


**DEMOCRATIC**

No.16

**PALESTINE**

April 1986

Grabbing the Land,  
Dividing the People...



Johan

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*Democratic Palestine* is an English language magazine published by the PFLP with the following aims:

- conveying the political line of the PFLP and other progressive Palestinian and Arab forces;
- providing current information and analysis pertinent to the Palestinian liberation struggle, as well as developments on the Arab and international levels;
- serving as a forum for building relations of mutual solidarity between the Palestinian revolution and progressive organizations, parties, national liberation movements and countries around the world.

You can support these aims by subscribing to *Democratic Palestine*. Furthermore, we hope that you will encourage friends and comrades to read and subscribe to *Democratic Palestine*. We also urge you to send us comments, criticisms and proposals concerning the magazine's contents.

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The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is a Marxist-Leninist organization and an integral component of the Palestine Liberation Organization. A primary motive for establishing the PFLP was to inject a clear class perspective in the Palestinian national liberation struggle. Experience shows that the most oppressed classes - the workers, peasants, sectors of the petit bourgeoisie, the camp Palestinians - are those most in contradiction with imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction. It is they who carve history with determination that can persevere in a protracted war against the enemy alliance.

The PFLP is deeply committed to the unity and independent, national decision-making of the Palestinian people and their sole legitimate representative, the PLO. To this end, we work for strengthening the role of the Palestinian left, thereby accentuating the PLO's anti-imperialist line in common struggle with the Arab national liberation movement.


The process of liberating Palestine relies on radical, national democratic change or development in one or more of the surrounding Arab countries. This will provide the PLO with a strong base for liberating Palestine. Thus the struggle for a democratic Palestine is linked to the creation of a united, democratic and ultimately socialist, Arab society. This will provide the objective basis for eradicating the poverty, exploitation, oppression and the problem of minorities, from which the people of the area suffer.

As a cornerstone in this process, the establishment of a democratic, secular state in Palestine will provide a democratic solution for the Jewish question in this area, while simultaneously restoring the

national rights of the Palestinian people. After liberation, Jews in Palestine, like all citizens, will enjoy equal rights and duties. The decision of the PLO to establish an independent Palestinian state on any liberated part of the national soil is a step in this direction. It is the sincere hope of all Palestinian revolutionaries that more and more Israelis will recognize that they, too, have become victims of Zionism's racism, expansionism, exploitation and militarism, and will join us in the struggle for a democratic Palestine.

### Star Wars/Earth Wars

Recently we received a copy of *Issues in Radical Science*, published in June 1985, by Free Association Books, 26 Freegrove Road, London N7. Of special interest was an article entitled *Star Wars/Earth Wars* which links Reagan's plans for militarizing space with the military-industrial complex of the capitalist countries. We also thank the Radical Science collective for including mention of *Democratic Palestine* in its list of «Comradely Publications». (We call attention to the fact that the price of our magazine is \$24 for 12 issues, not \$15 as stated in the list.)



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# Editorial

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## Snags in the Enemy Plan

In a circular addressed to members of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 9, 1985, William L. Ball, assistant secretary for legislative and intergovernmental affairs, stated that King Hussein of Jordan plays a key role in the «peace process» in the Middle East. In an attached statement, Ball added, «Indeed a strong, stable Jordan, able to defend itself against radical pressures, is in Israel's interests, as well as our own.»

In a speech delivered on February 19, 1986, King Hussein himself made it very clear that he will serve Zionist and imperialist interests, even if these contradict with the interests he is supposed to represent. The king's speech was carefully planned and timed. It was devoted to attacking the PLO and the Palestinian revolution, on the assumption that the overall conditions in the area would serve his ends. (See following speech by Comrade George Habash for more analysis of Hussein's speech.)

King Hussein estimated that the nationalist and progressive forces were handicapped by the prevailing balance of power which is tilting in favor of the reactionary forces — in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in Egypt, in Iraq and the Gulf generally, etc. Yet it now seems that the winds did not blow as King Hussein, Shimon Peres and Ronald Reagan had anticipated.

In the West Bank, Palestinian revolutionaries implemented the people's judgement against Zafer al Masri, the Israeli-appointed mayor of Nablus and collaborator with the occupation. This revolutionary judgement forced other collaborators to withdraw from participation in the Israeli-Jordanian plan for joint rule of the Palestinian land and people, with the help of Palestinian collaborators.

In Egypt, the regime, one of US imperialism's main allies and a strong supporter of King Hussein's policies, was deeply shaken by the Egyptian conscripts' revolt. The regime's weakness was underscored by the fact that the popular masses joined in the revolt which was directed against Egypt's relations with the Israeli enemy and imperialism.

To the east of Jordan, the Iraqi regime, another main ally, received heavy blows in the latest flare-up of the Iraq-Iran war, on both the northern and southern fronts.

To these events was added the failure of US pressure against Libya, unsuccessful Israeli tactics in Lebanon and continued resistance to Israeli occupation in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights. All this indicates that the US and Israeli policies, in collaboration with Arab reactionaries such as Hussein, are not running smoothly. Rather, they are facing real difficulties despite the fact that the Palestinian right-wing, represented by the Arafat leadership of the PLO, has failed to respond to the dangers facing the Palestinian cause. This leadership has so far failed to cancel the Amman accord with

King Hussein, which paved the way for this dictator to try to implement his conspiracy against the Palestinian people.

The right-wing leadership's failure to respond to the present danger was manifest in the PLO Executive Committee's statement on Hussein's speech, issued on March 8th. A PFLP Politbureau spokesman commented on this statement as follows: «The PLO rightist leadership's statement is disappointing to the Palestinian people who expected this leadership to cancel the Amman accord and abandon its betting on US solutions. This should have been the response to King Hussein's speech and his attempts to create an alternative to the PLO...The PFLP once again calls on all Palestinian organizations, forces and personalities to close ranks and unite in a broad nationalist coalition to abrogate the Amman accord and confront the threats explicit in Hussein's speech...The PFLP also calls on all leaders, cadres and members of Fatah (Central Committee), who are opposed to the Amman accord, to exert all possible pressure on the right-wing leadership of the PLO. This would be an important contribution to abrogating the accord, and pave the way for reuniting the PLO...» ●

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### Important Notice — Subscription Payment

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# Martyrs' Day

## Comrade Habash Exposes the Dangers of Jordan's Plan

*On March 7th, hundreds of people convened for a mass rally sponsored by the PFLP in Yarmouk camp, to commemorate Martyrs' Day. PFLP Secretary General George Habash focused his speech on analyzing King Hussein's February 19th speech, and how the Palestinian revolution should confront the threat it represents.*

Comrades, on March 9th, 1973, our comrade and hero Guevara Gaza was martyred in a battle with the Zionist enemy forces. In the same battle, two other comrades, Abdel Hadi Hayik and Kamal al Amasi were martyred. It was then that the Zionist enemy admitted that while it ruled the Gaza Strip during the day, it had to withdraw and leave the Strip to the fedayeen at night. In view of the significance of Guevara Gaza's experience in the Strip, the PFLP leadership designated March 9th as Martyrs Day. On this day, we remember Ghassan Kanafani, Wadia Haddad, Abu Amal, Taghrid Batmeh and all the others who were martyred under the banner of the PFLP and the PLO...for the Palestinian cause. We honor their martyrdom so that we and our children after us will know that those who die for freedom and the homeland will always have an esteemed place in our hearts and in the pages of history...We will always remain loyal to this heritage.

Due to our feeling of responsibility towards our martyrs, we believe that the continuation of the revolution requires clear political vision. This is especially important now due to the difficult phase our revolution is experiencing. The current political

moment requires a sound, scientific understanding from which emerges the program and plans, and in turn, serious efforts to protect the revolution and carry it to victory.

The revolution entered a new phase after the 1982 Zionist invasion of Lebanon, and after the revolution was forced to lose its main base in Beirut. We began to witness the deterioration of the right-wing leadership of the PLO, due to its considering an imperialist-reactionary settlement of the Palestinian cause. Instead of drawing on the experience of the heroic defense of besieged Beirut to reinforce our strength; instead of relying on this steadfastness to throw condemnation in the face of the reactionary forces for their feebleness and hesitancy during our fight, the right-wing leadership began solidifying relations with these regimes. It hoped to benefit from their influence with the US to find a solution for the Palestinian cause.

We have continuously articulated our stand on this phase...Therefore, I can concentrate on the current political moment which has two headings: First, the Jordanian regime's plans to swallow the PLO. Second, the Zionist plans to liquidate the PLO once and for all. The deterioration of the rightist

*There were many spontaneous responses during Comrade Habash's speech. People improvised verses, including the following: Not every man is a man  
Not all words are worth hearing  
If Hussein is a man  
Let him respond to your words.*



PLO leadership encouraged the two enemies. What are their plans?

### King Hussein's speech

The content of King Hussein's speech clearly reflects his intention to swallow the PLO...If there is one thing we have in common with King Hussein, it is the necessity of studying this speech very closely. Hussein gave a historical resume of how his regime has viewed the Palestinian cause, emphasizing the period after 1967. Time does not allow me to cover this speech in detail, and I do not wish to keep you for three and a half hours as he did. However, I do want to stress the main ideas.

Clearly, Hussein wishes to separate the subject of the land from that of the Palestinian people's national rights...He emphasized UN resolutions 242 and 338 as *the basis* of a just, comprehensive and enduring solution for the Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, he completely neglected UN resolutions like 3336 which stress not only the land, but the Palestinians' right to return, self-determination and an independent national state! It is as if he is saying it is important to save the land, but the martyrs of the Palestinian revolution, the Palestinian people, the whole Palestinian cause are something else.

Another idea along the same lines is his reference to this period as one when the «consequences of aggression» must be wiped out, i.e., to return the West Bank to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and then later deal with the other issues.

With respect to the decisions of the Rabat Summit of 1974, which acknowledge the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people...Hussein intimated that they have now become an obstacle to the process of recovering the land. He goes further and tries to divide into two the Palestinian people who are united under the banner of the PLO. According to him, there are the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians who are concerned with saving the land. Then there are those Palestinians outside who don't really care about saving the land, but are more concerned with slogans and outbidding others.

Some may say: «He has a point there; there is a foul settlement plan, and frankly we want to save the land!» Well and good, but how does Hussein propose to save the land?

There is a law derived from many revolutionary experiences: What is taken by force can only be regained by force. Our people's experience with the Zionist enemy, the course of the Zionist movement and the policies of the various Zionist parties prove that it is impossible to expect 'Israel' to withdraw from all the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Only if 'Israel' finds itself under a barrage of fire mortally threatening it, might it begin to *consider* withdrawal...Is that what the king has mentioned as a method for saving the land?...No! He advocates diplomatic maneuvers...Maybe the US would finally condescend to pacify Hussein with a piece of land?!

In short, Hussein's speech contains the following ideas: (1)First we concern ourselves with the land and afterwards we think about the people. (2)We restore the land through diplomatic methods because of Arab weakness and hesitancy.

In the summer of 1971, we fought our last battle with the regime on Jordanian soil. After that King Hussein proposed his project for a 'United Arab Kingdom'. The memoirs of prominent US and Zionist politicians reveal that, during the decisive battles with the fedayeen, Hussein was promised the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Why wasn't he able to get the land back? Hasn't he read the Likud's program? He makes a big show of being scientific

and objective. We have the duty to expose his aims and deceitful intentions to our masses. Let him read the Zionist programs and then tell us if we can ever regain the land without force of arms!

### Hussein aims to swallow the PLO

In his speech, Hussein also stressed his adherence to the Amman accord. He declared a halt to coordination with the rightist leadership, but the accord still holds. King Hussein realizes the extent to which the present PLO leadership is willing to stoop to enter the US gateway. He also wishes to preserve the concessions already extracted. He wishes for this leadership to go on making concessions until it liquidates itself on its own.

Finally, I wish to point out that Hussein has now taken a position different from the one he took after the Rabat decisions. Houari Boumedien (the late Algerian president) personally told me the story of how these decisions were made. They were adopted unanimously. During the sessions, Hussein opposed them. However, finding himself without sufficient backing and due to the resounding voice of the PLO at that time, Hussein grudgingly consented to their adoption. He said to the PLO: «You try (and see if you can solve the Palestinian cause your way).»

In his speech, however, the king was definitely against the Rabat decisions. This time he did not say: «The PLO and I did not agree on resolutions 242 and 338, and I therefore leave the matter up to the PLO.» This time, Hussein says: «I'm directly concerned and my duties with regard to the East and West Bank and Jerusalem oblige me to go ahead to save the land.»

This leads me to the political aim behind his speech.

Is the aim to pressure the PLO to make more concessions and agree to resolutions 242 and 338?

Is it to protect his throne in the East Bank (Jordan), especially in the light of the continuous Israeli threats?

Is it to decrease the difficulties in obtaining the arms package from the US?

Is it to improve relations with Syria in the belief that the Syrian stand towards the present PLO leadership would be extended to all of the PLO?

The aim is all of the above in one form or another. We in the PFLP believe, however, that the central aim is liquidating the PLO, because it is considered *the* obstacle to the US solutions. Other variations of this liquidation, which would allow for the implementation of the US solutions, include finding a substitute for the PLO, or a Hashemite PLO, or going ahead without the PLO.

The wording of the speech is also indicative of Hussein's intentions. He notes that ever since 1967, he has taken the initiative, or participated in all initiatives, except — he said — the Sadat initiative, although he described it as a «historical and daring» step. The ex-foreign minister of Egypt, Ibrahim Kamel, notes in his memoirs that during the Camp David negotiations, King Hussein was in continuous contact with Sadat. Thus Hussein has not exempted himself from *any* initiative. What he wishes to say is: «I will continue with these initiatives. I want the US to understand this well, so as to protect my throne.»

For years we have led the battle to protect the PLO...Ever since the foundation of the revolution, the enemy camp has tried to liquidate it and the PLO. They imagined that they succeeded in defeating us in Jordan, but we sprang up again in Lebanon. In Lebanon, the enemy tried many times to liquidate

us and failed. The last time they tried, we were steadfast for 79 days under siege, and still they did not liquidate us.

We are now faced with another attempt to liquidate the PLO, and in this lies the danger of the current political moment...If King Hussein succeeds, and I'm confident that he will not — he will have offered the greatest service to imperialism, for imperialism and 'Israel' want the PLO's head! King Hussein wishes to boast of enticing the PLO leadership until it stoops and is prostrated. If the PLO refuses, he will cross it out, thus ridding the region of the so-called 'danger of the PLO'. This is the plan awaiting us. How do we confront it?

### **Husseins dilemma**

It is my estimation that it is not easy for King Hussein to succeed because he knows he needs a Palestinian and Arab cover. This, by the way, was Reagan's advice to him when the seven-member delegation went after the Fez Summit. Reagan said: «I gave my plan and you must convince the PLO to mandate King Hussein.»...There will be a (pro-Hussein) Palestinian-Jordanian lobby. However, it will eventually become clear, as it did with the village leagues plot, that it is impossible for this lobby to be considered the representative of the Palestinian people.

The Arab cover won't be easy either. Even the reactionary regimes will find it difficult to give Hussein this cover, while they are so absorbed in the Gulf war. We all know the difficulty Hussein encountered at the extraordinary Arab summit in 1985. He attained only a partial cover. At that time, Hussein was a partner to the PLO. Now the reactionary regimes will ask: «What about your partner?»

Therefore it will not be easy to pull off his plan, but we would be greatly mistaken if we were to rely on these conditions. We must be determined to foil this plan relying on our own strength, our own plans and our ability to work to foil this plan...The PLO, our people and cause are in danger...How should we confront this plan?

### **The PLO is not Arafat**

There are two main points for confronting the present danger: One is taking a very responsible stand on the PLO, its unity and restoring its national line. Shall we leave it to be swallowed by King Hussein, and dismantled? How do we save the PLO, our sole, legitimate representative?

The PLO is *not* Arafat. Whosoever has a grudge against Arafat should use his brain! We have strongly faulted Arafat...but the PLO is one thing and the rotten PLO leadership is another. Is Lebanon Amin Gemayel? Is Egypt Hosni Mubarak? The PLO is not Arafat nor Fatah's Central Committee. The PLO is our hope, our national role, our only means for drawing the Arab national liberation movement into the conflict with the Zionist enemy. The PLO is the Palestinian people everywhere...

There are now suitable objective conditions for restoring the PLO's unity and national line...It is an unparalleled opportunity. Will they (the PLO leadership) take advantage of this or will they stand as an obstacle? It is the right of the masses to judge every organization and leadership. Who will work to restore the PLO as the Palestinian national force opposed to imperialism and 'Israel'?...Who will pose obstacles?

### **Cancelling the Amman accord**

Taking advantage of this opportunity begins with cancellation of the Amman accord, publicly and clearly. Don't forget that Hussein kept the Amman accord. He acquired legitimacy

from the PLO, which he wishes to keep. Therefore, the will of the Palestinian people must be manifest in cancellation of this accord...There is no chance of genuine national unity before cancellation of the Amman accord...(This is the second main point in confronting the enemy plan.)

The leadership which signed the Amman accord is the one who can cancel it. We must struggle for the broadest national call for such cancellation. We must crystallize a popular will demanding cancellation. However, the one who can in the least time take advantage of the opportunity and provide the basis for restoring national unity, is the leadership which contracted this accord.

What has this leadership done up till now? To tell the honest truth, I am one of those who, despite scientific analysis, said after Hussein's speech: «I wish the leadership would think of the interests of the revolution and declare cancellation of the Amman accord.» But the hours passed, then days...We are waiting for the official statement from the meeting in Tunis. Up till now, nothing has been issued. At such a point, matters must be judged scientifically; responsibility must be designated. The channels for our people's struggle must be specified. The objective conditions for national unity must be complemented by subjective conditions, i.e., a stand by all parties of the Palestinian revolution...However, there is a great difference in responsibility between those who signed the agreement and can cancel it, and the other factions of the PLO...

The PFLP raises the slogan: Assembling the broadest national ranks to crystallize the popular will calling for cancelling the Amman accord, as a prelude to serious thought about the condition of the PLO...Cancelling the accord would constitute something qualitative, because this means cancelling the program of confederation with Jordan. Such a non-national program can only be cancelled on a patriotic basis.

After cancellation of the accord, all efforts should be channelled towards jointly concluding the lessons gained from the course followed by the present PLO leadership, through its dealing with US solutions...I remember when I was a child in the thirties, the common man used to say: «Our enemy is not the Jews. It is Britain.» Now we are in 1986. The official leadership forgets this great elementary lesson, the gist of which is that it is impossible to get anything for our national cause through colonialism or imperialism. We must update the experience to say scientifically: Betting on imperialism, to achieve our rights, is a tremendous mistake and must not be repeated in the future of the Palestinian national struggle. If the national forces do not learn this, then even if unity is achieved, it will be faulty from the start.

