Agricultural Development in the West Bank (ص 83)
غرض
- عنوان
- Agricultural Development in the West Bank (ص 83)
- المحتوى
-
154
It is true that aid to individual peneficieries involves higher
over-head expenses and meticulous attendance to details, but in
a country where private initiatives currently constitute the
1 and economic development, the
cornerstone of agricultura
extra cost is certainly justified.
Cooperation among voluntary agencies is effected through frequent
meetings of their senior officials. put still there is obvious
overlapping and occasional conflict in their lines of activity,
more so in that they have different affiliations and because
most of them are doing a little in many directions.
Relations with Israel
Despite their philanthropic identity voluntary agencies face
close supervision and even harrassment by Israeli authorities.
They all have to submit their proposed projects long in advance
and wait long periods for approval. Here lies the crux of the
confrontation between most VA'S and the Military Administration,
for they have sharply different perceptions of development
priorities.
Israel would like to see the bulk of aid go to improving living
conditions in refugee camps and rural communities, but without
introducing important changes in their production bases unless
tha i
t conforms with Israel's own economic strategies in the
oseapded territories.”
pied territories. Furthermore, the Military Administration
a
1. The
Fees tue winisceya a letter sent to the director of ANBRA
tay Senn tia Nelo of lat eniasuve tet told him that
Then they list for Ad local residents better than he did.
which they would Lik a wide range of welfare projects
listed projects had 2 to see him assist. None of the
production ectivitins to do with agriculture OF
155
is anxious to exploi
Oit economic aid in gaining political
leverage by channelling aid to the "right" people This
1 "right" :
ng . % i
is strongly resisted by most agenci
ies.
Project proposals which do not meet Israeli favour are often
shelved and later rejected. This often triggers a tedious
process of bargaining and lobbying involving local and foreign
media, as well as senior political echelons. Usually this
results in more approvals by the Israeli authorities, but
sometimes not without corresponding concessions. A balance
sheet of Israel's initial reaction to proposed projects is
presented in Table (IV-5) which shows, though not quite
typical of all VA's, that of 19 projects submitted by
ANERA for 1979, only 9 were cleared, 3 are still pending, and
7 were rejected. The researcher was told furthermore, that it
took two years of lobbying to have the nine projects cleared.
Slow processing of project proposals entails important difficulties
for both sponsoring agencies and recipient organizations.
rely heavily on us AID for finance find it
sk for more funds when they
Agencies which
increasingly embarrassing to 4
f outstanding allocations. In contrast
are unable to dispose
1. The Israeli
financial support through those "lea
to join autonomy talks promoted by Camp pavid (US, Egypts
[srael). For that purposes they
“yillages leagues" which they like to see
and local municipal councils 48 xepresentare i
communities. By 1 five such leagues we! t
and Shalt Bers were even armed by the authorities. - تاريخ
- ١٩٨٢
- المنشئ
- Hisham Masoud Awartani
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