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DEMOCRATIC PALESTINE

DOP

West Bank and Gaza Strip
20 Years After,
The Struggle Continues

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- Conveying the political line of progressive Palestinian and Arab forces;
- Providing current information and analysis pertinent to the Palestinian liberation struggle, as well as developments on the Arab and international levels;
- Serving as a forum for building relations of mutual

solidarity between the Palestinian revolution and progressive organizations, parties, national liberation movements and countries around the world.

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Palestinian refugees pushed into Jordan by the 1967 Zionist aggression.




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June 1987 marks five years since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.



Editorial

Anti-Zionist Israelis are Allies

On June 11th, there was a meeting between a PLO delegation and an Israeli delegation in Budapest, Hungary. This meeting led to controversy within the Palestinian movement, which necessitates an explanation of the different viewpoints concerning relations with Jewish forces in 'Israel'.

THE NIHILISTS

The first viewpoint is a nihilistic one. The advocates of this viewpoint oppose any relations with Israelis. They do not see the necessity of having relations with democratic, anti-Zionist, Jewish forces in 'Israel', even if these people are supportive of the Palestinian struggle and legitimate rights, and opposed to the repressive Israeli policies against the Palestinian masses. The nihilists say that any meeting with any Israeli means outright recognition of the state of 'Israel'. Concurrently, they reject the idea of making use of inter-Israeli contradictions as being wishful thinking.

THE RIGHTISTS

In contrast to the first viewpoint, the rightists go as far as meeting any Israeli, whether Zionist or not, provided that the Israeli concerned claims to be a supporter of the PLO. The rightists believe that such contacts will lead to Israeli and US recognition of the PLO. It is clear that the advocates of this viewpoint put more emphasis on the diplomatic work. They do not see the importance of changing the balance of forces in the region as a prerequisite for forcing 'Israel' and the USA to concede to Palestinian demands and recognize the Palestinians' legitimate, inalienable, national rights. Many times in the past, spokespersons of the Palestinian right wing have declared this or that year as the year of liberation, after listening to this or that US official speak about the importance of solving the Palestinian problem. These rightists were spelling out their ideology which is an idealist one.

THE REVOLUTIONARIES

The third viewpoint neither minimizes nor overestimates the importance of relations with Jewish forces. The advocates of this viewpoint clearly see that relations with democratic and progressive Jews are important. They put only one condition to such relations, namely, that the Jewish forces involved should first of all be anti-Zionist. Secondly, the advocates of this viewpoint recognize the importance of gaining support for the PLO and Palestinian national rights. Revolutionaries within the Palestinian national movement realize that Zionism, in theory and practice, means the negation of the Palestinian people's right to Palestine. In theory and practice, it means the implantation of an alien canton in the Middle East, a canton opposed to national liberation, democracy and progress, whose main function is promoting imperialist interests. For this reason, Palestinian revolutionaries think that the thesis about a Jewish nation being in formation in 'Israel' is irrele-

vant. Such a thesis merely serves as an excuse for the imperialists and colonialists to market their merchandise in the Middle East via the state of 'Israel'.

In the last PNC session, held in Algeria in April, the PFLP objected to a resolution on this issue, which was adopted by the council. This resolution (see text of the PNC resolutions in this issue) did not state the condition mentioned above.

ASSESSING THE BUDAPEST MEETING

In Budapest, Abu Mazen and Abdel Razaq Yahya of the PLO Executive Committee met an Israeli delegation headed by Charlie Biton of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality. The delegation included members of Mapam which is a Zionist party. The policy of engaging in such meetings is harmful to the Palestinian struggle, for a number of reasons:

First: For the PLO to meet a delegation that includes avowed Zionists tends to blur the distinction between Zionism and anti-Zionism. Such a policy weakens the struggle of the PLO and its allies against Zionism and the state of 'Israel'. At present, the Palestinian movement is fighting an important battle to defend UN resolution no.3379 which equates Zionism with racism. For their part, 'Israel' and the US government are attempting to reverse this resolution, which would never have seen the light of day had it not been for the Palestinian armed struggle and the support the PLO enjoys from the friends of the Palestinian people all over the world. The resolution would not have seen the light of day had it not been for greater awareness of the atrocities of the Zionist state, among peace-loving people all over the world. Still, the rightists contend that their policy is correct, although it blurs these realities.

Second: The Budapest meeting occurs at a time when the Zionist Prime Minister Shamir is promoting relations with 'Israel' on the African continent. Without a doubt he is making use of the fact that some Arab regimes - and even the PLO - have contacts with Israelis, asking African leaders, «why shouldn't you too?» Here one should ask what the difference is between meeting the Zionist, Shamir, and meeting a member of the Zionist party, Mapam.


Third: the Budapest meeting occurs at a time when the US, 'Israel' and the reactionary Arab states are very active in their efforts to reach a capitulationist settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict, based on unilateral solutions and bilateral negotiations. The prelude to such a settlement is the liquidation of the PLO and Palestinian national rights. There is no doubt that the reactionary Arab regimes will utilize the PLO's contacts with Zionist elements to justify their own negotiations with the Zionist enemy and recognition of the Zionist state. It is for this reason that Butros Ghali, Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs, praised the meeting in Budapest, terming it a positive step.

In conclusion, we would like to stress the importance of contacting the democratic and progressive, anti-Zionist forces who support the PLO and Palestinian national rights, while

opposing Zionism and Israeli policies in theory and practice. Relations with these forces serve not only the Palestinian people's interests, but the interests of these forces in combatting Zionism.

The PLO Executive Committee should objectively assess its policy on this vital issue. It should assess the results of its

meetings with Zionist elements. In so doing, it will regain an important weapon in its efforts to isolate the Zionist movement and state. The road to real peace in the Middle East is filled with battles. In these battles, the democratic and progressive, anti-Zionist Jewish forces are main allies of the Palestinian liberation movement.



Assessing the PNC

Interview with Abu Ali Mustafa

Soon after the unifying Palestinian National Council session in Algeria, *Al Nida*, the Lebanese Communist Party's newspaper, interviewed Abu Ali Mustafa, deputy general secretary of the PFLP and newly elected member of the PLO Executive Committee. In the interview, he assesses the results of the PNC and their repercussions on the struggle in Lebanon.

What is your assessment of the political and organizational resolutions adopted at the latest PNC?

The resolutions of the unifying PNC have two aspects, dealing with the political and organizational matters of the PLO. These resolutions cannot be understood without consideration of the preceding years and the discussions in the Palestinian arena concerning the necessity of political and organizational reforms in the PLO. The weeks preceding the PNC session were characterized by intensive dialogue in Algiers and other countries, but most important was reaching the summation in the Algiers session.

First among the main issues of discussion was the cancellation of the Amman accord. To us and others, this accord was not only an accord. It was a program facilitating a policy totally contradictory to the Palestinian national program. Second among the main issues discussed was breaking relations with the Camp David regime in Egypt. In addition, there was a third issue concerning recognition of the UN Security Council resolution no. 242. Over the past years, some Arab reactionaries have attempted to press the PLO to adopt this (recognition) as policy. This was not an issue of great dispute though.

NATIONAL PROGRAM REHABILITATED

The sum of the political resolutions adopted has rehabilitated the Palestinian national program and reaffirmed the patriotic tenets for which the Palestinian people are struggling. These resolutions have settled the most disputed issues, particularly cancelling the Amman accord prior to the PNC, and basing relations with Egypt on the 16th PNC's resolutions. Agreement was also reached concerning the Palestinian and

Arab levels. This presents good prospects for the possibility of reconciliation with Syria and establishing relations on the basis of common struggle against the US-Israeli project.

On the international level, the PNC reaffirmed a clear understanding of the international conference. This indicates prospects for active political moves whereby the PLO should present its understanding of this issue, since the international conference deals with the Middle East conflict, the core of which is the Palestinian cause... The PNC focused on the main aspects, taking into consideration that any conference should deal with the Palestinian people's cause, affirm the Palestinians' legitimate rights to self-determination and establishing an independent state, and recognize the PLO as the Palestinian people's representative, participating on an independent and equal footing.

ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM INCOMPLETE

On the organizational level, there was the imperative of instating collective leadership and establishing correct, democratic and front-type relations within the PLO. This issue is not less important than the political issues, for it concerns the instrument for expressing the program and interpreting it in daily political relations. We can say that a positive but incomplete step was taken. Still, it paved the way for us to develop these resolutions through the daily organizational work in the PLO's institutions.

We think that what was achieved in this session was great, but there must be serious adherence to the political resolutions and firm execution of the organizational aspects. There should also be active political moves to revive the Lebanese-Palestinian-Syrian triangle of steadfastness and to establish a state of Arab solidarity antagonistic to the imperialist-Zionist reactionary project.

Despite talk about cancelling the Amman accord and closing the gate to Cairo, there are still statements by Yasir Arafat and his political advisor, praising the Egyptian regime. What is your response? Do you think that the right wing in the PLO will abide by the PNC's decisions, or as usual try to escape from them?

Undoubtedly, a number of statements have been made contradictory to the PNC's resolutions. Being represented in the PLO's highest organizational body, the Executive Committee, we will raise this for discussion at the first meeting. The resolutions of the PNC should be respected by all. I don't think these attempts will stop totally. This is common practice for the Palestinian right wing. These statements are an attempt to exploit the period separating one stage (division) from another (total unity). In summary, I can say that in as much as the previous period has affected us all, moving into a perfect situation is an idealistic vision. This period can be a recovery period that follows being seriously wounded and precedes being healthy. Such a period requires adhering to the adopted resolutions... We certainly never doubted, whether during the dialogue or the PNC, that there would be differences once national unity was achieved.

IMPOSING ADHERENCE TO RESOLUTIONS

The political and social differences in the Palestinian arena will continue to be expressed in one way or another. Such differences will sometimes take a dangerous direction. Our duty is to curb this on the basis of the PLO's unity. It is important to understand that unity does not mean ending all conflicts over political stands or practices or interpretations of these stands. Our patriotic duty does not end with the declaration of the political resolutions. We must work to impose adherence to these resolutions and to improve the political and organizational situation of the PLO.

Several Palestinian organizations have taken a position opposing the PNC resolutions. In addition, there are different evaluations of these resolutions by every organization. How do you characterize the post-PNC situation? What are the prospects of a future consolidation of Palestinian national unity?


Every Palestinian organization is free to express its views concerning the PNC's results. We should not obscure anyone's views that are based on their convictions. Every organization undoubtedly expresses its convictions on the basis of patriotism, regardless of whether this expression leads in a positive direction. This is natural given the plurality of political and social positions in the Palestinian arena which includes both leftist and rightist poles. Undoubtedly the dilemma experienced by the PLO for years caused the accumulation of negative consequences. Some of these were big, and we don't imagine that they will vanish in a few days. This needs time. Therefore, we are opposed to imposing restrictions on any organization's freedom of expression.

With respect to the second part of your question, what was achieved in Algiers was restoration of the PLO's unity. However, this achievement should not be viewed as everything. We fear two mistakes in dealing with Palestinian affairs. The

first is playing down the value of the political and organizational achievements made. The second is ignoring those who did not participate in the unification process. A great achievement was made in restoring the PLO's unity. Politically it was achieved in favor of the entire Palestinian patriotic work, but it needs consolidation and dialogue and positive relations between the PLO leadership and all Palestinian organizations, in particular those who did not participate in the unification process. During the short Executive Committee meeting (held at the end of the PNC session), this issue was discussed, and a number of Palestinian leaders were charged with following up the matter with our brothers in the other organizations.

CONFLICT WITHIN UNITY

The unity of the PLO has never obstructed any organization's freedom to express its own convictions. There is, however, a qualitative difference between disputing on a divided basis and disputing within a framework of unity. Our experience has proved that conflicts aimed at improving our struggle, not nihilistic conflicts, can contribute to the PLO's political and organizational development and its ability to struggle. This is contrary to the division that brought nothing but harm to all, aggravating the dilemma.



Comrade Abu Ali Mustafa interviewed by «Al Nida» journalist

This does not mean playing down the political differences behind the PLO's division. It does not mean saying that the differences were inconsequential and could have been resolved by reasoning, etc. The differences represented two political trends. One trend adheres to the national program and struggles to achieve the program's goals. The other trend bets on illusive policies, thinking that they will achieve something, only to discover that their course led to a dead end. This trend aggravated the dilemma of those who advocated it, and aggravated the dilemma of all Palestinian nationalists. We are all required to extract the lessons. In the end, it was clear to all that unity, rather than division, had the potential to protect the PLO, the national program and our people's struggle.

What is Libya's real position on the PNC and its resolutions?

Libya did not boycott the PNC. There was a Libyan representative present, brother Ahmed Al Qaddafi. Moreover, months before the convening of the PNC, Libya played a role in the drive for Palestinian national unity. Libya's role, especially the efforts of Col. Moammer Qaddafi, had a

positive effect on the results of the PNC. He participated seriously in the discussion held between the six Palestinian organizations that agreed on the Tripoli document (see *Democratic Palestine* no. 24 for text). This was one of the main documents discussed at the dialogue which preceded the PNC. On this basis, Libya welcomed the delegation from the Palestinian leadership after the PNC ended. Libya was also enthusiastic about the political results of the PNC, as was duly expressed by Libyan officials and the media. Libya is to reopen the PLO office as was agreed after Qaddafi's meeting with Abu Jihad (of Fatah's Central Committee).

While on this topic, we must also point to the efforts of other parties such as Algeria whose efforts complemented those of Libya and Democratic Yemen, and the efforts of our friends in the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union. In short there were concerted Arab, progressive and international efforts which had a great effect on the results achieved during the PNC.

What repercussions will the PNC's resolutions have on the Lebanese arena, especially in terms of organizing Palestinian and Lebanese nationalist relations?

This matter was dealt with in the PNC. There was a special clause on the subject in the final political communique. Palestinian and Lebanese nationalist relations have passed through different phases. This requires that we deal with this matter in depth in order to learn from the lessons of the past.

In the phase before 1969, the national presence of the Palestinians residing in Lebanon was suppressed. They were oppressed by the Lebanese authorities more than anyone can imagine. The Lebanese authorities tried to enact the reactionary program for suppressing any Palestinian nationalist activity, even verbal political expression. This was an abominable stage unacceptable to any Palestinian or Lebanese nationalist.

In the second phase, the armed struggle against Israeli occupation began. This merged with the civil war which was ignited by the fascist, isolationist forces against the Lebanese nationalist forces and masses and the Palestinian revolution. There is no doubt that the patriotic Lebanese masses offered many sacrifices in defense of their nationalist position and the Palestinian revolution. This phase ended with the Israeli invasion of 1982. This phase was marked by faults. However, these faults do not negate the positive value of the patriotic trend that prevailed due to the presence of the Palestinian revolution and the joint Palestinian-Lebanese national resistance.

THE MAIN LESSON

One cannot but extract an important lesson from this phase. In our opinion the most important lesson is that the Palestinian revolution should not act in a way that undermines Lebanese nationalist decision-making, or try to dominate it. We have always struggled to establish correct Palestinian-Lebanese nationalist relations. It is our opinion that regarding Lebanese affairs, everyone must abide by the Lebanese nationalist decisions. Regarding Palestinian nationalist affairs, there is the decision of the PLO. In addition, there are joint issues, since one cannot mechanically separate the Palestinian national factor from the Lebanese national factor and the joint struggle against the common enemy. For such issues, there must be a basis regulating relations. This was missing during the seven-

ties and up till the beginning of the eighties. This should not, however, prevent us from making a critical review of this phase.

POST — INVASION STAGE

The third phase is that after 1982, which was characterized by a positive escalation of Palestinian and Lebanese national resistance against the Israeli occupation. There were many attempts to distort this struggle, especially during the camp wars waged against the Palestinian armed presence under a range of pretexts and slogans such as 'No return to the pre-1982 situation.' This is to insinuate that everything that existed before 1982 was wrong. Such demagogic is intended to strike at the Palestinian nationalist armed presence and the Lebanese national resistance as well. It also aims to misrepresent the major role played by the democratic and progressive forces and parties, especially the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP). The LCP's heroic, militant contributions are known to the Lebanese people and all Arab progressive forces who followed the events in Lebanon. The post-1982 phase witnessed a rise in Palestinian-Lebanese resistance, supported by Syria. This resulted in the abrogation of the May 17th accord; it defeated the US forces and ousted the Zionist enemy from vast areas of Lebanon.

