of a new type, a movement ready to adopt itself
to the most diverse and rapidly changing conditions of struggle.
Hamad al-Farhan, an acknowledged leader of the ANM's branch

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[1]The Administration Committee, "al-Nizam al-Dakhili"
[The Internal Rules], p. 2.

in Jordan in the early 'fifties, thinks that it was inconceivable for the founders of the ANM whose objective was to create a combat party not to recognize the organizational weapon of the successful revolutions in history such as the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and China.[2] Indeed it is deemed necessary for a movement which has to adopt itself equally for conditions of open struggle and clandestine combat to observe strict discipline and centralization. However, centralization may be autocratic or democratic depending on the role of the rank and file in the policy-making process within the party apparatus.[3] To which form of centralism does the ANM subscribe?

It is rather difficult to give a clear cut answer. On one hand, the ANM recognizes the worth and importance of all its members. It encourages them to discuss freely at party meetings all questions pertaining to party life. It urges them to utilize the principle of "criticism and self-criticism", an important item on the agenda of party meetings, to expose the shortcomings in the work of the Movement or anyone of its members. Furthermore, the ANM urges its members to address questions and to make proposals to the higher organs of the Movement. On the other hand, the decisions which are made at the higher levels of the

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[2]Personal interview, June 23, 1970.

[3]Barbara and Robert North (trans.), _Political Parties_, by Maurice Duverger (London: Methuen, 1967), p. 2.

Movement are carried by representatives of the higher levels whose authority cannot be questioned by the rank and file.

From the above, one might be led to believe that the Movement's "flexible centralism" is what other revolutionary parties call "democratic centralism". In fact, the Movement itself began to speak of the principle as such since 1957. The Movement's literature now defined the principle as "... the prominance of the democratic procedure in the application of centralism, or the acceptance of decisions taken by the center in the light of free discussion below."[4] However, one should not accept the ANM's claim at face value. For one thing, the incompatibility of centralism and democracy is profoundly increased in an organization where all party posts are delegated by the higher levels instead of being elected through democratic processes.

The ANM's structural organization resembles a pyramid, in which the base represents the rank-and-file, and the apex represents the leadership. Like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or any authoritarian Party for that matter, its structure is highly centralized. The ANM organs at all levels are sealed off both vertically and horizontally from relationships and information which the ANM considers unnecessary for the performance of their tasks.[5]

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[4] ANM, "al-Markaziya al-Democratiya", 1957, p. 1.

[5] ANM, "Mafahim tanzimiyah", [Organizational Concepts], p. 3.

The primary unit of the ANM is the cell, which consists of three to seven members. There are two types of cells: area cells, composed of members living in the same quarter; and work-place cells, composed of members working in the same factory, workshop or office.[6] The cell. is the basic organizational unit where the Movement members receive their party education and undergo a process of tough training and experience in order to emerge as dedicated revolutionaries in the struggle against the existing order. A strict agenda has to be observed in the regular weakly meetings of the cell in order to equip the members with the fundamentals of revolutionary thought and practice. The agenda, as a rule, consists of the following permanent items:[7]

1. Reading and discussing circulars and directives of higher organs;

2. Discussing a commentary on the important events of the week presented by one of the cell members;

3. Studying a theoretical issue or an organizational problem presented by the higher levels of the Movement or selected by the leader of the cell;

4. Discussing the activities of the cell for the previous week and assigning new tasks for the next week;

5. Financial and miscellaneous items;

6. Criticism and self-criticism.

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[6]Statement by Salam Ahmed, personal interview, November 10, 1968.

[7]ANM, "Kayf taqoud Khaliya" [How to Lead a Cell], pp. 3-5; ANM, "Risalah ila'ada al-Khalaya" [Letter to Cell Members], pp. 1-5.

The ANM attaches the utmost importance to the cells whose members are in direct contact with the man-in-the-street. To put it in other words, the cell members are in fact the eyes and ears of the ANM. Besides being an instrument of agitation, propaganda and recruitment, the rank and file members have to perform the important function of collecting data and reporting to the party apparatus important happenings which take place in their immediate surrounding.[8] To use Easton's theoretical framework for the analysis of political systems,[9] one might say that the above information which is fed into the Movement through the channels of the basic units of the organization provide the essential material which enable the political system (i.e., the ANM) to carry out its functions. These lowest level "inputs" entering the political system through the channels of the cells are necessary to avoid becoming divorced from the masses without whose assistance and support the Movement cannot function.

The Internal Rules of the ANM state that any Arab who believes in the objectives of the Movement and its principles, who works in one of the Movement's units, who abides by the Movement's decisions and carries its orders faithfully, who participates in financing the Treasury of

[8]ANM, "Awaliyat fi al-tanzim: al-Khaliyah" [Preliminaries of Organization: The Cell], p. 3.

[9]David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

the Movement and who honestly represents the Movement and its ideology, may become a member of the Movement. Applicants for membership must be recommended by at least two members who know the applicant personally. If approved by the Section (i.e., the Movement's leadership in the area), the applicant may join the cell in his neighborhood or his work-place. However, a candidate is usually asked to join one of the "educational circles" where aspirant members of the Movement are put under a probation for six months to prove their worthiness. During this probationary period they have to study the basic principles of Arab nationalism and the Movement's revolutionary doctrines. They are also asked to participate in the activities of the Movement. Membership in the "ancillary organizations" of the ANM such as the Arab Cultural Clubs which are spread in many Arab cities may relieve applicants for membership in the Movement from joining an "educational circle" for such organizations are in fact training grounds for the recruitment of new members to the Movement.[10]

The next unit in the organizational hierarchy of the ANM is the "league". It consists of three to seven members appointed by the section. There are two types of leagues: area leagues, responsible for the area cells active in a

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[10]ANM, "Awaliyat fi al-tanzim: Kayf tatasil" [Preliminaries of Organization: How to Approach].

village or part of a city; and work-place leagues, responsible
for the work-place cells active in a factory, work-place, some
profession or among students. The league has the important
functions of executing the plans and programs put for the
territorial or functional unit where its sphere of influence
lies. It carries out its obligations through its own men
who are usually responsible for directing the affairs of the
basic units. Because of the strict system of vertical linkage
to which the Arab Nationalists Movement subscribes, the cells
cannot communicate with one another directly. The league
provides such a medium of communication between the basic
units.[11]

The "Section" which is next on the organizational
ladder of the ANM is the unit responsible for organizing and
co-ordinating the work of the league active in a city or
a geographical area such as the Middle Euphrates in Iraq or
North Lebanon. As in the case of the lower units, it is
usually composed of three to seven members. These members
are appointed by the "Command of the Region". The leagues
cannot communicate with each other without the medium of
the Section because of the above-mentioned system of vertical
linkage. The Section provides such channels of communications
through its members who are usually the cadres responsible
for supervising the leagues. The Section is also entrusted
with the important function of approving the admittance of
new members to the Movement.[12]

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[11]ANM, "Mafahim tanzimiya", op. cit., pp. 3-5.

