Palestine: A Modern History (ص 35)

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Palestine: A Modern History (ص 35)

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72 Polarisation: The Military Administration 1917-1920
, and gendarmes and that is very good for our future. We -must-all
know the martyrs of the Fatherland and our honour.'”
Another member reported that ‘all the fellaheens and beduins are
waiting for the first signals and are ready for everything’.
The Zionist informer did not-fail to report the seoretive manner of
the el-Feda'iyyeh ‘who decided to meet once or twice a week without
mentioning the next meeting only a few hours before the meeting
time’.
Another report covered a meeting at the Muntada el-’Adabi-where
Issaf Nashashibi, the well-known literary figure, stated that money was
very much needed, and it-was not a shame to collect the money either
by representation or’ by lottery. Hé also advocated ‘continuous
troubles’ with the Jews as a means of discouraging ifnmigration.'’*
Mahmoud ‘Aziz el-Khalidi, who belonged to many secret societies,
advocated assassinating some Jewish leaders in Jaffa and Haifa 4s a
means of .intimidating potential Jewish immigrants. Furthermore, his
speech revealed the existence of religious overtones and considerable
agitation against the British:
The youth of this country are not afraid of anybody even the
autocratic Government. They want to begin already and they: will
all-receive death gladly. Most of them ask me always when we are
going to rise against the unbelievers and know our strength ‘and
get rid of them once and for all.'*®
In the light of these activities and points of view, General H.D.
Watson’s warning shortly after taking over the .Administration of
OETA South, was both realistic and timely: “
™
The antagonism to Zionism of the majority ‘of.the population is
deep-roated — it is fast leatling to’hatred of the British — and will
result, if the Zionist programme is forted upon them, in an. outbreak
of a very serious chatacter necessitating the employment ‘of a much
larger number of troops than at present located in the territory.'’®
x ' fe M
From the available intelligence reports, British and Zionist, it was
apparent’ that the peasants were more prone to action and to revolt
‘entailing self-sacrifice thar other groups of society, This was, in some
instances, attributed to religious fariaticism. In addition to this relevant
element, there were economic reasons for peasant resentment of Zionist
Polarisation: The Military Administration 1917-1920 73
schetnes and ambitions: the boycott of Arab labour in Jewish colonies
and Jewish enterprise, the prospect of being uprooted as the Zionists
acquired more lands, and finally Zionist opposition to the Agticultural
Loans Scheme.
According to the report of the Court of Inquiry which investigated
the circumstances that led to the disturbances of April 1920:
117
The incident of the veto on the Agricultural Loans, however, had a
far greater effect in inflaming the growing irritation of the popula-
tion against’ the Zionists... The peoplé at once came to the conclu-
sion that the Zionists had interfered in order that they should be
left in great straits and should ultimately have to sell their lands to
the Zionists at any price.!!® °
4 \
%* During September British Naval Intelligence reported that anti-
Zionist ‘feeling was becoming incteasingly bitter and that ‘a plot has
béen’ discoveted by us by which it‘was proposed to assassinate Dr
Weizmann on his arrival’.!!9
On announcing the separation of Palestine from Syria towards the
end of September vehement protests were voiced in Jerusalem’s
Suriyya al-Janubiyya (Southern Syrid), which was owned and edited by
‘Aref al-‘Aref, and in the Damascus press. The announcement inspired
an article by ‘Izzat Darwaza in al-Urdun (The Jordan), published in
Damascus, appropriately entitled ‘Now is the Time to Act’:
It is not for the representatives of English,-French and Zionist affairs
to do as they please with’a country which has been‘liberated by the
bldod of its children, who are ready td shed more blood if necessary
to attain their ends.!”°
Another Naval Intelligence report noted that by November 1919
the -whole anti-Zionist movement in Palestirie had taken a very anti-
British turn. Four weeks later ‘Naval Intelligence réported that anti-
Zionist propaganda: was spreading to small villages where the fellaheen
are interested listeners when local and Damascus papers are read out
to them... The possibility of active opposition to the Jews is being
discussed. There are indications that a definite demonstration against
tHe Zionists will be attempted, and*dn undoubted air of expectancy
exists.'7!
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هو جزء من

Palestine: A Modern History

تاريخ

1978

المنشئ

Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali

مجموعات العناصر

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