In the light of reviewing these three phases, we must derive the formula for joint militant, nationalist relations. The new formula must emphasize the role of the Lebanese nationalist movement and support its program for democratic reform, which underscores Lebanon's Arab identity, unity and independence. The new formula must also stress confrontation of the Zionist occupation and of the fascist, isolationist forces that are tied to the Israeli-US project. It must underscore the right of the Palestinians in Lebanon to nationalist armed struggle, and guarantee their social rights in this period. Our people do not aspire to more than being guests of the Lebanese people. They do not seek a substitute homeland or permanent residence in Lebanon as some claim in order to misrepresent Palestinian nationalism.

When relations have been established on this comprehensive basis, giving priority to the Lebanese nationalist tasks and to continuing the Palestinian national struggle, I believe that this will advance the process of benefitting from the positive aspects of the previous stages. It will suppress the negative factors which enemy forces tried to exploit to harm the Lebanese national movement and the Palestinian revolution. If we wish for a more thorough regulation of relations, then the Lebanese-Palestinian-Syrian alliance must be revitalized.

How do you view the escalation of Israeli aggression against South Lebanon and the Palestinian camps?

As efforts to restore the PLO's unity intensified, we noticed an escalation of the reactionary-US-Zionist aggression against the PLO and the bases of the Palestinian revolution, especially in Lebanon. The Israeli belligerence which we experience daily in Lebanon... is also being applied against the popular uprising in occupied Palestine. This uprising has spread throughout -Ramallah, Nazareth, Al Khalil, Gaza and Jenin - leaving the Zionists disconcerted. The Israeli officials have expressed their worry by tightening the iron fist. We are aware that the enemy's worries stem from the anticipated future rise in the struggle. This popular, militant, political movement in the oc-

cupied territories has worried the Jordanian regime before them-the regime that now strives for joint administration of the occupied territories, along with the occupation authorities, in order to restrict the PLO's influence and popularity.

NEW AGGRESSION POSSIBLE, BUT WE REFUSE TO SPREAD FEAR

Israeli aggression against Lebanon and the Palestinian camps will increase. I believe that the Israeli comments on the results of the PNC are a sufficient indication that the Zionist enemy will resort to aggression in the occupied territories, while increasing destructive attacks on our people in the camps of Lebanon. We do not put it past the Zionists to carry out a major new act of aggression. Yet we must notice the attempt to spread fear with the possibility of a renewed invasion, extending 40 kilometers into Lebanon, i.e., to the Litani River. We do not exclude any possibility, although there may be political considerations or internal differences among Israeli leaders, or international considerations, that would inhibit an invasion like that of 1982. We are faced with an enemy that does not respect borders, principles or standards, but justifies all its actions with 'security' pretexts. As I remember, Sharon said, in 1982, that the security of 'Israel' extends to the point of its troops' deployment and the range of its planes. This explains the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the PLO headquarters in Tunis. We must consider all possibilities and hasten to improve the Lebanese-Palestinian-Syrian nationalist coordination in order to foil Israeli ambitions to expand its aggression against Lebanon in general and against the Palestinian camps in particular.

May 8th air raid, Ain Al Hilweh



What are your expectations concerning the camp wars in the light of the new situation, and the Arab, Palestinian and Lebanese stands on the PNC resolutions?

We cannot guarantee Amal's intentions vis-a-vis the Palestinian camps, especially since elements in this movement are committed to furthering the reactionary program by striking the Palestinian and Lebanese national struggle. However, there is no doubt that strengthening the Palestinian-Lebanese-Syrian alliance could put a stop to this tragedy. Moreover, a leap could be made to overcome the deep gap which came about because of the camp wars, planting the spirit of sectarianism with the aim of striking everything patriotic, whether Lebanese or Palestinian. This alliance could surely restrict Amal's aggression and resolve the camp wars correctly and completely.

The (present) situation leaves much to be desired. If one looks at the situation of the camps for example: The lifting of the blockade on food and medical supplies did not provide solutions for all the problems... Such humanitarian gestures are sometimes made by our enemies. In reality, Amal is still besieging the camps militarily. This clearly indicates that some still have sick ideas, thinking that this will ensure elimination of the Palestinian armed struggle, by perpetuating a hostile situation. However, it is inevitable that the Palestinian-Lebanese-Syrian nationalist alliance take control of the situation - not militarily, but by establishing a national front and a united political program for the progressive and nationalist forces in Lebanon. This front would be responsible for guaranteeing the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. ●

Evacuating victims of May 6th air raid, Miye Miyeh



PNC Resolutions

The National Unity Program



PNC session emblem

Below are the resolutions adopted at the unifying session of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), held in Algeria, April 20-25, 1987.

POLITICAL:

First: On the Palestinian Level

Based on the Palestinian National Charter and adhering to the resolutions of the PNC, we reaffirm the following political points as the basis for Palestinian nationalist work in the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

1. To adhere to the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian Arab people. These are the right to repatriation, self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian national soil, with Jerusalem as its capital. Also, to adhere to the political program of the PLO, which aims at fulfilling these rights.

2. To consider the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; to reject delegating, mandating or sharing this representation; to reject and resist any alternative to the PLO.

3. To uphold the PLO's independence, rejecting tutelage, control, absorption or interference in its internal affairs.

4. To continue the struggle in all forms: armed, political and mass struggle. These are the means for achieving our national rights and liberating the Palestinian and Arab land from Israeli occupation. These are also the means for confronting the projects of the aggressive imperialist-Zionist alliance in our region, particularly the US-Israeli strategic alliance. These forms of struggle are considered as a genuine expression of the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and anti-Zionist nature of our people's national liberation movement.

5. To reject Security Council resolution 242 as a valid base for resolving the Palestinian cause. This resolution deals with the cause only as one of refugees, ignoring the inalienable national rights of our people.

6. To reject all partial and unilateral solutions. Also, to reject all projects which aim at liquidating the Palestinian cause, including the Camp David accords, the Reagan plan, self-rule and the (Israeli-Jordanian) joint administration plan in all its forms.

7. To uphold the resolutions of the Arab summits related to the Palestinian cause, particularly those of the Rabat summit of 1974. To consider the Arab peace plan which was adopted at the Fez Summit of 1982 as a basis for Arab action on the international level, in order to try and find a solution to the Palestinian cause and restore the occupied Arab territories.

8. To support the convening of an international conference with full authority under the auspices of the UN and on the basis of its resolutions related to the Palestinian cause. This conference is to be held in order to deal with the Arab - Zionist conflict and its core, the Palestinian cause. The conference shall be attended by the five permanent members of the Security Council. The PLO shall participate as a full, independent party, on an equal footing with the other parties, because the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, as stated in the Arab summits' resolutions. To uphold this form of international conference.

9. To consolidate the unity of all nationalist forces and institutions in the occupied territories under the leadership of the PLO. Also, to develop all forms of cooperation in order to struggle against the Zionist enemy and its racist, repressive policies - its colonialist settlement policy, iron fist policy and its plans for self-rule, joint administration, normalization of relations and the so-called development plan. To struggle against the attempts to fabricate alternatives to the PLO, including the attempts to appoint municipal and village councils. To support the steadfastness of our people, represented in their nationalist forces and institutions.

10. To enhance the joint work aimed at organizing our camps in Lebanon. To defend the existence of these camps and consolidate the unity of our people there under the leadership of the PLO. To uphold the rights of our people in Lebanon: their right to residence, work, travel and political and social activities. To reject all attempts to disperse our people or to confiscate their arms. To reaffirm our people's right to fight the Zionist enemy, and defend themselves and their camps in accordance with the Cairo agreement and its appendices,

regulating relations between the PLO and the Republic of Lebanon. To join our Lebanese brothers and nationalist forces in resisting the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.

11. To protect, safeguard and care for our people wherever they may reside. To uphold their rights to residence, travel, work, education and health, in accordance with the resolutions of the Arab League and the Human Rights Declaration. This is an expression of Arab fraternity, Arab nationalism and fraternal Arab joint struggle.

Second: On the Arab Level

1. To enhance Arab solidarity on the basis of Arab summit resolutions, Arab agreements for joint Arab action and mobilizing all capacities to liberate the occupied Arab territories.

2. To enhance the alliance with the Arab liberation forces, aimed at achieving the goals of joint Arab struggle on an anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist basis. In this context it is important to reconstitute the Arab Front for Participation in the Palestinian Revolution; this front should play a nationalist role in supporting and protecting the Palestinian revolution.

3. To support the struggle of the Lebanese people and their nationalist forces against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, and for Lebanon's unity, independence and Arab identity. Also, to consolidate the militant Lebanese-Palestinian struggle.

4. To develop relations between the PLO and Syria on an anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist basis. These relations should be governed by the Arab summits' resolutions, particularly those of the Rabat and Fez summits. Mutual respect and equality is the path to a militant Syrian-Palestinian alliance.

5. To work to stop the Iran-Iraq war which is devastating to the peoples of the two countries, while benefiting only the imperialist and Zionist forces. This war aims at diverting Arab potentials from the main direction of confronting the aggression of the Zionist enemy, which is supported by US imperialism and directed against the Arab nation and Islamic

countries. To welcome and support peace initiatives aimed at stopping the war, building good neighborly relations between the two countries, based on mutual respect for the sovereignty and international borders of each, solving differences by peaceful means and appreciating the Iraqi response to these initiatives. To reaffirm the principle of defending Iraqi territory and any Arab territory against aggression or foreign invasion. To denounce the US-Israeli arms deals to Iran.

6. To reaffirm the special, distinguished relations between the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples. To develop these relations in accordance with the national interests of the two peoples and the Arab nation. These relations should further the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to repatriation, self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. To uphold the PNC's resolutions dealing with Jordan. Of particular importance is that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people inside and outside of the occupied territories. Any future relations with Jordan should be a confederal relation between two independent states. To uphold the resolutions of the PNC's 15th session and of the Baghdad summit concerning supporting steadfastness, including the Palestinian-Jordanian joint committee.

Third: International

1. To consolidate the PLO's relations of alliance with the forces of the international liberation movement.

2. To cooperate closely with the Islamic, African and non-aligned countries. To activate the work of the PLO in these countries in order to gain more support for the Palestinian revolution.

3. To consolidate the militant alliance with the socialist countries, first and foremost the USSR. Also, to consolidate relations with the People's Republic of China.

4. To support the people's struggle against imperialism and racism, and for national liberation. In particular to support the struggle of the peoples in southern Africa, Central America

Resolution on Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Work

- Adopted by the Executive Committee of the PLO prior to the convening of the unifying PNC.

On February 11, 1985, the PLO and the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan signed an accord for joint work. The aim of this was the fulfillment of the joint interests of the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples, as stated in the resolutions of the Fez Summit, in order to guarantee the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people through Arab and international efforts.

The accord was based on the resolutions of the PNC, in particular the 16th and 17th sessions. These two sessions reaffirmed the special fraternal relations between the two peoples, and called for future relations to be based on confederation between the two states of Jordan and Palestine. They also called for joint political action to confront unilateral solutions and settlements, and to defeat the idea of an alternative homeland (for the Palestinian people).

During the joint work, differences arose between the two sides concerning interpretation and implementation of the accord. These differences were increased by the pressure of the USA and other parties. In the light of this fact, Jordan, on February 19, 1986, stopped coordination with the PLO, and

took other measures. The result was that the accord was frozen and relations reached a state of stagnation and interruption.

The PLO Executive Committee is concerned to implement the PNC resolution concerning the special fraternal relations between the Jordanian and Palestinian people. In the light of the fact that the accord became an obstacle to the development of these relations, and since the accord is in reality not in effect, the Executive Committee considers the accord invalid.

At the same time, the Executive Committee, in accordance with its policy, will continue its efforts to find a new basis for work with Jordan and other Arab countries. The aim of this is joint struggle with unified Arab action and effective Arab solidarity in order to liberate Palestinian and Arab land and achieve Arab unity. These efforts will be based on the Arab summit resolutions on the international conference. This conference would be attended by the USSR, USA, the other permanent members of the Security Council, and the parties to the Middle East conflict, including the PLO which will participate on an equal footing with the other participants, under the auspices and in the framework of the UN.

Resolution on Relations with Egypt

Adopted by the PNC

The PNC reaffirms the historical role of Egypt and its people in the Arab struggle against the Zionist enemy, the sacrifices of the Egyptian people made in defense of the Palestinian people and their national rights, and the role the Egyptian people have played in furthering Arab unity and liberation from colonialism and Zionism. The PNC moreover recognizes the Arab and international prestige of Egypt and the importance of its returning to its natural role in the Arab arena. Accordingly, the PNC has decided to authorize the Executive Committee to stipulate the basis for Palestinian-Egyptian relations. These relations should be based on the resolutions of the consecutive sessions of the PNC, in par-

and South America. To denounce the alliance between the two racist regimes in Tel Aviv and Pretoria.

5. To develop the positive stand of the West European circles that concern our cause. To strengthen cooperation with the European parties and forces that support our inalienable national rights.

6. To work internationally by all means to expose the racism of Zionism and its practices in the occupied land. This work should aim at supporting the historical UN resolution, no. 3379, which equates Zionism with racism. To work to foil the imperialist-Zionist attempt to cancel this resolution.

7. To contribute, together with other peoples of the world, to easing international tension, stopping the arms race and preventing nuclear war. In this context, to support the Soviet initiatives. Also, to publicize the Israeli nuclear threat to our region and to world peace.

8. To develop relations with Israeli democratic forces that support the struggle of the Palestinian people against Israeli occupation and expansionism, who support our people's inalienable national rights, including the right to repatriation, self-determination and the establishment of an independent state, and who recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. To condemn all Zionist efforts, supported by US imperialism, to force Jewish citizens in countries around the world, to immigrate to Israel, calling on all honest forces to resist such mad propaganda campaigns and their effects.

New Executive Committee

Yasir Arafat, Fatah

Farouq Qaddoumi, Fatah

Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), Fatah

Mohammad Milhem, independent

Father Elias Khouri, independent

Jaweed Al Ghusein, independent

Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Abbas), PLF

Abdul Razaq Yahya, independent

Jamal Al Sourani, independent

Yasir Abed Rabbouh, DFLP

Abu Ali Mustafa, PFLP

Suleiman Najab, PCP

Mahmoud Darwish, independent

Abdullah Hourani, independent

ticular the 16th session. These resolutions included the positions and principles for the Palestinian struggle, first and foremost the right to repatriation, self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative (of the Palestinian people). Palestinian-Egyptian relations should be based on the resolutions of the Arab summits which relate to and serve the achievement of the Palestinian people's goals and the inalienable Palestinian national rights which were confirmed by Arab resolutions. Also, these relations should serve the Palestinian and Arab struggle against the Zionist enemy and its supporters.

ORGANIZATIONAL

First: The Palestine National Council (PNC)

1. To expand the presidium membership to include the speaker, four deputies and two secretaries.
2. To consider the Communist Party of Palestine as a member of the PLO.

Second: The Central Council (CC)

A. Composition: The CC shall be composed of:

1. the members of the Executive Committee;
2. the PNC presidium;
3. representatives of the organizations that are members of the PNC;
4. representatives of the mass organizations;
5. a number of independents who shall be elected, as one list, by the PNC;

6. persons with special qualifications, not to exceed five, appointed by the Executive Committee and the PNC presidium.

7. the membership of the CC shall not exceed 75 members.

B. Powers

1. To follow up execution of the PNC's resolutions; to supervise and control the work of the Executive Committee.
2. The CC has the authority to suspend Executive Committee members, not to exceed one-third of its membership.
 - suspension shall be governed by specific regulations.
 - suspended members shall not be counted in the quorum.
3. The CC shall form permanent committees from among its members and the members of the PNC.
4. A set of internal regulations shall be agreed upon. This shall be part and parcel of the PNC's basic statute.

Third: The Executive Committee (EC)

1. All member organizations of the PNC shall be represented in the EC.
2. The EC shall form a working body (secretariat) to be responsible for daily decisions on political, organizational, financial and military issues between two meetings of the EC. This body shall be headed by the chairman of the EC.
3. The EC shall form special committees from among its members, to supervise political affairs, the affairs of the occupied territories, Lebanon and others.
4. The EC shall agree on a set of internal regulations, which shall be a part of the PLO's basic statute.