[12]Ibid., pp. 5-7.

At the apex of the pyramidal structure in each Arab state, where the ANM functions, is the "Command of the Region". The latter consists of a responsible member appointed by the Regional Conference and a number of members appointed by the Executive Committee. The Command of the Region represents the ANM in the Region (i.e., Arab state) and is held responsible for its work before the Administration Committee. The duties of the Regional Command consists of the following:[13]

1. The application of the principles of the Movement and its rules and the execution of its plans and decisions in the Region;

2. Supervising the Movement's organizations in the Region;

3. Raising the theoretical and organizational level of the members in the Region;

4. Organizing the finances of the Movement in the Region.

"The Regional Conference" is to be convened by the Command of the Region and the Executive Committee whenever the need arises to review the strategy and tactics of the Movement in that particular Region. Except for Lebanon, very few Regional Confereneces convened elsewhere. It is believed rather risky to call for such conferences where the leaders of the clandestine movement might be exposed to the agents of the state. According to a prominant leader of the

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[13]ANM, *Internal Rules*, pp. 2-3.

Movement, the Arab Nationalists whose objectives include

the overturning of the existing order in the Arab states

cannot have the luxury of convening their leaders under one

roof before the watching eyes of the security police in

Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria or any Arab state for that matter.[14]

This may be a good justification for not con ening a

Regional Conference in a state where the crack down on the

leadership of the Movement might be suicidal to the organiza-

tion, but it is certainly challenged by many leaders in the

second level of the hierarchy, (i.e., the Section), who are

either in disagreement with the Command of the Region on

certain issues or who aspire to participate in the proceedings

of a higher organ of the Movement. These "second-class"

leaders accept the elite's justification only as partially

true; they claim that many members of the Command of the

Region have become authoritarian in character and hence are

not prepared to be questioned by those who are below them in

the hierarchy.[15] This is a very serious charge which is

impossible to verify for lack of information. The author

failed to convince more than a few leaders to elaborate on

this problem. However, it is the author's feeling that one

of the reasons for the leaders' failure to call for Regional

Conferences is the unwillingness on the part of the leaders

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[14]Statement by anonymous, personal interview,
November 9, 1968.

[15]Based on personal interviews with a number of ANM
members in Iraq, November 5, 6 and 7, 1968.

to discharge their authority to those who are less educated
and experienced than they are. Having interviewed many
members from the Command of the Region and from the second
level of the hierarchy in Iraq, the author can see why the
Command of the Region did not bother to call for a Regional
Conference during Kassim's regime or that which followed
(i.e., the Ba'thist's regime). Because of the gap between
the Command of the Region and the second level "leaders",
the Command did not see the value of convening the Regional
Conference. To put it in the words of an Iraqi leader,
"... it would have been time consuming and boring, besides
nothing fruitful would have generated from a conference
whose majority would have been mediocres".[16]

The Commands of the different Regions (i.e., Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Kuwait, ..., etc.) communicate
with each other only through the medium of the supreme organ
of the ANM, the National Congress where delegates from the
Commands of the different Regions meet regularly once a year
to perform the following functions:[17]

1. Review the general political situation and determine
the ANM's objectives for each stage;

2. Draw a general working plan for the Movement in
each stage;

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[16]Statement by anonymous, personal interview,
November 10, 1968.

[17]ANM, Internal Rules, op. cit., p. 3.

3. Study and approve the programs of the higher organs in each Region;

4. Study and approve the Financial Report of the Movement;

5. Elect the members of the Movement's Court;

6. Elect the Executive Committee and study its functions.

The National Congress also meets in emergency cases to review and amend the Movement's line whenever the need arises. The Executive Committee called for such a meeting immediately after the Ba'thists' coups in Iraq and Syria in 1963 to examine the repercussions of the above coups on the Arab national movement.[18] Another extraordinary Congress met in the aftermath of the June war (1967) to come with the most important pronouncements yet on ideology and organization (discussed elsewhere in this dissertation).

From the inception of the ANM in 1951 until 1964 members of this most exalted organ of the ANM were carefully picked by the founding leaders of the Movement who were predominant in the Executive Committee; but a group of a younger generation who were promoted to the Executive Committee in 1963 were influencial in ammending the Internal Rules of the Movement so as to invite all the members of the

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[18]"The Extraordinary National Congress of 1963", The Political Report (Beirut, 1963).

Commands of Regions to future congresses.[19] Indeed, the

1964 National Congress was a landmark in the history of

the ANM where new ideas, trends and organizational concepts

were introduced for the first time in that epoch-making

Congress (more is said of this Congress elsewhere in this

dissertation).

One of the most important functions of the National

Congress is the election of the Executive Committee which

represents the supreme organ of the Movement during the

intervals between the Congresses. Thus, the Executive

Committee is the central body charged with the responsibility

of directing the activities of the ANM during the above

intervals. However, it has to abide by the decisions and

resolutions of the National Congress.[20]

The Executive Committee sets the agenda of the

National Congress and presents the Main Report to that organ.

The Report is usually divided into two parts: in the first

part, the Executive Committee deals with political develop-

ments internally and externally; in the second part, it

deals with the activities and organizational problems of

the Movement.

In order to carry on its tasks adequately, the

Executive Committee divides its work between three

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[19]Interviews with Muhsin Ibrahim and Nayef Hawatmah, November 16, 1968.

[20]ANM, Internal Rules, op. cit., p. 2.

committees:[21]

1. The Political Bureau (formerly the Administration Committee): This is the most important central organ in the Movement. All its members are elected by the Executive Committee from among its prominant members. It is entrusted with the power of executing the decisions of the Executive Committee and supervising the daily work of the Movement;

2. The Ideological Committee: Members of this committee are members and friends of the Movement named by the Executive Committee. The person responsible for the Committee should be a member of the National Congress. The duty of the Committee is to draw and enrich the theoretical programs of the Movement in the light of the resolutions of the National Congress;

3. The Financial Committee: Members of this committee are members of the Movement named by the Executive Committee. The person responsible for the Committee should be a member of the National Congress.

From the above survey of the organizational structure of the Arab Nationalists Movement, one might conclude that the Movement has developed a very rigorous organizational set-up based on a system of vertical linkage where the lower organs are subordinated to the higher organs and organs at the same level cannot communicate but through the medium of

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[21]Statement by Muhsin Ibrahim, personal interview, loc. cit.

a higher organ. This system has best served the Movement
in its first years and would have continued to do so if
the Movement had a comprehensive theory which could answer
the fundamental questions that plagued the Movement in
later years.