After that we must clarify the political line. Either we want this playing games, or we want to benefit from the experience of our masses. We must first stress the national program — the program of return, self-determination and an independent Palestinian state. Then we should take a number of clear political decisions that cannot be misinterpreted or played with by any party.

Still, this is not enough to guard national unity. There must be a trustworthy, collective leadership. Then our efforts should culminate in a Palestinian National Council — either the PNC with the composition of the 16th session, or a new one, because the composition of the 17th PNC was not as it should be for a national front. Then we can crown our efforts with genuine national unity...The PFLP will act on this basis...

Until national unity is achieved, we must remain steadfast in the face of the Jordanian regime's plans...Our task is to crystallize a popular Palestinian will in all places to declare con-

demnation of King Hussein's plan, to declare adherence to the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This is the task which I call on you to accomplish immediately. Our masses in every town and camp must have their say about the plan to swallow the PLO. We declare that the Palestinian people are stronger than the enemy plans.

There are other aspects of confronting this plan: The role of the Jordanian national movement is important. There is the role of the Arab national regimes and national liberation movement factions, and the role of the international liberation movement.

### **The Israeli plan**

In addition to King Hussein's plan to swallow the PLO, there are the Israeli plans to liquidate the Palestinian cause altogether...

The Likud is a partner in the present Israeli government. Its plan is based on 'autonomy' — there is no Palestinian people; there will be no Palestinian state. There is an Arab minority which they don't acknowledge as Palestinians... These are 'allowed' 'autonomy'. There is another plan, that of the Labor Alignment, which leans to the right, i.e., closer to the Likud than is ordinarily thought. I don't want to go into detail, but

I do want to say that at the current moment, there is a policy which is mutually agreed upon between Likud and Labor. Their common ground is appointing Palestinian mayors and municipal councils... The Israeli aim is to liquidate the Palestinian cause, not leaving any trace — to show that people are content and those outside are loud mouths, by providing the very minimum requirements of daily civilian life, while completely neglecting national rights... King Hussein agrees to the appointment policy, whereby the Israelis and the Jordanian regime both fulfill an aim, resulting in joint self-administration, loyal to 'Israel' and Jordan. This is the dangerous step which confronts us in this period.

Our masses in occupied Palestine must confront this plan, rallying all national forces and exposing its aims. 'Israel' is a state of occupation, oppressing a people. It is very natural to resist and revolt — if not with guns, with molotovs; if not with molotovs, by raising the Palestinian flag, demonstrating, strikes or sit-ins. If we are unable, we sit at home and keep quiet, but to collaborate with the Zionist enemy is forbidden. The people's judgement will be carried out against those who do.

This is our view of the current political moment and how to confront the enemies' plans at this time... ●

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## *Execution of Zafer al Masri*

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### **PFLP Politbureau Press Release - March 2, 1986**

Today, the unit of the Martyr Guevara Gaza, operating in occupied Palestine, carried out the death sentence on Zafer al Masri in front of the municipal building in Nablus. The people's judgement, to execute Zafer al Masri, was due to his part in the Zionist-Jordanian reactionary project to liquidate the Palestinian cause, against the will of the Palestinian people.

Zafer al Masri was appointed Mayor of Nablus by the Zionist military governor in collaboration with the Jordanian regime. In announcing his execution, the PFLP spells out a warning to every one who dares to deal with or join the Zionist-Jordanian reactionary project which aims to liquidate the Palestinian cause by negating the PLO, the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

It is treason to cooperate with the moves to create an alternative leadership ready to participate in the capitulationist settlement project being prepared by the Jordanian regime. It is moreover a stab in the back of the martyrs of Palestine who have given their lives in the struggle for self-determination and an independent Palestinian state.

Any such treason committed by anyone will be dealt with directly and

swiftly. The people's judgement will be carried out on such collaborators regardless of the protection afforded them by the Zionist occupation authorities and the reactionary Jordanian regime.

### **Why Zafer al Masri?**

The execution of Zafer al Masri was primarily a political act. It forcefully expressed the Palestinian masses' rejection of the Peres-Hussein joint venture to cultivate a substitute for the PLO. It showed an alternative to the rightist PLO leadership's conciliatory approach to the enemy plans.

Masri was a wealthy businessman and headed the Nablus Chamber of Commerce. He might have remained as such, had it not been for the enemy alliance's need for him in the given situation. Until recently, the Israeli occupiers had no luck in finding a Palestinian political figure of any stature, who would lend credibility to their 'civil' administration on the West Bank. Then the Palestinian right wing signed the Amman accord, signalling readiness to compromise the PLO's revolutionary and representative role. King Hussein took this as a green light for coordination with the occupiers. The most prominent result was the Israelis' appointment of Masri, known for his ties to Amman, as Mayor of Nablus,

replacing the popularly elected Mayor, Bassam al Shakaa.

If such an appointment had been allowed to stand, other Israeli appointees might have taken their seats in other West Bank municipalities. 'Civil' administration might have become a reality, despite the continued presence of the Zionist occupation army. This would be conducive to direct Jordanian-Israeli negotiations, 'settling' the Palestinian question via an Israeli-Jordanian condominium in the West Bank. Indeed this would boost Israeli economic expansion, stabilize the Jordanian monarchy and pass a piece of the pie to the upper strata of the Palestinian bourgeoisie. For the Palestinian people as whole, its spells no return to their home, no self-determination or other national rights, no independent state.

A major setback occurred for this project when the people's judgement was carried out on Masri. Within days of his assassination, every Palestinian figure, who had been slated for appointment to public office, vigorously withdrew his candidacy or stated that he had never harbored such intentions. It is hoped that this will give a boost to the overall mass resistance against the Peres-Hussein plans which are at the expense of Palestinian rights and the PLO. ●

# King Hussein Doesn't Speak for Us

*King Hussein's February 19th speech, attacking the PLO and trying to divide the Palestinian people, was massively condemned in occupied Palestine. Following is a sampling of the response:*

**Bassam Shakaa, elected mayor of Nablus**

«What has occurred was expected, for the matter is not so much related to relations between two parties as to a trend that links its future with imperialism. The PLO was founded in the midst of Arab conflicts and at a time when the Palestinian cause was almost forgotten. The start of the armed revolution restored respect to the Palestinian cause and identity. Then the deviation started and with it came setbacks...The king's wrong presentation of the course of the Palestinian cause was an accumulation and one of the results of this deviation...Those who call for 242 will not be able to change the position of Zionism and US imperialism. Did any of them hear of Israeli willingness to withdraw from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jerusalem or the Golan Heights, abandon the settlements and then permit our people to establish an independent state?

«What has occurred should embarrass those who deviated from the revolution and our people's national struggle. The king's step provides an opportunity for unifying positions, reconsidering what has happened, initiating discussion and deep criticism, and returning to national unity in the framework of the PLO...

«It was evident that the king would abandon Yasir Arafat in view of the policy that is being implemented in the occupied land, aimed at a practical policy of adapting to occupation. The prime example of this was the joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee's acceptance of the (Israeli) appointments to the municipalities...

«The intention of the king's speech was to bring up side issues, far removed from the main issues, in order to bury national interests...This underscores the necessity of beginning serious and speedy efforts to unite the PLO on a militant basis, hostile to imperialism and Zionism. The results of the ongoing polarization will ultimately benefit the national forces.»

**Haider Abdel Shafi, head of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society in Gaza**

«The scene which we are now facing proves the validity of the principled position of the national factions who rejected the Feb. 11th accord, and adhered to the 16th PNC's decisions, calling for national unity between all factions, in the framework of the PLO, on a militant basis, opposed to imperialist and Zionist schemes...»

**Bashir Barghouti, editor of «Al Talia» newspaper, Jerusalem**

«This underscores the positions of those forces who refused the trend of the Amman accord. It accentuates the fact that there is no hope for a just solution, that guarantees the Palestinian people's legitimate rights, through accords with reaction and relying on imperialism. The correct trend is adopting the resolutions of the 16th PNC...»

**Dr. Farouq Al Saad, head of Al Hadaf Committee in Um Al Fahm, statistics teacher at Al Najah University in Nablus**

«King Hussein is no different from his grandfather. What happened in 1948 is repeating itself in a different form — the same mentality, the same sell-out. I don't believe Hussein can find a substitute for the PLO. Nor do I believe that anyone would accept such a Hussein.»

**Mustafa Abu Salem, secretary of the Timber Workers Union**

«It is of utmost necessity to reject the Amman accord and the sequence of concessions offered by the PLO leadership, and to return to the national line by commitment to the PNC charter and the decisions of its legitimate sessions. The illegitimate session should be cancelled as should all the ensuing steps which have retarded the Palestinian national struggle...We call on all the struggling patriotic forces to take the reins and confront the obvious efforts to split the Palestinian people...We are confident

that our people can foil all plans of liquidation and preserve national unity.»

**Mansour Khalil, head of the municipality of Deir Al Ghusson villages**

«What is going on now in Jordan is an attempt to return to the situation which existed before the PLO became the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Jordan's main worry is to push the Palestinians' sole representative out in the cold politically, and clear the coast for its own selfish interests. The era of the Ariha (Jericho)<sup>1</sup> conference is over. Those who think like their forefathers, of going back to it, will not achieve their aim...In my opinion, the response should be for Palestinians to close ranks, and readopt the Aden-Algiers decisions<sup>2</sup> and those of the 16th PNC session.»

**Khader Al Marnikh, secretary of the Public Service Workers Union**

«The king's speech came as no surprise. It was intended to intimidate and pressure (the PLO leadership) to extract more concessions at the expense of our cause. It was in accordance with the US imperialist and Zionist conditions for implementing capitulationist settlements. The king's speech is the cue for his puppets to start moving in the occupied territories. The speech is a result of the Amman accord which has put the PLO in its present deplorable situation.»

**Dr. Taysir Maraqa, M.D.**

«The king's speech aims at creating a substitute for the PLO...in the West Bank — something every Palestinian rejects. This step was taken so as to enter peace negotiations on the basis of UN resolutions 242 and 338...We repeat: No one represents us in the West Bank except a united PLO committed to the decisions of the PNC's legitimate sessions.»

**Odeh Al Jabari, member of the executive board of the Shoe Industry Workers Union**

«The contents of King Hussein's speech indicate that he is trying to create a popular support base for himself, that would call on him to go ahead with direct

negotiations. He himself has admitted that he is not ready to enter negotiations on the Camp David model. He wants a popular base that will support him *before* and not after entering negotiations.

«The halt of coordination between the right-wing leadership and Hussein presents an opportunity for the former to withdraw (from the Amman accord) and make up for its mistakes by renewed full commitment to the Palestinian tenets. This leadership is fully responsible for the Palestinian situation. What I mean is not so much to punish the right-wing leadership as to protect the PLO from future falls. This can only be achieved through a front which includes all factions on the basis of the unanimous national program of the PNC's legitimate sessions.»

***Ibrahim Nimr Hussein, mayor of Shafa Amer and head of the regional committee of Arab municipalities in 1948 occupied Palestine***

«The PLO achieved its legitimacy and credibility from Palestinians inside and outside the occupied territories. It is faithful to Palestinian interests, and decides what is required within the boundaries of the adopted Palestinian tenets. Our faith in the PLO is absolute.»

***Tawfiq Toubi, deputy secretary general of the Israeli Communist Party — Rakah***

«The king's speech confirms the soundness of our warning to the PLO about the danger which the trend of the Amman accord poses to the just Palestinian cause and to the PLO itself.» In an interview on February 23rd, Toubi stated that King Hussein's declaration, of stopping political coordination with the official PLO leadership, only emphasizes that he is on the way to a new settlement, Camp David-style. Blaming the PLO for hindering the peace process is to absolve the Israeli and US governments, who are actually responsible for blocking peace by refusing to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and denying the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

Toubi emphasized that the PLO is required to clearly give up the trend of the Amman accord and restore unity on the basis of adhering to the rights of the Palestinian people, the program of the PNC's 16th session and the Aden-Algiers agreement. It must strive to restore the alliance with Syria, the forces

of national liberation and the socialist community, first and foremost the Soviet Union.

***The people of Jenin***

«We declare that the West Bank members of (the Jordanian) parliament represent only themselves. We reaffirm that the PLO is the sole, legitimate representative of our people...We therefore call on our leadership in all factions to make serious efforts to restore the PLO's unity on a national democratic basis, on the tenets stipulated by legitimate PNC decisions.»

—This is an excerpt from a statement signed by the mayor and elected members of the municipal council of Jenin, by 22 different trade and professional unions, womens, students and youth organizations, other mass associations and committees, and dozens of shop-keepers.

***Ibrahim Tawil, elected mayor of Al Bireh***

«What has happened only reaffirms the necessity of all PLO factions' unifying on a patriotic basis...so that the PLO can impose itself from a position of strength and not weakness, for this only results in further concessions — a fact which neither our people nor the Palestinian national factions would consent to.»

***Farid Al Tawil, elected member of Beit Sahour municipal council***

«History has taught us that any political solution achieved with an imbalance of forces often results in inadequate agreements where the stronger imposes conditions on the weaker. The net result is a form of capitulation. It is a well-established fact that the US will never be impartial towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. The strategic alliance between the US and Israel is proof of this. The natural response to the situation of official Arab defeat is the PLO's unification on a clear patriotic basis, its alliance with the Arab liberation movement and the support of liberation movements around the world...Those who are betting on US solutions are swimming in a sea of illusions — we've had enough of ploughing the sea.»

***Samiha Khalil, head of the Family Welfare Society, Ramallah***

«In these decisive times of our people's history, we demand unity and

only unity. Without this, we cannot be effective. Sooner or later, our independent Palestinian state will be established on the land of Palestine under the leadership of the PLO, the sole, legitimate representative of our people...no matter the obstacles and catastrophes.»

***Dr. Hanna Halaq, owner of «Al Darb» (closed by the Zionists)***

«This stage requires extra efforts to reinforce ranks and achieve genuine national unity based on previous PNC sessions...Any solution short of restoring the rights of the Palestinians and their sole representative, the PLO, and establishment of a state is far removed from the aspirations of our people...Hussein's speech meets all the US and Israeli conditions for a settlement which would surely be at the expense of the Palestinian people.»

***Mohammad Atrash, head of the executive board of the youth social center and member of the Committee to Defend Duheisha Camp***

«King Hussein's speech is nothing more than a defense of US imperialism, aimed at liquidating the PLO. The puppets he addressed have no influence in the ranks of our people in the occupied territories. Our people have the ability to foil the king's plans and the plans of those whose pockets are bulging with his money...The PLO leadership must pause and realize what their policies have inflicted on our people's cause. They must take the initiative to immediately break off the ill-reputed Amman accord.»

***Students in Bethlehem and Bir Zeit***

Student groups in these two West Bank towns issued a statement emphasizing that King Hussein's teary-eyed concern for the masses in the occupied land does not change the fact that these masses are a part of the PLO. They have defended the PLO from all past and present plots. They are always concerned about its unity and the legitimacy of its representation.

***«Al Mithaq» newspaper published in Jerusalem***

Al Mithaq stressed the dangers underlying the king's speech which takes the blame off the US administration and its aggressive policies against

the Palestinian people, throwing it on the PLO leadership. The most dangerous thing about the speech is that it heralds a new political stage: The regime has initiated a new war against the PLO and Palestinian cause, based on officially withdrawing from the Rabat summit decisions, dividing the Palestinian people and separating the question of Palestinian national rights from that of liberating the land. *Al Mithaq* denounced the 'Jordanized' Palestinians who were only too willing to participate in this war against the Palestinian cause and the people, and the PLO...The people will prove to the regime and its puppets that they are stronger than these new plots.

### **Palestinian National Personalities in Kuwait**

*Yahya Haddad, president of the General Union of Palestinian University Professors and Researchers — Kuwait branch*

«The king's declaration of halting coordination with the present leadership of the PLO should be a lesson to those who do not read history, and to those who chase the mirage of US solutions. They were betting on being allowed to participate in the liquidationist solution, sacrificing Palestinian national unity and closing their ears to loyal calls to prevent them from following the deceitful mir-

age...This leadership should admit its extraordinary mistake, and abandon this political trend and all the agreements based on it. It should call for a unification PNC to reaffirm the Palestinian tenets and former PNC decisions, so as to set a plan for revolutionizing Palestinian affairs and developing collective leadership...»

*Basim Sarhan, doctor of political science and economy; journalist*

«King Hussein's stand did not come as a surprise to me...It was clear that Hussein accepted the Arafat leadership in Amman on special conditions that converge with those of the US...Thus it was clear that Hussein would abandon Arafat if he did not accept the US conditions. We have no confidence in the Jordanian regime...Its role is known historically. We demand that Arafat and his leadership be judged for all political deviations committed since 1982.»

*Joudeh Al Hindi, independent PNC member*

«We were pained by Arafat's surprise at King Hussein's decision, and by his affirmation of the February 11th accord and willingness to resume dialogue with the Jordanian regime. We still had some hope that Arafat, upon reaching the end of this bitter experience, would return to the path of strug-

gle...We are looking for a new stage where the resistance factions and the masses take the initiative to upgrade the PLO's situation on the basis of the PNC charter.»

*Abdullah Al Danan, independent PNC member*

«We should absolutely not deal with our cause using terms such as 'let us maneuver and use tactics'...»

*Ibrahim Al Khatib, independent PNC member*

«Jordan wants the PLO as its Palestinian cover, and the PLO wants the Amman accord as a means of gaining US recognition. The king suspended relations but has left the door ajar because he wants a decision (from the PLO) to recognize UN resolutions 242 and 338...The situation now rests with the factions and national personalities who have denounced the PLO leadership. If they can unite their ranks on a clear political program and rally the Palestinian and Arab masses, then they will be able to defeat the deviating trend and reunite the PLO on a sound national basis.»

<sup>1</sup> Assembly of pro-Jordanian notables in 1948, who approved the idea that the West Bank become part of Jordan.

<sup>2</sup> Agreement of spring 1984 between Fatah's Central Committee and the Democratic Alliance. ●

## ***Peres and Unilateral 'Autonomy'***

Towards the end of February, Zionist Prime Minister Shimon Peres announced: «The Hussein-Arafat talks were a total failure and we are back at point zero.» Peres therefore declared that the next step was to give the Palestinians in the West Bank broader powers of self-rule. This idea has always been rejected by policy-makers in the Zionist state. Recently, after Peres announced his plan, there was broad opposition in the government, even among his closest colleagues. Three of those who opposed the plan are ex-chiefs of staff of the Israeli army: Health Minister Mordechai Gur, Police Minister Haim Bar Lev and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir refused the plan. Likud Minister Moshe Arens went even further, proposing annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Gur pointed out that he had discussed the idea of self-rule with Moshe

Dayan at least ten times, and each time they concluded that the plan was not practical or easy to implement.