20 Years After the June 1967 Defeat

Twenty Junes ago, the Zionist army occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and Sinai, defeating the Arab regimes' armies and dispossessing thousands of Palestinians and Arabs. The less than six-day war of 1967 marked a sharp defeat for the Arab rightist and bourgeois leaders and regimes. It exposed the failure of the policies espoused by the classes and leadership in power. On the other hand, the 1967 defeat demonstrated with irrefutable logic that the aspirations of the Arab masses and the Palestinian people for liberation and social progress could only be realized by a revolutionary alternative to these classes.

The 1967 defeat was the prelude to a new stage in the region - a stage characterized by official Arab decline and the emergence of the Palestinian revolution as a direct, popular response to the June defeat. Undoubtedly, the 1967 war was a Zionist victory on the one hand. On the other hand, it was a political victory for the reactionary Arab regimes that capitalized on the setback inflicted on the organizations and regimes of the Arab national liberation movement. Under the impact of the 1967 defeat, the reactionary regimes were later able to assume the decisive role in drawing up official Arab policies. This was particularly true after the oil boom and its negative effects on the class structure in the region.

Twenty years later, the region is still affected by that defeat. The decline of the official Arab policies has continued - a sorrowful fact that could be seen in one simple example: the silence concerning Peres' public visit to Morocco last year. In this article, we will examine what has become of the official Arab policies, the Israeli policies and the Palestinian policies, twenty years after the June 5, 1967 occupation.

1967-1987: POLICIES IN DECLINE

A look at the official Arab situation today can only prompt a description like that of Marcellus in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*: «Something is rotten in the state of Denmark.»

It is known that since the establishment of the parasitic Zionist state, a prime goal for imperialism and Zionism was attaining the Arab government's recognition of that state. The Zionists and imperialists realized that this goal could only be achieved through military force, to create facts in the region to their advantage.

The 1967 aggression came during a historical period that was not conducive to Arab recognition of 'Israel'. On the Israeli level, a socioeconomic crisis threatened the fragile structure of the Zionist entity. On the Palestinian level, armed struggle was escalating, and the PLO and Palestine Liberation Army were formed by the Arab League. On the Arab level, Egypt, the major front-line state, had enacted a radical socioeconomic program that would establish it as a firm, anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, anti-revolutionary force. In Syria, several progressive changes were taking place.

Thus, the 1967 aggression was a necessity for the Zionist-imperialist alliance in order to attain hegemony in the region and establish a base antagonistic to the socialist system and revolutionary forces around the world. These aims were obvious in all the Israeli and US plans for solving the Middle East crisis since 1967: UN Security Council resolution 242, the Johnson plan, Rogers plan, Allon plan, Jarring mission, the Israeli Labor Party's plans, Camp David and, finally, the Reagan plan issued after the Palestinian forces' withdrawal from Beirut in 1982. The common aim of all these plans was ending the state of war between 'Israel' and the Arabs in a way that would consolidate the Zionist state while subjugating the Arab nationalist regimes. To this end, all these plans emphasized recognizing the right of existence and sovereignty of all states in the area. What is actually meant by that is 'Israel', since all the Arab states are recognized.

Although the Zionist-imperialist goals have not materialized after twenty years, this alliance cannot be totally dissatisfied with what has been achieved over these two decades. In addition to the 'peace' and normal relations established between the Zionist entity

and the most important Arab country, Egypt, there is a *de facto* acceptance of the Zionist entity by the vast majority of Arab states. This is witnessed in several facts: First is the Arab states' firm, unilateral adherence to the ceasefire resolutions, and their acceptance of the new Israeli borders after 1967. An exception to this was the 1973 war which proved to be only an attempt to pave the way for a settlement; in the case of Egypt, it led to outright surrender. Second is the total, forcible prohibition of Palestinian armed activity in the Arab states, particularly in the front-line states or across their borders. Third is the establishment of covert and even overt relations with the Zionist entity, namely by Morocco, Jordan and Numeiri's Sudan. Fourth is the complete neglect of the Israeli atrocities against the Palestinian people, whether in occupied Palestine or elsewhere. It took almost three months of siege of Beirut for the Arab states to convene a summit, and they did so only after the Palestinian withdrawal. Aggression against the Arab masses and territory is treated with the same attitude (the Israeli air raid against the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the bombing of the PLO's headquarters in Tunisia). Fifth is neglect and non-adherence to the resolutions boycotting the Camp David regime in Egypt. Sixth is the establishment of strong ties with the imperialist states, the strategic allies of 'Israel' and the supporters of its aggression, paving the way for the US in particular to consolidate its influence in the region. On the other hand, all efforts were exerted to weaken the role of the Arabs' friends and allies, particularly the Soviet Union.

Egypt's acceptance of UN Security Council resolution 242 was an initial indication of the Arab governments' willingness to recognize 'Israel', without consideration of the Palesti-



Zionist soldiers guard Palestinian prisoners in Jerusalem, June 1967.

nian people's cause and rights which are neglected in this resolution. The Egyptian leadership said at the time that its acceptance was only a tactical step, aimed at gaining time to rebuild

Palestinian woman in Baqa camp, Jordan, after being evicted from her home in Jericho, 1967.

its armed forces. However, the danger of that acceptance was later unveiled with Sadat's capitulationist policies which he justified by referring to Nasser's acceptance of 242 and subsequently the Rogers plan.

The decline of the official Arab policies continued with the 1970 Rogers plan, named after the US secretary of state, to settle the Middle East conflict. This plan was initially welcomed by Egypt. In September 1970, King Hussein of Jordan and his army waged a vicious war against the Palestinian revolution in Jordan, resulting in the expulsion of Palestinian forces from Jordan and the start of a wave of attempts to curtail Palestinian activities in other countries.

In an interview with *Newsweek* magazine of February 15, 1971, Sadat declared his willingness to enter into a partial Egyptian-Israeli settlement as an «initial step towards Arab-Israeli peace.» He thereby actually outlined the results he desired from the October 1973 war. The US-sponsored disengagement agreements between Egypt and 'Israel' after the 1973 war paved the way for Sadat's journey to occupied Jerusalem in 1977, the 1978 Camp David accords and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli 'peace' treaty.

In 1978, in response to the Camp David accords, the Baghdad Summit

was convened; resolutions for boycotting the Sadat regime were formally adopted. A few years later, these resolutions were only ink on paper as far as the majority of Arab states were concerned. Then came 1982, when the Arab states watched the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the besieging of an Arab capital with less interest than they watched the 1982 World Soccer Cup on television.

On May 17, 1983, the Lebanese regime headed by Amin Gemayel signed the infamous May 17th accord with the Israeli invaders, under US auspices. Not one Arab government broke diplomatic relations with the Lebanese government. (This excludes Syria which had no diplomatic relations with Lebanon since French colonialism divided the two countries.) The accord was later abrogated due to the heroic resistance of the Lebanese people and patriotic and progressive forces, supported by Palestinian revolutionaries and Syria. That resistance forced 'Israel' to withdraw from most of Lebanon, the first time since its creation the Zionist state has unconditionally withdrawn from occupied territory.

Concerning the other front-line states, Jordan for its part realized the danger of entering into a Sadat-type settlement with 'Israel', or a May 17th-



type accord, without political cover on the Palestinian or Arab levels. Instead, the Jordanian regime is normalizing relations with 'Israel' through the policy of joint administration of the 1967 occupied territories.

The vast majority of the Arab regimes no longer object to an unjust, capitulationist settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict and its core, the Palestinian problem. So when Morocco's Hassan II received Israeli Prime Minister Peres in 1986, there was complete silence on the part of most Arab regimes - a sad state of affairs. Times sure have changed.

1967-1987: ISRAELI TENANTS

Ironically, while the Arab state's policies have declined during the past two decades, the Zionist policies have kept a steady course, namely that of subjugating, if not eliminating, the Palestinian people. Despite tactical differences between the Zionist leaders, the strategy remains the same. Golda Meir's famous declaration that «there were no Palestinians» is the theme that dominates political circles in 'Israel'. Her declaration was in 1967. In 1981, a book entitled *Central Issues of the State's and People's History* was included in the curriculum of Israeli secondary schools. Among other statements, it reads: «The Palestinian people do not exist.» In 1982, 'Israel' invaded Lebanon, hoping to make that statement a reality.

The basic Israeli tenants focus on many issues and have been reiterated by 'doves' and 'hawks' alike whenever there was a move to settle the Middle East conflict or one of its aspects. These tenants, which were reaffirmed by the present 'national unity' government, can be summarized as follows:

1. refusal to recognize the PLO, or to negotiate or deal with it;
2. rejection of the idea of an independent Palestinian state under any conditions, considering this to be a disaster for 'Israel';
3. insistence on undisputable Israeli rights to Jerusalem as the 'eternal capital of Israel';
4. rejection of the idea of returning to the pre-1967 borders.

These tenants have been firmly adhered to throughout the two decades after the 1967 war, from Yigal Allon's plan and the conditional Israeli acceptance of the Rogers plan, to the section of the Camp David accords pertaining

to the Palestinian issue, and Peres' current plans. Not only does 'Israel' act on the basis of these tenets, it has demanded that successive US administrations adhere to them as well. In 1985, 'Israel' strongly opposed the idea of US officials meeting with a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation that was formed after the now defunct Amman accord.

The Israeli tenants are based on a number of considerations as follows:

First: The thesis that recognition of the Palestinian people's rights to an independent state and self-determination would threaten the existence of 'Israel' and the Zionist claims about the 'promised land', as well as the plans to attract the Jews of the world to Palestine. Only about 20% of the Jews of the world are in 'Israel', and failure to bring a larger number would mean the failure of Zionism's claim that 'Israel' is the solution for all Jews.

Second: 'Israel' is unwilling to relinquish the political, economic and security advantages obtained through the occupation of all of Palestine. 'Israel' uses the occupation as a point of pressure on the Arab regimes, in order to orientate these regimes towards imperialism, politically and economically.

Third: Relinquishing any part of occupied Palestine, or recognizing the PLO and the Palestinians' legitimate rights would threaten the unity of the main Zionist parties and factions. Despite the seeming divergence between Labor's principle about the 'purity of the Jewish state', whereby some non-

colonized territory could be ceded, and the Likud's principle of 'the unity of the Land of Israel', rejecting any concessions, the two factions have not been willing to dissolve the joint government.


Fourth: The most important factor is the Palestinian revolution. In early 1968, Moshe Dayan replied to a question about the escalation of Palestinian armed activities by saying, «The saboteurs are but an egg in my hand that I could crush whenever I want» - a premature prediction for sure. Nineteen years later, the 'egg' has not been crushed. Rather it has become a great revolution that refuses to be crushed. Successive Israeli attempts to destroy the PLO, supplemented by the attempts of Arab regimes and sectarian forces like Amal and the Phalangists, have all failed. This failure is another cause for Israeli adherence to their tenants and insistence on maintaining the 1967 occupied territories.

It is thus elementary to conclude that the Zionist rhetoric about 'peace' and 'political settlement' is actually a means of gaining Arab approval for the Israeli tenants. This is apparent in Israeli insistence on direct negotiations, also if there is to be an international conference. The Israeli positions are strategic ones, not tactical. They can only be changed by a radical shift in the balance of forces in the region.

1967-1987: ONGOING REVOLUTION

One can with certainty say that the Palestinian revolution stands as one of

Arab boycott weakens - King Hussein, Mubarak and Sultan Qabus in 1982.



the brightest landmarks of the last two decades. The emergence of the Palestinian revolution represented the popular response to the 1967 defeat. The Palestinian resistance represented a contradiction not only to the Zionist project, but to the Arab reactionary project as well. In practice, the Palestinian revolution has become the vanguard of the Arab liberation movement.

Having disappointed the calculations of the Zionist-imperialist-reactionary alliance, the Palestinian revolution has been the prime target for this alliance. In fact, the PLO's major task during the past twenty years has been to confront the enemy alliance's political and military conspiracies.

On the military level, there were the 1970 Black September massacres in Jordan; the 1975 Israeli-backed, Phalangist war against the Palestinians and the Lebanese national movement, and the 1976 Tel Al Zatar massacre; the 1978 and 1982 invasions of Lebanon, and the Sabra-Shatila massacre; the 1985-87 war on the camps waged by the sectarian Amal movement; and the continuous Israeli raids on Palestinian camps, especially in South Lebanon.

On the political level, liquidationist solutions have never stopped pouring in, among them: resolution 242, the Rogers plan (1970), King Hussein's United Kingdom plan (1972), Saudi Prince Fahd's plan (1980), the Reagan plan (1982) and last, but not least, the cancellation of the Cairo accord regulating Palestinian civilian and armed presence in Lebanon.

Yet like the phoenix, the Palestinian revolution rose up again and survived all the military and political conspiracies. Moreover, the PLO has grown to be a well-known, respected and recognized political body, as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Over 150 countries recognize the PLO. The principle of self-determination and the right to an independent Palestinian state are now accepted on the international level. Only those who hide their heads in the ground, like the ostrich, refuse to recognize these rights. Their rejection is translated into daily, US—backed, Zionist aggression against the Palestinian people inside and outside occupied Palestine.

Unfortunately though, the continuous blows dealt to the PLO during these twenty years have yielded some results. Unlike the Israeli tenets, the

Palestinian tenets have been shaken during the past few years, due to some Palestinian forces' betting on US solutions and harboring illusions about the results to be gained. This policy resulted in the Amman accord, but it proved to be futile, and this failure paved the way for restoring the PLO's unity at the PNC session in Algeria this April. This unification session rehabilitated the Palestinian tenets which are as follows:

1. rejecting resolution 242 because it does not constitute a solution for the Palestinian problem; rejecting the Camp David accords, the Reagan plan, and all capitulationist plans and unilateral solutions;
2. adhering to the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, return and establishing an independent Palestinian state;
3. adhering to the Palestinian people's historical rights in Palestine;
4. adhering to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

These tenets are totally contradictory to the Zionist tenets, and this explains the failure of all the attempts to arrive at a solution to the Middle East conflict. Such solutions have consistently ignored the nature of the conflict and the Palestinian people's rights. For twenty years, political activities in the region have focused only on attempts to find a solution for the 1967 territories, ignoring the original occupation of Palestine.

'Israel' and its allies offer one of two 'solutions': either 'autonomy' or a confederation with Jordan. The PLO and its allies, on the other hand, offer a just solution based on the necessity of recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The Arab reactionaries look for a middle solution, one that includes Israeli withdrawal from most of the occupied territories in return for peace, recognition and coexistence with 'Israel'. Such a solution is undoubtedly at the expense of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights. There are even two understandings of the proposed international conference. That of Shimon Peres is an international umbrella under which all the parties concerned, except the PLO, would negotiate directly. To the PLO and its allies, an international conference means one where all parties concerned participate under UN auspices, with the PLO participating on an independent and equal footing.

It is true that the PLO's just solution will take a long time and much struggle. However, it is equally true that the proposed Zionist solution will continue to be in crisis, despite whatever temporary successes may be achieved.

WHOSE DEFEAT WAS IT ANYWAY?

Despite the gloomy outlook in the region during the last twenty years, there is one fact that should never be overlooked. The Arab masses' capabilities have been suppressed, but this situation cannot last long. The most encouraging example is Lebanon. In 1982, the Zionists intended to reenact their successful June blitzkrieg, like in 1967, but the Israeli expectations of a 72-hour victory over the Palestinian and Lebanese fighters vanished in thin air only a few hours after the start of the invasion. Unlike the 1967 aggression, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon did not yield a quick Israeli victory. The Israeli army failed to conquer Beirut despite nearly eighty days of siege and a barbaric military assault. The Lebanese people's heroic resistance, led by the Lebanese National Resistance Front and supported by Palestinian forces and Syria, succeeded in driving the Israeli occupiers out of most of Lebanon. The invasion of Lebanon was the most costly aggression ever staged by the Zionists.

In addition to the Lebanese example, one should never forget the heroic uprisings of the masses in occupied Palestine and the Golan Heights. The Palestinian masses' continuous uprisings in the occupied territories affirm the dialectical relationship between our masses' struggle, whether inside or outside occupied Palestine. Since 1967, 250,000 Palestinians have been imprisoned in Israeli jails; 1,215 have been deported or expelled; and 1,300 homes have been demolished by the Israeli authorities. These are Israeli statistics and therefore modest estimations, but they give an idea of the scope of mass involvement in the struggle.