MEMBERSHIP

The Arab Nationalists Movement corresponds, more or
less, to what Duverger calls _devotee_ parties.[22] It is more
open than _cadre_ parties which are restricted to a few
notables or influencial persons and more closed than mass
parties which seeks to recruit an increasing number of
people. The ANM, though aspires to be a mass party in the
long run, is nevertheless very selective in its membership.
The founding leaders envisaged the organization as a vanguard
contingent of the Arab national movement. They demanded
that members of the movement should be dedicated to the
cause of the Arab revolution. To join the Arab Nationalists
in those early years, a member had to carry on the day-to-day
activity of the Movement. A member had no personal life
apart from that of the Movement.[23]

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[22]Duverger, op. cit., p. 70.

[23]Statement by Hani al-Hindi, personal interview,
June 22, 1970.

The zeal and excitement of the first generation waned when they soon discovered the hard realities of life. It was sometime toward the late fifties when the Movement observed that it was not going to fulfill its aims through its "boy scouts". The achievement of unity between Egypt and Syria in 1958 shed some light on the weakness of the ANM which was until then indulging in organizing students, especially high school students. The National Congress which convened later that year reviewed in detail the previous experience of the Movement and found that its criteria for membership was too rigid to attract members from any group other than students. It called upon the Commands of the Regions to look for new vistas to recruit workers, farmers and members of the armed forces.[24]

The Movement now associated itself with the rising tide of Nasserism and a breakthrough could be established in more than one Arab state and among a multitude of classes, social groups and sections of the population. In Iraq, the Movement members threw their lot with the Ba'thists and other nationalist forces to combat communism which all of a sudden was threatening the newly established revolutionary regime. When Kassim collaborated with the communists, they turned against him and stubbornly fought his dictatorship.

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[24]Statement by Mustafa Baydoun, personal interview, November 17, 1968.

In a short time they were recognized as one of the most
trusted fighting forces of Arab nationalism and revolution.
They were credited with a prominant place in the National
Front which led the struggle against the dictatorial regime
of General Kassem. The above stands won the Movement an
increasing number of members from all walks of life. Of
special interest to the ANM was the opening it established
in the Armed Forces where influencial officers were
attracted to the Movement. The Movement's achievements
in Iraq, in a matter of a few years, was beyond anything
its leaders expected when they started on a new program
with a bunch of students in 1958. Their accomplishments
in the next five years were really fantastic. When the
Ba'th took over the reigns of government in 1963, the ANM
was a force to reckon with. It had its organizations
spread in every corner of the country, with its strongholds
in Mosul, Baghdad and the Middle Euphrates. Its followers
were mostly working-class people. Students, high school
teachers and few university professors still comprised its
hard core cadre.[25]

In Jordan, there has always been definite limitations
imposed on the activities of the Movement. These limitations
were caused by two factors. First, the paternalistic and

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[25]Statement by Salam Ahmed, personal interview,
November 10, 1968.

pragmatic approach of the founding fathers of the Movement there; second, the policies of Egypt in the area. The importance of these factors can be appreciated in the light of the Movement's objectives in Jordan. Since the over-throwing of the King and his regime has always been a short range objective, the Movement had to put special emphasis on the Army and the state's bureaucracy. The Jordanian intellectuals and civil servants have long been recruited by the Movement who had the best and most efficient civil servants. Some influencial Army officers were recruited in the mid-'fifties but these and their followers in the Army were dismissed after the abortive coups of the late 'fifties. The Movement had its strength also in the refugee camps and the Palestinians in the West Camp. The Movement's emphasis on the Palestinian problem early in the 'fifties have won her large segments of the Palestinians, especially among students and workers.[26]

In Lebanon, the Arab Nationalists Movement has always had its strongholds in Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon.[27] The campus of the American University of Beirut has been the rallying ground for the ANM supporters and hence, students have comprised the overwhelming majority of the

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[26]Statement by George Habash, personal interview, June 24, 1970.

[27]Michael W. Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 159.

Movement's membership. One has to make the observation here
that very few student members stick to the Movement after
graduation. Dr. Michael W. Suleiman made the observation
that intellectuals are more likely to follow the more
sophisticated Ba'thists.[28] With all due respect to
Dr. Suleiman, an authority on political parties in Lebanon,
this author cannot subscribe to this observation.
According to this author's investigation it is hardly
possible to agree that the Ba'thists in Lebanon are more
sophisticated than the Arab Nationalists. Besides, the
Lebanese Ba'thists have been losing their graduates no
less than the Arab Nationalists.[29] It is fair to say that
since Pan-Arab movements such as the Ba'th and the ANM are
still far from seizing the reigns of government in Lebanon,
members of these movements do not envision a bright future
for themselves after graduation by sticking their necks to
illegal organizations. To put it in other words, energetic
Lebanese would rather throw their lot in the system of
laissez-faire and individual opportunities than to tie
themselves to some unforseen future.

The ANM in Lebanon is also active among Palestinians
in the refugee camps. Until 1965 Lebanese and Palestinians

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[28]Ibid., p. 158.

[29]Based on personal interviews with several
Ba'thists in Lebanon, November 20, 21, 22 and 23, 1968.

were organized in the same organizational structure of the
Movement in Lebanon, but for strategic reasons (discussed
elsewhere in this dissertation) the Palestinian members of
the Movement were given their own organization set-up.
However, the Palestinians remained to be very active in
Lebanese politics.[30]

In Syria, where the ANM had the Ba'th as a strong
competitor on the campus of the Syrian University and other
education institutions, it could make only little progress
among students before 1961. Nevertheless, it embarked on a
major offensive in the favorable political climate that was
created after the dissolution of the union with Egypt in 1961.
With a nucleus of hard-core cadre reserved from the days
that proceeded the establishment of the United Arab Republic,
the Movement achieved no less spectacular results than its
sister branch in Iraq. In a matter of two years engaged in
fighting the separatist regime that seceded from the United
Arab Republic, the ANM assumed a leading role in rallying
the masses under the banner of Nasserism. When the Armed
Forces overthrew the separatists in 1963, the ANM was rewarded
with two cabinet posts in the revolutionary regime. In the
ensuing days the Movement could manifest its strength especially
in Damascus and Aleppo, where its militants took the streets
in an effort to increase the pressure on the Ba'thists who
were wavering on the question of reestablishing the union

[30]Statement by Wadi' Haddad, personal interview,
June 21, 1970.

with Egypt. The early 1960's were in fact the golden years
of the ANM in Syria; it attracted large segments of the
population especially among the working-class people who
responded to the ANM which has become the outspoken voice
of Nasserism in Syria.[31]

In Kuwait the Movement's membership consisted
mainly of students and teachers. It also had its followers
among the workers of the Kuwait Oil Company. In the 'fifties
the Movement's appeal for democracy and constitutional rights
won her many sympathizers among merchants, business men,
and contractors who supported the Movement financially. But
since the Movement began to preach socialism in the early
'sixties these bourgeois elements were repelled by the new
slogans.[32]

In Yemen and South Arabia, the ANM which was
organized by young students returning from their schools in
Egypt and elsewhere took a different approach. Their
commitment was essentially to the poor peasants and workers
where one could trace the origin of many of their leaders.
In Aden, they infiltrated the trade unions and spread their
cells in the countryside. In Yemen, they ran the only trade
union in the country which included the workers constructing
the American-financed road between Ta'iz and San'a.[33]

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[31]Statement by Hani·al-Hindi, personal interview,
June 22, 1970.