From where, then, did Peres acquire such confidence to think of implementing this plan? In the wake of the Amman accord, between Yasser Arafat and King Hussein, Peres eyed the chance for the PLO's giving concessions that would eventually enable Hussein to enter negotiations on the West Bank, marginalizing the PLO. The Zionist leadership is now eager to exploit the break-down in the Arafat-Hussein relations, to impose its own conditions. It is important to remember that when Peres speaks of self-rule, he means something more like 'civil' administration which does not tamper with Israeli control over the 1967 occupied territories.

Speaking to the press, Peres said that he supported handing over some

powers in the occupied territories to the local population. He proposed appointing Palestinian mayors, increasing freedom of movement between Jordan and the West Bank, development aid and opening an Arab Bank in the West Bank. However, speaking before the Knesset's Foreign Relations and Security Committee, he stressed that he does not support the idea of evacuating the Israeli army from the West Bank, because «If the forces leave, we may under certain conditions, have to redeploy them.» This reveals the real intention of talk about more powers to the local population and «improving the quality of life». Such phrases are primarily a tactical ploy thrown out to potential collaborators in the occupied territories, and especially to please the US administration and their friend King Hussein. When self-rule is seen in this context, Shamir's opposition is minimal. ●

# Iron Fist — Deportations

## 34 Palestinian Citizens Deported

With the increased use of the iron fist policy, the Zionist occupation authorities have deported 33 Palestinian citizens since August 1985. Over 100 citizens remain under indefinite administrative detention orders. Those deported in 1986 include Doctor Azmi Al Shuaibi, trade unionist Ali Abu Hilal and journalist Hassan Abdel Jawad Fararja, on January 31st; student Mahmoud Fanoun, ex-prisoners Hassan Al Amoudi and Jalal Aziza, on February 5th; and Adnan Mansour Ghanem, ex-prisoner, deported on February 11th. In the same week, the occupation authorities deported ex-prisoner Abdul Majid Radad and prisoner Ahmad Balu (who had never been released after serving a 16-year sentence). Those deported in 1985 include:

1. Badr Darweesh Mohammad al Qawasmi
2. Khalid Mahmoud Suleiman Dalloul

3. Abdullah Iyad Harb Elian
4. Abdel Ghafer Ahmad Abu Asaba
5. Muhaman Hamdan Abu Asaba
6. Mahmoud Abdullah al Taamari
7. Abdel Qader Mahmoud Al Wahsh
8. Mohammad Harouj Hanani
9. Eisa Mohammad Shaheen
10. Nazmi Hussein Hamdan
11. Mohammad Hassan Hashem Aziz
12. Jumaa Awad Salem Abu Hamed
13. Khalil Abdel Hamed Salama
14. Salem Ahmed Amer Baryoush
15. Salah Khader Abu Murtada
16. Adnan Mohammad Al Balidi
17. Mohammad Ahmad Hassan Al Beiruti
18. Walid Mohammad Qasrawi
19. Younes Salem Al Rajoub
20. Amin Ramzy Maqboul
21. Bahjat Mustafa Al Jayousi
22. Walid Ahmad Nazal
23. Khalil Abu Ziad
24. Khamis Hussein Nasr Allah
25. Khalid Mohammad Tantash

## Adnan Mansour Ghanem

Adnan Mansour Ghanem spent seventeen and one half years in Zionist prisons, and was released in the May 1985 prisoner exchange. The Zionist forces arrested him again for no reason other than that he was freed in the largest exchange of prisoners they had ever been forced to concede to the Palestinian revolution. The story of Adnan's arrest and the torture he received at the criminal hands of the occupation forces, was reported by *Al Ittihad* (Rakah's newspaper, Haifa) on January 23rd. The story reads:

On December 22, 1985, Adnan Mansour was arrested and taken to Gaza prison. During the court hearing to discuss his being released on bail, the detainee made the following complaint: "The charges of which I am accused are not true. I was not allowed to sleep. They're still threatening and beating me. I told them I am innocent. They threatened my life, continuously giving me cold showers for lengthy periods, and not allowing me to sleep since my arrest. Does the law permit this?!" Adnan added, "From the questioning, I found out that the intelligence men want

to force me to speak, and if I don't do so, my life is in danger. I therefore request that this information be recorded in the court transcript."

On January 16th, the police requested an extension of Adnan's detention. During the court session, the detainee again complained about his detention. He said that he had only been allowed to sleep four times since his arrest, that he was still given cold showers, only allowed to wear underwear and



Israeli soldiers arrest Gaza youth

a shirt, and given no blanket or cover at night.

On January 14th, the prison administration had prevented lawyer Lea Tsemel from visiting Adnan. However, on that day, she met the detainee Hasan al Amoudi who told her that he and another detainee, named Jalal, had seen Adnan in the interrogation room four days before. Jalal had fainted when he saw Adnan's condition. Hasan said that Adnan's physical and mental state was very bad.

On January 13th, Hasan had again been taken to the interrogation room to see Adnan. He said that Adnan was in very bad shape and looked quite sick. He spoke and acted as if he had lost his mind. Hasan told Lea Tsemel that the intelligence men, who took him to see Adnan, had told him that if Adnan did not confess, his fate would be that of Abdullah Ayesh. (Abdullah Ayesh is an ex-

### Stop the deportations of Palestinians from their country

In the USA, a number of progressive organizations have launched a campaign to inform the general public about the brutality of the Israeli policy of deporting Palestinians from their country. Besides giving the facts of the deportation cases, the campaign draws a parallel between how Palestinians are treated by the occupation authorities, and the apartheid regime's expulsion and repression of Blacks in South Africa.

On February 13th, Palestinians, Arabs and progressive Americans demonstrated in front of the Israeli Con-

sulate in New York City, protesting the Zionist iron fist policy, and expressing solidarity with the Palestinian people. This was one of eight demonstrations held at Israeli consulates in different US cities in the space of two weeks. Among the organizations sponsoring the campaign are the November 29th Committee, the Committee to Support Palestine, the Palestine Human Rights Campaign, the American Peace Council, the Committee for Mobilization Against War, and Jewish anti-Zionist organizations.

prisoner, resident of the Gaza Strip, who lost his mind while being interrogated. From 1980 until today, he has suffered from mental illness and is completely unaware of his surroundings.)

In the light of this information, Lea Tsemel submitted another request for Adnan's release on bail. The military court discussed the request in Gaza. When Adnan was brought into the courtroom, he looked very tired. He said that the interrogators had tried to convince him that he was crazy. They had sprayed him with gas, claiming that he had caused disturbances. They also hit

him on the head and face until his ears bled and his eyes were swollen from bleeding to the extent that he could not see. Adnan added that during the beating, his head was covered with a bag. He testified that all this was intended to force him to confess to something that he did not do, and a form of revenge because he was a liberated prisoner.

Despite a court order to end Adnan's interrogation and submit his case to trial, he was kept under interrogation and tortured. Then, on February 11th, he was deported from Palestine, despite his poor health and without trial.

made no mention of casualties, but admitted that the reception hall suffered minor damages.

### Three attacks in one day

The Israeli police reported three incidents on Feb. 13th: In the first, explosives went off near a guard tower for the Israeli intelligence service in Haifa port; a number of people were injured. In the second, a bomb went off at the Egged Bus Company's central station in Afula, causing heavy damage and injuring two people. In the third, the Zionist forces discovered and defused a bomb placed in an Israeli bus as it arrived in Bisan in the occupied Galilee.

On Feb. 14th, the Israeli police reported that six people were injured, some seriously, when a bomb went off in a bus traveling between Peta Tikva and Tel Aviv.

On Feb. 16th, four attacks were carried out in different parts of occupied Palestine, in addition to the operation carried out by the PFLP, which was mentioned earlier. First, in French Hill, north of Jerusalem, heavy explosives went off at a bus station used by the occupation soldiers traveling to the West Bank. The explosion destroyed the station, killing or injuring those there. The Israeli radio claimed there were no casualties. Second, in the Jerusalem suburb of Ramat Ashkoul, a bomb went off, injuring several people. Israeli radio reported the incident but denied any casualties. Third, on a hill near a Zionist military camp near Tel Aviv, the enemy forces discovered two rockets of the Lual type used by the Israeli army to combat armoured vehicles. The rockets had been set to be fired at the camp. Fourth, in Al Khalil (Hebron), in the occupied West Bank, 80 kilograms of explosives were discovered and defused by the Zionist forces. This large bomb had been set near the headquarters of the military governor.

On Feb. 18th, an Israeli military spokesman reported that a bomb went off near a bus stop in Tabaria (Tiberias). In Gaza, on the same day, Israeli radio reported that five soldiers were wounded when a hand grenade was thrown at an Israeli military patrol.

Zionist military officials continue to express their worry about the increase in anti-occupation operations. Special mention has been made of the increased acts of resistance in Ariha, including stone throwing, hand grenades, burning tires and shooting.

## Military Operations

Wherever you look - behind the trees, over the hills, on the streets and at sea - you will find us fighting you, causing heavy damage and dealing blows where it hurts. This is the message our people in the occupied land are sending to the Zionist enemy through acts of resistance ranging from stone throwing to heavy explosives.

In a recent press conference in Tripoli, Libya, Comrade George Habash answered a question on how to change the balance of power, by saying: «With military and mass struggle in Palestine and over the borders of the neighboring Arab countries, with political and diplomatic struggle on the local, Arab and international levels...Israel will not withdraw from the West Bank unless it is forced to do so militarily.»

In accordance with this strategy and the PFLP's decision to increase and upgrade attacks against the Zionist occupiers, the group of the martyr, Husni Shahrou, planted explosives at a crossroads near Tulkarm in the occupied West Bank on February 16th. While a bus carrying Zionist soldiers was passing, the militants detonated the explosives by remote control, and attacked the vehicle with grenades and machine guns. The bus was destroyed, and the soldiers aboard were killed or wounded. The group of freedom fighters returned safely to base. An Israeli military spokesman reported the attack but admitted only one injured.

The following are other operations carried out in February by Palestinian revolutionaries working in the occupied homeland:

On Feb. 2nd, a molotov cocktail was thrown at a Zionist military patrol near Balata camp in the Nablus district

of the occupied West Bank. Curfew was imposed on Balata.

On Feb. 3rd, a hand grenade was thrown at a Zionist military patrol in the center of Ariha (Jericho) in the southern part of the occupied West Bank. A Zionist military spokesman said that a bomb was thrown by an unidentified person, causing casualties. Curfew was imposed on Ariha for three consecutive days.

On Feb. 4th, a Palestinian military spokesman reported an explosion in Jabotinsky Street in the Tel Aviv suburb, Ramat Gan. It destroyed a military bus stop and caused a number of casualties among Israeli soldiers.

On Feb. 6th, a bomb went off at a power station in a settlement near Nazareth in the occupied Galilee. According to an Israeli military spokesman, the explosion destroyed the power station, cutting electricity at settlements in the area and forcing hundreds of workers in nearby factories and companies to go home.

On Feb. 7th, a molotov cocktail was thrown at a Zionist bus on the outskirts of Balata camp. The Zionist military report of the incident made no mention of casualties, but admitted that the bus was burned.

On Feb. 8th, three molotov cocktails were thrown at Zionist patrols in Tel Aviv. The Israeli newspaper *Davar* reported the attacks, saying that they caused minor damage to the vehicles, but as usual did not mention casualties. On the same day in Jerusalem, an explosive set at a station for military vehicles was discovered and defused.

On Feb. 11th, a hand grenade was thrown in Tesfahia hotel in Jerusalem. As usual, the Israeli military spokesman

# Occupied Palestine February 1986

*The Zionist authorities continue their oppressive policy against the Palestinians under occupation, following the iron fist policy. The month of February was no exception. There were increased attacks on Palestinian civil and human rights, ranging from land confiscation to outright murder, in an attempt to break the people's will.*

## Land confiscation and house demolition

Land confiscation is one aspect of the Zionist policy of *de facto* annexing the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and emptying them of Palestinian citizens. On February 3rd, the occupation authorities informed several residents of the village of Surrah, near Nablus, that 200 dunums of their land had been confiscated. In the villages of Tal, Arraq and Bourin, 400 dunums were confiscated and fenced off with barbed wire.

On Feb. 4th, the Zionist authorities confiscated 4000 dunums of land belonging to the Hanmi, Mlitat and Nasasrah families of the village Beit Foureek. In Baleen near Ramallah, the villagers were told by the president of the so-called Supreme Zionist Organizing Council in the West Bank, that 15 dunums of their land had been confiscated in order to build a park.

In the area of Nabi Samuel, north of Jerusalem, the occupation authorities bulldozed a two-room house on February 6th, on the pretext that it was built without a permit. The house was owned by Mohammad Abdullah Ellayan, a 37 year old resident of Beit Eksa and provider for a family of thirteen, who said that it was bulldozed with all the furniture inside in the family's absence.

On February 12th, the citizens of Al Khader and Artas villages renewed their protest against an Israeli project to open a road cutting through their land and that of Beit Jala village. The size of the road exceeds the needs of the area. It is planned to be about 200 meters wide. This would mean extensive destruction of crops, agricultural land and homes that stand in the way of the road.

## Destroying trees

On February 4th, Israeli radio reported that the Green Patrol of the Israeli Land Administration had uprooted 70 olive trees planted by Palestinians in Khirbat Samer, near Jerusalem. The next day, the same unit

uprooted 100 olive trees north of Bir Sabi (Beersheba), alleging that they were illegally planted on 'state land'. In fact, the Palestinians planted these trees to assert their ownership of land which the Zionist authorities were preparing to confiscate. The destruction was clearly intended to pressure them not to fight the confiscation.

On February 9th, Israeli radio reported an official decision which has very serious implications in terms of Zionist land confiscation and annexation policy. The decision is to uproot all trees in designated «forbidden areas» of public and private land all along the line that separates the part of Palestine occupied in 1948 from the West Bank. This project targets almost 10,000 dunums of land and thousands of olive trees. It is part of the overall plan of the occupation authorities for destroying Palestinian agriculture and changing the environment and demography. The current drive began the first week of January, when the Green Patrol chopped down and uprooted 6000 almond and olive trees (some 20-50 years old) northwest of Jerusalem.

In the Gaza Strip on February 11th, the occupation forces began bulldozing 45 dunums of forests and 28 dunums of planted trees owned by local Palestinian citizens. According to the Jerusalem newspaper *Al Quds*, this land will be added to Nissanet settlement which is built on Palestinian land.

## Settlement plans

Israeli newspapers reported government plans to build 13 new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1986. This was announced by Housing Minister David Levy. Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai pointed to the coalition government's agreement to build 27 new settlements by the end of its term in September 1988.

The Israeli newspaper *Al Hamishmar* reported a secret Likud plan for intensifying settlement when it heads the

government (starting September 1986). The plan aims at housing 50,000 settlers and building outposts similar to the one existing in Al Khalil (Hebron where settlers have taken over buildings in the city's center). The plan aims at 'protecting' the land which was confiscated and declared 'state land' by the previous Likud government, amounting to almost a third the size of the West Bank. The plan envisions building 12 new settlements, six while Peres heads the government and the other six after Shamir takes the wheel.

Concerning Al Khalil, the Zionist authorities are planning to expand Kiryat Arba settlement in order to encircle the city in preparation for annexing it.

On February 3rd, the Israeli newspaper *Davar* reported that a new settlement is being built on the southwestern slope of Al Jalboa mountain, east of Jenin. It is designed to house 500 families.

## Judaization

In its February 15th edition, the Zionist daily *Haaretz* reported that 40 rabbis met on February 13th, near the western wall of Al Aqsa mosque. They were led by the former chief rabbi Shlomo Goren, and adopted his position that Jews be allowed to enter the area of Al Aqsa after washing and taking off their shoes. The meeting was held on the initiative of Rabbi Grishon Slomon, president of the so-called Temple Mount Faithful. It is worth mentioning that the present Israeli chief rabbi, Mordechai Eliaha, announced three weeks ago that he supports building a temple in the southeastern corner of the area of Al Aqsa.

## Four Palestinians murdered

In the city of Gaza, a 25 year old Palestinian, Shaban Atlouf, was shot and killed on February 15th, by Zionist occupation soldiers. The incident began when Atlouf refused to show his identification card to a Zionist patrol which then chased him and another man, and shot.

In the village of Silwad, near Jerusalem, a young Palestinian man died when a bomb exploded under his feet as he was walking in a field. Zionist settlers have before been known to plant explosives near Palestinian villages.

On February 14th, a resident of Hebron was shot in the head by an Israeli policeman who claimed it had been an accident. The Palestinian later died from the injury he sustained.

On March 3rd, Zionist soldiers shot at demonstrators in Balata camp, killing a youth.

## Fightback

### Prison strike

On February 15th, Palestinian detainees in Bir Sabi prison declared an open-ended strike to protest harsh conditions which are well below the minimum specified for political prisoners in the Geneva Convention. Of special note is the situation of 27 prisoners who were transferred to Bir Sabi prison from Jnaid and Jenin prisons, as a punishment. The prison authorities suspected them of leading the hunger strike that spread throughout the prisons in occupied Palestine in December.

The 27 are kept in very crowded cells; there are 14 beds in cells designed for only seven beds. These prisoners receive no reading material except for a copy of the *Jerusalem Post* every ten days for which they must pay. Despite the prison's desert location, they are

only allowed an average of one and a half showers weekly. There is only one working toilet. Most of the prisoners are forced to wear their regular shoes constantly in the cell, for only four pairs of house slippers are provided for all 27. Health care is extremely bad. The prisoners sent a letter to the prison administration and minister of police, demanding improvement of these conditions.

In another section of the prison, 55 detainees await trial under conditions no better than those of the 27. For example, they are forced to stand for roll call while eating - an obvious harassment.

### Demonstration in Beit Hanina

Scores of progressive Israeli Jews and a large number of Palestinians demonstrated in front of the office of the central region military headquarters in Beit Hanina, near Jerusalem, on February 1st. The demonstration was organized by the Committee to Confront the Iron Fist, to protest the deportation and administrative detention of Palestinian citizens. The progressive Israeli lawyer Felicia Langer described the present iron fist policy as the most severe policy followed by the Israeli authorities since 1967: «This policy was not practiced even under the Likud rule. This

cancels the illusion of the lenient policy of the Labor government.»

### Lift the iron fist from the camps!

On February 24th, Palestinian residents of Balata camp, near Nablus, traveled to Jerusalem to speak out at a press conference organized by the Committee to Confront the Iron Fist. They called for an end to the ongoing house searches and arrests in Balata. Over 250 people, mainly youth, have been arrested from Balata camp since November. Most of the youth are detained in Al Faraa which has become notorious as a torture center. Testifying at the press conference, one youth, who had recently been released, described how he was beaten, tortured and humiliated by the Zionist forces. Another speaker, a Palestinian lawyer, pointed out that while a Jewish citizen of the Zionist state can only be arrested at the age of 16, Israeli law permits the arrest of Palestinians at the age of 12.