The latest example of the capabilities of the Arab masses was the 1985 uprising in Sudan, that overthrew the Numeiri dictatorship. So whose defeat was it in 1967? It was the defeat of the Arab regimes, not the masses. An Arab poet once said that the chains will be broken, and the darkness will fade away. Undoubtedly, the darkness will fade away. ●

Occupied Palestine

Military Operations

In April, there was a marked escalation of military operations against Zionist targets in occupied Palestine, parallel to the rise in mass resistance. Spurred on by the restoration of the PLO's unity and national program, this militant trend continued throughout May and into June, stressing our masses' continued will to resist, 39 years after the original occupation of Palestine and 20 years after the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

APRIL

In the last issue of *Democratic Palestine*, we noted some of the military operations in the first part of April. Here we present a summary of the entire month. All in all, Palestinian revolutionaries carried out 33 military operations in the occupied homeland, in addition to more than 27 attacks on Zionist targets using stones. As a result, five Israelis were killed and 21 wounded, according to the admissions of Israeli sources. Moreover, damage was inflicted on a number of Israeli vehicles and establishments.

Operations occurred in all parts of Palestine, and employed a variety of methods and weapons ranging from stones, fire bombs and explosives to machine guns and heavy rockets. An Israeli army spokesman acknowledged that police stations, military buses and soldiers were attacked 23 times with molotov cocktails. Zionist vehicles were increasingly targeted by stones, resulting in the injury of 12 Israeli soldiers and settlers, and damage to many vehicles. Israeli police centers were attacked in the occupied Gaza Strip and in Tobas in the occupied West Bank. Fire bombs were repeatedly thrown at the same target, as in the Gaza Strip when an Israeli patrol was successively hit by fire bombs while trying to clear away the street barriers set up by the people.

In mid-April, Palestinian commandos succeeded in kidnapping a Zionist soldier, David Shoham. He disappeared on April 24th, and Israeli radio reported in early May that he had been found dead, though it claimed that initial investigations indicated suicide.

Perhaps most upsetting to the Zionist leadership was the brave attack of April 18th, when Palestinian revolutionaries penetrated the Zionists' security wall and crossed into northern Palestine, to attack Al Manara settlement. A clash ensued, and before being martyred, the revolutionaries managed to kill several Israeli soldiers. The Israelis admitted the death of two soldiers, one of them an officer, but Palestinian sources estimated the enemy losses to be as many as ten. This heroic operation underscored the failure of the Zionists to achieve their goals in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and the inability of their 'security zone' and Lahd's army to insure Zionist security. Two days later, the same point was driven home when rockets launched from South Lebanon landed in northern occupied Palestine.

MAY

The month of May witnessed a great increase in the number of military operations against the Zionist occupation, its military forces, intelligence agents and settler gangs. There were 44 military operations, averaging 1.5 daily. Palestinian freedom fighters hit Zionist targets in all areas of occupied Palestine. According to Zionist admissions, five Israelis were killed and 74 wounded. The operations also caused heavy financial losses to Zionist institutions.

Five operations occurred in occupied Jerusalem where four Israeli vehicles were destroyed and many Zionist soldiers killed or wounded, although the Israeli spokesmen deliberately neglected to announce these casualties.

In the occupied West Bank, there were 20 operations. An Israeli spokesman admitted that seven Zionists were wounded and eight vehicles destroyed. In the occupied Gaza Strip, there were ten operations - in Gaza city, Khan Younis, Rafah and Jabalia camp. According to Israeli admissions, two Zionists were killed and seven others wounded. In addition, six Israeli vehicles were destroyed. In Rafah, the Israeli Hapoalim Bank was blown up. Also in the Strip, a Palestinian citizen was martyred in Khan Younis. He was shot by the Israeli occupation forces who claimed that he was carrying explosives and refused their orders to halt.

In the part of Palestine occupied since 1948, there were nine operations. Israeli sources admitted that three Israelis were killed and sixty others wounded; two Israeli vehicles were destroyed, as was a shop. The Telmoudi Institute was burned as was a store selling tires. These operations occurred in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Khadeira and other places.

In May, there was a marked increase in the use of molotov cocktails. Twenty out of 45 operations were carried out using this weapon, about half of all operations. This weapon has become common among the Palestinians under occupation, because it is easy to make and use. There was also a noticeable rise in attacks using knives. Four operations were carried out using this weapon, killing one Zionist and wounding three. There was also an increase in the use of firearms in confronting Israeli soldiers and intelligence agents. Five operations were carried out using firearms. Israeli soldiers were attacked with guns; others were abducted and then shot, as happened on Al Khadeira road in Tel Aviv on May 17th. Also in May, there was a remote-control explosion. This method was used last year, and it will probably be developed if materials and know-how are available. Moreover, there is a noticeable increase in self-reliance in producing weapons locally. This is seen in the increased use of molotovs and the creation of explosives by filling sacks with burning material to be thrown at Israeli vehicles and establishments.



Zionist Terror and Iron Fist Policy

April was characterized by extensive, arbitrary arrests in the occupied territories in an attempt to suppress the ongoing mass uprising. An Israeli army spokesman announced that more than 71 Palestinians had been arrested in the early days of April. On April 15th, Defense Minister Rabin announced that the Zionist forces had arrested more than 100 people in the Gaza Strip in the two preceding days. At least ten were imprisoned in Ansar II detention camp, without charges being brought against them. Students were among those targeted by the arrest campaign. At Beit Sahour high school in the West Bank, fifty students were arrested, while seven were arrested from Hebron University. On April 13th, twenty Bir Zeit University students were detained. Of these, nine were placed under administrative detention for six months. Added to the nine Palestinians administratively detained in late March, this brings the total of such detainees to over sixty.

The Zionist courts handed out sentences to 134 Palestinians during April, ranging from fines to life imprisonment. Moreover, at least five residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were placed under house arrest, while five residents of Duheisheh camp were served with deportation orders.

Arrests continued to rise in May with the Zionists' failure to halt the mass resistance. In the early part of May, 250 students were arrested in Dur, near Hebron; four citizens were arrested in Nazareth; five in Jenin; thirty from Qalqilia, and sixty from Duheisheh. In mid-May, the Zionist forces arrested 300 students of the Islamic University in Gaza, and 30 of them were sent to Ansar II. Arrests continued in the camps, villages and towns of the occupied territories after the large May 15th demonstrations.

In May, 202 Palestinians were sentenced to prison terms ranging from a few months to forty years. Heavy fines were also imposed. Thirteen citizens were arrested without charges being specified, and house arrest was imposed on ten Palestinians.

Also in May, two prominent student activists were expelled from occupied Palestine by the Zionist authorities.

One of them was Marwan Barghouti, chairman of Bir Zeit University Student Council. The other was Khalil Ashour, resident of Askar camp, who was a student leader at Al Najah University.

Reports from occupied Palestine in May also told of a new form of Zionist atrocity. Palestinian prisoners in Nablus prison have been used for testing the elements of germ weapons. The prison authorities exposed them to the effects of drugs which can change human genetic characteristics. This is reminiscent of the kind of experiments made in Nazi concentration camps in the time of World War II.

HALTING PALESTINIAN EDUCATION

In a form of collective punishment, the Zionist authorities have closed a number of universities and high schools, hoping to deter students from participation in demonstrations and other nationalist activities. As of late April, Al Najah University had been closed a total of 102 days during this academic year. Students at Bethlehem University had lost 39 teaching days. In mid-April, Bir Zeit University was ordered closed for four months. All universities and many high schools of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip were closed for periods ranging from a few days to two weeks during April.

DEMOLISHING HOMES

In April, the last remaining house owned by a Palestinian Arab in the southeast part of Jabalia quarter of Jaffa was demolished by the Israeli police. Ismael Dabbagh had inherited his house from his father, and his grandfather had lived there before him. Though the house was very small in size and surrounded by Jewish-owned houses on all sides, the Israeli authorities had issued an order for its demolition because it had been disturbing the Zionists for 39 years, i.e., since the 1948 occupation of this part of Palestine. Ismael Dabbagh had fought a long legal battle to save his family's home, but in the end, all his appeals were rejected, though he possessed ownership papers on the house. The

family home was demolished as part of the Zionists' long - standing policy of Judaization, to deprive Palestinians of living quarters in their homeland, while bringing in new Zionist settlers to replace them. In line with the same policy, the Israeli authorities moved to evacuate the Palestinian citizen, Rashad Subhi Al Karaki from his home in Akaba Al Khaldieh quarter of Jerusalem, claiming that it belonged to Jews.

In Um Al Fahem, in the Galilee, the Zionist authorities destroyed sixty houses, claiming they were built on agricultural land. In the Naqab (Negev), forty houses in the Bir Sabe area were destroyed on various pretexts. In the occupied West Bank, a number of houses were demolished by the bulldozers of the 'civil' administration department, on the pretext that they were built without a license.

In Jerusalem, three Palestinian homes were ordered sealed. They belong to Hussein Alian, Isam Jandal and Abdul Nasir Al Huleisa, all accused of staging the 1986 attack on the recruitment ceremony for the Gevati Brigade (special Israeli army unit) in Jerusalem, where the Zionists suffered seventy casualties.

SETTLER TERROR

The Zionist settlers have played a prominent role this spring, complementing the Zionist state's terror tactics against the Palestinians under occupation. The failure of the Zionist security forces to stop Palestinian commando attacks led the armed settler movement to demand that the state impose an even harsher iron fist policy. After a settler was killed near Qalqilia, Zionist settlers demanded that the state take new emergency measures such as:(1) closing all Palestinian newspapers;(2) destroying three rows of houses in the Palestinian camps, adjacent to main roads;(3) imposing a minimum five-year sentence on all stone throwers; and (4)stepping up settlement-building. The Council of Settlers established a working leadership to act against Palestinian national institutions and to map new strategies for creating new settlements prior to

gaining official permission.

There were a series of terror attacks on Palestinian citizens in April, carried out by Zionist settler gangs in concert with the official Zionist forces. The Israeli newspaper *Hadashot* reported that settlers blocked traffic on the Jerusalem-Hebron road near Halhoul and threw stones at Palestinian-owned cars. The fascist KACH movement of Kahana announced that it had established a special unit for 'protecting traffic' to and from the settlements. Near the village of Al Tayaseer, a group of Zionists threw a hand grenade at five Palestinian children, seriously injuring them. In Gaza, a nine-year old Palestinian child was kidnapped by three settlers who drove away with him in a car. Fortunately, the child was able to jump out of the car and escape.

The settlers' activities reached a peak in mid-April when gangs attacked Qalqilia, destroying Palestinian property. Other settlers invaded Ramallah, threatening the residents with their guns. Settlers also lodged themselves in Al Aqsa mosque and harassed and humiliated Palestinians who came to pray. In mid-April, the Episcopalian Church in Jerusalem and the Middle East published a report about the burning of one of its churches in Akka. The church demanded an investigation to determine who had carried out this attack. On the walls of the burned church had been left slogans like: «Kahana the Great», «Get out, Christians and Moslems» and «Death to you, death to the Pope.»

Settler terror continued into May. On May 18th, terrorists stabbed to death a Palestinian child less than eight years old in Jerusalem. On May 3rd, another Palestinian had been found dead in the same city. Two citizens of Gaza were reported missing, most probably kidnapped by settlers. The body of Jebril Abraham Hussein Al Darawish from Dora was found burned to death in his car.

Settlers of the Gush Emunim movement demonstrated in Jerusalem, and blocked the entrances to Nablus on May 9th. They invaded Qalqilia, while it was surrounded by Israeli troops, and damaged Palestinian-owned cars and other property. On May 22nd, settler gangs stormed the village of Masha, near Nablus.

In the Gaza Strip, settlers of the KACH movement attacked the citizens of Rafah, injuring many of them.

These same gangsters attacked a Palestinian factory in Gaza, but the workers fought them off while Israeli troops looked on. KACH also tried to storm Gaza city and Khan Younis, but the citizens stood up to them, and they were not able to enter. On May 30th, five young Palestinians were assaulted by settlers simply because they were in the area of Ramat Ashoul settlement in Jerusalem. A Palestinian guarding a building in Kfar Saba was assassinated by Zionists.

The Zionist authorities demonstrated their support to the terrorist gangs by releasing two Jews, British citizens, who had shot two Palestinians in Jerusalem, injuring one of them. According to *Al Hamishmar* newspaper, the two British citizens have been working as engineers in the Israeli military industry for three years.

The most massive fascist plan was aborted when a Palestinian boy discovered a strange object buried near Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. It appeared to be a time bomb, one of four found in different parts of the mosque at a time when thousands were gathering for prayers at the end of the Ramadan fast. The bombs were timed to explode successively at two-minute intervals. There have been many Zionist attempts to destroy Al Aqsa before, but this was perhaps the most horrible because the intent was to kill thousands of Palestinians as well. Fortunately, however, the charges were discovered and people were warned.

BALATA BESIEGED, BUT STILL RESISTING

Balata camp near Nablus was curfewed and besieged by the Zionist forces several times during May. On May 30th, the Zionist authorities declared the camp, which houses 15,000 people, as a closed area. The Israeli forces made house to house searches, arresting more than sixty residents, aimed to prevent their participation in the ongoing mass uprising. General Yahuda Barak, deputy chief of staff, declared that Balata is one of the main points of tension and 'provocation'. Besides those arrested, 150 citizens were interrogated by the Zionist forces according to Barak who stated that many weapons had been found during the search, including knives and locally produced guns.

For a year and a half, Balata has been repeatedly besieged. Most of the



Hands off Duheisheh and Balata!

young men of the camp have been detained in Al Faraa youth detention camp or other Zionist prisons. Despite all this repression, however, the camp residents are on the frontlines of the anti-occupation struggle.

On May 31st, a curfew was imposed on Balata after an Israeli military vehicle was attacked with a molotov cocktail. The Israelis used tear gas to disperse the women of the camp who defied the Zionists by throwing stones and demonstrating to protest the repression. All residents of the camp over sixteen years of age (about 2,000 people) were gathered in the school yard and interrogated by the occupation forces. Sixty were arrested. The curfew was extended, yet the people of Balata demonstrated again on June 2nd. Several of them were injured as the Zionists shot rubber bullets. The Zionists blockaded the camp, cutting it off from other parts of the occupied West Bank. Still another demonstration broke out on June 3rd. Camp residents confronted the occupation forces with stones and managed to break through the lines of siege. Several Palestinians were injured by the Zionists' gunfire.

In late May, the Zionist authorities issued deportation orders for two Palestinian freedom fighters, Jihad Abdullah of Balata and Abdul Fattah Naser, chairman of the youth union of Khan Younis in the occupied Gaza Strip. They are accused of organizing anti-occupation demonstrations.



Protesting 20 years of occupation



Palestinians interrogated on their way home to Balata



General Strike in Jerusalem marking 20 years of occupation



Writing «Palestine» in the dust of a refugee camp

Mass Re

Protesting 20 Year

In April, the popular uprising in occupied Palestine entered its sixth month, despite the numerous repressive measures taken by the Zionist occupation forces to halt the masses' resistance. Six Palestinians were martyred and 28 wounded during April by the Zionist troops' violent repression. A Zionist official described the situation in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip as the most explosive since 1967.

The demonstrations that started earlier in solidarity with the besieged



Resistance

39 Years of Occupation

Palestinian camps in Lebanon, and the political prisoners' hunger strike in Zionist jails, continued in protest of Zionist repression and settler terror. Then, in late April, the mass struggle gained yet new impetus: On April 20th, Palestinians in the occupied territories poured into the streets, celebrating the convening of the unifying PNC in Algeria. In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, there were violent confrontations with the occupation forces. Demonstrators threw molotov cocktails while the Zionist forces tried to disperse

them. Israeli radio reported that the driver of a military patrol was injured in Dahariyah (West Bank), while another patrol was attacked by molotovs in Khan Younis (Gaza Strip).

PROTESTING 39 YEARS OF OCCUPATION

There were demonstrations in occupied Palestine on May 1st, marking International Workers' Day, and even bigger ones on May 15th, marking the occupation of the major part of Palestine and the declaration of the Zionist state in 1948. Demonstrations were especially powerful in the West Bank camps of Balata, Duheisheh and Askar, and in the towns of Nablus, Al Khalil(Hebron), Ramallah, Tulkarem, Al Bireh and Jerusalem, and in the camps and towns of the Gaza Strip. In many places, the Palestinian flag was raised and anti-occupation slogans chanted, as demonstrators blocked the path of the Zionist patrols by burning tires in the streets. Walls were covered with slogans expressing support to the PLO.

