Palestine: A Modern History (ص 41)
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- Palestine: A Modern History (ص 41)
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FAI DEADLOCK: 1920-1923
The Jerusalem outbreak of Apfil 1920 attracted the attention of the
San Remo Conference to the Arab-Zionist conflict in Palestine. Far
from bringing about a review of Britain’s JNH policies, the Conference
nominated Great Britain as Mandatory in Palestine whose duties were
defined by a verbatim repetition of the Balfour Declaration.
It was+ not until April 1920 (three days after the Mandate
nomination), that the Declaration itself was officially disclosed by the
Military Administration to the people of Palestine.! Five days later, the
San Remo: decisions were announced to the notables of Nablus. Despite
Allenby’s grave warnings? ‘and’ despite legal cbnsiderations arising from
the delay in the ratification of the Peace Treaty, the Prime Minister and
the Cabinet approved a Zionist suggestion that Herbert Samuel be the
first High Commissioner in Palestine*:
Between the San Remo nomination in, April 1920 and September
1923 when the Palestine Mandate was brought into full operation, the
respective attitudes of the three parties to. the Palestine problem
hardened and crystallised. The Mandate provisions transferred the
British-Zionist accord — as embddied in the Balfour Declaration — from
a love affair built on mutual interest into an internationally sanctioned
Catholic marriage, where Britain was committed to a JNH policy in
return for Zionist cooperation and backing in Palestine.
Following, the official announcement of the Balfour Declaration and
the San "Remo decision, a wave of Palestinian Arab protests against
these policies and against the separation of Palestine from Syria swept
Palestine? and manifestations of anxiety and restiveness abounded.
Several major clashes between Arab tribes and the British garrisons
along the Beisan-Samakh frontier with Syria took place, where heavy
casualties on both sides were inflicted.
On 6 May Fata al-‘Arab of Damascus, reported that “Muslims and
Christians are convening more political meetings which may result in
protestations against the British policy that helped divide Syria’.
Four days later al-Karmal reported that ‘delegates were sent to
Galilee and Acre to urge the inhabitants to assist in the Jerusalem
Conference’.
Indignant as the Palestinians were at British pro-Zionist policies, the
Palestinian political notability sought with energy and determination to
84
Deadlock: 1920-1923 85
avoid a head-on collision with the British authorities in the course of
the fight against Zionism. The Palestinian leadership aimed at, bringing
about a change of British policy (in Palestine) through a show of
(peaceful) determination and friendly persuasion.
In an article on the composition and purpose of the proposed
Congress, al-Karmal reflected the prevalent strategy of the Muslim-
’ Christian Associations’ leadérship vis-d-vis_ the Anglo:Zionist
convergence in Palestine. ‘The British Government is strong and
therefore it is difficult to fight it. We must confine our revolt against
, our opponents’.>
Conciliafory gestures notwithstanding, the British authorities
| prohibited the convention of the Palestine Second Congress for security
f reasons.
A minority of the political notability went to the length of
f co-operating with the Zionists. In accordance with a secret Zionist
programme drawn up by Weizmann,® Dr Eder of the Zionist
¢ Commission concluded a deal with the editor of al-Akhbar for£P 125.
! He also concluded deals for larger" sums of money with Sa‘id Bey
t Nablusi and Rashid Abu Khadra of ‘Jaffa and Haidar Bey Tuqan of
4 Nablus. This particular Zionist drive fdiled- and Palestinian protests
; against the collaborators were reported:by Eder’s liaison officer.” It was
} this episode that prompted al-Kafmal’s call on 14 May 1920, for
q national unity ‘in order to influence public opinion to see that
, \andowners do not sell their land to the Jews’.
The announcement of Samuel’s appointment as High ‘Commissioner
4 came as a severe shock to the Palestinfins. Following a comprehensive
. ‘tour in May, General Bols recorded: ‘
‘They are convinced that he will be a partisan Zionist and that he
represents a Jewish and not a British Government.’ :
In the same report Bots spoke ‘of ‘definite signs of Bolshevik ptopa-
panda and ideas’. However, neither the Poale Zion (Workers of Zion)
nor the Socialist Workers’ Party (Communist Party) had any great
following among the Arab proletariat workers and peasants. A
amphlet by the Poale Zion accused the Zionist leaders of ‘poisoning
he soul of the Jewish. workers against the uncultured fellah and of
aging economic war against’ those who have nothing’.? The Socialist
f Workers’ Party ‘remained exclusively Jewish up +to late 1920 and‘the
jCommunists had great difficulty in finding, not only Arab candidates
for party membership but even symipathisers and ‘potential allies’.!°
g - هو جزء من
- Palestine: A Modern History
- تاريخ
- 1978
- المنشئ
- Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali
- مجموعات العناصر
- Generated Pages Set
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