Duheisha camp, near Bethlehem, has also been heavily targeted by the iron fist. Again, youth are specially hard hit. On the night of January 28-9, the Israeli occupation forces detained six residents of the camp; four of them were 14 years old, and two were 15. ●

*Jerusalem: Palestinian woman confronted by occupation troops.*



# Survey of Zionist Policy

*March 30th is the Day of the Land — a Palestinian national celebration created by the struggle of our masses in the part of Palestine occupied in 1948. On this day in 1976, Palestinians there mounted massive demonstrations protesting the Zionist land confiscations. This grew into an uprising and clashes with the Zionist occupation forces. Seven Palestinians were mercilessly gunned down. The Zionists acquired a new fear of the strong sense of Palestinian national identity kept alive in the midst of what they want to be a «purely Jewish state».*

The first Day of the Land expressed grievances accumulated over the years since 1948, as a result of the Zionist policy of dispossessing and oppressing the Palestinians who remained in the state of 'Israel'. The Palestinian masses there have suffered the most abominable discrimination, unequal distribution of funds, restrictive construction laws despite population growth, land expropriation, inhuman demolition of homes, lack of educational facilities, and constant attempts to submerge their culture and national identity. This article surveys these Zionist policies and their effects, focusing on the recent period (1984-5).

## Starving Palestinian municipalities

During the past two years, a series of strikes and protests have been organized by local and regional councils, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, and other organizations to voice the grievances of the Palestinian population. A main focus of these protests has been the discrimination in funding for Palestinian towns and villages.

The total budget for the local authorities of the 1948 occupied area (both Jewish and Palestinian communities) was \$1.3 billion. Although Palestinians comprise 12% of the overall population, only 2.3% of the budget is allotted to services for them. On the other hand, \$400 million are collected in taxes from them every year. This means that less than 10% of what Palestinians contribute finds its way back to them. Moreover, devaluation and inflation have eroded the value of the existing budget to the extent that most local councils had 10% less cash in 1985 than in 1984.

The Zionist authorities' intentional lag in funding for Palestinian towns and cities has resulted in the accumulation of a \$10 million debt. In attempts to alleviate the economic situation and continue services, the councils have taken loans at commercial banks at high interest rates, which only aggravated the already shaky financial state. Despite this, the councils were unable to carry out development projects or even maintain the required level of services. Many public employees went without pay for up to five months. Moreover, funds are distributed unjustly, not taking into consideration population density or needs. In 1984, the budget allocated for Um al Fahm (pop. 25,000) was IS600 million, while a nearby Jewish settlement (pop. 10,000) was allocated IS1,200 million.

Needless to say, the Zionist authorities tried constantly to defuse popular indignation by stalling for time or making promises which were never fulfilled. However, due to the persistence of the Palestinians' struggle, the Zionist authorities were forced to meet some of the most pressing demands. In December, an amount of IS1 billion was supposed to be trans-

ferred to the municipalities and another \$4 million paid in installments. Despite this seeming concession on the part of the Zionist authorities, 50% of this amount will be needed to cover the most pressing debts. What remains will barely be sufficient to keep the services of local councils and municipalities functioning, let alone provide a radical solution to the existing problems. Many Palestinian villages and towns remain without electricity, proper sewage systems or drinking water. In many instances services are limited to street lighting and sanitation.

## Choking construction

Out of 120 Palestinian municipal communities, only 72 have town plans approved, and even these are considered by the Zionist authorities to be outdated because of the extraordinary high population growth among the Palestinians. Another 22 have such plans at various stages of consideration, while 20 have no plans at all. Thus any Palestinian is liable to have his home categorized as illegal and consequently razed to the ground!

In one case, the village of Majd al Kurum submitted a town plan in 1965, which the Zionist authorities sat on until 1974 when they rejected it as unsuitable. Another town plan was submitted in 1978 and is yet to be approved. In another case, a villager was sentenced to one year of imprisonment and fined IS1 million «for living in an unlicensed house.»

Overall, there are court orders for the demolition of 7000 Palestinian residential buildings, 1000 of which are in the Galilee. These are to be demolished on the pretext that they are illegally constructed. The Zionist authorities consider a building illegal if it is (a) in contravention to their zoning regulations; (b) on agricultural land; (c) «too close» to highways or major crossroads; or (d) built in the wadis or on the hillsides of the central Galilee. However, in view of the increase in the Palestinian population, the net result of the Zionist restrictions on construction is that many Palestinians find themselves without adequate housing for their families. Due to sustained protest, the Zionist authorities have temporarily suspended the 7000 demolition orders, but these are not revoked and could be implemented at a later date.

## Land confiscation

Historically speaking, the expropriation of land has been the most constant and systematic of Zionism's methods for dispossessing the people of Palestine, depriving them of their original means of livelihood and driving them to work in the Israeli economy. Current plans to expropriate thousands of dunums of Palestinian land are furthermore part of the Zionist

attempts to strangle Palestinian villages and towns. Coupled with inadequate funding, exorbitant taxation, restrictions on construction and political repression, the ultimate intent is to drive Palestinians from their homeland altogether. The theft of Palestinian land is accomplished through a variety of means, ranging from evoking special Israeli laws designed for this purpose, declaring areas as «military zones» and increasing taxation, to outright vandalism.

The residents of Laqiya in the Naqab (South Palestine) were terrorized out of their homes, then had their property confiscated under the Absentee Property Law and given to nearby kibbutzim (Lahav and Ratamim). They are not allowed to build on the land they now reside on; there is no running water, no electricity, no telephones, no paved roads and no mail service. The 6000 inhabitants make Laqiya the second largest town in the Naqab, but of the 75,000 dunums of land it had prior to 1948, only 12,000 remain. The 50,000 bedouin of the Naqab are also subject to systematic land seizure, as are the villages around Nazareth in the Galilee, and the villages of the Triangle: Mahfara, Ailot, Majd al Kurum, Nafr and Kufr Barra; Um al Fahm originally had 148,000 dunums; 128,000 have been confiscated. Abd al Latif Habib, head of Taibeh's council, reports the confiscation of more than half a million dunums since 1948.

No less criminal is the ploy of declaring large areas of land to be «military zones». What makes the pretext so outlandish is that no signs of warning or off-limits are put up, and then civilian settlements are seen to sprout all over the confiscated area! In the Sakhnin area of the Galilee, the Zionist settlement

Ma'aleh Zviah was built in the middle of what was declared to be a «shooting range». The Zionist settlers are allowed to use adjacent land for grazing, but the villagers of the Sakhnin and Arrabeh area are prohibited from cultivating the very same land which was originally theirs! These double standards only go to underscore the discrimination practiced in all other fields.

Vandalism and terror are also common practice. During the first months of 1985, thousands of fruit trees belonging to Palestinian citizens were destroyed by government troops. In the area of Saknin, 1345 olive trees were bulldozed. In another instance, 140 trees were destroyed. In the Arrabeh area, 1100 saplings were crushed by Zionist patrol cars which zigzagged over the land. Needless to say, these attacks are never taken seriously by Zionist officials. The Knesset has gone so far as to drop them from their normal agenda. In the Galilee, soldiers rounded up farmers in the middle of the land they were cultivating and starting shooting in the air. A 70 year old woman, two children and an 18 year old were injured.

### Unjust taxation

The annual property tax levied on Palestinian-owned land was the focus of protest, especially in May of 1985. The tax is calculated per dunum according to estimates of the land's value which amounts to 300% of its real cash value. In 1985, a new land tax was enforced which was 1500% of the 1984 value. Previously, people were allowed to pay the tax in installments. In 1985, however, the Zionist authorities required that the tax be paid in one lump sum. According to the mayor of Nazareth, Tawfiq Ziad, the property tax levied on Palestinian

Land Day rally in the Galilee.



Arabs is much more than that paid by Jewish citizens. Ariel Sharon, who owns 4000 dunums of land, pays next to nothing in property tax.

## Education neglected

Palestinian education and culture are an integral part of the process of liberation, and the embodiment of Palestinian national identity. Aware of this fact, the Zionist authorities

### THE OLIVE TREE

for Janan

*The wind on the hill is growing still.  
So many buildings appear to smother the air.  
A 90 year old Palestinian man and his son  
live on the hill among the buildings of Israel,  
their stone home earlier bulldozed against  
their will, their current cold tent in jeopardy.  
The town still requires room. The old man  
and his son wait for the bloom on the olive tree  
they planted--a strong tree though it takes long  
till the fruit. The town grows rapidly, protected  
by an army. The tent is surrounded by soldiers.  
They've come to uproot the olive tree.*

*And if you listen well, you can still hear  
these questions on the wind: How can there  
ever be peace? How can one be expected to extend  
an olive branch when a war has been declared  
on the olive tree? Olives are tumbling in groves  
into the road. The road is tree-lined with men  
and if you listen well, you can still hear the wind  
crying, «Palestinian agriculture was uprooted,  
Palestinian economy uprooted.» The dying wind  
whispers «slave labor, slave labor»  
and Palestinian men await at junctions  
to be picked up by Israeli construction trucks.*

*Stones race toward the road, rebel-stones  
on the loose from the bulldozing  
of a woman's house--strong, ancient black stones  
but it takes long before structures made from them  
deteriorate. Now they're tumbling like fruit  
shaken loose from the tree.*

*Black stones  
and black olives  
and unseen olives  
are becoming interchangeable.*

*In the road and on the hill,  
Palestinian children stand shoulder to shoulder  
against Israeli soldiers,  
not in peace  
not in fear  
not unaware  
but clearly in strength  
and the olive tree lives.  
It's just that now, it sprouts olives  
with their pits on the outside and their thin skin  
sealed within while the wind on the hill  
keeps growing awesomely still.*

—by Yvonne Lubov Rusiniak

—January 1986

implement a policy aimed at obliterating anything which asserts this. Lack of funds, dilapidated schools, primitive school facilities, unqualified teachers and outdated curricula constitute some of the conditions which the Zionist Ministry of Education deliberately perpetuates in the campaign against the Palestinians of the 1948 occupied area. Former minister of education, Zevulun Hammer, announced that a special committee would be established to investigate the curricula with a view to «curb Arab nationalism among Arab youth.»

The Zionist authorities are disturbed by the growing participation of both teachers and students in protests against the fascist, discriminatory policies. Under the pretext of teachers being «disloyal to the state of Israel», the occupation authorities carry out campaigns of dismissal and harassment. Even those who are merely suspected of not sympathizing with the state do not escape being victimized. One teacher says, «I have not been promoted for the last 16 years...I hold two degrees in Arabic history and language. They resort to this method against me and many others because, according to the law, they cannot fire competent, veteran teachers without clear reasons.» Only two Palestinian teachers' seminars exist in the 1948 occupied area. According to the *Israeli Statistical Abstracts* (1981), the number of teachers accepted fell from 813 to 415 in 5 years. This is clearly intended to sabotage the Palestinian educational system by decreasing the number of qualified Palestinian teachers.

Numbers show most clearly the severity of the educational crisis. There is a shortage of 1500 classrooms. Forty percent of the existing ones are overcrowded, lack proper facilities, running water, electricity, laboratories, etc. Some schools remain without desks, while a considerable number of students study in makeshift rooms, stores or outdoors. Out of 140 towns and villages, only 13 have public libraries, and only 3 have proper gymnasiums. In Jatt, a town of 5000, there is no high school. In a Jewish settlement of the same size, there would be several high schools.

Palestinian students who finish primary schooling travel long distances to another district to complete their studies. This hits hardest on girl students because parents hesitate to allow them to travel between districts since harassment is common. This is one factor contributing to the dropout rates. The Zionist Ministry of Education states that dropout rates are higher among secondary school pupils who have to travel long distances to get to class. According to the ministry's statistics, only 40% of the 16,000 Palestinian students in the Naqab reach high school, and only 15% complete their high school studies. Because of these inhuman conditions, the percentage of Palestinian students, ages 14-17, who go to high school is only 50%, while 90% of the Jews of the same age go to high school. Only 25% of the Palestinian students reach the final school classes, while among Jews the rate is 50%. Moreover, only 40% of those Palestinians who reach the final class obtain the general certificate.

Another aspect has to do with the services provided to the schools. Any new service introduced to the Israeli educational system takes years to be introduced to Palestinian schools. For example, counseling was introduced for Jewish students ten years before it was made available to Palestinian children. Even then, Palestinian counselors had to operate within the boundaries imposed by the Zionist authorities.

The plot to submerge Palestinian national identity is clearly depicted in the outrageous neglect of the Arab language curriculum. Although the Zionist authorities did set up a committee to revise the Arab language curriculum, under the

pressure of popular protest, only superficial changes were made. Although it was boasted that works by Palestinian national poets were included, they were all about love and courtship, written in the early stages of the poets' careers. Everything on Palestinian culture or history was completely excluded. Furthermore, all school programs and projects specific to Palestinians are submitted for censorship not only to the Zionist Ministry of Education, but to the Ministry of Defence as well. There are textbooks dating back 20 years, while some schools use Arabic grammar books printed 75 years ago. The deliberate gross neglect is based on a policy of misinforming the new generation of Palestinians growing up under occupation. Another aspect is the historical falsification in new books introduced into the schools. Safad, in an eighth grade geography book is called 'Zfat'; Ibn Amer plain is called 'Emeq Yisrael' and Wadi al Hawarish is called 'Emeq Haifa', in addition to insinuations that Palestine was uninhabited before Jewish immigration.

All the above factors aim at smothering anything Palestinian, and at minimizing and eventually eliminating Palestinian participation in higher education institutions. At present Palestinians comprise less than 10% of the overall student body in universities. Out of a total of 6000 university lecturers, only 6 are Palestinian Arabs. The aim is obvious — to eliminate Palestinian competition from the job market and leave unchallenged the economic and cultural hegemony of the Zionist entity.

## Strangling culture

Palestinian culture, the mark of Palestinian national identity, has always been a thorn in the Zionists' side. Cultural expression is most often met with fascist measures of destruction and impediment. School books cover the culture of all peoples in the world except that of the Palestinian people. To hold national festivals or rallies means a constant struggle with the Zionist authorities over otherwise trivial formalities like obtaining permits to set up temporary structures. Even when permits are procured, the Zionists have been known to cancel permission or look the other way when incidents of vandalism by Zionist settlers occur. In one instance, a settler tore up a painting by a Palestinian artist because it enraged him to see the colors of the Palestinian flag being used in the picture!

Seventy percent of the Palestinian towns and villages have no cultural centres or youth centres. The 38 that do exist were allocated only two-thirds the budget given to one Jewish youth centre.

All attempts to establish a professional Palestinian theatre have failed. Small theatre groups do perform, but any attempt to develop or expand are always nipped in the bud. Many groups receiving invitations to perform abroad are denied the opportunity to travel because the authorities prohibit them.

The international conference held by UNESCO, devoted to the discussion of Palestinian education, did not exaggerate when it described the actions of the Zionist entity as a flagrant violation of international law and human rights.

# Operation Terror

## 1986 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon

*On Monday, February 17th, Lebanese patriots ambushed a joint Israeli-South Lebanon Army motorized patrol, killing two SLA men and capturing two Israeli soldiers. The attack occurred near Beit Yanoun on the northern edge of the 'security zone' the Israeli occupiers have imposed in South Lebanon. Almost immediately, the Zionist army reinvaded Lebanon.*

Three columns of over 1,000 mechanized infantry and air-borne troops crossed the 'security zone' to storm seven villages and arrest about thirty persons. Israeli planes swooped over all parts of Lebanon, breaking the sound barrier to increase the atmosphere of terror. Each ensuing day brought new reinforcements to the Zionist invaders, swelling their ranks to 1,500.

The Israeli-occupied portion of Lebanon was expanded by almost 200 square kilometers, in addition to the permanently occupied 'security zone'. In the newly reoccupied area, over twenty villages were besieged and repeatedly invaded by paratroopers dropping from helicopters and tank-borne troops. An average of 500 southerners were detained for questioning each day. By



the time the Zionists decided to halt the operation on Saturday, February 22nd, 130 Lebanese citizens were still being detained. According to confirmed reports, 17 had been killed and 22 injured, but the actual casualty toll may be much higher.

## Fierce resistance

The first day of the invasion, Israeli planes dropped leaflets over southern villages, promising not to enact collective punishment. Besides being a lie, this was based on the Zionists' vain hope that the population would acquiesce and even cooperate in the attempt to find the captured soldiers. Quite the opposite occurred. From the first day, the invaders met stiff resistance, dodging patriots' bullets as they moved from village to village. On February 18th, an Israeli corporal was killed when nationalist forces fired on an Israeli gunboat off the coast of Tyre. The next day, Israeli soldiers were engaged in clashes with anti-occupation resisters, and two SLA men were killed by RPGs near Harris. On February 20th, there were more clashes, and an Israeli soldier was killed in an ambush near Srafa.

## Search and destroy

The Zionist soldiers' search for their captured colleagues became a new exercise in human rights violations. Frustrated by lack of quick success, they

turned the full force of collective punishment on the southern population. The village of Shaqra, just outside the 'security zone', was a particularly grim example of the methods employed. From the first day of the invasion, this village was besieged. Israeli troops and SLA thugs entered and herded all the men into the schoolyard for questioning. Here they stayed until nightfall, while homes were searched. The invaders destroyed the food supplies which the Irish UNIFIL troops tried to send in to the villagers.

Then, on the fifth day of the invasion, February 21st, Shaqra was again surrounded by two rings of invading troops - Israeli on the outside and SLA inside. All the villagers, including women and down to a day-old baby, were locked in the schoolyard. People were interrogated, in fact tortured, in two classrooms. Many sustained serious injuries and later had to be hospitalized from beatings, having chairs broken on their backs, being stomped on, burned with cigarettes, and jabbed in the ear with nails. One man's penis was burned with a cigarette lighter.

According to a story filed from the area, youth were taken to the nearby pond: «They said they were thrown into it and then, dripping wet and their hands tied behind their backs, were made to lie until dawn on the floor of an unfinished shop» (*Guardian*, Feb. 24). Fifty-five men and six women, one of them pregnant, were taken away by the Zionist troops; three houses were dynamited and many others looted and wrecked; dozens of cars were stolen by the invaders.

Reuters and AFP reported how SLA thugs held a noose on the neck of a Shaqra shopkeeper, tightening it while questioning him, and hitting him when he tried to speak. A woman from Shaqra reported that she and her 18 year old daughter were subjected to electric shock. Another citizen had a metal compass, used for drawing circles on the school blackboard, stabbed into his ear. Mariam Majed, a 40 year old mother of eight, described her experience with the invaders: «They took my eldest son, snatched my gold bracelets and shot at my cows.» Many other southerners reported large-scale looting and the theft of their savings.

