Palestine: A Modern History (ص 31)

غرض

عنوان

Palestine: A Modern History (ص 31)

المحتوى

64 Polarisation: The Military Administration 1917-1920
Palestinian Arab demands fot self-determination and to their appeals
against Zionism was bound to lead to friction. One reason why
Palestine was denied self-determination was explained in a letter from
the Foreign Minister, Balfour, to the Prime Minister which no amount
of Arab petitions against Zionism could alter.
‘The weak point of our position of course js that in the case of
Palestine we deliberately and-rightly decline to accept the principle
of self-determination. If the present inhabitants were consulted they
would unquestionably give am anti-Jewish verdict. Our justification
for ‘our policy is that we regard Palestine as being absolutely excep-
tional, that we consider the question of the Jews outside Palestine
as one of world importance.4
&
As the Peace Conference dragged on the Palestinians became more
restless as their worst fears were confirmed by Zionist public statements.
Towards the énd of March Clayton reported:
Anti-Zionist propaganda has increased considerably in Palestine
lately and feeling is now running very high among Moslems and
Christians who fear that political and economic‘advantages may be
given to Jews in peace settlement. This feéling is increased by the
rash actidns and words of the Jews themselves and by pronounce-
ments which appear by ‘leading Zionists in the Press‘in‘ England and
America and elsewhere. There are considerable grounds for belief
that anti-Jewish riots are being prepared in Jerusalem, Jaffa.and
elsewhere. Precautions are being taken but an announcement that
Jews will be given any special privileges might precipitate
outbreaks.®
4
On the 28 March, the Muslim-Christian Committee of Jetusalem
proposed to hold a demonstration on | April to protest against the
Zionist Programme. When permission was’ denied; the Mufti.and the
three ex-deputies of Jerusalem‘acquiesced but elaborate precautionary
schemes were prépared,to provide against trouble in the cities‘and:the
more exposed Jewish colonies lest the more extreme Arab elements
decide to act on their own. Towards the end of April the Zionist
Organisation informed the Foreign Office that ‘they were perturbed
by the 'most recent advice they shad had from Palestirie which repre-
sented the Arabs as preparing to make. trouble and as secretly arming’ .®
The Palestinian situation was aggravated by the confusion that
Polarisation: The Military Administration 1917-1920 65
dominated -the discussions of the Paris Peace Conference on the future
of the Near East. In April the Peace Conference decided to send an
Inter-Allied Commission to Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia to ascer-
tain the sentiments of the people with regard to the future administra-
tion of, their affairs. The departure of the Commission was delayed
because the French were ‘unwilling to name their members for the
Commission. The British too were apprehensive lest the;findings of the
Commission prove: detrimental to their plans and policies.in Palestine.
+ London’s worst fears were unequivocally confirmed by the Palestine
Chief Administrator’s report on the likely results of the findings of the
Inter-Allied Commission, and on the potentially explosive situation in
Palestine:
In the present state of political feeling there is no doubt that if
Zionism’s programme is 4 necessary. adjunct to a mandatory the
people of Palestine will select in preference the United States or
France as the mandatory, or as the protecting power of an Arab
administration .
1 . The Palestinians desire their country for themselves and will
resist any: general immigration of Jews: however gratlual, by every
i means in their power including active hostilities. . recent events in
Egypt have greatly irnpressed the people of Palestine.
In-conclusion; the idea.that Great Britain is the main upholder
“of the Zionist programme will preclude any local request for a
British Mandate and no mandatory: power can carry through Zionist
programme except by force.®”
Clayton considered the report ‘a true appreciation of the situation.
Fear and distrust of Zionist aims-grow daily and no amount of persua-
sion or propaganda will dispel it’! Furthermore, he reported that, “There
was recently a danger of serious disturbance in which Arabs from East
of Jordan were to take part’..
In accordance with the Faisal-Weizmann agreement of ;January
1919,®8 Faisal tried to reconcile the Palestinian Arabs to Zionist policy.
On’ 1} May 1919 Glayton reported that, 4
. ' é FS Bip
“Faisal jhas..: informed an Arab delegation in Damascus that ‘he did
not consider ‘Arab and, Zionist aims to be'incgmpatible.and.delega-
tion seemed favourably impressed. Members of, Zionist, Commission
are being-invited to visit Haisal who may also ask a,few leading
Palestinian Arabs to attend with a view to rapprochment.®?
Wee 6 ALE ES
SERGE PR MS Staiger FID EET Sb ns ee

هو جزء من

Palestine: A Modern History

تاريخ

1978

المنشئ

Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali

مجموعات العناصر

Generated Pages Set