[32]Statement by Ahmed al-Khatib, personal interview,
November 12, 1968.

[33]Fred Halliday, "Counter-Revolution in the Yemen"
New Left Review, September-October 1970, p. 11.

After the September Revolution of 1962 they expanded the

trade union movement and formed the General Union of Yemeni

Workers. They also opened an Arab Cultural Club in Ta'iz

which was instrumental in recruiting students and educated

people.[34]

The Nationalist Front of South Yemen was a coalition

of the Arab Nationalists and other like-minded groups which

believed that armed struggle was the only weapon to liberate

South Yemen from imperialism and Arab reaction. Once they

launched their attack against the colonial power an increasing

number of peasants, workers, students and members of the

Armed Forces joined their ranks. The Arab Nationalists who

are the predominant group in the Front are very jealous of

their structural organization and hence they are their own

decision-makers.[35]

LEADERSHIP

The leadership of the Arab Nationalists Movement has

displayed, from its inception in 1951 to the National Congress

of 1964, a high degree of collegial unity and internal soli-

darity. The founding leaders of the Movement who were in

complete control of the organization until the latter date

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[34]Ibid., p. 17.

[35]Statement by Qahtan al-Sha'bi, personal inteview,
July 16, 1967.

were in fact a community of true believers more than anything else. As such, one can hardly compare them with the leadership of other political parties who are mainly interested in seeking or maintaining public office. The leaders of the Movement were young men in their twenties, who were either university students or recent graduates. Although they were almost exclusively of middle class origin, they had no or little class consciousness. They were idealists with little political experience and less political thought.[36]

The above leaders viewed their organization as the spearhead of the Arab masses in their struggle for national unity and independence. With such an elitist concept they started to set the rules for one of the most disciplined and strictly organized political movements in the area. They laid special emphasis on the leading organs of the ANM which had to conform to the following organizational principles:[37]

1. Collective Leadership: This principle was deemed very important for the following reasons:

A. As a safeguard against deviation, opportunism, personal influence, and motivations;

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[36]Statement by Dr. George Habash, personal interview, July 16, 1967.

[37]ANM, Mafahim tanzimiyah, [Organizational Concepts], pp. 4-7.

B. As a safeguard against serious mistakes which could naturally be committed by any single leader. Group discussion was deemed instrumental in avoiding such mistakes;

C. As a device for uniting the talents and experience of members in the best interests of the Movement;

D. As a device for guaranteeing the continuous activity of the Movement should the state crack down on the Movement.

2. <u>The Leadership for the Most Efficient</u>: In the selection of leaders the Movement refuses to accept age, priority, financial support or higher academic degrees as the criteria for efficient leaders. Instead it puts special emphasis on the following:

A. Higher ideological level and organizational experience;

B. Higher degree of persistence in carrying the struggle and readiness for sacrificing everything including one's life for the achievement of the Movement's objectives;

C. Greater efficiency in handling the daily functions of the Movement;

D. The promotion of qualified leaders and de-escalation of unqualified leaders.

3. <u>The Leadership in the Midst of Members</u>: The ANM does not approve of leaders who think and plan in ivory towers. The Movement demands of its leaders to live and work with the rank and file, for after all the members are not to be asked to sacrifice their lives for the sake of their leaders but for the common objective.

The above organizational principles befitted the first generation or the "community of believers"[38] when that community was still small in number, but as the organization grew in size and its cells spread in several Arab states it was deemed necessary to review the above organizational principles in the light of the new situation. Late comers to the ANM, especially those who have had some experience in political organizations, began to raise doubts about certain aspects of the party machine. They questioned in the first place the feasibility of the above organizational principles in the absence of inner-party democracy. They asked: "Who is to judge whether a member is qualified for a leading post in the party hierarchy or not?"[39] They also complained that the principle of "democratic centralism" in incommensurate with the "delegate system" where all party posts are filled by delegates from above. That may be very

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[38]This expression which best d fines the ANM in its early years was first used sarcastically by the <u>Ba'thists</u> students at the A. U. B., statement by Monah al-Sulh, personal interview, December 28, 1968.

[39]Statement by al-Hakam Darwaza, personal interview, December 29, 1968.

true for if "democratic centralism" is to work at all the leading organs of the Movement have to be elected. The National Congress of 1964 addressed itself to this question upon the insistence of the South Arabian delegates who felt the need for the democratization of the organization more than any other branch because certain elements in the "center" were blocking their revolutionary designs for the future. The Congress, after appraising the issue at hand, accepted in principle the need to revise the organizational principles of the Movement to meet the ever-growing demands for the democratization of the party machine. Furthermore, the National Congress recommended that all Regional Commands prepare detailed studies for the democratization of the party machines in their Regions. Since then the issue became the talk of the party organs and members in every Region, but no effective steps were taken under the old center.[40] It was only after the disintegration of the National Leadership in 1968 that the Regions, now reformed under different names and novel structures, based their organizational principles on genuine party democracy. More about the offsprings of the ANM is mentioned elsewhere in this dissertation.

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[40]Statement by Muhsin Ibrahim, personal interview, November 16, 1968.

Chapter 5

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ARAB

NATIONALISTS MOVEMENT

Having traced the historical background of the Arab

national movement in the first chapter, the author begins

here by outlining the context within which an ideology was

searched for in the Arab World so as to appreciate the ANM's

contribution to this quest.

The first characteristic feature of that context was

the search for a national identity. In the late 'forties,

an average citizen of Egypt had several identities. He was

considered a 'native' by the British, an Arab by the Israelis.

At the Mosque, he was taken as a Muslim but by the ruling

class he was treated as one of the faceless masses. Again,

by geography, he was an African. What was true of the

average Egyptian was equally true of the man-in-the-street

in the other Arab states. He too had several identities,

not necessarily the same as that of his brother Egyptian.

