Palestine: A Modern History (ص 42)

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Palestine: A Modern History (ص 42)

المحتوى

86 Deadlock: 1920-1923
As the date for the introduction of civil government drew nearer,
Palestinian Arab protests, against the Sam Remo decisions and the
appointment of Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner became more
vehement. Faisal begged Allenby to urge the British Government ‘to
reverse a decision which vitally affects both interests and amour propre
of Arab population’."'
Opposition to Samuel’s appointment was not confined to diplomatic
notes: ‘rumours of intended Arab raids on June 30th, with intention of
impressing Sir Herbert Samuel. Further reports that attempts to
assassinate him are intended’.!? The Zionists gave information regarding
an alleged impending outbreak at the end of Ramadan.'? When Samuel
arrived on 30 June 1920, he found the Military Authorities nervous
‘and had made the most formidable preparations against any possible
eventuality’.'*
Samuel’s Two-pronged Policy
Prior-to his arrival Samuel had decided to adopt a two-pronged policy
devised to bring about Palestinian Arab acquiescence to Britain’s JNH
policy in Palestine. On the,one hand he intended to bring home to the
Arabs that the gradual establishment of the national home for the Jews
in Palestine was a chose jugée as far as HM Government were
concerned.'5 On the other hand Samuel intended to win over the
moderate Palestinians, i.e. vested interests, by a display of personal
friendliness, political liberalism and impartiality within the framework
of the Balfour Declaration.
Soon after his arrival, Samuel summoned the notables of Jerusalem
and the neighbouring districts to a meeting on 7 July and those of Haifa
on the following day. The Palestinian national movement, which had
earlier declared that the Palestinians cannot recognise Herbert Samuel
whom they regarded as a Zionist leader,'® called for a boycott:
for a few days, and in certain districts some of the leading men were
wavering as to the course they would pursue, in the end with
exceedingly few exceptions they all attended.”
The failure of the boycott exposed the timidity of the political
notability in Palestine. At both of these assemblies, Samuel read 2
message from the King+tq the people of Palestine and delivered speeches
promising freedom and equality for all. religions, geod administration
and economic,development, and declared an amnesty for all who were
in prison on account of the Easter disturbances in Jerusalem. Further-
Deadlock: 1920-1923 87
mére, Samuel disclosed his plans’for a ‘first stage in the development of
self-governing institutions’.
The ‘Advisory Council’ was a step calculated to permeate a feeling of
participation in the government, and a channel of peaceful expression
of feelings that would help avert sudden and violent political
explosions. In-his report to the Foreign Secretary, Samuel expressed his
satisfaction at the favourable effect of his pronouncements throughout
the country: ‘...the extremists will no doubt continue their
criticisms’."® fo
In reply to Samuel’s seemingly moderate announcements, al-Karmal
pointed out the basic irreconcilability of the two injunctions of the
Balfour Declaration and the Mandate:
We do not understand how the making ‘of a national home for
strangers in our country can be without prejudice to oltr religious
‘and civil rights. . . ,
‘ We strongly protest against separating Palestine from its mother,
Syria, and making it a national home for Jews and we appeal to the
British‘ Government and to the liberal British Nation for Justice.’?
Aid
The Advisory Council foreshadowed in Samuel’s inaugural address
had -its first meeting on 6 October 1920. It consisted of twenty
members, with Samuel as Chairman,‘of whom half were British officials
and half nominated Palestinians — seven Palestinian Arabs four
Muslims and three Christians) and «three Jews.2° The Arab members
were pro-British notables with eritrenched vested interests. Deedes
destribed the first meeting of the Advisory Council as a great success in
spite of the criticisms voiced by the non-official members. Furthermore,
Deedes reported the presence of ‘a feeling amongst a section (notably
Moslem) of the population that members of the Council should be
elected and not nominated’.*4
Thrée weeks later the optimistic outlook of the Administration gave
way to a more solemn mood. Deedes explained that the reasons for this
change included a new initiative by the ‘so-called Intelligentsia’: ‘In the
East«this Class is almost impossible to compete with’, and ‘the existence
of such movements, as Arab Natiorfalism, Pan Islamism etc.,’?? and the
necessity of dealing with certain practical questions arising out of the
Zionist programme.
The Third Palestine Arab Congress
Another factor was thé prospect of a Third Palestine Conference. The

هو جزء من

Palestine: A Modern History

تاريخ

1978

المنشئ

Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali

مجموعات العناصر

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