Violent clashes occurred. The Zionists used tear gas and gunfire against the demonstrators who retorted with stones. As a result, three Israelis were injured in Duheisheh, two in Balata and three in the Gaza Strip. Three Palestinian civilians were wounded by gunfire in Jenin and one in Balata. A number of Israelis were injured in clashes with the citizens of

Nablus and the surrounding villages of Housan and Bteir. Demonstrations continued in this area in Armout, Salem and Deir Al Hatab, and a curfew was imposed on May 22nd on these villages. Many citizens, including women, were arrested. In Rafah in the Gaza Strip, the Zionist authorities closed three schools.

On May 22nd, Jerusalem was crowded with more than 100,000 Palestinians who had come from Gaza, the Galilee, Triangle and Naqab (Negev), to pray together at Al Aqsa mosque. The religious occasion provided the opportunity for this tremendous expression of the unity of the Palestinian people and their adherence to their land. It served as confirmation of Palestinian determination to resist the Israeli occupation and specifically the Judaization of Jerusalem. This gathering expressed the Palestinian people's unity in confronting capitulationist plans, the Israeli-Jordanian joint administration and maneuvers to normalize the occupation. The next day, there were clashes in Jerusalem between Palestinians and extremist Zionist gangs after the Ramadan evening prayers. The Israeli forces intervened on the side of the gangs, shooting and hurling tear gas cannisters at the Palestinians.

Meanwhile, the Zionist siege on Qalqilia, begun in mid-April, continued after the increase of military operations and popular resistance in the area. On

Israeli soldiers make arrests at Abu Dis.



May 26th, a street of the town was sealed off, after the throwing of a fire bomb against the Zionist forces. Also on May 26th, there were violent clashes in Gaza and Khan Younis, between Palestinian citizens and the Zionist KACH gangs. There was also a demonstration in Nazareth, protesting Zionist practices and in support of the people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At a Nablus demonstration, a Palestinian was killed by the Zionist troops' indiscriminate firing.

A highlight of the resistance struggle in May was the escape of six Palestinian prisoners from Gaza Central Prison. The Zionist forces were unable to catch them, despite imposing a lengthy siege on the area and conducting a relentless search. All roads in the area were closed and the siege continued. Palestinian fishermen were prevented from taking their boats out to fish, in an attempt to prevent the prisoners from escaping by sea.

PROTESTING 20 YEARS OF OCCUPATION

The first week of June, massive demonstrations erupted throughout the occupied territories on the occasion of the 1967 Zionist aggression and occupation. Thousands participated in the protests despite the Zionists' extensive preemptive arrests whereby hundreds of Palestinians were rounded up in the last days of May. From the first days of June the Zionist authorities reinforced their military units in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights, in anticipation of demonstrations on June 5th, the start of the 1967 war.

On June 4th, the Palestinian shopkeepers in occupied Jerusalem began the strike protesting twenty years of occupation, while youth distributed leaflets calling on all to join the strike. Shopkeepers in Ramallah and Al Bireh also closed, while citizens began street demonstrations. The Zionist forces surrounded the Old City of Jerusalem, and other towns and camps, increasing street patrols and checkpoints. Citizens from other parts of Palestine were prevented from entering Jerusalem by car.

On June 5th, there were demonstrations throughout the towns and villages

of the occupied territories, as the general strike went into effect. Palestinian flags were raised high in many places. The Zionist forces were on high alert. In Nablus, they fired straight into a large demonstration, killing fifteen-year-old Azam Arandi, and injuring another Palestinian. There were many acts of resistance, and the Zionists called in more reinforcements. An Israeli bus was struck by a grenade, and in Hebron a Zionist patrol was attacked with a molotov cocktail. Curfew was imposed on the city after the people forcibly prevented the Zionists from entering the Ibrahimi mosque, leading to a large clash. Stones were thrown at an Israeli bus at nearby Al Zahrieh camp.

Demonstrations continued on June 6th. In Jerusalem, the Zionist forces opened fire on science faculty students at Abu Dis, near Jerusalem, who were demonstrating and throwing stones at Israeli soldiers and vehicles. Two students were injured and Abu Dis College was closed for two weeks. This event sparked more demonstrations in the West Bank, as in Hebron, where Islamic College students threw stones at a military patrol. A curfew was imposed on Nablus and other towns and camps, and arbitrary arrests continued. At least six Palestinian citizens were placed under administrative detention for three months.

On June 6th, settlers from Kiryat Arba and Hebron broke into Duheisheh camp, near Bethlehem, after a settler was injured by stones thrown at the vehicle she was riding in near the camp. Although the camp was surrounded by Israeli soldiers, the settlers broke through their lines and entered Duheisheh, firing wildly about and damaging property. The women of the camp organized a demonstration protesting the settlers' attack.

A few days later, a Palestinian youth was stabbed in the Bethlehem area. In the night of June 9th, the Israeli forces raided Duheisheh and were met by gunfire, although no injuries occurred. This is the first time the residents of the camp are reported to have used guns against the Israeli security forces. A curfew was imposed on the camp and scores of Palestinians were arrested. The Israeli forces searched for those who fired the shots, but they were faced

by strong resistance. Israeli soldiers were hit by stones and fired upon. The Israeli daily *Yediot Aharonot* carried the comments of the Israeli who led the search party into the camp. He said that the roads had been blockaded by the residents, with stones stored behind the barricades to be used against Israeli troops.

PROTESTING DISCRIMINATION

In early June, the students of Al Ozeir Rummaneh elementary school, in the part of Palestine occupied in 1948, went on strike, protesting the failure to finish the building of a new school. The students warned the Israeli Education Ministry that their strike would continue until the building is finished. Last year, the people of this village announced a four month strike protesting the lack of classrooms in the school. The school has not been connected to the electricity or water network, and lacks playground space.

On June 12th, there were three demonstrations in the 1948 occupied land-in Nazareth, the western Galilee and the Triangle, protesting discrimination against Arab citizens in the Zionist state. Thousands participated in these demonstrations which were led by the Heads of Arab Councils and the Committee to Defend the Land. A number of Palestinians were arrested in Nazareth by the Israeli police, charged with possessing weapons stolen from the Israeli army, to be used in the resistance struggle.

Also in mid-June, a Palestinian flag was found to have been raised over the Meir paint factory in Petah Tikva, to the surprise of the management. Twenty-five Palestinians are employed at this factory, mainly citizens from the Triangle. Israeli police began an investigation into the matter. In the same period, the Palestinian flag was publicly raised in East Jerusalem by Palestinian youth who had burned the Israeli flag.

Palestinian prisoners in Nablus old prison resumed their strike in mid-June after it became apparent that the Zionist prison authorities were not going to fulfill the pledges they had made after the hunger strike in March.

Lebanon

Cancellation of the Cairo Agreement

On May 21st, the Lebanese parliament 'unanimously' passed a resolution calling for cancellation of the Cairo agreement signed by the Lebanese government and the PLO in 1969, under the auspices of Egypt. However, a few notes about the nature of this parliament are in order. Elections were last held in 1972. Of the 100 deputies elected at that time, only 85 are still living. Of these, only 44 were present at the session. Together with the speaker of the house, Hussein Husseini, they barely constituted the quorum necessary to pass any resolution. Along with cancelling the Cairo agreement, the parliament passed a resolution cancelling the authorization granted to the Lebanese government in 1983 to conclude the May 17th agreement with 'Israel'.

The very fact that the parliament, which otherwise so seldom meets, could convene at this particular time makes it apparent that a deal had been struck whereby the two agreements would be cancelled at the same session. This deal aimed to equate the Cairo agreement with the infamous May 17th agreement of capitulation to 'Israel'. Equating the two was an attempt by the 'humble' chamber of deputies to indicate that the price for Lebanese patriots having abrogated the May 17th agreement was cancellation of the Cairo agreement.

The Cairo agreement was signed on November 3, 1969, between the Lebanese Army's commander, Emil Boustani, and the PLO's chairman, Yasir Arafat. It was intended to regulate the Palestinian people's military and civilian presence in Lebanon. The first clause stipulated the «right of the Palestinians living in Lebanon to work, residence and relocation.» The second article stated that «local committees formed by the Palestinians in the camps would be established to safeguard the interests of these Palestinians, in cooperation with the local authorities in the domain of Lebanese sovereignty.» The other aspect of the accord concerns military presence, regulating Palestinian military activities in the camps and in the South, in cooperation with the

Lebanese authorities. Given the conditions of the civil war in Lebanon, where Palestinian camps have been repeatedly attacked by 'Israel', the Lebanese fascists and more recently other sectarian forces, the civilian aspect of the accord has no meaning whatsoever without the military aspect.

REACTIONS

Before discussing the why's of the Cairo agreement's cancellation, a quick review of the reactions to this may provide an initial understanding of the reasons for the cancellation. The deputies who took it upon themselves to cancel the Cairo agreement represent two main trends. The first is the trend supportive of the Amal movement. The second is supportive of the Phalangist Party and Lebanese Forces militia. The cancellation is thus one result of the undeclared alliance between these two trends, based on sectarianism and antagonism to any Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

The fascist forces were quick to welcome the 'historical' resolution of the parliament. Phalangist Party President George Saadeh viewed the cancellation as a «materialization of the true Lebanese people's will...» In turn, Amal's reaction was an extension of their policies and role. Amal President Nabih Berri justified the parliament's decision as «self-defense! Other Amal officials voiced their approval of the decision as a step towards ending Lebanon's calamities!

In contrast, the Lebanese patriotic and progressive forces voiced their opposition to this decision, in line with their nationalist policies. The parliament's decision came as a shock to Lebanese patriotic circles. Walid Jumblatt, president of the Progressive Socialist Party, said that «cancelling the Cairo agreement means telling the Palestinians to throw down their guns and submit to massacres.» Other nationalist forces responded in a similar vein, considering the cancellation as a conspiracy against the Palestinian people. The Lebanese Communist Party termed the cancellation a «free gift to the internal and external enemies who

are betting on the US-Zionist projects and new Israeli aggression to tip the balance of forces in their favor.»

WHAT THE CANCELLATION MEANS

The sectarian alliance that succeeded in cancelling the agreement had a number of interrelated motives: First, they aimed at achieving a political victory to make up for the consistent military defeats they have suffered. This political victory is intended to lay the groundwork - now a legal groundwork - for fighting the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, military and civilian alike.

Second, by cancelling the accord, the sectarian alliance hopes to eliminate an obstacle to a sectarian solution in Lebanon. The Palestinians are considered an obstacle because of their alliance with the Lebanese nationalist and progressive forces, and their history of participation in the struggle in Lebanon against the fascist forces, imperialist domination and Zionist occupation. At the same time, the cancellation would pave the way for a deal on the regional level, that would grant the Zionist enemy the security arrangements it desires.

Third, in view of the possibility of the convening of an international conference on the Middle East, the sectarian forces aim to cut the PLO's influence down to size, to prevent it from attaining an independent and special role in such a conference. The PLO's presence in South Lebanon gives it military and political weight considered undesirable by other parties promoting the conference, i.e., the US, 'Israel' and Arab reaction.

Fourth, the cancellation is a gratuity offered to the US and 'Israel' in an attempt to stop the pressure which the imperialist-Zionist alliance exerts on Lebanon to stop the growth of the Lebanese national resistance in the South, and the return of greater numbers of Palestinian fighters who participate in this resistance struggle.

Fifth, and possibly the main issue, is that it is not simply an agreement that has been cancelled. Rather the intent is to cancel the entire phase that produced it, namely the phase of the rise of the Arab national liberation movement in the region as a whole.

The cancellation of the Cairo agreement occurred a few weeks after the unifying Palestinian National

Council session in Algiers. Given the angry response of Arab reaction to the restoration of the PLO's national program, it is natural to assume that the Lebanese parliament's cancellation of the agreement is a complement to Arab reaction's policy. The cancellation comes in the context of accelerated political moves to strike at Palestinian presence in Lebanon, and at the Lebanese nationalist and progressive forces as well. It occurred on the backdrop of escalating Israeli aggression on Lebanon, aided by the Zionists' proxies in the South Lebanese Army (SLA).

The scope of the enemy alliance's plans and aggression demands a proportionate confrontation on the part of the nationalist and progressive forces. Steps should be accelerated to revitalise the Palestinian-Lebanese-Syrian nationalist alliance on a correct basis in order to seriously confront the Zionist-backed sectarian project in Lebanon,

and escalate the struggle against Zionist occupation. It should be clear to all that letting time pass by is not to the interests of the Palestinian-Lebanese-Syrian nationalist alliance. The cancellation of the Cairo agreement represents the start of new Zionist sectarian aggression. That it was followed by the assassination of Lebanon's prime minister, Rashid Karami, sends a clear message to all: No one is exempt from the fascist-Zionist plan. A misreading of this message could lead to the total destruction of the nationalist alliance and the Lebanese nationalist forces themselves.

In conclusion, the Palestinian people have a legitimate right to struggle, whether from Lebanon or from the other front-line states. This is a right so fundamental and just that it cannot be eliminated by this or that resolution in the Lebanese parliament or any other forum.

Hilweh, housing 100 people, was demolished. In the May 8th attack, about 40 residences were destroyed or damaged; one-quarter of those killed were children, and almost one third of the injured lost a limb. The Zionists justified their terror bombing as retaliation for a cross-border attempt to attack Naharia in occupied Palestine, hoping to discourage such attacks in the future. However, a young Palestinian whose leg was broken in the attack drew quite another conclusion, saying: «If I could walk, I would be the first to do a suicide operation against Israel.»

TERRORIZING THE SOUTH

Besides portending more aggression against Palestinians, Shamron's statement had a hidden meaning. Ignoring the fact that Lebanese patriots are leading the struggle against Israeli occupation in South Lebanon, Shamron singles out the Palestinians to separate them from the Lebanese, aiming to curb the resistance of both. Attacks on the Israelis and SLA in the South continue to average over two a day despite reinforcements which brought the number of Israeli troops in the 'security zone' up to 3,000 earlier in the year. Zionist failure to eliminate the Palestinian revolution and control Lebanon, despite the application of massive force, is now compounded by the obvious failure of the 'security zone'. In late April, Zionist settlers close to Lebanon's borders were again sleeping in shelters due to the frequency of Katyusha rocket attacks which Begin vowed to eliminate in 1982.

In their desperate attempt to halt the joint Lebanese-Palestinian resistance, the Israelis have continued their hidden war against the southern Lebanese - storming and shelling villages, demolishing homes, strafing fields and peasants, etc. Zionist aggression also targeted Lebanon as such, with naval blockades of the southern coast, fre-

Southern villagers determined to stay



Resurgence of the Zionist-Fascist Plan

As June 6th approached, marking five years since the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, there was a marked escalation of Israeli aggression. The Zionist leaders, still chaffing under their failure to realize the goals they set for the 1982 war, have refurbished their time-worn tactics of terror bombings and scorched earth, hoping to sow fear and desperation among the people and thereby create a separation between Palestinians and Lebanese, and between the masses and the freedom fighters. At the same time, the Zionists are banking on other developments, chiefly the cancellation of the Cairo agreement and the assassination of Prime Minister Karami, to revive their chances for keeping Lebanon weak and divided, thus more easily dominated.

TARGETING PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS

Typical of the Zionist tactics was the May 3rd statement of the newly appointed Israeli army chief of staff, Dan Shamron (incidently leader of the Israeli raid on Entebbe in 1976, and thus a veteran of Zionist terror under

the guise of 'counterterrorism'). Speaking in Israeli television, he defined the Palestinians as the main enemy in Lebanon, rather than Lebanese resistance forces. Indeed the most prominent Zionist aggression was directed against the Palestinians in the Sidon area. Of twelve Israeli air raids in the first four months of this year, nine have targeted Ain Al Hilweh and Miyeh Miyeh camps or nearby Palestinian positions. Three of these bombings occurred in the last week of April as Palestinian national unity was being restored at the Algiers session of the PNC. Renewed Palestinian unity reinforced the Zionists' permanent fear of the resilience of the Palestinian armed revolution, and Israeli raids became more murderous in May.