Since the last century, the intellectual activities

which were interested in emphasizing one or the other of the

above identities or in striking a balance between them, were

mainly governed by Western influence. This influence had

manifested itself in two peculiar ways. On the one hand,

the national resentment against the colonial West was working

to shape up the national identity as something anti-West: Eastern versus Western; Muslims versus Christians; spiritual people versus materialistic people ... etc. On the other hand, the ideas by which the intellectuals were expressing these differences were exclusively Western ideas.[1]

The second characteristic feature was the need for a historical continuity. An Arab boy in an elementary school was aware of two "histories". The glorious history of the Arab Empire a few centuries ago, and the history of the last thirty or fifty years. The great gap between the ancient past and the present remained unabridged. It was only natural that the national consciousness would be disturbed because of this gap. Living heavily on this consciousness were "great Arabs" and "poor Arabs"; "good Arabs" and "bad Arabs". Filling this gap required not only an understanding of the roots and causes which led to the decline of the Arab Empire, but also an appreciation of the basis of western power and an analytical stand regarding the different schools of thought which emerged in the West.

The third characteristic feature was determined by Arab mentality which was basically a religious one. The mechanism of that mentality was not yet trained in the liberal

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[1]See Mary Matossian, "Ideology of Delayed Industrialization", in John H. Kantsky (ed.) Political Change in Underdeveloped Countires (New York: John Wiley, 1966), p. 254.

scientific heritage of the West.[2] The will to speculate, argue, and explore was not a commonplace feature of the Arab intellectuality. The will to believe and conform was stronger.

The above features constituted the historical requirements that an ideology had to meet. They also constituted limitations that an ideology had to face and overcome. It is to be understood that the role of an ideology is not only to satisfy the intellectual demands and the political needs of a group of people, but also to develop those demands and needs so as to reach a higher stage of development. An ideology answers people's questions, but these answers should raise new questions.

Two political movements had made an impact on the masses in the Arab East before Arab nationalism asserted itself as an ideology: the Muslim Brotherhood and Communism. Both of them offered a simplified interpretation of the universe and history. The former exploited the religious feelings and the longing for the glorious Islamic Empire. The latter encouraged the sense of revolt against tradition. The fact that both were uncomplicated yet comprehensive systems explains their strength in appealing to the mentality of the Arab masses. But at the same time, it explains their weakness as well.

In asserting the supreme importance of Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood could not explain the cause of Arab

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[2]R. Bayly Winder (trans.), The Meaning of the Disaster, by Constantin K. Zurayk (Beirut: Khayat's College Book Co-op, 1956), p. 34.

backwardness. Any attempt to this explanation was doomed to be contradictory. If nations were to have their salvation by religion, then Christianity would be superior to Islam since the powerful West is Christian. On the other hand, if the civilization of the West were to be understood as divorced from Christianity, then the cause of strength and advancement would be found in something other than religion. This ideology doubtlessly imparted great influence on the masses, but nevertheless it failed to capture their imagination, and it failed to advance a theory that could explain the day-to-day events in the world.

Because the economic development of the Arab countries was so lagging behind Europe, Communism was translated to the Arab masses in a very crude manner. The lack of a working class tradition and a socialist intellectual heritage rendered the early introduction of Marxism to the Arab world as a mechanistic fatalistic doctrine. The working class was presented as the long-awaited hero, the new Mahdi. But since the problems of the Arab countries were not centered around the struggle between the workers and the capitalists, but around the need for industrialization, the Communist parties failed to play any meaningful role. Instead they followed literally whatever instructions they received from Stalinist Russia. Since some of these instructions were against the deep-rooted national feeling, Communism was

looked upon as an alien ideology.[3] The objective conditions of the Arab countries, as emphasized in the first chapter, were decisive in creating an ideology whose roots were in European liberalism and nationalism.

Both the Ba'th and the ANM grew out of the mainstream of liberal ideology. Hence, there is a sharp and historical difference between them on one hand and the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communists on the other hand. They neither articulated their thoughts along the lines of the nation's traditions as the former did, nor did they inject a comprehensive theory like the latter. Instead, they portrayed the aspirations, disenchantments, interests, and illusions of the rising middle class. They also reflected the impact of the continuing spread of mass education in the Arab countries. It is important to note in passing, that one should differentiate between the meaning of the middle class as used in the European sense, and its meaning in the economic and social context of the Arab countries. In the Arab countries where capitalism has not yet developed into a system where social classes are neatly formed, the middle class, or what came to be called in Arabic political jargon "petty bourgeoisie" play an increasing political role. Lawyers, teachers, government employees, and students are the human elements from which political and ideological

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[3]For an illuminating discussion of the experience of the Communist parties in the Middle East, see Walter Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1956).

thoughts are imparted. In the Arab World, as in other developing nations, this class is characterized by its strong national feelings, and its distrust of the growing capitalist sector of the society. It should be added that this class is also characterized by its hostility toward working class ideologies and Communism in general. The "petty bourgeoisie" distrust of the "national capitalists" is motivated by psychological jealousy and patriotic fear that capitalism tends, in general, to link the national economy with the capitalist monopolies in the advanced countries.[4] They do not feel at ease with radical socialist and communist ideas because it sounds foreign to them and tends to cut their relations with the nation's history and tradition.

To the above, one may add that the "petty bourgeoisie" tend to be individualistic, and hence, they lack the solidarity characteristic of the working class or the capitalist class. Their concept of politics is half real and half imaginary. An example of this is their concept of the West. Their imagination is always excited by the "powerful West". Indeed it is not unusual to hear a representative of this class praising the United States and the Soviet Union at one and the same time. To him, both ascribe to power. He may be influenced by such men as Hitler, Roosevelt, and Stalin at

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[4]"The National Charter of the United Arab Republic", in Hisham Sharabi, Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1966), p. 130.

the same time. He dreams of acquiring the material power of the West. But at the same time, he is against most of the Western philosophies. In his system of thought there is no correspondence between the national power acquired by a country and its political, economic and social structure. To him, a good government makes a powerful country. What counts, in the final analysis, is power not principles or ideas.

By the same token, all social ills and economic disparities are blamed on the government. This attitude towards governments in general has a deep-rooted origin in the Arab mentality. Islamic history was taught as a history of dynasties and great rulers. Abdu's early cry that the East is in a desperate need of a "benevolent despot" is a manifestation of this mentality.

The people were yearning to the glory of their past, the glory of powerful heroes. It is no accident, therefore, that Aflaq introduced the Ba'th as a "new era of heroism".[5] His later rhetoric always touched on this focal point. A good one is his famous saying: "Mohammed was all the Arabs, so let now all the Arabs be Mohammed."[6]

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[5]Fi Sabil al-Bath [Toward the Ba'th], (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1963), p. 21.

[6]Ibid., p. 54.

