Democratic Palestine : 13 (ص 15)
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- Democratic Palestine : 13 (ص 15)
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1969, at which Fatah assumed the leadership of the PLO. The
PFLP boycotted this session on the basis that the PLO should
be an embodiment of national unity. The PFLP advocated
extricating the PLO from its bureaucratic structure which kept
it from being a framework for national unity. We also criticized
the classical nature of the PLA. We insisted that unless the
PLO was revolutionized in line with its stated purpose, we
would not participate in its institutions. The PFLP advocated
recognition of all armed Palestinian organizations and not dis-
solving them into the Kifah Musallah (literally Armed Struggle
- a body formed in Jordan to coordinate between these organi-
zations), for this could lead to the dissolution of their military
power. The Executive Committee, however, looked upon the
Kifah Musallah as a suitable body for resolving other problems.
The PFLP considered it pointless to participate in any
institution tied to the Executive Committee without being
actively represented in the PNC. A declaration to this effect
was issued during the 6th session of the PNC, in which the
PFLP did not participate fully. The declaration stated: «The
PFLP did not participate in the PNC session, the Executive
Committee or the leadership of the Kifah Musallah, because
we are convinced that our remaining outside the PLO, in its
present state, is to the long-run advantage of forming a more
solid, clearer and more efficient formula.»
National Unity in the PLO
After the February 10, 1970 fighting between the Palesti-
nian resistance and the Jordanian regime, and the escalation
of events in Jordan, the various factions of the Palestinian
resistance movement intensified their contacts and their dis-
cussions. They formed a unified leadership which reached
agreement on several points as was declared in a com-
munique on May 6, 1970. This communique stated that the
PLO constituted the broad framework for national unity; it
emphasized participation in the coming PNC and the institu-
tions that grew out of it.
In this context, the 7th PNC was convened, resulting in the
formation of a National Central Committee which replaced the
unified leadership. The National Central Committee consisted
of the Executive Committee, representatives of all the organi-
zations, the head of the PNC and of the PLA. However, the rep-
resentation of the PFLP was symbolic, to test the seriousness
of intentions and practice.
The PNC defined the National Central Committee as the
supreme leadership of the Palestinian struggle in the matters
proposed to be in its jurisdiction. The Executive Committee
was obliged to carry out the decisions of the National Central
Committee. The Central Committee could present its propos-
als directly to the PNC and moreover had the power to freeze
the membership of the Executive Committee.
This phase was distinguished in that it injected a spine into
the body of the PLO, which had been a flabby mass. The PLO
gained two feet to stand on. However, this period of national
unity was short-lived and full of ambiguity about the question of
unity on the part of the PLO leadership and the organizations
themselves. The Executive Committee wanted to simplify our
struggle through the Kifah Musallah (which eventually came to
play the role of a military police). It belittled the importance of
looking for a united front which could fulfill the tasks of that
Stage. However, the Executive Committee’s proposal about
Kifah Musallah was not implemented. Instead, they formed a
coordinating body which aimed to restrict the size of the milit-
ary forces.
Factional, individualistic mentality dominated in the Fatah
leadership. While it was their right as the largest organization
to be the leadership, the fault lies in their not searching for a
viable unity formula. The National Central Committee was for-
gotten without anyone giving an explanation. Also forgotten
was military unity, although decisions were made regarding it
from the PNC's 7th session and onwards.
There is no doubt that the blame for these breaches rests
with the executive leadership of the PLO. However, this does
not exempt us from specifying our responsibility as the PFLP.
We made the political mistake of refraining from entering the
PLO and waiting for it to become revolutionary, instead of par-
ticipating in the revolutionizing process and practicing the pol-
icy of unity and conflict. An idealistic mentality prevailed in the
PFLP, and we did not treat matters scientifically. The PFLP
was aware of matters of utmost importance as seen in the com-
munique of January 16, 1968, stressing revolutionizing the
PLO, including the active forces, organizing elections for the
leadership bodies, and stressing that the PLO is the broad
framework for a national front. Yet in practice we overlooked
these matters as seen in the contents of the other communique
which stated: «Our remaining outside the PLO, in its present
State, is to the long run advantage of forming a more solid,
clearer and more efficient formula.»
Our explanation for this is the organizations’ fear of losing
their identity within the framework of unity. However, unity
should have been understood as a common denominator
which is complemented by ideological and organizational inde-
pendence, leaving room for discussion and contradictions.
Whether we are talking about the mentality of the PLO leader-
ship and its methods of work, or the thinking of the PFLP at that
time, there was an absence of the maturity needed for a united
front in the stage of national liberation. Conflict overshadowed
national alliance at a time when a balance should have been
maintained between the two. National alliance should have
usually taken priority over conflict, while secondary conflicts
should have been subordinated to the demands of the main
conflict with the enemy.
Unimplemented decisions
The third period was between 1971-1982, after the bloody
events in Jordan and the massacres which the regime perpet-
rated against our people and patriots. Looking back, we find
that the documents of the PNC’s sessions, from the 8th until
the 15th, unanimously agreed on the importance of national
unity and bringing about a qualitative leap in the PLO’s form. In
the 8th session, under the title of organizational structure for
national unity of the Palestinian revolution’s forces, the follow-
ing six clauses were adopted:
1. The PLO is the framework which includes all the Pales-
tinian revolution’s forces which practice armed struggle for
the liberation of all of Palestine. The PLO has a charter which
governs its course, specifies its goals and organizes its work.
It has a national council which chooses its leadership. This
leadership is the highest executive authority of the organiza-
tion as stated in the basic program. The leadership draws up
an overall united plan for Palestinian work in all different fields,
which is carried out by the PLO’s institutions which include all
the instruments of the revolution.
2. All national guerrilla organizations and fighting forces,
unions, associations and figures participate in national unity
on condition of complete commitment to the Palestinian
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