Ain Al Hilweh is now crowded with 80,000 Palestinians, having been swelled by the arrival of persons displaced by Amal's war on the camps in Beirut and Tyre. These people and the residents of Miyeh Miyeh were the targets of four air raids in May, which killed about forty people and wounded over 120. In one of these attacks, on May 6th, a whole quarter of Ain Al

quent reconnaissance flights and mock bombings, hijacking boats and even intercepting a Lebanese Army plane and forcing it to land in 'Israel'. In line with their plans for increased interference in favor of the Lebanese fascist forces, the Israelis have upped their overt military presence in Jezzine, north of the 'security zone' and centrally located between Sidon on the east and the mountains to the north. For the first time since their partial withdrawal from Lebanon, Israeli Merkava tanks have been spotted in Jezzine. On May 31st, villages around Jezzine were subjected to ten hours of shelling and strafing after a major resistance attack in which six Israelis were wounded and about ten of their SLA proxies killed. Four Lebanese civilians were killed by Israeli fire, including a six-month old baby; twenty were wounded.

The accumulation of aggression sparked speculation about a major new Israeli aggression. Whether or not this materializes, it is certain that the Zionists' purpose is to spread fear. This would create the political climate for the Lebanese state and reactionary forces to move to check the anti-occupation resistance, thus preserving the Israelis' security without their risking the casualties a major aggression would entail. In other words, the escalated terror campaign was the Israeli contribution to having the Cairo agreement cancelled, to encourage the Lebanese fascists and other sectarian forces to step up their war on patriots, Lebanese and Palestinian alike.

DEFYING 'SLOW DEATH'

While the Lebanese parliament bowed to the Zionist logic and cancelled the Cairo agreement, the daily steadfastness of the masses in southernmost Lebanon provides a different picture. In late May, a Reuters reporter visiting villages on the edge of the 'security zone', that are constantly exposed to shelling and harassment, recorded the comments of the residents. In Froun, the mukhtar, Kamal Jaafer, told the reporter why the local people remain in the war zone: «Whoever starts running away will have to keep running all the time... Life has become very difficult, but where can we go? We live from our land and we have to stay near it». Also in Froun, where villagers risk their lives just going to the Litani River to get water, Fatima Mikdad, who works at a sewing factory, said,

«Even if the (resistance) attacks stop, the shelling will continue. We are ready to pay with our lives to help the resistance fighters.» In another village, Tulin, an elderly farmer whose family often shelters resistance fighters, concluded, «If we don't sacrifice our children and grandchildren in the fight against the Israelis, they will never leave. If some of us die, and Israeli leaves, it is better than this daily slow death.»



RASHID KARAMI — MARTYR TO THE ZIONIST PLAN

The June 1st assassination of Prime Minister Rashid Karami was the ultimate proof that the fascist-Zionist alliance is on the offensive. Karami was not just any politician. Having served as prime minister nine times, he had a long history of working for a balanced solution that would preserve Lebanon's unity and Arab identity. In the words of Mustafa Saad, Sidon's nationalist leader, «This crime was a declaration of war against the nation and the citizens, and targeted not only the late prime minister, but also the idea of a state of justice and national accord, based on equality and Arabism.»

Karami's prominent nationalist role dates back to 1958 when he joined the nationalist movement to oppose President Camille Chamoun's move to turn Lebanon into a *de facto* US protectorate. He was effective in organizing mass protests especially in his home area around Tripoli, North Lebanon, a stronghold of the nationalist movement aligned with Nasser's Egypt. In 1969, he resigned after the Lebanese Army's bloody suppression of pro-Palestinian demonstrations. When the civil war broke out in 1975, he moved to prevent the Lebanese Army from joining the fascist side. He was widely regarded as one of few Lebanese politicians able to

steer Lebanon through a national unity process that would guarantee reforms and Lebanon's relations with Syria.

Lebanese nationalists have accused the fascist Lebanese Forces and their penetration of the Lebanese Army, noting that 'Israel' stands as the ultimate beneficiary and probable mastermind of the crime. All the facts validate these accusations. Karami was killed by a bomb planted in a helicopter where the Lebanese Army had made the security check. The bomb exploded as the helicopter was over fascist-controlled areas, giving the possibility of remote-control detonation. According to *Al Safir*, a Beirut daily, an Israeli officer visited the fascist-controlled areas in May to plan the operation. Soon afterwards, Lebanese Forces commander Samir Geagea visited 'Israel', returning to Lebanon via Jezzine. Cooperation between the Lebanese Forces and sections of the Lebanese Army is a known fact. (Uniformed Lebanese Army officers train Geagea's elite troops at Ghosta monastery-turned fortress, north of Beirut.) Such cooperation allowed for planting the bomb on Karami's helicopter and preventing further security checks.

Karami had resigned in May due to the deadlock in the political and economic crisis, challenging Amin Gemayel whose adherence to the fascists' positions had blocked all reform solutions. Despite the Lebanese Forces' concerted calls for Gemayel to accept Karami's resignation, the president had dallied, not wanting to further antagonize Syria that was firmly backing Karami's leadership. In this deadlock, the fascists acted, assassinating Karami in order to take the pressure off Gemayel and create a power vacuum that would block Syrian and Lebanese nationalist efforts for stability, while giving 'Israel' greater room to interfere in Lebanon.

With the assassination of Karami the situation in Lebanon was once again blown wide open, and the Lebanese democratic forces are faced with a double challenge. One is the sectarian tendency to find a partial solution to the Lebanese crisis that falls short of establishing real unity and democracy. The other challenge, which may prove to be the most powerful, comes from the fascist-Zionist-imperialist alliance that may embark on new aggression to impose their domination in Lebanon. ●

Voices from Shatila and Burj Al Barajneh

In Shatila camp there is a convergence between pain and hope, tragedy and bravery, and between the justice of the Palestinian cause and continuous conspiracies. Almost 500 families are enclosed in 200 square meters. From a distance you see that Shatila has been turned into ruins. Not a single house is left standing. The closer you come to the camp, the more you see the destruction. This destruction has a fetid smell; it is the smell of death. The residents of this camp, along with those of Burj Al Barajneh, survived a brutal siege and continued to resist through months of Amal's shelling and food blockade. Seeing them now makes one feel ashamed for having thought the camp would fall. We didn't realize that these people would make life out of death, houses out of ruins and food out of dust, in order to preserve their camp.

Soon after the blockade was partially lifted, journalists visited Shatila and Burj Al Barajneh. Below are interviews with some of the Palestinians who were besieged, as printed in the Kuwaiti newspaper, *Al Watan*.

SHATILA

Samira Al Khatib

37 years old

«I still can't believe the shelling and shooting are over. It is a miracle that we survived. They were harassing us, destroying the whole camp in the most barbaric way ever. During the siege, I was feeding my children boiled rotten vegetable peels. Food provisions were confiscated at checkpoints. All were targeted for death.»

Izzat Al Taibi

35 years old

«I do not believe there is anyone in Shatila not suffering from some kind of physical or mental disease. During the siege, I remained among the damp, smashed stones. I was shivering with each shell that landed, trying to hide my head in the fortifications. As for food, I fed my relatives seven cats before they knew what it was! Later on, they were fighting for a leg of boiled cat or dog...»

Now we ask for a plan to build new houses, as there is no shelter left. We also need services, especially sanitation.»

Moh'd Abu Khalid

30 years old

«It was the most savage war the Palestinians have ever experienced. We had enough weapons, but we were running out of food. I was among the group formed to hunt cats and dogs. Once when we were running after a cat on the outskirts of the camp, we clashed with the Amal gangs and heavy fighting started. Shatila was a red line for us. It did not collapse because of the fierce resistance of the people. All knew that the fall of Shatila would signal the end of all Palestinian presence... We want relief. We want a normal peaceful life like any other human society. We want to live together with the Lebanese like we always did, until we go back to our homeland, Palestine.»

BURJ AL BARAJNEH

Burj al Barajneh did not suffer as much as Shatila during the siege, as it is

larger in size and population (approximately 20,000). Burj contains more medical and social institutions. Nevertheless, interviews with those who were besieged in Burj Al Barajneh did not differ much from those in Shatila.

Fatima Khalid

60 years old

«My daughter Randa was martyred at the passageway,» she said, breaking into tears. «She went to fetch food and milk for the children after the ceasefire, assuming that Amal would not fire on women. She never came back. During the siege, I was feeding my grandchildren sugar dissolved in boiling water. Even after the siege, we did not get any of the provisions that were said to have been sent to us.»

Dalal Faoni

35 years old

«I keep thanking God that we are still alive. I can't forget the happenings during the siege. I can never forget the tragic scene of a brother screaming when they were amputating his hand

Burj Al Barajneh



and putting his arm in boiled oil so the flesh would heal. I can't forget the children crying for food. I urge all the Arab countries to send their officials to see the inhuman conditions we live in.»

EXPECTATIONS

Aggression against the Palestinian people and camps in Lebanon has still not stopped. All indications point to the possibility of another explosion and a new episode of the camp war. In spite of the ceasefire concluded in April, the Palestinian camps in Beirut and South Lebanon are still besieged.

There have been a series of arrests and other provocations in the camps of the Tyre area. Tens of Palestinian youth were arrested in Al Bus and Burj Al Shamali camps in a very brutal way. In Rashidiyah camp, Amal has started fortifying its positions and bringing in more arms. In Beirut, the Palestinians in Shatila and Burj al Barajneh are forbidden to walk out of the camps in order to get food. Only a minimum of food and medical supplies are permitted to enter the camps. Around Ain al Hilweh and Miye Miyeh in the Sidon area, Amal is reinforcing its fortifications, armament and forces.

Amal has continued its policy of terror and intimidation against Palestinian and Lebanese patriots. Along with the latest political developments, particularly the cancellation of the Cairo agreement and the assassination of Prime Minister Karami, everything indicates that the situation will be ignited once again, to block the nationalist struggle against the Zionist-fascist plans. It is therefore most important for the Lebanese nationalist forces to confront Amal's plan for eliminating Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, for this is part of implementing a sectarian solution. At the same time, the Lebanese-Palestinian-Syrian nationalist alliance should be consolidated against the Zionist-fascist plans.

The previous camp wars have turned against Amal. If Amal again starts such a war, the results will be horrendous, for the Palestinians will resist fiercely to protect their presence in Lebanon, and to protect the PLO from all sectarian plans.

Dr. Hassan Hamdan

Communist Writer Assassinated

On April 18th, reactionary forces carried out yet another murder in the streets of Beirut, coldly silencing Dr. Hassan Hamdan, who was known as Mahdi Aamel, a Lebanese communist and great Marxist thinker.


Murderous bullets torn apart the body of Dr. Hassan Hamdan, and another patriot fell victim to the sectarian project in Lebanon, like Hussein Mroweh, Khalil Naous, Suheil Taweileh, Labib Abdul Samad and scores of Palestinian men, women and children in the camps of Lebanon. Their 'guilt' lay in their antagonism to the sectarian fascist project; their 'guilt' lay in their aspirations for a democratic Lebanon, the simple fact of being a member of the Lebanese Communist Party or being a Palestinian. The assassination of Hassan Hamdan, like that of respected Lebanese Communists before him, is an attempt to silence all democratic voices as a prelude to imposing the sectarian project in Lebanon.

Despite the great loss signified by the martyrdom of Hassan Hamdan, we are positive that his comrades will continue on the same path. His works will continue to disturb and expose his assassins, while his comrades will strengthen their confidence in the victory of the democratic project and the defeat of the sectarian one. If the bullets that killed Dr. Hamdan had known where they were headed, they would undoubtedly have returned to where they came from.

DR. HAMDAN'S LIFE

Dr. Hassan Hamdan was born in 1936. His hometown is Harouf in Nabatiyah province, South Lebanon. He obtained a bachelor's and doctor's degree in philosophy at Lyon University in France. He taught philosophy at the social sciences college of the Lebanese University. He was an active member of the Lebanese Writers' Union, South Lebanon's Cultural Council and the Lebanese University Teachers' League.

Dr. Hamdan was active in the struggles of the Lebanese students, youth, teachers, writers and intellectuals. He participated in organizing the na-



tionalist confrontation against the Zionist occupation in South Lebanon, and against the fascist project in Beirut and the mountains. He was active in the resistance to the Zionist siege of Beirut in 1982, and in the liberation of Beirut. In 1960, he joined the Lebanese Communist Party on the basis of his conviction in scientific socialism. At the party's fifth congress in 1987, he was elected to the central committee.

WORKS


Dr. Hamdan published a number of studies concerning the Lebanese and other Arab societies. Among his works we mention only a few:

- «A Study of the Causes of the Lebanese Civil Wars» (1979);
- «The Dilemma of the Arab Civilization or the Dilemma of the Arab Bourgeoisie?» (1980);
- «A Prelude to Refuting Sectarian Thought» (1980);
- «About the Sectarian State» (1986).

Dr. Hamdan also wrote poetry and a number of studies and articles that were published in different magazines and newspapers. He was a member of the staff of the famous Lebanese magazine, *Al Tariq*.

Elections in Jordan

Far from being a move towards democracy, the coming elections in Jordan are part of the regime's plan to usurp the PLO's representation, while marginalizing the internal opposition.



King Hussein reconvenes the parliament in 1984, trying to steal Palestinian representation from the PLO.

In 1974, the Arab summit in Rabat adopted the historical resolution recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Jordanian regime was thus forced to yield to this undisputed fact, but the bitterness of this defeat never stopped it from attempting to reimpose itself as representative of the Palestinian people.

After the 1974 Rabat Summit decision, the Jordanian regime dissolved the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies (parliament). The chamber, elected in 1967, represented the population of the West Bank and Jordan. Ten years later, in 1984, the regime revived the seventeen-year-old chamber. In suspending the parliament for ten

years, the regime had referred to two reasons: first, the occupation of the West Bank; and second, a legal reason, the Rabat decision. However, ten years later these two reasons are still alive. Neither has the occupation ended, nor has the PLO ceased being the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative.

Following the Jordanian regime's decision to revive the chamber, byelections were held in 1984 to elect representatives to replace those who had died. In 1986, the regime issued a new election law.

So, what had changed since 1974 to make the regime enact these steps?

The answer to this question lies in the developments that have taken place in

the region in the intervening period: Egypt's peace with 'Israel', Camp David, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the decline in official Arab policies and the Palestinian right wing's betting on US-sponsored solutions, as with the now defunct Amman accord - in short, the increased tilt in the balance of forces in the region in favor of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance.

This tilt gave the Jordanian regime a suitable chance to exploit new channels for pursuing its capitulationist policy, crystallizing in 'confederal' Palestinian-Jordanian work (encouraged by the rightist trend in the PLO), the plans for joint administration of the 1967 occupied territories with the Zionist state, the 'development' plan for the territories and finally the new election law.

In the new election law of 1986, the regime's aims are obvious. The new law states that both the West Bank and the Palestinian camps in Jordan will be represented in the new chamber as electoral districts. The West Bank deputies will be appointed by Palestinians elected in Jordan. This Jordanian move comes at a time when extensive efforts and contacts are being made by the regime to give momentum to the US solution in the region, which was faltering after the suspension of Jordanian-Palestinian talks in February 1986. The regime's efforts are directed towards two main goals: First, it is seeking to pave the way for direct negotiations with 'Israel' under a suitable international umbrella. Second, it is seeking to create a Palestinian leadership that would cooperate with the joint Israeli-Jordanian administration of the occupied territories.

UNDEMOCRATIC LAW

In addition to the regime's goals in enacting this law, the law itself is a step backwards in comparison with the 1960 election law. The new law not only discriminates between regions in terms of the representation allotted to provinces and camps, it also includes religious and ethnic discrimination. (Nine seats are allotted for Christians and three for ethnic groups.) The province of Amman, for example, contains 41% of Jordan's population, but its representation is limited to 21 seats

(28%). Karak province, on the other hand, contains 4% of the population but is allotted 12% of the seats. This distribution is intended to deprive the democratic and nationalist forces of the power they have in urbanized areas, while giving more weight to backward forces

No date has yet been set for elections, but they will be held under the martial and emergency laws enacted in 1967, on the pretext that Jordan is in a state of war with 'Israel', whereas these laws are actually used to suppress opposition to the regime. The Jordanian authorities have already started preparing a 'democratic, honest atmosphere' for the elections, waging a broad campaign of arrests against patriotic and progressive figures. The latest preparation was closing down the offices of the well-known Jordanian Writers' League.