Interviewed in a hospital afterwards, the torture victims said that the interrogators had asked few questions about the missing Israeli soldiers, but demanded information on Amal and Hej-

bollah, showing that the main aim was to terrorize the people from supporting the anti-occupation resistance fighters. A 70 year old construction worker added to this thought: «If they cannot defend themselves, why make us suffer? They want us to be their policemen.»

### Zionist miscalculations

Major general Ori Orr, Israeli army commander on the northern front, was initially quoted as saying that there were no time or geographical limits on the search operation. Yet the Zionists decided to halt the search without having found the two soldiers. Their claim that this was to avoid friction with the local population was only a face-saving lie. Much more than friction had already been provoked. The comment of an elderly woman in Srifa, a village shelled so heavily that the population and UNIFIL troops fled, indicates the southerners' mood: «I want to kill them. I will choke them with my hands, and I don't need a rifle.»

Meeting a people determined to resist, the Zionists had once more

### New Fascist Elite Troops

When Samir Geagea rose to prominence last spring, he felt the need for more highly trained militiamen, and got the idea to establish an elite military school. The school is for university graduates only and is located in an ancient monastery at Ghosha, north of Beirut. Most of the instructors are former Lebanese Army officers. Their chief, Assad Abu Jaoude, says, «We want quality, not quantity. One thousand well-trained men can defeat thousands of disorganized rabble. The Israeli army started as a militia, and now it is one of the strongest in the world. We must do the same.» The school's location on the coast also raises thoughts of its being accessible to Israeli military experts who usually make their contacts to the East Beirut fascists on the northern coast (Junieh).

The school seeks to combine strict discipline with religious motivation: «At every stage we teach the recruits Christian history.» says Abu Jaoude. As usual, the Lebanese fascists are not above distorting the message of Christianity for their own purposes. One trainee's remark hints at how they are being taught this history: «We are suffering a Moslem invasion. So here we are taught that Christ lives within us, that we must fight for him.»

plunged themselves into the Lebanese quagmire of their own making. Actually, the situation that led to the new invasion had been in the making for some time. The turn of the year gave new evidence that the 1982 invasion and 2.5 years of occupation had not even fulfilled the slogan «Peace for the Galilee» which was the very minimum of what the Zionist leadership aspired to in Lebanon. In the week ending January 2nd, there were 14 Katyusha rockets that fell on northern 'Israel'.

In response to what the Israeli government would do about this situation Israeli War Minister Rabin said in a television interview: «I don't intend to repeat the mistake of entering Lebanon. Nor do I intend to return large forces into southern Lebanon.» Yet as he spoke, the Givati brigade (elite paratroopers) had recently ended three months of winter training with full-scale exercises in northern 'Israel'. There was «particular stress on landing from the sea and crossing water obstacles,» according to the commander (*Jerusalem Post*, January 10th), i.e., a rehearsal for invasion.

Another proof of Zionism's expansionist intentions in Lebanon came on February 1st; 35 square kilometers of land in the 'security zone' were annexed, surrounded by barbed wire and equipped with an electric alarm system and new fortifications. The same day, leaflets were dropped over Sidon. Signed by General Ori Orr, the message read: «Any cooperation with subversive Palestinian organizations will wreak destruction on your homes».

The February 1986 invasion will not be the last Zionist aggression against the Lebanese people and land. This aggression is an ongoing fact, especially in the 'security zone'. It does, however, serve to reemphasize that the Zionists cannot so easily resolve their Lebanese dilemma despite superior weaponry and willingness to resort to massive repression. As if to prove the point, the Zionist occupation troops' exit back to the 'security zone' was accompanied by more Katyushas falling in the Galilee. Within a week, another Israeli soldier had been killed in a resistance operation in the South. The Israelis responded with a new mini-invasion, searching villages while helicopter gunships strafed Kafra and Yater. The day before, Israeli army chief of staff Moshe Levy had said in reference to the February 17th invasion: «...We will do it again whenever anything of this sort happens.»

# View from the Mountain

*A member of the staff of «Democratic Palestine» spent time in PFLP military bases located in the mountains of Lebanon, southeast of Beirut, and conducted the following interviews with the freedom fighters.*



*The Mountain*, as it is called by people in Lebanon, is a special area for revolutionaries. There Palestinian fighters, alongside the fighters of the Lebanese national movement, face the fascist forces of Gemayel's Lebanese Army and Geagea's Lebanese Forces. The PFLP has several bases in frontline positions in the mountains. Two are less than 50 meters from the fascist lines, overlooking Souq al Gharb, stronghold of Gemayel's army.

Reaching some of these bases is an adventure in itself. At night, you drive without headlights to avoid attracting sniper fire. In the daytime, you hear the whistle of snipers' bullets. The fighters live in houses that have been fortified to stand up to bombardment, and are connected by tunnels and trenches. Inside, there are metal beds, a few tables with kerosene lamps and oil heaters. A Klashnikov (AK47) hangs at each bed; there are RPGs in the corner. On the wall are posters of martyred comrades from various organizations, pictures of Comrade

George Habash, of Lenin and of Che. The fighters immediately invite you to tea which they call the wine of revolutionaries. Over tea, the interview starts. Following are interviews with comrades on seven different bases in the mountains.

## *What are the comrades' duties on the base?*

*Adonees:* We have defense duties - making fortifications and guarding; combat duties using different weapons; cleaning duties to keep our base and weapons clean; educational and political duties; and training and weapon review.

## *What is your daily schedule?*

*Salameh:* The situation varies according to the security conditions (degree of engagement with the enemy) and the weather. We wake up at about 7 a.m., clean the base and have breakfast, while listening to the radio to hear the latest news.

The first priority in our schedule is fortifying our positions - digging trenches, building embankments for mounted weapons, and shelters. There is a saying that a drop of sweat saves a pint of blood. We work on fortifying from 8 a.m. until 1 p.m. when we have a lunch break. During the break, we discuss what we accomplished and our plan for the next period. We usually continue fortifications work until 5 p.m. At suppertime, the comrades rest. We discuss different issues. We exchange visits with our allies of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) at nearby bases. Before going to sleep, we organize our guard duty for the night.

### *What are your activities on a weekly basis?*

**Malek:** Every week we have an administrative day when comrades rest, clean their weapons, the base and personal belongings. We have weekly practical and political meetings, and weekly organizational meetings for party members. Every day one comrade has comradesly service which means he or she stays on the base and takes the responsibility for cooking and cleaning.

### *What is the difference between party members and non-party members?*

**Abu Lena:** Many people join the PFLP's military forces for nationalist reasons. The PFLP devotes a great deal of effort to develop these comrades ideologically, so they understand the basics of Marxism-Leninism. After comrades reach that level, they are accepted in the party organization. Party members have the same duties as other comrades, but they have extra responsibilities in terms of setting an example in discipline and dedication, and educating others. They also bear responsibility for strengthening ties with our local allies.

### *What do you do in your spare time?*

**Salameh:** We sit together and discuss the political and military situation. We also discuss our personal and family lives.

**Faraj:** We play chess and dominos, read and do physical exercise.

**Sarah:** I read and collect flowers.

### *What problems do you face in your daily life?*

**Abu Lena:** We have problems with the availability of fortifications materials - sacks, cement, gravel, wood, etc. On any given day, we can have a new military situation. This is how Lebanon is. We get our materials from the PSP, and usually they are not very late.

**Ziad, a platoon leader:** Here we cannot move safely in the day by car, so food and water arrive at night. We must cook meat or fish at night, so it doesn't get bad. We also have problems with water. Some nights there is heavy bombardment and it doesn't reach us until late, so we are careful with water. A liter of water can sometimes cost a liter of blood. Another problem is when new comrades join us in this area, we have to work hard to teach them where they can walk and where are the danger spots for sniping.

**Adonees:** Every base has small problems in carrying out duties and living together. New comrades need a lot of work to develop a sense of initiative which is a manifestation of developed revolutionary consciousness. In such cases, we interact with the new comrade and explain any mistake made. If it is repeated, we call a practical meeting; the base as a group discusses the problem.

### *What social problems do comrades generally face?*

**Kifah:** The distance from our families and our Palestinian people and civilians in general.

**Abdel Hamid:** Our people support us politically and materially and by continuously giving new fedayeen. But you know a fedayee's life is always at risk. So when a military comrade wants to marry, people are skeptical. The parents ask: If you die, what would happen to our daughter? The only way to overcome this is to have a strong relation with the woman and that is difficult because we only have four days vacation every month.

**Adonees:** I am married and have two children and am expecting a third. My wife is also in the military forces. We coordinate our vacations. It is important to coordinate your personal life with your revolutionary duties. A small number of comrades don't do that, and that is a problem. The Front is very understanding and arranges child care for working women.

**Sarah:** I had some problems in the beginning being accepted as a fighter. Some of the less educated comrades ask why I don't limit my work to the Front's women's organization, because it's easier. Others expected that my role is to cook or make tea on the base. I was able to solve these problems by interacting with the comrades and sometimes involving the local leadership. These problems are a result of the backward social beliefs that exist in our area. It is hard for men to accept women as equals in work, and this is especially true in the military, because we are brought up with the belief that women must look nice and stay at home... The PFLP does a lot of work to change this, but it cannot totally change until we change the social system itself.

**Ziad:** The question of women is not an easy subject. It is important to practice our theoretical belief on women's liberation. Women are half the society and must have the same rights and responsibilities. Having a woman comrade is an experiment that must succeed. It is an educational experience for both the female and male.

### *Why did you join the PFLP's military forces?*

**Jihad:** I joined the Front because of its mass support, its Marxist-Leninist line and alliance with communist forces internationally, its military achievements inside and outside Palestine, its practice of democratic centralism in meetings, and the mutual respect that exists between people in charge and the fighters.

**Salameh:** I joined the Front because of its principles, the positive relations between comrades and its firm position against the existence of the Zionist state.

**Sarah:** I believe that fighting is the duty of men and women alike. When Zionists and fascists kill, they don't differentiate between men and women. We saw that in Sabra and Shatila. The Front, by following Marxism-Leninism and practicing this in its internal relations, gives both sexes an equal chance to carry out their duties. For me as a woman, the Front is the most logical organization to belong to.

### *How is coordination with the Lebanese national forces in this area?*

**Adonees:** Our cooperation is based on the PFLP's political position of support to the Lebanese national movement. The dominant force in the Mountain is the PSP. The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) also has bases in this area. Here we are under the PSP's leadership from a military aspect. We

*Interview with Comrade Abu Ali Aish, commander of the PFLP battalion in the Mountain.*

*Do you expect new military developments in this area considering the Geagea-Gemayel efforts to sabotage the tripartite accord?*

Bloody disputes occurred in the fascist camp regarding the tripartite accord. The opposition to the accord was seen in the unity between the Gemayel and Geagea factions that took control of the fascist-held area. Their unity had clear Israeli backing. There should have been a new program of action for the nationalist forces in response to this situation but, due to various considerations, that was not the case. The situation remained within the framework of increased clashes and bombardment between the fascist and the nationalist sides. Our analysis was that the enemy forces might try to improve their positions on the ground. Therefore we were in a state of high alert. However, our front was less active than the Bikfaya front because of the objective political fact that Gemayel's home is in Bikfaya.

*How is your coordination with other Palestinian forces in this area?*

We stress the framework of the Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF) in relating to other Palestinian forces. Previously, the PNSF was not very active, but a month ago we initiated an activation in the Mountain. This had positive effects on cooperation on the leadership and local level. We are pleased with the new pace and are working to close any gaps.

*What priority do you give to political education for the fighters?*

An essential part of our program is political and ideological education. This is what creates the new type of revolutionaries. In our battalion, this work was done effectively until the time of the camp war (May-June 1985). For a few months afterwards, it was not carried out as we like, because some cadres had to move to other battalions. In that period we noticed an increase of problems related to discipline and behavior. We have now solved the problem and are happy with the situation.

*How do you answer those who propose that Palestinians only fight in occupied Palestine?*

This position does not arise from a vacuum, because the Zionist entity is our direct enemy. However, this fact should not blind us to other facts. We in the PFLP have a position that liberating Palestine is linked to change in the neighboring countries. These countries have different regimes and views on the Palestinian question. Change is the responsibility of the progressive forces in each of these countries. We in turn have principled relations with the progressive forces. We support the national liberation movements in their struggle to change the social, economic and political system. Such change is in our national interests. This is very clear in Lebanon. When we fight here, and aim our gun in a seemingly opposite direction, we are fighting the Zionist-fascist project here. When we support the Lebanese national movement in its struggle for change in Lebanon, we are moving towards the liberation of Palestine. We cannot fight the Zionist enemy from Lebanon if the fascists are in control. We support the Lebanese national movement which also supports us in our struggle to liberate Palestine.

have some joint bases with the LCP which is a very positive experience.

*Malek:* We have good cooperation with the PSP and the LCP. In battles, we coordinate firepower. We also do joint fortifications work.

*Ziad:* I can give specific examples: We paved a military road together. We dig trenches together. We share cars when needed.

*How are your relations with the neighboring villagers?*

*Faraj:* Most people from this area have left because of the war. There are three or four families left. Our relations with them are very good. We help them fortify their homes. We bring them water sometimes and give our old bread to their chickens. We visit them in our spare time and discuss the political situation, emphasizing that the war is not sectarian, but a nationalist war. The people also help us. We once had problems with the tiles on our roof; they solved that. Sometimes they send us home-cooked food.

*Jamil:* Our relation with the civilians is very special; it is based on respect and trust.

*How is coordination with other Palestinian organizations in this area?*

*Nassim:* We have good relations with all Palestinian organizations. We initiated visits and give them *Al Hadaf*, our central magazine. We also help in training them in new weapons if needed. We coordinate fortifications work. During a battle, if we hear there is an injury on another base, we send our car to take the injured to the hospital.

*Ziad:* We have close coordination with the organizations of the Palestine National Salvation Front. We have started dealing with our allies in the PSP as one group when requesting materials or ammunition...

*Some say that Palestinians should fight only in Palestine and not be involved in the struggle outside. How do you answer this?*

*Malek:* We are here to support the Lebanese national movement's fight to defeat the fascist-Zionist project. It is wrong to say we must fight only 'Israel'. We all know that the imperialist forces cooperate on the international level - aggression against Nicaragua, Angola and Afghanistan, the occupation of Grenada, the close cooperation between US imperialism, Zionism and the fascist regimes in Chile and South Africa. That is very clear. It makes it important for revolutionaries to cooperate internationally. What about revolutionaries who face interrelated problems? It is impossible to separate the Palestinian cause from the Lebanese. As we have the right to fight Zionism from South Lebanon, so we have a duty to fight fascism in the Mountain, to help bring about the national democratic program in Lebanon.

*Do you have any final comments?*

*Nassim:* We would like to send greetings from the fighters against fascism and Zionism in Lebanon, to all anti-imperialist comrades in the world and to all socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union.

*Malek:* In the West, people have the idea that the fedayeen are terrorists who like shooting. Well we like shooting, because we love the land and we love the flowers. We shoot for the beauty of the land and the flowers.

# International Women's Day

*On March 11th, the PFLP women's branch organized a public meeting to celebrate International Womens Day. Comrade Leila Khaled chaired the meeting and introduced Comrade George Habash who delivered the following address on the women's question.*

The women's question is no less important than the question of the current political situation. On this occasion, it is your right that I speak on the subject of the Palestinian woman. I convey heartfelt greetings on behalf of the PFLP's politbureau and central committee. We salute our women comrades in the jails of Zionism and reaction. We remember the women martyrs who sacrificed for the Palestinian and Arab liberation cause. I will speak on women's liberation and the main tasks towards achieving this. I chose this subject not only because of the occasion, but due to my conviction in its importance, and our need to emphasize it so as to release the potential of this large sector of our people. We will speak of how to release women's potentials and enable them to participate in liberating Palestine and building a socialist society. We are for a comprehensive change in the women's role in the liberation process whereby they take a full place as citizens with complete rights and duties.

When we speak of liberating Palestine from Zionism, we speak of liberating all the people - men and women. When we speak of liberation from a class viewpoint, we speak of liberating all the Palestinian masses from the exploiting classes. When we speak of women's liberation, we mean liberating women from their social status, as being unequal to men in terms of rights and duties. More frankly, we mean liberating women from men and how men look upon women.

We experience this inequality constantly in everyday life. The boy, when born, is welcomed with joy - the girl, maybe with anger, with sorrow, or at best with grudging acceptance. Inequality is seen on many levels. Male youths can go and come as they please - the girl does not. It also applies in inheritance. I remember I inherited two times as much as my sisters. We want to explain this phenomenon of inequality so as to be able to remedy it.

Revolutionary work is struggle to eliminate the exploitation of man by his fellow man. On this basis, we struggle to

liberate Palestine, because the Palestinian people are oppressed by 'Israel'. On this basis, we will continue to struggle in the process of class liberation, to end exploitation. This must continue to end any kind of social exploitation of women by men.

Inequality has its roots in a stage of history when a division of labor occurred whereby men began to be responsible for productive tasks, while the women's task was to provide services, mainly domestic duties. This is the root of the inequality. There is a great difference between production and services. Goods come by way of production - industrial or agricultural or crafts. This gave man greater value than that accorded woman. This historical process left its mark on women and their status.

Accordingly, women will be liberated only under socialism which provides women with productive work whereby they provide goods. Thus, a new understanding will prevail whereby women will be regarded as people with full rights and duties. Thus we would have ended inequality which even affects women's honour. You may have heard the expression: «Women are half-

wits.» Yet medical research indicates that women, from a biological viewpoint, have the same mental capacities as men. You should have faith in women's capabilities and right to equality.

However, the importance of women's liberation does not mean that it takes priority over the liberation of Palestine and all other political tasks. It would be a great mistake to draw this conclusion. I warn against infantile left misinterpretation of what I have just said. Women's total liberation can only be achieved after liberating Palestine and building a socialist society. If we forget the dialectical relationship between the liberation of Palestine and the liberation of women, we would be making a big mistake. Through liberating Palestine and then building a democratic, socialist Palestine, we will have genuinely contributed to liberating women.

Until that time, shall we leave this important task aside? No. We can begin now to forge a path towards liberating women, linked with national liberation, then social liberation. There are three main tasks which we can start now.

One is the ideological task which means spreading the ideas I mentioned above. We must constantly speak of the woman's right to equality, of her ability, whether or not we can find solutions to these problems or not. This is a main task for the PFLP, for the women's branch and for all Palestinian women's organizations, so that there will be a



united understanding of this subject. So far, our contribution in this field is very little.

The second task is encouraging an increasing number of women to participate in the battle for the liberation of Palestine. If women participate effectively in this process, who can deprive them of their right to equality in a democratic Palestine? This is your responsibility, to apply your ability to fulfill your duties, so as to be able to demand your rights. There is some progress in this field, but we must aim at achieving much more.