This was the background against which the Arab mind
was examining the different Western political ideas after
the first World War. It is understandable that liberalism
was most attractive to the well-to-do Arab intellectuals
who completed their higher education in Western institutions,
and whose main intellectual need was the search for an
identity. Thus, nationalism was introduced by the above
intellectuals as an outcome of European liberalism. In
fact, it was looked upon as a national identity within which
modern ideas about society and technology could be assimilated.
Early nationalist writers advocated Arab nationalism as an
identity against the identity of being merely "natives".
Later they advocated an overall Arab identity against such
regional identities as Syrian, Egyptian or Lebanese.[7] They
did not elaborate on the question of ideology because they
were true to the liberal tradition. They hoped that the
Arab people, after freeing themselves from foreign dominance
and influence, will develop their political ideology by the
fairplay of the democratic system, and within the framework
of a unified Arab nation. They did not present a concrete
political theory, nor did they advance a political program

[7]See Sati' al-Husry, Ara' wa-ahadith fi al-wataniyah
wa alqawmiyah [Views and Speeches on Patriotism and Nationalism],
(Cairo: Matba'at al-risalah, 1944), Muhadarat fi nushu'
al-fikrah al-qawmiyah [Lectures on the Origin of the National-
ist Idea], (Beirut: Dar al-'ilm lil malayin, 1956); and
Constantine Zurayk, Al-Wa'i al-Qawmi [National Consciousness],
(Beirut, 1936).

of action. Though they influenced a whole generation of Arab intellectuals, the liberal nationalists did not penetrate the masses' consciousness. Consequently, they failed to form the orthodox structure of Arab nationalism.

The orthodoxy was born later by the political parties which adopted nationalism: the Ba'th, followed by the ANM. These two parties came to the fore at a time when the colonial question was being settled. Hence, they did not have to fight the identity of "natives". However, they found themselves in the midst of another battle where they had to face not only the regional identities, but also the ideologies of international Communism and Islamic fundamentalism. At this time, both ideologies were exploiting the masses enthusiasm for a comprehensive ideology concerning man and his universe, a question which the early nationalist writers did not address themselves to.

Hence, the ideological task as conceived by the founders of the ANM was to develop a comprehensive scheme by which a Syrian, an Egyptian or any citizen of the Arab states for that matter would identify himself with the wider Arab nation. This ideological task represented a difficult dilemma for the founders of the ANM who had their political education within the heritage of liberalism. On one hand, to keep themselves within the framework of liberalism implied the acceptance of nationalism as a concept which defined something that exists, i.e., the Arabs. Consequently, the

ideological question had to be fought separately, because
there would be no contradiction if an Arab nationalist
wanted to organize the new Arab society according to the
teachings of Islam, or the principles of Marxism. On the
other hand, the acceptance of nationalism as a doctrine
which represented an attitude towards history and the
universe implied the abandoning of liberalism. For a
believer in Arab nationalism then, has to explain the
difference between his ideology and the ideologies of other
nations.[8] In the political arena, the dilemma was to make
the inevitable choice between liberal democracy and fascism.
It will be observed below that the ideological history of
the ANM was a record of the attempts on the part of the
Movement to free itself from this dichotomy. The history
of the ANM can be divided into three ideological phases:
First, Arab nationalism; Second, Arab socialism; and Third,
Marxism.

ARAB NATIONALISM

Ma'a al-Qawmiyah al-Arabiyah [with Arab Nationalism][9]
was the first attempt by the ANM to formulate its own ideology.

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[8]For a discussion on the different notions of
nationalism see David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965).

[9]Anonymous, Ma'a al-Qawmiyah al-Arabiyah (Cairo: The
Federation of Kuwaiti Missions, 1957).

The main argument of the book was to prove that nationalism
was not the product of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries bourgeois states in Europe, but rather the logical
result of a long process of development in all human history.
The authors traced the development of nations from the infant
stages of the family, the tribe, and the city state. Their
purpose was to show that nationalism was not merely a phase
in the history of human development, but rather the motivating
force behind history. They claimed that there was no other
force by which human history could be explained. This claim
was supported by arguments aimed at rejecting other explana-
tions. They emphasized that human societies neither develop
along the lines of class-divisions, nor according to
religious differences. There are no workers' societies and
capitalists' societies. Likewise, there are no Muslim or
Christian societies. Societies had developed along the
lines of nations, and the motivating force was nationalism.
It is obvious that the whole argument was based upon the
assumption that nationalism had something to do with human
nature.

The above theory runs into a real difficulty when
it attempts to spell out its humanist virtues. The authors
explained this by emphasizing that a true nationalist
believes in the right of all nations to develop along the
lines of their respective nationalisms. An Arab nationalist
respects all other nationalisms, and this is so by definition.
Why did history not demonstrate such humanist tendencies by

those who advocated the principle of nationalism? Because, we are told, those were not true nationalists. Moreover, it is the historic mission of the Arab people and other Afro-Asians to give the world a pure and true nationalism.[10] So nationalism, according to this theory was not an identity but a doctrine. The following observations are in order:

1. It is obvious that the concept had moved away from the fascism-liberalism dichotomy by ignoring it. The emphasis on true and untrue nationalism abstracted the issue from the real internal forces that lead nations along the path of agression.

2. The concept is a dogma that focusses all attention on the nation and says nothing about the forces within the nation. What political system is to be chosen and what form of democracy is to be advocated? Such important questions remain unanswered.

3. The defensive character of the doctrine and its stand vis-a-vis other doctrines exploited the masses' distrust of foreign political ideas. Thus, the weakness of the concept itself regarding its attitude towards classes or democracy was projected as a rejection of western political concepts.

Nevertheless, the optimism generated by Bandung, The Suez War, and the unity of Egypt and Syria gave great

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[10] It is only fair to mention that the idea of the Arab mission was first advanced by the Ba'th, see Aflaq, op. cit., pp. 139-152.

impetus to the new ideology. The historic mission of the new nationalism was to coincide handsomely with positive neutralism.

ARAB SOCIALISM

The failure of the nationalist ideology to analyze the real forces working in the Arab society, and consequently its failure to develop a system of democratic life was one of the causes that led to the breakdown of the U.A.R. as was mentioned in Chapter Three. The ANM which was the first national party to condemn the Syrian secession, carried the ideological struggle to wider circles and was very influential in this respect during the period 1961-1967.

Muhsin Ibrahim wrote a series of articles in al-Hurriyah following the Syrian secession which were considered along with Nasser's speeches and the U.A.R. National Charter the ideological framework of what came to be known as Arab socialism.[11] The main ideas of Muhsin Ibrahim could be summarized in the following:

The breakdown of the unity between Egypt and Syria had demonstrated that it is not true that national unity is in the interest of all classes in present Arab society.