TOWARDS FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

Given the fact that the Jordanian regime sees the upcoming elections as an opportunity to impose its 'representation' of the Palestinian people, the PLO Executive Committee issued a condemnation of holding elections in the Palestinian camps in Jordan and for the West Bank. Meeting in Tunis in May, the PLO Executive Committee termed such elections an infringement on the PLO's sole right of representation. All the organizations of the Palestinian revolution have determined to boycott the elections in the camps.

The other aspect of the planned elections is aimed against the Jordanian masses and democratic forces. It is an attempt to falsify the masses' will. In the face of this, the patriotic and progressive forces in Jordan should unite to make these elections a mass political struggle against the reactionary election law and the regime's policies. Entering this battle under the current conditions requires the broadest popular and nationalist work to end the state of emergency and martial law. It requires unified efforts by the masses in Jordan, Palestinian as well as Jordanian, to struggle for democracy while safeguarding the PLO and the Palestinian people's legitimate rights.


Committee for Democratic Freedoms: Release Abu Mashour!

On May 17th, the Committee for the Defense of Democratic Freedoms in Jordan issued a communique to the effect that the prominent militant Ahmed Saleh Musleh, otherwise known as Abu Mashour, is still being detained by the Jordanian General Intelligence in Amman, two months after his arrest on March 17th. Abu Mashour is a member of the Palestinian National Council.

This is not the first time Abu Mashour has been jailed. In 1967, he was arrested by the Zionist occupation authorities and imprisoned for nine years. After his release, he was deported to Jordan in 1976. In April 1980, the Jordanian authorities arrested him and detained him until July 18, 1980. He was rearrested on November

17, 1981, and detained until late 1983. All told, Abu Mashour has spent about eleven years of his life in Zionist and Jordanian prisons. Still, in March, the Jordanian regime arrested him for the third time, without specifying charges. He remains in jail, deprived of the minimal human conditions.

The Committee for the Defense of Democratic Freedoms in Jordan strongly condemns Abu Mashour's detention. It calls on all Arab and international humanitarian and juridical organizations to work for his immediate release, and for the release of all political prisoners in Jordan. These organizations are called on to work to put a stop to the overall human rights violations of the Jordanian authorities.



The Gulf War

Towards Internationalization

Iranian bellicosity and intransigence have combined with the attack on the US warship Stark to invite more imperialist involvement in the Gulf, opening a new chapter in US-Iraqi relations.

On May 17th, the US guided missile frigate Stark was hit by an Iraqi missile. Thirty-seven US sailors were killed and twenty-one injured. This coincided with Iran's threats to the Kuwaiti government for supporting Iraq in the Gulf war. The Iranians also threatened the United States and Soviet Union for responding to the Kuwaiti requests to have their oil tankers escorted as protection against any Iranian attack.

Tension has been high in the Gulf since the attack on the US warship, focusing increased international attention on the conflict there. Among the major world powers, it is perhaps only the Soviet Union that has genuine interests in a solution being found to the war. Besides the overall Soviet line for peace and stability internationally, there are two major reasons for this. One, the Soviets are interested in friendly relations with the Gulf countries, leading to mutual benefit, rather than seeing the two major Gulf powers

squander their resources in this senseless war. Two, the Soviets are concerned that the war gives imperialism added pretexts for reinforcing its military network just south of Soviet borders.

The Soviet policy can be embarrassing for the imperialist countries, and spoil their plans for exploiting the Gulf war to their own advantage. While publicly espousing solutions, the imperialist countries are playing their role of war capitalists to the hilt - selling arms to one side or the other, or to both. In contrast to the Soviet Union, the capitalist countries are delighted to make money while Iran and Iraq destroy each other, making both more vulnerable to imperialist domination and ultimately strengthening 'Israel' and other pro-imperialist regimes in the area.


The US, however, is still smarting under the Iran/contragate scandal, and thus especially attune to the need for

giving its Gulf policy a degree of coherence and respectability. So when the Soviets offered to protect Kuwaiti vessels, the US was quick to match the offer. Under the guise of working for peace and stability, the US is seeking to utilize the situation as an excuse for increased US naval presence in the area, strengthening the imperialist military network against any revolutionary movement and the socialist community.

JOINT EFFORTS?

The Stark accident along with the threats to the Kuwaiti government led to the activation of United Nations' efforts to seek possibilities for ending the Gulf war, forcing the two sides to enter into reconciliation talks. The five permanent members of the Security Council have presented a draft resolution to the council on ending the Iraq-Iran war. It contains a paragraph on imposing an arms embargo on either of the two sides that does not abide by the resolution.

The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council consider that the situation in the Gulf has reached its most critical point yet in the seven years of war. At the Venice Summit, the main capitalist countries demanded effective UN measures to stop the Gulf war. This is what was announced, yet no practical steps have been taken, making it obvious that there is not actual joint international work to stop the Gulf war.





USS Stark

Reports in European newspapers confirm this impression. For example, in May, the French newspaper *Le Monde* revealed that in the UN Security Council, Washington, London and Paris had worked against maintaining a firm resolution to halt the Gulf war, due to conflict between their national interests, which has the effect of hamstringing major new initiatives. On the one hand, England was flattering Iran by approving the Security Council resolution urging a ceasefire along the front where the forces of the two sides are now situated. France vetoed this resolution as it includes a paragraph for an arms and economic embargo on both sides; this would affect the French arms sales to Iraq. On the other hand, the US vetoed this resolution as it «did not want history to record that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council had maintained unified work.» However, more recent developments show that it may be forced to accept such unified work.

The outcome of the Venice Summit showed that the seven major capitalist nations are concerned about securing their respective national interests, rather than about ending the Gulf war. Although these states are the real decision-makers, capable of ending the war if they so choose, they were content with issuing statements. They produced a statement on the Gulf demanding «effective measures» by the UN Security Council to stop the war, while pledging to keep open the vital oil routes and maintain freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

Iran, for its part, refuses to halt the war and rejects all actions taken by the UN Security Council. According to the statement of the Iranian foreign minister, Ali Akbar Vilayyati, at a press conference held in Abu Dhabi on May 31st, the precondition for ending the war is the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. With this stance, Iran is providing the excuse for increased US involvement in the Gulf.

US—IRAQI COOPERATION

Brandishing the slogan of self-defense against deliberate or accidental attacks, the US Defense Department decided to add three more warships to its five-vessel force in the Gulf. One of these is the destroyer Fox and another is the aircraft carrier Saratoga. The attack on the Stark initiated an effective US-Iraqi cooperation on the military level, decisively ending thirty years of economic and political boycott which has anyway eased in recent years. US Navy Rear Admiral David Rogers led a nine-man delegation to Iraq soon after the accident to investigate the matter. On May 29th, Rogers declared a preliminary Iraqi-US agreement to develop relations and maintain effective cooperation in order to minimize the possibility of future accidental attacks. On June 2nd, the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al Qabbas* reported that the US investigation committee advised the Reagan Administration to form an American-Iraqi committee based in Baghdad, to specialize in exchanging urgent information with respect to US navigation in the Gulf.

Washington also exploited the Stark attack, and the Iranian threats to obstruct navigation, in its efforts to seek the formation of a joint naval force for the Gulf along with its NATO allies. The US is moreover working to enhance the role of the reactionary regimes in the region, mainly Saudi Arabia, so that they can execute US policy in the Gulf and the whole Middle East. On June 4th, US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger met in Nice with Amir Sultan Ben Abdel Aziz, secretary of the Saudi defense ministry. Reuters reported that their discussion focused on a US proposal about whether to permit US aircraft to utilize the airports of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and/or to have US aircraft participate in protecting airspace over the Gulf, and/or permitting US reconnaissance planes to use Gulf air bases.

Warning the Saudis to follow US wishes even more closely, the Reagan Administration withdrew its proposal to sell twelve F-15 fighters and 1600 Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia, after the sale met opposition in the Congress. Congressmen pointed to the Saudi refusal to intercept the Iraqi aircraft that fired on the Stark, but the real background for their opposition is long-standing Zionist lobbying against major arms sales to Arab countries generally. The Reagan Administration will present its proposal again in the context of drawing the Saudis into even closer military cooperation. Already the monarchy had agreed to extend joint air surveillance with the AWACS. In its latest move, the US has ordered the battleship Missouri to sail for the Gulf. This ship is equipped with Tomahawk cruise (nuclear) missiles, and its presence in the Gulf will again up the military ante. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has agreed to sweep Gulf waters for mines, while providing facilities for wounded US servicemen.

All facts attest to the Reagan Administration's determination to escalate its military presence and interference in the Gulf. The worse the Iraq-Iran war gets, the more pretexts US imperialism will gain to do just that. This imperialist aggression will only be subdued by a unified regional and international effort to stop this irrational war. ●

The Israeli Role in the Middle East

Nuclear Blackmail

The emergence of 'Israel' as the first, and to date the only, Middle East state to possess nuclear weaponry is the logical extension of Zionism's drive for unchallenged regional supremacy. As we pointed out in the first installment of this study (*Democratic Palestine* no. 24), this drive for power has led to five major Arab-Zionist wars. Today it threatens the people of the area with a potential nuclear holocaust.

On October 5, 1986, the London *Sunday Times* broke the story that 'Israel' is the world's sixth-ranking nuclear power, confirming what has long been assumed by experts. Mordechai Vanunu, the Israeli nuclear technician who was fired and then defected after working nine years at a secret nuclear plant at Dimona, gave information indicating that 'Israel' had built 100-200 nuclear weapons over the past twenty years. These range from high-efficiency, light warheads to the components of thermonuclear (hydrogen) bombs able to destroy whole cities. His revelations also indicated that the Israeli arsenal contains weapons more destructive than those used in World War II.

INTRODUCING THE BOMB INTO THE MIDDLE EAST

Though the Zionist state injected itself into a nuclear-free area, it began efforts to acquire the bomb within a year of its foundation. Mineral surveys were conducted, revealing the presence of phosphates with uranium in the Negev (Naqab-South Palestine). Along with their robbery of Palestinian land, the Zionists plundered this resource as well, as a military asset in the quest for regional supremacy. Young Israeli scientists were sent abroad for training in the nuclear field, notably to the US and France. By 1949, the Weizmann Institute near Tel Aviv had set up a department for isotope research, where the US subsequently funded nuclear research. These early efforts were conducted exclusively under the auspices of the Defense Ministry and kept top secret, indicating that nuclear power for military purposes was the aim from the start. Due to the particular structure of the Zionist state, with almost total overlap of political and military functions and power, David Ben-Gurion was both defense and prime minister in the early years. This fact assisted in keeping the essence of the Israeli nuclear program secret. Even after Ben-Gurion's time, a very small group of officials have traditionally been responsible for decisions in such strategic fields.

The Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) was founded in 1952, and the Zionist state embarked on a double-track course: ostensibly developing atomic power for peaceful purposes, and in the process acquiring the materials and know-how to make nuclear weapons. The latter occurred via secret cooperation with imperialist powers, and later fellow pariah states like South Africa and Taiwan, augmented by scientific espionage, including outright theft and fraud - acts deemed permissible when the culprit is 'Israel'. France and the US have been the main benefactors of the Israeli nuclear program, in accordance with their interests in having 'Israel' as an instrument for imposing imperialist policy in a strategic region.

Israeli secrecy around the nuclear program has always been a convenience for the imperialist states. They can support the Israeli military build-up, including its nuclear aspect, and reap the benefits of Israeli aggression on the Arab liberation movement, yet still publicly distance themselves from illegal Israeli acts. Professor Francis Perrin, France's high commissioner for atomic energy (1951-1970), substantiated this point in an interview with the *Sunday Times* (October 12, 1986): «We considered we could give the secrets... connected with work on nuclear weapons... to Israel, provided they kept it a secret themselves.»

The Zionist leadership has understood full well how to operate within the leeway provided by imperialist hypocrisy. In this context, one can note an entry in the diary of Yitzhak Rabin, today Israeli Defense Minister, from the time when he was ambassador to Washington (1968-73): «Some sources inform me that our military operations are the most encouraging breath of fresh air the American administration has enjoyed recently... There is a growing likelihood that the US would be interested in an escalation of our military activity with the aim of undermining Nasser's standing... Thus the willingness to supply us with additional arms depends more on stepping up our military activities against Egypt than on reducing it.»

The fact that imperialist support for conventional aggression could be transposed into a green light for the development of nuclear weaponry was not lost on the Zionist leadership. After all, the Dimona plant, the single most important advance in the Israeli nuclear program, was supplied by France in 1957, in effect a reward for Israeli services in the 1956 tripartite attack on Egypt. Moreover, in its attempts to be imperialism's major partner in the Middle East, 'Israel' was patterning itself after the US's global strategy and performance. In the years when the Zionist state was in the making, the US had used Hiroshima and Nagasaki as the testing ground for its own bombs. Although World War II was essentially won by the Allies, the US was sending a signal to the world that its leadership and conditions must be accepted. Meanwhile, destruction was wreaked on Japan so that it could be rebuilt in the US image, as a reliable ally in Asia. Israeli possession of nuclear weapons sends a similar ultimatum to the Arab people and states - submit or else.

SHIMON PERES— MR. NUCLEAR BOMB

In the early fifties, Ben-Gurion asked France for technical assistance in the nuclear field. In 1957, France agreed to supply a nuclear reactor and plant eventually capable of producing 40 kilograms of weaponry-grade uranium a year - enough for up


to ten bombs. Israeli cabinet approval led to the building of an eight-storey (six of them underground) complex at Dimona in the Negev, to house the reactor. The two states signed an agreement on nuclear cooperation, one aspect of over a decade of close military cooperation. A principal actor in this was today's Israeli foreign minister, Shimon Peres, who served as director-general of the Defense Ministry in the years 1953-59. In 1954, Peres was dispatched by Ben-Gurion on the first of many trips to Paris to negotiate arms deals. In his book, *David's Sling*, Peres characterized this as a «new era of Franco-Israeli relations... enabling Israel to overcome most of her security problems...» Left unspoken was the linchpin for Israeli 'security', i.e., nuclear weapons.

In the late fifties, 'Israel' collaborated with France on the design of the Mirage warplane capable of delivering nuclear bombs. In the sixties, Israeli scientists were on the scene when France staged nuclear tests in desert areas of Algeria. In 1961, 'Israel' launched its Shavit II missile patterned on a French model used in the Sahra tests, i.e., equipped to deliver nuclear warheads. 'Israel' went on to develop the Jericho missile originally begun in cooperation with a French firm and capable of nuclear delivery. The Jericho II can thrust a 1,000-1,500 pound warhead over 400 miles. It was tested in the Shah's Iran and in South Africa. In May 1985, the US newsletter, *Aerospace Daily*, reported that 'Israel' had deployed potentially nuclear-tipped Jericho II intermediate-range missiles with a 700 kilometer range in the Negev and Golan Heights, mounted on trucks and supported by nuclear-hardened underground facilities.

As prime minister in the national unity government, Peres may have revived the Israeli-French nuclear cooperation which was cooled by President de Gaulle in the sixties. Peres' December 1984 visit to Paris was accompanied by reports that France wanted to sell two nuclear power plants to 'Israel'. Complications arose and to our knowledge the deal has not gone through, though 'Israel' has on its own announced plans for a new nuclear station, supposedly for electric power generation. *Jerusalem Post*, on January 1, 1986, reported on the Tagar project to be situated in the Negev, pending final approval and the acquisition of technology from West Germany, Canada and the US.

With the advent of Mitterand's presidency, France has moved decidedly closer to 'Israel' again, and there may be more cooperation than is announced. *Jerusalem Post*, on August 11, 1985, revealed that a French agent, involved in the bombing of the Greenpeace's Rainbow Warrior ship, had

Shimon Peres - Mr. Nuclear Bomb



spent two weeks in 'Israel' following the crime. This suggests close intelligence cooperation in combatting anti-nuclear activities.

In a 1972 interview with *Davar*, Peres, as permanent secretary of the Defense Ministry, spoke of the concept of non-conventional «compellence» in an implicit reference to Israeli nuclear capacity. Indeed the man who today promotes his image as a 'dove', championing the Israeli version of an international peace conference, more rightfully deserves the title of Mr. Nuclear Bomb.