Third is the responsibility of the Palestinian organizations. Unfortunately, the PLO is not one political organization; it is not even a united front, though we strive for this. In our efforts to achieve at least unity in a front, let the recruitment of women be a measure for competition between the different organizations. The reality is that there are a number of organizations that compete in terms of number of members, military operations, etc. The organizations' concentration on recruiting women for the liberation battle should also be a criterion, in view of the importance of this subject.

The PFLP can be a little bit proud of having given importance to the women's question. In 1978, the politbureau decided to evaluate our progress in this field, to evaluate the percentage of women in our total membership. In 1979, in Lebanon, 30% of our members in Sidon were women; 28% in Tripoli; and 20% in Beirut. This was connected to the revolution's open presence which enhanced our ability to recruit. In other branches the percentage was not more than 5%. In Jordan, for example, recruiting women is difficult - we are underground.

If we are really concerned about the women's question, this will be seen in the extent to which we lay importance on having women in the PFLP. This concerns not only members; there is the circle of women who are friends of the PFLP. A chief measure of our conviction about the women's question is our enthusiasm about recruiting the broadest sector of women tied to the PFLP. If we understand this scientifically, we can recruit thousands to the PFLP in Syria alone.

Women comrades may find it difficult to adapt to the conditions and duties attached to PFLP membership, because of duties in the home and motherhood. If some are not ready to

participate as members, we are ready to find an organizational form whereby they can participate as friends. There is the framework of a democratic organization which has its own leadership. If each member of the democratic organization feels responsible for its program and future, there will be great enthusiasm. If the members feel they are not important and do not play an active role in shaping the future of this democratic organization, we cannot expect it to grow. This is very basic.

The 27th Congress of the CPSU stands for something new. The reports stressed removing the mistaken hegemony of the party from the economic institutions. Gorbachev hopes that this will increase production greatly. Also we should not understand the supervision of the party as restricting the potential of the democratic organization. It is not important that our woman comrades be the leaders of the democratic organization. If a non-member has the capacity to lead and recruit women, then let her. This understanding of the democratic organization, related to the PFLP, is very fundamental. We want 10 active members to bring in 500, not 120 to bring 30.

Let us not expect there will be large numbers of women able to commit themselves fully to a party; there are many reasons why they may not be able to do so. Even in socialist countries, the number of men and women party members is about 10-15%. What about the rest of the people? They are recruited into unions and other democratic organizations. Broad recruitment into democratic organizations should be a measure of our party organization's leadership role.

### **On the GUPW**

We must specify our policy with respect to the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) - how we can be effective towards the same goal of liberating women. Unfortunately, all the Palestinian unions, not only the GUPW, are experiencing a split. This is a new phenomenon but we should not forget the negative points about these unions before the split. Neither before nor after the split, has there been effective work on the tasks stipulated in the constitution and internal regulations.

What can we do in the light of this reality? We should concentrate on having our women friends play an active role in the GUPW. Do not despair because of the present difficulties in working for a

united GUPW, representing all Palestinian women. Determination and scientific thinking will always result in success.

We took the position that the political differences which occurred between the resistance organizations should not result in splitting the unions. We call for unity in the field, the unity of the Palestinian people. The teachers, students and writers union together total approximately 50,000 members. Why should these be split? Why can't we establish democratic dialogue? Anyone adhering to the national line is confirming the soundness of this line. Why be afraid of democratic dialogue? Those who contracted the Amman accord may be afraid of democratic dialogue, but should those who adhere to the national program be afraid? Some thought that if the unions remained united, they would give legitimacy to Arafat. If we look closely at this question, and if we think of making new unions, a large number of members will be lost; the opposition to the right-wing line will be lost within the unions.

The Cuban delegation which attended the student union's congress two years ago, was pleased that the PFLP and others opposed the right-wing line in the union. We fault anyone who is trying to split the unions. Arafat split the writers' union, ignoring the internal regulations governing the convention of congresses. The fact that we remain part of a union does not mean that we don't see the reality of the split. No matter where we are, on our own or with others, we raise the slogan: Unite the unions.

Even if the unions had remained united, their state of affairs was unsatisfactory. To improve this, we raise three slogans, especially for the GUPW: 1. The unity of the union; 2. genuine democracy embodied in proportional representation; and 3. effective work.

In closing I would like to make a point about the role of women vanguards, in the context of the role of collective leadership. This is the era of collective leadership. We emphasize this on all levels in democratic and party organizations. Yet the importance of collective leadership should not lessen the value of the role of the woman vanguard, which is a historical phenomenon in our revolution. We are waiting for new vanguards to blaze the trail. History will record that they played a major role in the liberation of the Palestinian woman and her participation in the liberation struggle and the establishment of a democratic Palestine. ●

# Egypt

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## Tip of the Iceberg

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*Opposition to the Egyptian regime, and its ties with US imperialism and Zionism, recently became more than vocal. The February uprising of the Egyptian people, triggered by the revolt of security police conscripts, is rooted in the deteriorating economic and social situation, initiated by Sadat's 'open door' policy. The previous month, the slogans chanted during demonstrations protesting the brutal murder of Suleiman Khater, himself a conscript, had indicated that the masses' indignation encompassed everything the regime stands for.*

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Much as Mubarak's adviser, Osama al Baz, would wish to dismiss the February revolt as «isolated incidents», all facts point to its being a mass uprising. The government claimed that «99% of the people were opposed to these incidents of violence.» Yet gun battles raged through many areas, indicating more than a measure of organized resistance. Fighting swept through the populated area of Giza in Cairo, Ismailia on the Suez Canal, Sohag on the Nile River, Asyut, the area of the Pyramids Road, the industrial area of Helwan and Madinat al Nasr, east of Cairo. A bloody massacre was enacted on the road to the international airport, where an entire regiment of conscripts (300 men) were mowed down by the army. In another incident, one of the largest prisons in Cairo was stormed by angry militants who released 300 political prisoners.

Independent reports said that university and high school students, as well as religious groups from Al Azhar, flowed into the streets to join their brothers in fighting government troops. Officials quickly denied these reports. Nevertheless, universities, colleges and schools were ordered closed until further notice. A curfew was clamped on Cairo and other areas of the uprising. Only with much wariness was it partially lifted for Friday prayers.

### The people vs. the government

Although the official media tried to downplay the uprising's significance, the targets of the people's anger showed that their uprising had a genuine class and national essence. First-class hotels, restaurants and nightclubs, especially those frequented by Zionist tourists,

were hardest hit. Damages tolled in the hundreds of millions of dollars. One western diplomat commented, «It is not...the police vs. the government, but the whole deprived group against the government.» Sadat had offered visions of a rosy future to the millions of poverty stricken, but in reality his 'open door' policy delivered nothing but more poverty. The result was rising discontent among all sectors of the population and escalated militancy among the poor, erupting in more protests, demonstrations and strikes, and then the most recent armed clashes with the government.

### \$4 a month

The spark which ignited the uprising was an order to extend the conscripts' service from three to four years. Another factor which played into the events was the power struggle between Minister of Defense Abu Ghazala and Mubarak. Supporters of the former tried to capitalize on popular discontent and harness it in their favor. They did not realize they were tampering with a time bomb.

The young policemen who began the revolt are conscripts assigned to the Central Security Forces for three years. They total about a quarter of a million and are used to supplement the regular police force which is too small to fulfill all its duties. The conscripts are drawn from the poorer strata, usually from rural areas, and are supposed to be grateful for the meagre room and board, and \$4 monthly, which they receive. Not only are their families deprived of badly needed support, but the great majority actually become a financial burden, because they need support from their families to survive in the city.

### Economic slump

The social consequences of trying to swing a public-sector-oriented economy to a completely 'free' capitalist one are anything but good — except for a small elite. Although it is said that Egypt is the largest recipient of US aid after 'Israel', 90% of this so-called aid is spent by US companies on oil exploration and services for US investments, not on bolstering a self-sufficient economy for Egypt. Thus, for hard currency, Egypt relies heavily on: (1) remittances from Egyptian nationals working abroad, especially in the Gulf; (2) oil revenues; (3) Suez Canal tolls; and (4) tourism. All of these income sources have suffered in the last few months. Due to the international recession, remittances from the Gulf dropped by \$500 million. Oil revenues dropped drastically due to falling oil prices and the slash in production. Suez Canal tolls dropped about \$30 million. Tourism, Egypt's fourth largest source of income, normally brings in about \$1100 million a year. It suffered its worst season since World War II. Cancellation of reservations averaged 50% and sometimes hit 75%. Added to this is the 40% devaluation of the Egyptian pound.

### Close the 'open door'

The only radical solution to these problems is closing the 'open door' which Sadat swung ajar. However, in view of Egypt's \$31 billion debt to imperialist creditors, it is not surprising that Mubarak lends his ear to the advice of the IMF and the US Agency for International Development (AID). The IMF and USAID have long advocated dismantling the public sector and fully integrating Egypt into the capitalist market. This would mean reducing subsidies, expanding the private sector and curbing imports.

The vast majority of Egyptians cannot afford to pay world market prices for food, clothing and shelter. Thus, subsidies are a vital necessity and their reduction would rock the boat dangerously. No less vital is the \$8 million worth of food imported daily. It covers only half the needs of Egypt's 50 million people. In view of a population increase of 1 million every ten months, curbing imports would pose a serious problem, especially in the absence of a national policy for boosting local production.

### Treading lightly?

Mubarak is not at all loath to follow the advice of his imperialist masters. Yet he realizes full well that he must tread



One of 15 army tanks which surrounded the Pyramid road area as hotels burn.

lightly on already sore toes — those of the Egyptian masses who have regularly revolted against increased food prices. Dr. Ragaa Rassoul, director of Egypt's Institute of National Planning, says, «The IMF writes its prescription but we have to be very careful about how we implement this.» Nevertheless, a team headed by the prime minister and economist, Ali Lutfi, has begun what the government calls a series of «reforms». They started by introducing a 20% increase in consumer good prices but have been careful about not publicizing the fact for fear of the social and political impact. A 10% deduction from the paychecks of government employees (one-third of the work force) is being made, although officials insist this is «voluntary contributions». Coupled with the 20% inflation rate, their \$50 a month wage does not stand a chance of making ends meet.

These «reforms» are accompanied by a massive publicity campaign where Mubarak calls on the millions to join in a «great awakening to arouse the slumbering economic giant that Egypt could become.» Yet according to an editorial in *Al Akhbar* newspaper, «Egyptians would have to consider sacrifices to cope with worsening economic circumstances.»

### Mubarak vs. Abu Ghazala

With the uprising, Mubarak made a feeble attempt to diffuse the charged atmosphere by dismissing Ahmed Rushdi, interior minister and comman-

der of the security police conscripts. Imperialist circles are anyway having second thoughts as to Mubarak's ability to maintain the stability vital to their interests. In a recently released study from Frost & Sullivan's Political Risk Services Division, Egypt was listed among the nine countries where «conditions for international business during 1986 will get increasingly risky.» Creditors are expressing increasing doubts as to Egypt's ability to maintain its current rate of repayment. No extensions of grace periods for payment of debts are granted, and no dramatic injection of aid seems forthcoming, to bail Mubarak out of his dilemma.

Mubarak, sensing that his abilities were being subject to question, tried to broaden his political support by meeting with opposition leaders even before the uprising was quelled by the army. He feared that Abu Ghazala's success in putting down the uprising would only further the defense minister's already blooming popularity with the US administration. Such a show of force is of particular importance now, because of the deteriorating economic situation and the negative social impact of this. Imperialist circles seem to prefer a strongman who knows how to run an efficient operation.

Even the Zionist press began to signal dissatisfaction with the present Egyptian regime, hinting that a «change would be met with approval» and that Abu Ghazala should take over, because he «is the strongman in Egypt now.»

Mubarak is obviously on a losing streak. He is unable to come up with real solutions for the economy. He must use force to suppress popular discontent. He is suffering the disfavor of his allies as well. Is this the beginning of the end? Was the conscripts' revolt just the tip of the iceberg of the Egyptian masses' potential to rise up? One opposition figure had this to say about the uprising: «There is an economic and social condition behind the feeling of anger. If the economic situation is not corrected, these incidents will be repeated.» The regime's orders to dismiss 22,000 conscripts, purportedly «social misfits», is hardly a solution. Moreover, 8000 armed conscripts escaped arrest, and are hiding among the people. ●

People line up for bread during curfew lift.



# Political Prisoners in Jordan

*Amnesty International issued the following circular in January.*

Amnesty International is concerned at continuing reports of arrest and short term detention without charge of political opponents to the government, some of whom may be detained solely for the non-violent expression of their political beliefs and may therefore be prisoners of conscience. Amnesty International is also concerned at allegations that some of these prisoners have been tortured or ill-treated during their detention.

Arrests for political reasons are normally carried out in Jordan by the intelligence services, the largest of which is the Department of General Intelligence (Da'irat al-Mukhabarat al-'Amma) based in Amman. According to the provisions of martial law, in force since 5 June 1967, such arrests should be confirmed within a maximum of 15 days by the Prime Minister, in his capacity as General Military Governor, or by local administrators empowered to do so as Local Military Governors. Martial law provisions invest Military Governors with wide powers to arrest anyone considered a threat to state security. Security detainees can be held without charge for an indefinite period or be formally charged and brought to trial before the Martial Court, which lacks basic legal safeguards such as the right of appeal.

Prisoners detained by the intelligence services are held, usually incommunicado, for periods ranging from a few weeks to a few months, after which they are either released or formally charged and transferred to an ordinary prison, awaiting trial by the Martial Court. The intelligence services are apparently responsible for deciding whether a prisoner is to be brought to trial before the Martial Court or released. Such a decision is taken weeks and sometimes months after the arrest, leaving the prisoner until then uncertain about any pending legal proceedings against him/her.

When torture or ill-treatment of political prisoners takes place, it is usually during the period of detention by the intelligence services. Reported torture methods include beatings on all parts of the body, although beatings are often concentrated on one part at a time such as the *falaqa* that is beatings on the soles of the feet, and the *farruf* known as the parrot's perch (the prisoner is hung

from a perch by his wrists and ankles tied together and beaten intermittently). Other forms of reported physical ill-treatment include sensory deprivation, deprivation of sleep and deliberate mishandling of food.

Psychological pressure is reportedly exerted on all political prisoners, whether they are also being physically ill-treated or not. Reported practices include solitary confinement, verbal abuse, threats on relatives, threats on the prisoner's employability and threats of being brought to trial with a heavy sentence as a result.

## Brainwashing in Jordan

We have received reliable information about literature being circulated in the Jordanian armed forces by the military intelligence. The gist of this is tarnishing the image of the martyr, Nasser al Bayed, the Jordanian soldier who attacked the Zionist forces in the Jordan Valley on January 29th. Jordanian soldiers were assembled and lectured that Al Bayed was a confused person, who had an unsuccessful love affair, and carried out the operation as a deliberate suicide, not a heroic attack on the enemy.

The military intelligence purposefully delayed delivering his body to his family for burial, and changed the place to avoid mass participation in the funeral. Many people went afterwards to pay condolences to Al Bayed's family who stressed that they were not receiving condolences, but congratulations on their son's heroism.

Political prisoners recently subjected to this pattern of short term detention without charge belong to a number of political organizations including the Organization of the Democratic Front in Jordan, the Organization of the Popular Front in Jordan, and the Islamic Liberation Party. All political organizations in Jordan were dissolved in 1957, with the exception of the Jordanian Communist Party which was outlawed earlier in 1953.

Amnesty International has received reports of 35 people having been reportedly arrested and detained without charge during the past 4 months. They

include students, trade unionists, labourers, engineers, writers and journalists, as well as a lawyer, a pharmacist, a translator and a bank employee. Six of them were allegedly tortured while detained. In all these cases the arrests were reportedly made by the Department of General Intelligence and the detainees were held in the General Intelligence building in Amman. By January 1986, Amnesty International learned that 13 of these detainees had been released.

The attached is a list of 55 prisoners — including those listed above — reportedly arrested by the Department of General Intelligence and detained without charge in the General Intelligence building in Amman, unless otherwise specified. Amnesty International believes that in all 55 cases the prisoners are detained for political reasons. The organization is at present seeking details of their detention and clarification of the allegations of torture involving some of them.

1. Ali 'Abdul-'Aziz 'Amer (politician). Arrested in October 1985 in Amman. Member of the Palestinian National Council. Former student leader at Jordan University. Reportedly moved to al-Mahatta Central Prison in Amman.

2. Bassam Haddadin (trade unionist). Arrested on 6 November 1985 at home in Amman. Member of the General Union of Print, Press and Publications' Workers. Haddadin was reportedly already detained once, without trial, for a period of 3 years, and was released in August 1984. He was arrested the same day as al-Mreidi and al-As'ad. Reportedly moved to al-Mahatta Central Prison.

3. Majid Mustafa al-Mreidi (translator). Arrested on 6 November 1985 at home in Amman. Member of the Syrian Branch of the General Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists. Al-Mreidi was reportedly already detained once, for 18 months, and was released in August 1984. He was arrested on the same day as Haddadin and al-As'ad. He is 30 years old. Reportedly moved to al-Mahatta Central Prison.

4. Mazin al-As'ad (writer). Arrested on 6 November 1985 in Amman. Member of the Jordanian Writers' Association. He is a short story writer. Member of the National Union of Jordanian Students. Al-As'ad was allegedly tortured. He reportedly suffered a heart attack and was treated at the al-Hussayn medical center and brought back to the General Intelligence building. Later in December

he was visited and reported in good health. Al-As'ad was already reportedly detained for 5 years and was released in 1983. He was arrested the same day as Haddadin and al-Mreidi. He is 25 years old.

5. Muhammad Abu Marar (trade unionist). Arrested on 31 October 1985 at his office in Irbid. Member of the Council of Teachers of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, member of the Administration Council of the General Union of Palestinian Teachers, and member of the Palestinian National Council. Abu Marar has been reportedly moved to the Military Prison in Zarqa. He was arrested the same day as Thalji, Mityani, and al-Mukahhal.

6. Muhammad Thalji (lawyer). Arrested on 31 October 1985 in Irbid. Thalji was arrested the same day as Abu Marar, Mityani, and al-Mukahhal. He is 28 years old. Reportedly moved to the Military Prison in Zarqa.

7. Nash'at Mityani (labourer). Arrested on 31 October 1985 in Irbid. Mityani was allegedly tortured in Irbid and then moved to the Military Prison in Zarqa. He was arrested the same day as Abu Marar, Thalji and al-Mukahhal. He is 23 years old.

8. Ahmad al-Mukahhal. Arrested on 31 October 1985 in Irbid. Former President of the National Union of Jordanian Students in Lebanon and former candidate in the March 1984 by-elections. Al-Mukahhal was allegedly tortured in Irbid and then moved to the Military Prison in Zarqa. He is reported to have suffered head injuries and to be held in solitary confinement with no access to his family. He had been previously detained by the General Intelligence for 18 months. He was arrested the same day as Abu Marar, Thalji and Mityani.