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[11]Muhsin Ibrahim's articles were later published in two volumes: Fi al-Dimuqratiyah wa al-Thawrah wa al-Tandim al-Sha'bi [In Democracy, Revolution and popular organization], (Beirut: Dar al-Fajr, 1962) and Munaqashat Hawl Nadhariyat al-'Amal al-Arabi al-Thawri [Discussions on the Theory of Revolutionary Arab Action], (Beirut: Dar al-Fajr, 1963).

The Syrian secession, which was triggered by the big land-
owners and capitalists, had shown that those classes are
not for national unity. Muhsin Ibrahim claimed that this
fact does not negate the basic premises and principles of
Arab nationalism. On the contrary, he stressed, it serves
to enrich the ideology of Arab nationalism. Because of the
previous colonial rule, the economics of the Arab countries
did not develop according to the national interest. Their
colonial character made the big landowners and capitalists
develop their strength by linking their interests with the
financial centers of the colonial powers. These interests
made it impossible for these classes to play the role that
was played by their counterpart in Europe in the last century,
i.e., to be nationalist in character.[12] Economic planning
in the developing nations is in conflict with the interests
of the bourgeoisie. In the Arab world national unity is in
conflict with the bourgeoisie because the latter have an
interest in keeping the Arab states divided. This explana-
tion doubtless added a new ingredient to the new nationalism.
It took the ideology away from the liberal heritage by
stressing its anti-bourgeois character, and it moved away
from fascism by emphasizing the role of the masses and the
need for democratization.

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[12]It seems that Muhsin Ibrahim was very much
influenced by the writings of Franz Fanon.

It goes without saying that the above analysis
departed from the previous orthodox dogma but nonetheless,
it was carried with the same dogmatic spirit. Once again,
the nation was looked upon as a whole. Big landowners
and capitalists were singled out as enemies of the people,
but nothing was said about how the relationship between the
other classes of the society would be.

Arab socialism, we are told, is different from
communism in that it does not profess the inevitability
of class struggle. After getting rid of capitalists and
landlords, other classes could solve their differences
peacefully.

Lastly, Muhsin Ibrahim championed the cause of
uniting all the progressive nationalist groups into one
Nasserite movement. The experience of the latter was dis-
cussed in the third chapter.

MARXISM

In the West ideologies usually enjoy a long life span.
In the developing nations, ideologies have a short life. The
Nasserite scheme of achieving Arab unity by supporting Free
Officers' coups in other Arab states failed to achieve unity.
The war of June 1967 was an explosion that shattered the
whole ideology of Arab nationalism and socialism. The ANM
was the first national party to admit, in the aftermath of
that war, that its ideology and political program was defeated

and rendered useless.[13] The Arab Nationalists rejected
their ideology as a dogma that was partly responsible for
the defeat.

They abandoned all the assumptions and structure of
the old ideology and set themselves to start anew. It is
important to note here that this soul-searching did not
come all of a sudden following the June war. We had
occasion to refer to the ideological struggle which erupted
within the Movement as early as 1962. Nevertheless, the
defeat of the Arabs in June 1967 accentuated the ideological
crisis and gave it the chance to surface, and very violently
for the matter.

For the first time in the life of the ANM, the old
concept of the nation as one "whole" was abandoned, and a
completely new analysis of the Arab society was upheld. It
was emphasized that the old notion that the people are free
because the nation is free from foreign dominance is wrong.
The freedom of the people cannot be won unless the masses
organize themselves in political groups and force a democratic
dialogue. The main point in this analysis is that the pro-
gressive regimes of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria along
with the Ba'th, the ANM and the Communist parties do not
represent the interest of the masses. They represent the
interests of the petty bourgeois class whose political program

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[13]ANM, Mawdhu'at Khamsah. Huzayran [Subjects of June 5],
1968.

was defeated in the June war. Within this context the tools of Marxist analysis were employed. It was pointed out that the petty bourgeois regimes which had an interest in eliminating the big landlords and capitalists, have no interest in governing the country democratically, because democracy would endanger the new privileges they have acquired. Furthermore, these privileges render the petty bourgeois regimes incapable of carrying the fight against Israel to its ultimate end.

The basis of the above logic assumes that the military regimes in the Arab countries genuinely represent the interests of the petty bourgeois class. But the history of these regimes does not support this assumption. On the contrary, there is reason to believe that these regimes work against the interests of a large segment of the lower middle class. The analysis does not ignore this fact completely for in other places it drops this assumption and states that the military regimes represent the "mentality" of the petty bourgeoisie. The shift to Marxism is relatively new, and it is hard to judge its full impact now. However, two points are in order:

1. The shift is useful in the sense that it had done away with the old dogma. Developing a habit of free enquiry is a good thing in its own right. However, the danger of substituting one dogma for another cannot be completely disregarded.

2. The great shift from nationalism to Marxism within a short period might look very odd for an outsider. However, a closer look at the violent conditions prevailing in the

Middle East might supply an understanding. On one hand, the turmoil makes people look for new ideas. On the other hand, the religious mentality of the people is receptive to accepting ideologies as means of salvation. It is very common in the Middle East to blame "Arab socialism" for the defeat of June, not the performance of the Arab armies!

Chapter 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The ANM was one of the streams of the Arab national
movement whose initial aim was national unification and inde-
pendence. Its establishment in the early 'fifties, represented
the rejuvenation of the ideals and concepts of an earlier
generation. In the manner of the older and now defunct
Group of Arab Nationalists, whose activities between the two
World Wars spread in all parts of the Fertile Crescent, the
ANM gave clear priority to the issue of national unification
over all other issues. The creation of a unified Arab state
was looked upon, by the founders of the ANM, as the cardinal
objective that would lead to the liberation of the usurped
Arab lands and to the establishment of a better life for
future generations.

The ANM grew out of Dr. Constantine Zurayk's study
groups at the American University of Beirut. There its
founding leaders were imbued with the abstract thought of
the early school of Arab Nationalists. Hence, they paid only
little attention to specific social and economic problems at
this early stage.

The character of the early ANM was akin to the German
university student groups who, a century earlier, had fought
under the banners of union and freedom. In fact the Arab

Nationalists, following the example of the German students, believed that the means to be used for the fulfillment of their national objectives were education and armed struggle. The only thing different was that the Arab Nationalists were out of touch with the hard realities of life. They believed that the struggle for Arab unity was but an easy task that can be accomplished in the near future. At one time they believed that the assassination of King Adbullah and other conciliatory leaders would bring about the desired objectives.