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL

In the Zionist reality, the 'dove' and the bomber are two means to the same goal. Peres' international conference is a political trap to force the Arab regimes and the PLO to submit to Israeli conditions, i.e., to accept the consequences of four decades of Israeli state terrorism. If the aggression of the past is not enough, nuclear capacity remains as the trump card of the Zionist state's dangerous game of blackmail. It warns of the possibility of the Zionists staging their ultimate blitzkrieg-a nuclear first strike. In the book *Two Minutes Over Baghdad*, the Israeli/American authors write: «... there is no doubt that one of the greatest factors that motivated Sadat to choose this direction in policy (his 1977 visit to occupied Jerusalem) was the Israeli nuclear threat. In the long-running negotiations between Israel and Egypt, the nuclear issue had been paramount - although both sides, including the Americans, were reluctant for the world's media to publicize it.» On November 8, 1978, the *New York Times* reported that 'Israel' had rejected two Egyptian offers to give up the nuclear arms race in the Middle East and to limit the conventional arms race.

Short of wreaking a nuclear holocaust in the Middle East, Israeli nuclear blackmail serves a variety of purposes. The mere knowledge that the Zionist state has the bomb is intended as a deterrent to the Arab state's attempts to redress their grievances. This is probably the main reason that a variety of Israeli officials have made statements hinting at their nuclear capacity. 'Leaks' have often been timed to match impending aggression, such as just before the 1967 and 1973 wars. In June 1981, a year before the Zionist army invaded Lebanon, by which time the invasion was in the final planning stages, Moshe Dayan warned that 'Israel' had the capacity to produce nuclear weapons «in a short time.» For these reasons, the why's of Vanunu's revelations, though not the substance, initially elicited some scepticism.

For a state like 'Israel', the line separating psychological warfare from actual aggression is quite thin. *Two Minutes Over Baghdad* recounts how 'Israel' prepared to use nuclear weapons in the 1973 war: «There were indications that Dayan gave an order secretly to put in combat readiness, for the first time, Israeli-made Jericho SS missiles, carrying nuclear warheads, as well as Kfir and Phantom bomber fighters equipped with nuclear devices. Altogether, 13 Israeli-made nuclear weapons were put on alert.» This was blackmail of both friend and foe: It aimed to push the US for a quick weapons delivery, a demand that was obliged in the US airlift. More important, it was a warning to Egypt and Syria to back down from their initial victories in the battlefield.

US 'OVERSIGHT'

Besides funding Israeli nuclear research, the US, in 1955, provided 'Israel' with its first nuclear reactor, accompanied by a wealth of research material on nuclear power. Over the five ►

ensuing years, 56 Israeli nuclear scientists were trained in the US, while 24 more visited nuclear installations there. The reactor was installed at Nahal Soreq on the Mediterranean coast. While it may not be used directly for developing weapons, there is certainly a spill-over of expertise to the Dimona plant. Moreover, in the sixties, the CIA transferred considerable technical information to the Israeli nuclear program.

The US's other contribution to Israeli nuclear capacity is over two decades of deliberate official 'oversight'. The US administration usually rants and raves over any country allegedly developing nuclear power without signing the non-proliferation treaty, which 'Israel' has not done. Yet successive US administrations have kept silent despite knowledge since the sixties that 'Israel' had the bomb or at least all its components. In this permissive environment, 'Israel' has engaged in all the tricks of the trade - fraud, theft and international piracy.

The Zionist state probably got the fuel needed for the first charge of the Dimona reactor from France, South Africa and Dead Sea phosphates. This being insufficient to continue, the Mossad's services were brought into play. One of the biggest steals was the siphoning off to 'Israel' of 361 pounds of nuclear-grade plutonium in the early sixties. The uranium had been supplied by the US government to NUMEC, a firm in Apollo, Pennsylvania, ostensibly researching how to preserve foods by nuclear radiation. Under Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' program, NUMEC was to cooperate with Westinghouse Corporation on the production of uranium oxide for US nuclear submarines. In 1966, the US government granted NUMEC the largest contract for plutonium processing ever

Claudia Wright noted, «In the past few years, several men investigated by the FBI and indicted for various offences, including the illegal export of nuclear materials and arms to Israel, have been allowed out of jail on bail and have fled.» Clearly, the Pollard case is the exception and not the rule for the treatment the Zionist state receives from the US.


Another major act of nuclear piracy occurred in 1968, when 200 tons of stolen nuclear-grade uranium were smuggled by ship on a diversionary route from Belgium to 'Israel'. Some estimate that by 1981, 'Israel' was producing sufficient uranium from Negev phosphates to keep Dimona in operation, but Israeli nuclear espionage continues apace. As an example, it was revealed in 1985 that 800 krytons, nuclear triggering devices, were illegally transferred from the US to 'Israel' from 1979 to 1983. 'Israel' was requested to return only part of them retaining those that had been used.

NUCLEAR FORTRESS

Besides relying on imperialist support and permissiveness, the Zionist state's nuclear quest springs from its own nature as a settler colony, implanted and expanded through violence, at the expense of the indigenous people. All means of destruction are considered necessary and justified. Two corollaries of this make 'Israel' an ideal possessor of the bomb from imperialism's point of view. One is secrecy, and the other, lack of internal dissent.

The Dimona plant was kept secret not only from the Israeli public, but from the Knesset; even some members of the cabinet were kept ignorant of the exact details. Not until 1966 was the IAEC moved from the Defense Ministry to the prime minister's office, and there are reports that Defense Minister Moshe Dayan ordered a continuation of the nuclear program in the Defense Ministry, secretly and at an accelerated pace, in 1968. Maintaining such secrecy over so many years is only possible in a 'security' state where true democracy, even for Jewish citizens, is more facade than reality when it comes to strategic military matters. This point is also emphasized by the Mossad's kidnapping of Vanunu, his isolation in a Mossad-Shin Bet detention center, deprived of the rights usually accorded Jewish prisoners, and the fact that he is being tried *in camera*. When the *Sunday Times* broke Vanunu's story, Prime Minister Peres summoned major Israeli editors, urging them in the «national interest» not to cover the story. (This was in any case prevented by the censor.)

Internal dissent to the Israeli nuclear program has been minimal, although it was probably the reason for the 1957 resignation of six out of seven government-appointed members of the IAEC. In the sixties, debate was confined to the political-military elite. Those who opposed the development of the bomb did so for pragmatic not principle reasons. They were convinced that conventional weaponry was sufficient and feared the repercussions on the international standing of 'Israel'. The *de facto* result of the debate was keeping up the program, but still in secret. This Israeli policy was articulated by Levi Eshkol, who was simultaneously defense and prime minister in 1963-4, and is often billed as a 'dove': «Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East, but neither would it be the second in the race.» The success of the nuclear program was acknowledged by Israeli President Ephraim Katzir in 1974: «It has been our intention to provide the potential for nuclear development... We now have that potential. We will defend this country with all possible means at hand.»




Vanunu's photo: cutaway model of Israeli atomic bomb

given to a private firm. The owner of NUMEC was Zalman Shapiro who, besides being a Zionist, had participated in the US's Manhattan project for developing the nuclear bomb -hardly an unknown fact for the US government. The co-owner of NUMEC was the Israeli government. Among the many foreigners visiting the plant each year was Rafi Eitan, one-time Mossad head of operations and more recently a major figure in LEKEM (Liaison Bureau for Scientific Affairs), the technical espionage unit of the Israeli Defense Department, which was ostensibly broken up after the arrest of Jonathan Pollard as an Israeli spy in 1985. There have been subsequent disappearances of uranium from the US, but despite extensive investigations of this nuclear smuggling, the US government never took any action. Writing in the *New Statesman* of November 29, 1985,

Indoctrinated in the fortress state mentality, the Israeli public generally accepts nuclear weaponry. In the mid-seventies, a poll showed that 62% thought that the country had the nuclear bomb; 77% thought that if it didn't, it should.

GLOBAL REACH

While defense minister, Ariel Sharon outlined his conception of the strategic problems facing 'Israel', emphasizing the following main tenets: «... Israel's security interests are affected by developments and events far beyond the area of direct confrontation upon which Israel has concentrated her attention in the past... The Soviet factor... is arousing increasing alarm both here in Israel and in the Western world, and it is



«Sunday Times» diagram of Dimona, based on Vanunu's revelations

by no means impossible that it develop to become the principal challenge in the eighties.» Besides advocating strategic cooperation with the US, Sharon proposed to «expand the field of Israel's strategic and security concerns in the eighties to include countries like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and areas like the Persian Gulf and Africa, and in particular the countries of North and Central Africa.» Sharon also links 'security' policy with the economic structure of the garrison state: «We are determined to see the development of security industries and production as one of the vital constituents of our national security» (*Maariv*, December 18, 1981, as translated in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Spring 1982, p. 169).

Some ascribe such ideas to Sharon alone, citing the grandiose nature and recent failures of his projects, such as in

Lebanon. However, he is only stating bluntly the thinking that has historically guided the Zionist leadership. Such global ambitions are the only real rationale for developing the bomb. Obviously it would be counterproductive for 'Israel' to use strategic nuclear weapons in direct 'self-defense', i.e., on or adjacent to the territory of occupied Palestine claimed by the Zionist state. The real reason for the Israeli bomb then is Zionism's quest for broadly defined regional dominance, where a first strike could be aimed at a more distant target - an Arab capital, the PLO or other revolutionary presence in a more removed country. Equally important are the Israeli ambitions to be part of the NATO bloc opposing the socialist countries, and especially the US drive for unchallenged nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. In advocating Israeli participation in Star Wars, Dore Gold of the Jaffe Center of Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, predicted, «We can expect an enlarged battlefield in a future Middle East war» (*New York Times*, March 9, 1986).

In the global context, 'Israel' has a special role to play in conjunction with other illegal states like South Africa and Taiwan. Together they augment the pro-imperialist, global nuclear capacity, while serving reactionary aims in their respective regions. In 1976, 'Israel' and South Africa signed an agreement on nuclear cooperation. Tel Aviv contributed technology and expertise, while South Africa offered access to testing space and uranium mined in occupied Namibia. The Zionist state has helped South Africa circumvent international sanctions regarding needed nuclear technology. Vanunu testified that South African scientists often worked at Dimona, while Israelis travel to South Africa for joint work at a huge industrial complex in the Kahari desert, built by West German and other European firms. Some experts think that the final assembly of Israeli nuclear devices occurs there. The world acquired evidence of the two racist states' collaboration with the 1979 nuclear explosion over the Indian Ocean; some think this might have been a neutron bomb.

There are reports of 'Israel', South Africa and Taiwan working to develop a cruise missile with a 1,500 mile range, enough to hit targets in the Soviet Union from 'Israel'. The indications of Israeli-South African work on a neutron bomb are perhaps the most horrifying in terms of the danger of immediate use. This is an ideal weapon for racist regimes as it kills people while inflicting minimal damage on structures. This would fit neatly into the Zionist recipe for wanting the land but not the people of Palestine and other occupied Arab territories. The ANC has maps made by the South African military, showing black population concentrations, which might indicate where a neutron bomb could be used. All in all, nuclear weapons in the hands of racist states, whether 'Israel' or South Africa, are not only an element for blackmail, but a concrete danger to the peoples and to world peace.

The quotes and facts used in this study, and not otherwise documented, are to be found in the following sources:

1. MERIP: *Middle East Report*, November-December 1986, no. 143.
2. Stephen Green, *Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel*, 1984.
3. *AfricAsia*, November 1986, no. 35.
4. *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, September 1985.
5. *Granma*, January 18, 1987.
6. Perlmutter, Amos; Michael Handel and Uri Bar-Joseph; *Two Minutes Over Baghdad*, 1982. (Perlmutter is a former member of the IAEC and military consultant to several Israeli governments, now teaches at the American University in Washington; Handel is at the Harvard Center for International Affairs, formerly of the Hebrew University in Tel Aviv; Bar-Joseph was formerly in the Israeli Air Force.)

Poets of the Resistance

In the last issue of *Democratic Palestine*, we printed a selection by Emil Tuma on the Palestinian Arab cultural movement in the Zionist state. Tuma noted that: «Several good poets have emerged with poems that harmonize revolutionary contents with an original form.» Outstanding among them are those who came to be known as the Poets of the Resistance, especially Tawfiq Zayyad, Samih Al Qasem

and Mahmoud Darwish. Here we print some poems that are representative of this trend.

Samih Al Qasem's «The Land After I Had Gone» reflects the focus on the land, whereby it rises from being mere soil to stand as a symbol of the Palestinian cause itself.

Tawfiq Zayyad's «The Coming Day» expresses the persistent optimism of the Palestinian people and their conviction

in the inevitability of liberation, despite decades of oppression.

In «The Path Has Risen,» Mahmoud Darwish pays tribute to the distinguished Palestinian poet, Muin Bseiso, who died in January 1984. At the same time, Darwish's poem brings out the universal aspect of the Palestinian cause. (For reasons of space, we print only the first verse.)

The Land After I Had Gone

by Samih Al Qasem

A day after my green youth
was engraved on marble tomb
my heart said - excuse me,
marble tomb
will a stronger knight be
victorious.
after I have gone?
If he becomes the 'lover'
I am a memory
then completely forgotten.

My land which, with my
ancestors' bones,
I ploughed
It intermingled with my sons
my land, to which I showed my
love
and cared for its fruit all my life
my land which...
Is he the lover,
I am a memory
and then completely forgotten

Oh, our everlasting home
oh, our temple-home
upon its doorsteps I kneel
and smell the perfume of the
shoes of its builder
oh, the door to my home
opened to houses all over the
world
of my attic
the cradle of the first word I
sang
you are witness to my
affection
you, when his hands grab its
fruit
you, my sole shelter
Is he the beloved
am I a memory
then completely forgotten

who put boulders on plains,
who watched the stars?
who taught the breeze to blow
softly on gardens?
who... but only the good
generous heart of my grandfather

who made the fields bountiful?
who but my old uncle and father
who watched for nests in our
ancient olive trees?
who engraved the names of relatives,
one after another,
on each branch of all our vines,
only this blessed lover?

Is he the lover
Am I a memory
and completely forgotten?
Oh the most beautiful beats of
my heart
oh with which I enjoyed love
Am I made wretched through hatred?
Answer your son,
your misfortunate son
oh land?

The Path Has Risen

by Mahmoud Darwish

How many deaths must you die?
In how many languages must you make mistakes
Before you arrive?
The path has risen against the path
And our steps have taken many directions.
The hero's dead,
Long live the mountain!
How many times, for your sake and mine,
Must you raise two tents on the shores?
How often must you come into the kingdom of violets,
Only to find no violets there?

Do not use my eyes to cry, but lift me
So I may carry the weapons of the dream
Stained with a blood that calls our name
And leads us - I don't know where.
No. We have not found a river to take
Save this one. Let's go with it then.
Cities appear, and disappear in us,
While from our hand to our blood-
A horizon that cannot be fenced in
Except with the boxthorn of childhood.
How much have we seen? How often
In the four winds have we seen
Cities approach, in which we disappear,
Only to emerge like hostages when hope betrays us?
The hero's dead,
Long live the mountain!

The Coming Day

by Tawfiq Zayyad


That day is coming
It is coming soon
I will carry my flute and sing
On roads
In my towns and villages full of blessings
In the high mountains and forests
I will sing
To the man liberated from all oppressors
From all invaders and occupiers
To the people liberated from the fear of
The past and the future
From the worries of earth and the day
After I will sing
From place to every place...
In the Arab Jerusalem
In Gaza and Golan

“My homeland was once occupied
my homeland became free
the illegal occupation existed
and today became a memory”

That day is coming
It is coming soon
I will pick my pen
Dipped in my heart,
On the flowers’ leaves, I will write
On the bird’s wings, I will write
On the steadfast tree branches
In confrontation with the wind
I will write
On the doors of our factories, schools, farms,
On the walls of workers’ palaces
On the palms of children’s hands
On the heroic martyrs’ statues
On the shoulders of our bold pilots,
I will write... write... write
On everyplace, everywhere
In the Arab Jerusalem
In Gaza and Golan

“My homeland was once occupied
my homeland became free
the illegal occupation existed once
and today became a memory.”

In Solidarity
with the
Jordanian
Writers' League



8

On June 17th, the Jordanian authorities closed the offices of the Jordanian Writers' League in Amman, Irbid and Zarqa, in accordance with the martial law