9. Khalid Abu al-Ni'aj (student). Arrested on 3 November 1985 in Irbid. Student at Yarmouk University.

10. Khalid Shurbaji (student). Arrested on 3 November 1985 in Irbid. Student at Yarmouk University.

11. Mutaq Irsan (student). Arrested in October/November 1985 in Irbid. Student at Yarmouk University.

12. Akram Salameh (student). Arrested on 11 November 1985 in Irbid. Student at Yarmouk University. Salameh was allegedly tortured in Irbid and then moved to the Military Prison in Zarqa.

13. Ibrahim Muhammad Suleiman al-Rihawi. Arrested and taken to al-Mahatta Central Prison on 23 June 1985. Al-Rihawi had previously served 15 years

in prison on criminal charges and was released on 17 June 1985 following a special amnesty.

14. Jamil al-Nimri (pharmacist). Arrested on 15 May 1985 in Amman. Reportedly charged with membership of an illegal organization but not brought to trial yet. He is detained in al-Mahatta Central Prison. Al-Nimri is a member of the Pharmacists' Union. He is 26 years old.

15. Wajih al-Nahhas (student). Arrested on 28 June 1985 in Amman. Reportedly charged with membership of an illegal organization but not brought to trial to date. He is detained in al-Mahatta Central Prison. Al-Nahhas has reportedly already served a three year sentence for membership of an illegal organization. He was released in 1981. In 1983 he was detained for 4 months without charge by the General Intelligence. He is 24 years old.

16. Hani Habash (bank employee). Arrested 29 December 1985 in Amman.

17. Adel Jadallah (trade unionist). Arrested in October 1985.

18. Ibrahim Matter (trade unionist). Arrested in October 1985.

The following ten names belong to a group of engineers reportedly detained in al-Mahatta Central Prison in Amman.

19. Anwar Khalil Da'ibis. Arrested on 1 April 1985.

20. 'Abdul-'Aziz Mahmud Husayn Khadr. Arrested on 1 April 1985.

21. 'Abdul-Rahman Ahmad Yahia. Arrested on 1 April 1985.

22. Taysir 'Ali 'Abdul-Nabi al-Zaghir. Arrested on 1 April 1985.

23. Husayn Shukri Sabah. Arrested on 1 July 1985.

24. Taysir Mahmud 'Abdul-Hafidh Marar. Arrested on 19 August 1985.

25. Muhammad Nur al-Baytar. Arrested in October 19885.

26. Nabil 'Allan. Arrested on 3 December 1985.

27. Samih Ahmad Muflih al-'Ali 'Awawdah.

28. Subhi 'Ali

The following 12 names belong to members of the Jordanian Popular Movement reportedly arrested in March 1985 and presently detained in al-Mahatta Central Prison.

29. Nidal Muhafadhah

30. Sharif Muhahadhah

31. Muhammad 'Anaqrash

32. 'Atef 'Anaqrash

33. Usamah al-Zu'bi

34. Muhammad Malkawi

35. Muhammad al-Daman

36. Ahmad al-Daman

37. Ruhi Suleiman (engineer)

38. Rashid Karasna

39. Salah 'Ubaydat

40. Sabri 'Abdul-Qadir

The following 10 names belong to prisoners who were reportedly arrested in 1985 and are presently detained in al-Mahatta Central Prison:

41. Maher Niyaz

42. Badawi Niyaz

43. Ahmad 'Abdul-Rahman

44. Munir 'Abdul-Razzaq Sa'id

45. Ghassan al-Khalidi

46. Jamal al-Khalidi

47. 'Adel al-Shuruf (allegedly tortured)

48. Yusuf Shaqirah

49. 'Abdul-Latif al-Zuhud

50. Yahia Ibrahim Husayn

These are the latest arrests, reported to Amnesty International in January 1986:

51. Taysir al-Zabri (politician). Arrested on 4 January 1986 at home in Amman. Member of the Palestinian National Council. He was reportedly moved to the Military Prison in Zarqa the same day of his arrest.

52. Muhammad Sa'id Farhan. Arrested on 10 January 1986.

53. Ziad Momaneh. Arrested on 12 January 1986.


54. Hamadeh Fara'neh. Arrested on 13 January 1986. Head of the Department of Education for the Occupied Territories at the PLO office in Amman. Fara'neh was previously arrested in 1966, 1972 and 1975. Following his arrest in 1975 he was detained without trial for five years and was released in August 1980. During his previous detention he was reportedly subjected to the *falaqa* and kept in solitary confinement for 18 months.

The following is the name of the prisoner of conscience adopted by Amnesty International following his arrest in November 1985:

55. Suleiman Saliba Suwais (journalist). Arrested on 9 November 1985 in Amman. Reportedly charged with membership of illegal organizations but not brought to trial yet. Suwais is a member of the General Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists. He has a doctorate in sociology from the Sorbonne. He is a founding member of the Committees for the Defense of Democratic Freedoms in Jordan and has returned to Jordan in October 1985 after several years of residence abroad. He is 47 years old and married with 2 children. Amnesty International believes he is detained solely for the non-violent expression of his political beliefs and is seeking his immediate and unconditional release. ●

# CPSU 27th Congress

*The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which convened on February 25th, can rightfully be called the most important international event of this period. It was attended by 5000 delegates, plus 135 representatives of progressive and communist organizations from all over the world.*



In view of the congress documents and the speeches delivered at its sessions, one can say that this congress marks a new era of international and socialist developments, due to the following facts:

**One:** The congress stressed the Soviet Union's sincere decision to employ all means for attaining world peace and nuclear disarmament. In the opening speech, Secretary General Gorbachev stressed that socialism definitively rejects war as a means for solving political, economic or ideological differences: «Our aim is a disarmed, non-violent world.»

**Two:** The documents of the congress stress the progressive role played by the national liberation movements seeking to liberate their countries and peoples from imperialist hegemony and oppression. It was stressed that newly liberated countries are moving in one of two directions in their development, either in the direction of socialism, or in the direction of capitalism. Consequently, the Soviet Union will continue to support those countries that choose the socialist direction, and cooperate with the others.

**Three:** It is clear from the congress documents that the Soviet Union will make all efforts to improve relations with China, because China considered the

October Revolution as vital to the victory of the Chinese revolution; the Soviet Union, for its part, considers the victory of the Chinese revolution as having strengthened the world communist movement.

**Four:** In line with the emphasis put on the importance of the Soviet Union's economic development, the following goals were set for the coming 15 years: (a) doubling production; (b) fully automatizing the economy, exploiting currently untouched natural resources and land without fearing unemployment,

knowing that the Soviet economy can absorb much more man power; (3) concentrating on meeting the needs of Soviet citizens in terms of quality and quantity; (4) cutting waste of raw materials to a minimum, and benefitting maximally from resources.

## Open discussion

The congress devoted special attention to faults and failures of the past, making it clear that mistakes would be eliminated and those responsible punished. There was a broad, open discussion to find constructive solutions for existing problems. In a press conference in Moscow, February 27th, CPSU Politbureau member Haidar Aliev said that questions concerning social policy had never before been discussed so frankly at a party congress. During the February 26th session of the congress, the leader of the Moscow party committee, Boris Yeltsin, said that one of the reasons behind the economic problems of the last decade was that the party organization had intervened in economic affairs to the extent of beginning to lose its role as a political leadership. Thus, the committees of the Central Committee had become almost like duplicates of the ministerial committees.

On March 6th, the congress held its closing session. A new central committee of 307 members and politbureau of 12 were elected. The composition of these bodies showed clearly that new dynamism had been injected in the CPSU top leadership by the congress, in line with the tasks the party will shoulder in the coming period. In his closing speech, Comrade Gorbachev urged the congress to «bring home to every Soviet citizen» the message of «radical transformation in all spheres of our life.» ●

## Cuba — 3rd Party Congress

*Our people and party will always be like a single fist and a single heart.*

This was said by First Secretary Fidel Castro at the closing session of the 3rd congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, on February 7th. Attended by 1790 delegates and guests from 197 progressive parties and liberation movements, the congress evaluated every aspect of the party's and country's life — economic and social development, defense of the revolution, the role of the mass organizations, etc. — in addition to

the international situation and Cuba's role. Tasks were charted for the coming period, and elections were held based on a slate of candidates drawn up to inject more women, youth, blacks and mulattos into the leadership, strengthening its popular representative character.

The Communist Party of Cuba distinguishes itself by having developed from a national liberation movement, by having led the people not only to over-

throw a US-supported dictator, but further towards socialism, raising the society out of backwardness and at the same time extending internationalist support to other struggling peoples. For these reasons, we find of special interest the section of the congress' main report, which deals with Cuba's position in the socialist community:

«Our party has played a decisive role in the development and strengthening of ties that bind us to the communist parties throughout the world, particularly those of the socialist community to which we belong. It is our position that the cohesiveness of the communist movement, which fully respects the independent opinions of each of its members, is an important factor in the struggle for the advancement of socialism and the implementation of a joint strategy for peace and development. The role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in this historic task is



well known. As the world's first socialist country and because of its enormous economic potential, its unquestionable military might, and its loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, the Soviet Union is a decisive part of contemporary histori-

cal forces. The CPSU, its guide and leader, is our closest friend and our best political ally, although each party, whether great or small in this important movement, will always be deserving of our greatest esteem and consideration.»

## Special Relationship

### 'Israel' and West Germany

*Attention is most often focused on the massive political, military and economic support the US gives the Zionist state. Yet one should keep in mind that consolidation of the Zionist state is a concern shared by all the imperialist countries. It is no coincidence that West Germany, the bulwark of capitalism and NATO in Europe, is second only to the US in terms of strategic support to 'Israel'.*

Economic aid from West Germany was the single most crucial factor in the original Israeli program for economic growth and industrialization. West Germany and the US are the only countries to have provided the Zionist state with direct capital infusions. In the years 1967-78, German investment in 'Israel' ranked second only to that of the US. After the US, West Germany is the Israelis' most important trading partner.

When Israeli Prime Minister Peres visited Bonn in January, the media focused on his talks on the Middle East 'peace' process and his commemoration of Jews who died in Nazi concentration camps. However, the crux of Peres's talks with West German officials was economic issues - trade, scientific cooperation and setting up a German-Israeli venture capital company. *Jerusalem Post* had preceded the visit with an article entitled «German-Israeli cooperation in the third world?» (January 23). The article quoted the chairman of the West German parliament's Foreign Committee as saying: «West German experts and investments can play an important role in promoting Israeli knowhow in third world countries.» While it is not known what was concretely agreed upon in this respect, Peres and Chancellor Kohl did announce plans for a joint scientific institute in 'Israel'. Bonn has pledged \$31 million for the project. Peres named the research fields as medical, biological, plant and water. Yet one notes that this further consolidation of West German-Israeli scientific cooperation comes at a time when both states have expressed willingness

to join in the research for the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative - Star Wars.

#### *The Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel*

Above is the title of a book written by Lily Gardner Feldman and published in 1984, in London and Sydney. It gives a detailed, well-documented, historical account of West German-Israeli relations, which we have used as the basis for the rest of this article. (All facts and quotes are from the book, although we take responsibility for the analysis which is not identical to Feldman's.)

In defining the special relationship between 'Israel' and West Germany, Feldman relies on the methodology of bourgeois political science, which is descriptive rather than analytical. This leads to superficial conclusions. For example, Feldman attributes this special relationship to the Germans' bad conscience about Nazi persecution of the Jews, rather than to imperialism's strategic interests in the Middle East. However, facts speak for themselves. An objective reading of the book gives insight into Israeli and West German motives for their mutual political, economic and military relations. Though not stressed by the author, the facts show that Israeli-West German relations stem from the two states' respective positions in the imperialist camp and its strategy for controlling the peoples and resources of the Middle East.

## Economic aid first

It is telling that West Germany and 'Israel' enjoyed full-blown economic and military relations for over a decade before diplomatic ties were established. West Germany feared that according full recognition to the Zionist state would jeopardize relations with the Arab states and lead them to recognize the German Democratic Republic. These considerations did not, however, keep West Germany from providing 'Israel' with massive economic aid. This started in 1952, parallel to West Germany's integration into the Western bloc (including NATO) and the gradual abolition of its status as a defeated, occupied power after World War II. This aid was not an entirely German initiative; nor was it based on guilt feelings. Rather, according to Feldman, «The US perceived a need for a German contribution to Western defense, especially after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950» (p.50).

The special relationship began in the context of Israeli demands for compensation to the Jews and their families who had suffered under the Hitler regime. This demand was actually rooted in the nature of the Zionist state. Established as a settler colony through war and expulsion of the native Palestinians, 'Israel' needed massive external aid to maintain itself and its army; it could not look to its neighbors for normal economic relations. Shinnar, head of the Israeli delegation to the initial talks with the West German government in 1952, admitted: «There can be no doubt as to the importance of our awkward economic situation in the decision to seek reparations» (p.70). Just as the Zionist movement exploited the holocaust to bring settlers to Palestine, so the Zionist state was eager to solicit funds in the name of the victims, for strengthening itself as imperialism's forward base in the Middle East.

As a result of the complementary motives of the Zionist and West German states, the two entered into talks in Wassenaar in March 1952, which ended with the signing of the Luxembourg agreement in September of the same year. West Germany hereby agreed to pay 3.45 billion German marks in reparations. Of this, 450 million were paid to the Conference of Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, but by far the greatest amount (3 billion) was paid directly to the state of 'Israel' in goods and services «to help absorb 300,000 refugees» (p.90). According to international law, 'Israel' could not claim reparations, yet it was treated preferentially.

Parallel to the Wassenaar talks, West Germany negotiated in London with 18 European countries about reparations and debt repayment. The agreement was signed with 'Israel' six months before the London talks reached agreement. The Adenauer government promised 14.3 billion marks to the 18 creditors who had brought their claims to London, while the Zionist state alone got 3 billion marks. European states wanting reparations had to postpone their claims until a future peace treaty with a united Germany would allow a final settlement. The Zionist state was the only country to receive reparations. When reparations agreements were later concluded with 12 European states, they had to pass the money on to the individuals making the claim. Together, the 12 received 978 million marks, compared to 3 billion for 'Israel' alone.

## Building Zionism's industrial base

After the Luxembourg agreement, Bonn and Tel Aviv undertook a series of measures to speed up payments, so that by 1958 'Israel' had received 95% of the amount due as of 1962. By the end of 1978, Israeli individuals had received

about 40% of the total compensation due - approximately 22 billion marks. Although the latter payments are not to the state, they helped the Israeli economy, contributing to foreign currency reserves and reducing welfare costs.

In the first years after the Zionist state's foundation, West German funds were the most important. From the total of unilateral transfers to 'Israel' in 1953-65, the West German contribution was 47.2%; that of Jews around the world was 46.9%; and that of the US was 5.9%.

After 1965, the US became the only state to unilaterally transfer funds to 'Israel', but the German government's transfers to Israeli individuals continued. From 1970-8, 41-58% of all transfers to Israeli individuals came from West Germany. The benefits to the Israeli economy from these transfers can be summarized as follows:

- 1.Capital imports from West Germany constituted over a quarter of capital imports to 'Israel' over a 19 year period.
- 2.Of all the goods and services provided, 38% were investment goods; 24% raw materials, industrial and agricultural products; 8% transportation goods and bank charges; and 30% oil. Approximately 80% of the total eventually went into investments.
- 3.West Germany virtually built the Israeli commercial fleet, crucial because of the lack of land access to other countries.
- 4.Industrial equipment which derived from the Luxembourg agreement amounted to 14% of total Israeli investment in industrial equipment.
- 5.From 1954-64, West Germany supplied about one quarter of the total investment in power installations, a prerequisite for industrialization.
- 6.Reparations paid one-fifth of the equipment imported for the Mekorot Water Company in 1954-61, which helped the Israeli irrigation program and consequently agriculture.
- 7.During 1954-9, West Germany supplied half of the investment in railways.
- 8.During 1954-9, one quarter of the capital investment in Haifa port came from reparations.
- 9.In 1962, 12 % of the total assets of the telephone system came from reparations (p.97).

West Germany's contribution to the Israeli economy through reparations was supplemented by other aid. When West Germany started its Development Aid Program in the early sixties, 'Israel' was among the first recipients, getting 560 million marks by June 1965. This is a unique case because West Germany has never extended such aid to any other country in the absence of diplomatic relations and written agreements. In this period, 'Israel' ranked third (after India and Turkey) among the 65 recipients of bilateral aid in absolute terms, and first in per capita terms.

After diplomatic relations were established in 1965, a formal agreement was signed in Bonn to «promote...economic relations by means of continuous cooperation.» In 1966, 'Israel' received 160 million marks as development aid and for specific projects. Normally recipients of development aid apply for certain projects and have to review their request with the Ministry of Economic Cooperation. For 'Israel', this procedure was simplified and abbreviated; aid is generally granted without negotiations.

In the years 1950-77, 'Israel' ranked in the top four among about 100 countries receiving development aid from West Germany, and first in per capita terms. Loans have been granted to 'Israel' on better than average conditions. Not until 1977 was the Zionist state regarded as a take-off country, which means loans on somewhat less favorable terms.

## West Germany ushers 'Israel' into the EEC

After 1960, West Germany became one of the Israelis' major trading partners. The Israeli-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Tel Aviv is one of the largest in the Zionist state. In 1977, the West German government sponsored the Israel Trade Centre's establishment in Dusseldorf. Along with the Netherlands, West Germany sponsored the Zionist state's association with the European Economic Community, leading to a series of special status agreements which give Israeli products significant tariff reductions. The latest of these, concluded in 1975, provides for completely free trade between 'Israel' and the EEC in industrial goods by 1985-9, and significant tariff reductions for Israeli agricultural exports.

## Military cooperation

Military cooperation between the Zionist and West German states also preceded diplomatic relations. It was crucial for 'Israel' in the years 1957-66. (West Germany was then replaced by France and later the US as the Zionists' major arms supplier.) The preferential treatment accorded the Zionist state can be seen in the following:

1. Due to Germany's past and efforts not to appear as a militaristic power, its military aid policy has always been restrictive. The very fact that 'Israel' received such aid was unusual.
2. 'Israel' was at this time the only state in the Middle East to receive such aid, which occurred despite the absence of diplomatic relations and written agreements.
3. The military aid granted to 'Israel' was qualitatively different from that granted to other countries. The Zionist state received at least 30% of all West German military aid to non-NATO countries. Most other countries received only software. Only 'Israel', Sudan, Nigeria and Tanzania received aircraft. Only

## Another Angle

There is another recent book covering the special relations between Israel and West Germany. Written in German by Kenneth M. Lewan, it is entitled *Sühne Oder Neue Schuld?* (*Repentance or New Guilt?*), published in 1984, and distributed by Das Arabische Buch, Wundstr. 21, West Berlin 19.