The spread of the Arab Nationalists to the neighboring Arab states added new ingredients to the movement which ultimately transformed it from a militant student group to a political party. In Jordan, the ANM was reinforced by a group of elder politicians, some of whom had previous experience with the Arab Party of Palestine. The paternalistic and pragmatic approach of these politicians imposed certain limitations on the activities of the younger members. Instead of adopting the revolutionary tactics of the underground movement they vied for power and at one time encouraged the ANM to seek support at the polls. If it were not for the heavy-handed policies of the King, following the dismissal of the Nabulsi government, these new adherents to the movement could have succeeded in integrating the Jordanian branch of the ANM into the political system. However, with the crack-down on the organization of the ANM, these elder

politicians lost their controlling position in the movement. Nevertheless, their legacy remained with the ANM for years to come. Indeed some of these politicians continued to command the respect and moral support of the ANM.

In Iraq, the ANM branch took the unprecedented step, as far as the movement is concerned, of working with the military. This was to implicate the movement in a series of abortive coups. While the Iraqi branch failed to utilize the military to bring about the desired revolutionary changes, other branches of the movement, especially the Syrian branch, built upon the ANM relations with the military in Iraq, to enter Arab politics from its widest door! This special relationship with the military was later to be utilized also by the national leadership of the ANM to win the favors of President Nasser.

The ANM also spread to Egypt, Libya, the Sudan and the Yemen, but in each of these countries, except for the latter it remained a student movement. In the Yemen it was reinforced by a number of experienced politicians such as Qahtan al-Sha'bi, who gave the movement a political organization and a sense of direction. The Yemen, and more importantly Aden and the South Arabian Federation, soon provided the ANM with the battleground to test its theories on armed struggle and guerilla warfare. Indeed, the victory of the ANM-dominated National Liberation Front in South Yemen gave a greater incentive to the ANM to develop its revolutionary theories and to apply them elsewhere in the Arab world.

The experience of the rise and fall of the United Arab Republic had a great impact on the ANM. When the U.A.R. was established, the ANM allied its fortunes to the fortune of the new state. In fact it aspired to become the striking force of the U.A.R. in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Again when the U.A.R. collapsed, the ANM wanted to play the role of the savior of that state. The ANM failed in both roles: the striking force and the savior.

The ANM failed to play the roles it was set to perform not because of its weakness, though it was not that powerful, but more importantly it failed because the prevailing circumstances were not conducive to the emergence of an Arab unionist force. Both local forces and foreign powers were then working to subdue the U.A.R.

The fall of the U.A.R. lead to the disintegration of the Nasserite movement throughout the Arab World. The ANM could not escape the cross fire. The division between the nationalist and the leftist factions surfaced at a party congress held after the secession of Syria from the U.A.R. Further defeats in Iraq, Syria and Jordan accentuated the divisions within the ANM. Finally the June war shattered the few remaining ties that held the different factions together.

In the meantime there emerged three trends: the first upheld the old line travelled by the movement, the second repudiated the old line as wholly responsible for the

the defeat, and the third, though admitting the shortcomings of the old line, nevertheless did not single out those shortcoming as wholly responsible for the defeat. Instead, it put the emphasis on the superior forces facing the Arab nation. In any event, the mother organization was dismembered, and the old factions now emerged as independent political groups.

It is significant to note that the emerging groups which have outlived the mother organization such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Gulf, the Organization of the Lebanese Socialists, and the Arab Socialist Action Party, have all subscribed to Marxism-Leninism. This trend towards Marxism-Leninism may be attributed to the following factors:

1. The industrious work of a group of party members who have absorbed Marxist through. It is believed that such influential members as Muhsin-Ibrahim and Nayef al-Hawatmah, both members of the Political Bureau of the ANM, were utilizing Marxism as a tool of analysis as early as 1959.

2. The Nationalization Decrees of 1961 in the U.A.R. have singled out the bourgeoisie as a force inimical to the cause of unity.

3. The secession of Syria from the U.A.R. prompted by the feudalist-bourgeois alliance emphasized the conviction held earlier that the bourgeois class cannot be trusted anymore.

4. The role played by President Nasser in drawing the relationship between the nationalist and the socialist thought. Of particular significance in this respect is the National Charter which proclaimed that socialism is the path to social freedom and that, "scientific socialism" was the suitable style for finding the right method leading to progress.

5. The Nationalization Decrees and the Syrian secession have also shed doubt on the petty bourgeoisie as a unionist force. It is to be recalled that while the Hourani faction of the Ba'th supported the re-examination of the Nationalization Decrees, the Aflaq group was reluctant to take a stand. Aflaq declared, "that there can be no socialism without socialists".

6. The events of June 1967 revealed an apparent affinity between Israel, imperialism and the reactionary forces. The Arab Nationalists knew all too well the limitations of Nasser's policies. Hence their endeavor to wage a protracted war of liberation utilizing the doctrines of Mao, Giap and Guevera. As these doctrines of revolutionary warfare eminate from Marxist-Leninist thought, the ANM offshoot groups have increasingly upheld Marxism-Leninism as the ideological weapon that would challenge the enemy. They found in Cuba and Vietnam a working example of how an underdeveloped nation can face the technological superiority and the military might of a great power.

7. The support of Arab rights in Palestine by the Socialist camp, and the support of the Palestinian resistance movement by the leftist forces in the West was greatly appreciated by the Arab nationalists.

For the above factors the emerging groups have openly committed themselves to the thesis that a Marxist revolution within the Arab world is a precondition of victory over Zionism, imperialism and Arab conservatism. It is not necessary to elaborate on the deeper, unconscious or semi-conscious motivation of the young Arab revolutionaries, except to emphasize that they contain an element of frustration. They believe that the petty bourgeois parties and regimes have been hopelessly compromised by the West and hence nothing is to be gained by allying their fortunes to the fortune of those forces. Moreover, they point out that the present national regimes have proved themselves unable to inspire and organize the masses for a confrontation with the enemy. Thus they aspire to mobilize the masses, i.e., the workers and peasants, by upholding their ideology: Marxism-Leninism.

So far, the above groups have met little success. For one thing it is necessary to have a "political class" in the Gramscian sense of the term to provide it with the vehicle that would attain its ends. Owing to the nature of agricultural production in the Arab World, the peasants remain, in their majority, an illiterate, inert mass. The

working class, on the other hand, still lacks the necessary degree of organization. It goes without saying that the ANM off-shoot groups are facing a real dilemma. On one hand, they see no hope but in the mobilization of the masses to carry on the struggle to achieve the national objectives. On the other hand, they lack the organizational tools to do the job.

It remains to be seen if the role of the petty bourgeoisie in the national struggle will be re-examined by the above-groups. This stratum of the population has played an important role in all the national liberation movements and it may prove, after all, to be receptive to the radical ideas imparted by the Arab Nationalists. If the petty bourgeoisie can be integrated in the national liberation movements, then they can provide new vistas for the movements by supplying the cadres and the organizational devices for the mobilization of the less conscious working classes.

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