While covering basically the same facts as noted in this article, Professor Lewan's book injects another angle, pointing out that it is the Palestinian people who have suffered most from the special relationship. The book includes a survey of the Middle East conflict and an analysis of Zionism's strivings for a pure Jewish state. Lewan points out that because West German support was channeled strictly to the Jewish sector, it served to widen the structural gap between the standard of living for Jews and Palestinian Arabs.

Professor Lewan did a bit of research on his own to see if military support had stopped to 'Israel' as purported. In 1973, he wrote the Minister of Economic Cooperation, requesting information on forms of support to Israel. He got the answer that the ministry could not give any information on aid to 'Israel' — «as the special relations between Israel and West Germany do not allow for any comparison...»

Lewan argues that it was US strategy motivating West German support to 'Israel', not guilt feelings for Nazi atrocities. He points out that the Gypsies were never compensated, nor were Jews living in countries with whom Germany had no relations, not to mention compensation for the 20 million Soviet citizens who died. We recommend this book to our German readers.

'Israel' received fighter planes, as well as about 200 M28 Patton battle tanks, submarines, helicopters, anti-tank and anti-aircraft equipment without having to pay for them.

4. The value of the military aid granted to 'Israel' far exceeds that to any other country — 20-800% more than to Somalia, the second most costly recipient.

5. The West German Defense Ministry showed a preference for buying Israeli weapons, purchasing ammunition, grenade throwers, uniforms and Uzi submachine guns. The declared aim of these purchases was to stimulate the infant Israeli arms industry. 'Israel' viewed the sale of Uzis as a step towards entering the NATO market.

The main initiator of this aspect of the special relationship was the ultraright politician, Franz-Joseph Strauss. Shimon Peres, then Defense Ministry director-general, was the arms negotiator. Though military cooperation was justified with phrases such as «contributing to peace in the Middle East» and «reparation for Nazi Germany's crimes», the West German government actually sought to contribute to the Zionist state's build-up as an anti-communist stronghold in the Middle East. Feldman puts it this way: «Israel seemed to be conjured by German leaders as a Middle East Berlin standing against communist expansion» (p.133).

In return, the Zionist leadership helped to whitewash German officials of their Nazi past. In February 1965, *Stern* magazine claimed that Strauss had agreed with Israeli envoys that Hans Globke, a close aide to Chancellor Adenauer, would not be summoned to witness in the trial of Nazi war criminal Eichmann, in return for German arms supplies. The Israeli mission in Cologne denied this, but in fact Globke never had to testify.

Although there is no concrete evidence that the US instigated German military aid to the Zionist state, it is obvious that West Germany was generally following US policy. Feldman says, «It seems clear...that the initial contacts and the first agreement were probably related to an American initiative...The arms in question were often American, now obsolete, and there were strict rules about the transfer of such obsolete weapons» (p.135).

The military relationship was officially suspended with the establishment of diplomatic relationship between 'Israel' and West Germany in 1965, but Feldman's book records a number of indications that arms deals continue. Since 1975, the Israeli embassy staff in Bonn has included a military attache whom the Israelis call a «purchasing officer», although West German law prohibits arms sales to areas of tension, and the Middle East is classified as such an area. Exchange of technological, strategic and defense information is ongoing. One can surmise that military-related cooperation goes on in the name of scientific and technical cooperation which Feldman describes as perhaps the most important aspect of current West German-Israeli relations.

## Zionist lobby

Feldman's book also covers cooperation in cultural and academic fields, including youth exchange programs. The book details how the special relationship has been reinforced by personal friendship between Israeli and West German officials and other influential persons, including publishers, trade union and political party leaders. These relations span the entire bourgeois political spectrum of both countries. Especially enduring are the relations between the Israeli Labor Party and the SPD (West Germany's Social Democrats). Pro-Israeli viewpoints are promoted through a diversity of political

and cultural channels, amounting to a virtual Zionist lobby, based on imperialist-minded politicians and business interests, but involving broader circles as well. The case of West Germany is interesting in that it refutes superficial analysis that the US's pro-Israeli policy is due to the Zionist lobby and, in turn, the size of the Jewish community. West Germany, like the US, renders support to 'Israel' based on its own imperialist interests.

Feldman's book also deals with West Germany's seemingly diminished political support for the Zionist state in the seventies, due to its need for Arab oil. West Germany has joined other West European states in pointing out that the

Palestinian question must be resolved for any peace in the Middle East, and this entails fulfilling some Palestinian rights. A closer look reveals that Bonn's role, like the European initiative generally, has been that of a go-between, offering carrots to the Palestinian and Arab side to draw them into a settlement that would essentially consolidate Zionist and imperialist control of the region. Feldman points out the West German role in the European initiative: «Voices within the SPD limited the declaration of the EEC's Venice summit in June 1980 to a call for association, not full participation, for the PLO in the Middle East peace process» (p.222).

## Nazi-Zionist Collaboration

*Jewish opposition to Zionism is not only a matter of humanitarian or international solidarity with the Arabs, but a pretty natural reaction against a fundamentally anti-semitic movement that has already managed to uproot the entire Jewish population of all the countries of the Arab world, is currently trying to do the same in both the Soviet Union and Iran, and would not be adverse to doing so in Australia if it could.*

The above quote is taken from a book entitled *Nazi-Zionist Collaboration*, published in Britain by BAZO-Palestine Solidarity and AZAN (Anti-Zionists Against the Nazis) in cooperation with JAZA (Jews Against Zionism and Anti-Semitism) in Australia. The main text is written by JAZA in 1979, as evidence for the inquiry into Radio 3CR in Melbourne, Australia. 3CR operates on an anti-imperialist and anti-racist basis, considering Zionism as a form of racism.

Zionists in Australia, specifically the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies (VJBD) lashed out at 3CR with charges of «Anti-semitism», «terrorism» and so forth. Most disturbing to the Zionists were 3CR's broadcasts about Nazi-Zionist collaboration at the time of World War II. The Zionists precipitated a public inquiry by the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal into 3CR. For the inquiry, JAZA compiled documentation of Zionist-Nazi collaboration. Interestingly enough, after their vicious smear campaign against 3CR, the Board of Deputies withdrew their complaint and the inquiry was never concluded. As stated in the preface to the booklet: «Although by no means comprehensive, the evidence submitted by JAZA was apparently sufficient for the VJBD to decide it did not want a public inquiry into these allegations at any cost.» In fact, JAZA's documentation drew on Jewish sources, many of them not at all unfriendly to

Zionism, but written by persons appalled by Zionism's collaboration with the fascists and consequent betrayal of the majority of Jews. The Australian Zionists preferred to silence any serious discussion of this topic for fear of the reaction, especially in the Jewish community, if the facts were known in broader circles.

The booklet covers a broad range of aspects of the Nazi-Zionist collaboration: negotiations by the leadership, the role of the Jewish councils and police, Zionism's suppression of information about the Nazi extermination campaign, its failure to mount resistance and its policy of selecting the few for immigration to Palestine, rather than trying to save the many.

Under the title «Zionist Emigration and Gestapo Expulsion», the booklet includes a long passage from Hannah Arendt's book *Eichman in Jerusalem* which gives basic facts about Zionism's collaboration with Nazi Germany:

*During the first few years, Hitler's rise to power appeared to the Zionists chiefly as «the decisive defeat of assimilationism.» Hence, the Zionists could for a time at least, engage in a certain amount of non-criminal cooperation with the Nazi authorities; the Zionists too believed that «dissimilation», combined with the emigration to Palestine of Jewish youngsters and, they hoped, Jewish capitalists, could be a «mutually fair solution.» At the time, many German*

*officials held this opinion, and this kind of talk seems to have been quite common up to the end. A letter from a survivor of Theresienstadt, a German Jew, relates that all leading positions in the Nazi-appointed Reichsvereinigung were being held by Zionists (whereas the authentically Jewish Reichsvertretung had been composed of both Zionists and non-Zionists), because Zionists, according to the Nazis, were the 'decent' Jews since they too thought in 'national' terms.»...There existed in the early years a mutually highly satisfactory agreement between the Nazi authorities and the Jewish Agency for Palestine — a Havarah or Transfer Agreement, which provided that an emigrant to Palestine could transfer his money there in German goods and exchange them for pounds upon arrival. It was soon the only legal way for a Jew to take his money with him...The result was that in the thirties, when American Jewry took great pains to organize a boycott of German merchandise, Palestine, of all places, was swamped with all kinds of goods «made in Germany.»*

*Of greater importance for Eichman were the emissaries from Palestine, who would approach the Gestapo and the S.S. on their own initiative...to enlist help for the illegal immigration of Jews into British-ruled Palestine, and both the Gestapo and the S.S. were helpful. They negotiated with Eichman in Vienna, and they reported that he was «polite»...and that he even provided them with farms and facilities for setting up vocational training camps for the prospective immigrants...»*

Nazi-Zionist Collaboration can be obtained from BAZO (British Anti-Zionist Organization), at the cost of £1.50, from George Mitchell, 90 John Street, Glasgow G1, Britain.

# Development of the PFLP's Posters

*The following article, written by the responsible for PFLP's art section, appeared in the anniversary edition of «Al Hadaf», the Front's Arabic weekly.*

We cannot be sure when the art of the poster began to take shape in the Palestinian society. We do find an early form of this art in the twenties, but it was not up to the standard in other parts of the world. Rather, there were posters advertising theater groups or commercial goods. Later, as Zionist colonization escalated, there were agitational posters, calling the people to take up arms and defend the country. However, the poster as a cultural and informational material did not assume its current form until the late fifties and early sixties. At this time, it began to assume a conscious and artistic form. One kind was the posters issued by UNRWA. These were educational, aiming at increasing public awareness about health. Another kind of poster emerged with the establishment of the PLO in 1964. This developed and engendered an understanding for the political poster in the Palestinian society.

The development of the poster in the PFLP intersects at many points with the same process in other Palestinian organizations. All were affected by the same political events and shared many national occasions, such as the anniversary of the revolution (Jan. 1st), the Black September massacres in Jordan 1970, the Day of the Land, the Day of the Prisoner, the Day of the Martyr, etc. There are, however, differences in the content of the posters of the various organizations, due to differing political lines and ideologies; there are also differing artistic views, depending on the personnel working in this field in each organization.

## **The armed resistance from 1967 and its effect on the poster**

The early posters of the PFLP have a special impact, because they convey the memories of the early years of militancy. We find great artistic value, simplicity and clarity in the early posters, making them easily understandable to all. The early period witnessed militant armed uprising in two main arenas:

occupied Palestine and Jordan. The distinctive features of the posters of that time were as follows:

*One:* The early posters conveyed a definition of the political and ideological identity of the PFLP. There were text posters, displaying only written slogans, while other posters combined slogans with drawings or artistic symbols. One early poster depicted the Palestinian flag and two hands carrying a weapon; it read: «The road of armed struggle...the road to a free Palestine.» On another, there is a hand holding a weapon and the slogan: «Liberating Palestine is the battle of the Arab masses...and the cause of progressive forces in the world.» A third poster carries lines by the Palestinian poet, Mahmoud Darwish: «My home is not a suitcase and I am not a traveler.» Still another poster reads: «Armed struggle is the response of the toiling masses to the June defeat...People's war - our path to liberation...Our enemies Israel, Zionism, imperialism and reaction...Leading the revolution - the working class.»

*Two:* The early posters were affected by the youthfulness of armed struggle which created a state of uprising among our people who had spent 19 years wandering, dispersed and dep-

rived. Almost always we find pictures of weapons - the rifle, molotov, hand grenade - on the PFLP's posters at that time.

*Three:* The early posters often expressed and paid tribute to the extensive military operations of the Palestinian resistance at that time: The commando units crossing the Jordan River and the actions of military units active in occupied Palestine. In addition, there was the battle of Al Karama which created a tremendous mood of militancy among the masses. On an undated poster, we find a drawing of Al Maghazi battle in the Gaza Strip. Another one shows a Palestinian fighter, wearing the kofia and holding a grenade, atop a Jordanian army tank. The slogan on this poster reads: «Glory to the fighters who destroyed the fascists' tanks at Al Wihdat» (refugee camp in Jordan). A poster entitled «Greetings to the rebels in Gaza in their heroic struggle» contains a drawing of a hand holding a molotov. In the background is a collage of military communiques announcing operations staged by militants of the Front in the Gaza Strip.

*Four:* At this stage, Palestinian symbols began appearing and became widely used in political posters and other art work - the rifle, the kuffiyah, the horse, the map of Palestine, etc.

*Five:* From the artistic aspect, the painted posters were the most successful, followed by posters using photographs. Use of the collage was not so successful. Realism was the dominant style, portraying events and persons as they are, with the beginning use of clearly defined symbols. On one poster there are no slogans, but rather the statement: No need for clarification. This poster shows a picture of a hat made of the US flag with Zionist stars. It is placed on a skull with open jaws holding two victims of the Black September massacre. In one of the eye sockets of the skull is the head of Jordan's King Hussein, with one eye covered by a patch, like Moshe Dayan.

The posters of this time employed many symbols and clear, direct ideas. One poster, that is more of a cartoon drawing, shows a person wearing a military uniform and a helmet covered with the US flag, holding in his huge hand a club with the Star of David on it. One of the most famous posters of Ghassan Kanafani shows a woman drawn in the



shape of Palestine, cradling a rifle in her arm.

There is no record of the number of artists who participated in the production of the PFLP's posters in that period except those who worked regularly for a period of time. Ghassan Kanafani did several of the Front's early posters, but there were other Palestinian and Arab artists who contributed, such as Shafiq Radwan, Rafiq Sharaf and others.

## The seventies: Accumulating events and experience

This period of the revolution witnessed many dramatic events that came faster than they could be absorbed. There was the resistance's departure from Jordan to Lebanon. Then there was the October War, followed by disengagement agreements on the Arab fronts. Then came the Geneva conference, the PLO's interim program and the strengthening of the PLO's institutions. The PLO took its first solid steps towards asserting its representation of the Palestinian people, as was confirmed at the Rabat summit in 1974. In the mid-seventies, we witnessed the civil war in Lebanon and the massacre at Tel al Zaatar refugee camp. Then there was the Day of the Land uprising in the Galilee in 1976, then Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem, Camp David and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978...

In the midst of these events, the Palestinian resistance was sometimes in the position of reacting to events, at other times making events. It is beyond our purpose here to go into all the political headlines of this period. Rather we will examine how the Front presented political posters in this period, and what were the main characteristics of these posters.

*First:* It became a tradition to commemorate the anniversaries of special occasions for the PFLP, such as the anniversary of its foundation, the Day of the Martyr and Ghassan Kanafani's martyrdom, as well as general Palestinian national occasions. These occasions multiplied with the addition of new ones such as Women's Day, the Day of the Land, the Day of the Prisoner, May 1st, May 15th - the occupation of Palestine, Tel Al Zaatar, etc. Many posters were made as part of these commemorations.


*Second:* Posters appeared reflecting the relations of solidarity between the Front and the Arab and other national liberation movements. One example was the poster issued by the

PFLP on the occasion of July 19th - The Day of Solidarity with the Sudanese People. It showed the repression suf-



fered by the Sudanese masses and revolutionary vanguards at that time. One year, on the occasion of International Women's Day, the PFLP's Women's Bureau published a poster in solidarity with the struggle of women in the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic. It showed two women, one Palestinian and the other from the Sahara, facing one another, both holding weapons. A poster made in solidarity with Vietnam had the slogan: «This is the peace wanted by the US and Zionism in Vietnam and Palestine.» It showed one of the horrible US massacres in Vietnam.

Representing international solidarity between different peoples, the PFLP



fered by the Sudanese masses and revolutionary vanguards at that time. One year, on the occasion of Interna-

issued a poster with a picture of the militant Patrick Arguella. In the background was a map of Palestine and the slogan: ▶

«Patrick Arguella...His father is from Nicaragua...His mother is from the USA...He studied in Switzerland...He was martyred for Palestine.»

The Front also published posters in solidarity with the Iranian revolution, the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), the Moroccan national movement and the National Democratic

shift the balance of power in the revolution's favor. On the poster of the 10th anniversary of the Front was the slogan: «No to imperialist settlement, No to treason - Yes to the protracted people's war for liberating Palestine.» Another poster for the same anniversary read: «Continuing the struggle for a democratic Palestine.» The poster of the Front's

nian and Arab artists in this field. The establishment of new, special schools in the skill and art of the poster also contributed to this progress. Among the artists who contributed in this period were Yousef Abd Laki, Yousef al Nasser, Haseeb al Jasem, Hilmi al Touni, Kamal Nicola, Jihad Mansour and Imad Abdel Wahab.

## The eighties - continued progress in the political poster

The eighties also witnessed dramatic events which affected the course of the revolution and its framework: the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the siege of Beirut, the resistance's departure from Beirut, the Sabra-Shatila massacre, the inter-Palestinian fighting in Tripoli, Arafat's visit to Cairo, the illegitimate PNC in Amman, the Amman accord and the worsening of the PLO's crisis. How did these events affect the political poster of the PFLP and how was this expressed?

*First:* There were new occasions to be remembered. The poster issued by the PFLP on its 15th anniversary depicted the siege of Beirut, showing a silhouette of the destruction in the background and a side view of a Palestinian fighter - the witness, defender and martyr. The slogan read: «Beirut: Symbol of Steadfastness.» The PFLP published several special posters to commemorate the Sabra-Shatila massacre. On the first anniversary of this massacre, a poster was issued with the slogan: «Massacres will never stop the fight for freedom.» It showed a hand in a pool of blood. From the hand were sprouting olive branches, symbolizing the continuation of life, growth and struggle.

*Second:* The posters of this period have conveyed the Palestinians' sense of anxiety more intensively than ever before. Most events were dominated by a feeling of tragedy.

*Third:* In this period, the Front's political poster advanced in terms of artistic skill and creativity. Many new artists contributed to this progress.

In conclusion, this historical overview of the development of the political poster in the Front is a living history of our militant heritage. We intend this review as a first step towards giving this matter the attention it deserves from all factions of the Palestinian revolution. We hope it will encourage all to further develop this work and archive it as part of the militant history of the Palestinian people and organizations.



Front in North Yemen. Many posters were made expressing the mutual solidarity between the Palestinian and Lebanese people.

*Third:* Political posters were made addressing the crucial issues facing the revolution at that time. These posters called for resolving the doubts and differences that arose concerning the line of settlement, in a way that would serve to

11th anniversary had the slogan: «With armed struggle, the sun of the worker and the peasant will rise in Palestine.» Following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the Front issued a poster that read: «Sadat has betrayed the homeland - You must respond!»

*Fourth:* On the artistic and technical level, the poster made great progress due to the participation of many Palesti-