Democratic Palestine : 13 (ص 23)
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- Democratic Palestine : 13 (ص 23)
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within the PLO institutions. From the strategic, ideological
angle, the two fronts had advocated the importance of the
democratic forces’ unity at their respective, foregoing congres-
ses. Though the discussions on the unity process began in
1981, the situation after the 1982 war, and especially the
emergence of the crisis in Fatah, served to catalyze the forma-
tion of the Joint Leadership in June 1983. The fact that it was
formed, despite the lack of total agreement on all issues,
attests to the importance which both organizations attached to
this experiment at the time.
The original political platform for the Joint Leadership was
the Program for Unity and Democratic Reform in the PLO,
issued in October 1983. In this program, national unity is
dialectically connected to the question of reform in the
framework of the PLO. The program attests to the radical
nature of the reform which the Joint Leadership was striving to
attain. This was the main juncture in the experience of the Joint
Leadership and later the Democratic Alliance, comprising the
PFLP, OFLP, Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) and Pales-
tine Liberation Front (PLF).
After the adoption of this program, the Joint Leadership
underwent several political fluctuations. However, the differ-
ences that arose did not negate the common ground which
existed between the two organizations. There were difficulties
in the wake of the inter-Palestinian fighting in Tripoli as a result
of the PFLP’s and DFLP’s differing assessments of how the
problem should be solved. Yet a joint stand was taken, con-
demning inter-Palestinian fighting, as the result of an internal
agreement. The two fronts agreed that democratic dialogue
should be adopted as the basis for resolving internal Palesti-
nian conflicts. The Joint Leadership also proposed that the
Program for Unity and Democratic Reform should constitute
the basis for solving such conflicts.
Upon Arafat's visit to Cairo in December 1983, contradic-
tions grew in the Joint Leadership. This visit was seen by the
PFLP as a qualitative development in the line taken by the
Palestinian right. We therefore considered that the Program for
Unity and Democratic Reform had become insufficient for con-
tinuing the struggle to unify the PLO. Moreover, the PFLP con-
sidered that Arafat's visit disqualified him from serving as the
common denominator for Palestinian unity. The DFLP, how-
ever, did not consider that Arafat's visit constituted a qualitative
development of the rightist trend and policy. The DFLP main-
tained its view of the Program for Unity and Democratic
Reform. Concurrently, there were differences with respect to
how to deal with Fatah’s Central Committee. The PFLP stres-
sed not meeting with them until they adopted a stand on
Arafat's visit. The DFLP considered it necessary to continue
such meetings despite their not adopting a stand.
Thus, the experiment of the Joint Leadership underwent a
difficult situation in the first four months of 1984. The differ-
ences centered on the extent of the danger implied by Arafat’s
visit; the view with respect to Fatah’s Central Committee, i.e.,
to what extent it was in harmony with Arafat; and the ways of
confronting the deviationist trend in the Palestinian arena.
Despite these difficulties, the PFLP continued to exert efforts to
preserve the Joint Leadership. We considered our step of
establishing the Joint Leadership as one imposed by the cur-
rent situation, but in essence a strategical aspiration as part of
the effort to unify the left as a whole.in contrast, the DFLP view-
ed the Joint Leadership from a purely tactical angle.
Then on March 26, 1984, the Democratic Alliance met in
Aden, with three Arab communist parties: The Syrian and
Lebanese Communist Parties, and the Yemeni Socialist Party.
The discussion of the developments in the Palestinian arena
resulted in the Aden agreement which emphasized the neces-
sity of exerting all efforts to preserve Palestinian national unity,
and gathering all forces to face the deviationist trend. One
‘Clause in the document specified the conditions for meeting
with Fatah’s Central Committee. Another specified the funda-
ments of mutual understanding with the other Palestinian
organizations, i.e., the National Alliance (the Fatah opposition,
Saiqa, PFLP-General Command, Popular Struggle Front), in
order to gather ail forces to confront the deviationist trend, and
work for unifying the Palestinian revolution on a national, anti-
imperialist platform.
This document then constituted the political platform for
the Joint Leadership and the Democratic Alliance, governing
any situation where differences occurred. After the Aden
agreement, the Democratic Alliance was supposed to begin a
dialogue with Fatah’s Central Committee to confirm the politi-
cal basis for restoring the PLO’s nationalist policy. At the same
time, meetings were to begin with the National Alliance, on
confronting the deviationist trend, in order to restore Palesti-
nian national unity. The Democratic Alliance began dialogue
with Fatah’s Central Committee and with the National Alliance.
However, the problem arose that all efforts were concentrated
on dialogue with the former, while the dialogue with the latter
was not followed up.
Why were we unsuccessful in implementing the
Aden agreement? Why did our attempt to preserve
the Democratic Alliance fail?
The main clauses of the Aden agreement were clear-cut.
However, in the ensuing practice of the Democratic Alliance,
there was too much stress on the general idea, while insuffi-
cient attention was devoted to the specific points outlined in the
clauses, especially regarding the dialogue with Fatah’s Central
Committee. The dialogue with the Central Committee resulted
in the Aden-Algiers agreement which was below the level of
the Aden document of the Democratic Alliance. It did not
specify anything about the consequences of Arafat's visit to
Cairo; the point that Arafat was no longer a common
denominator was omitted. Its specifications regarding rela-
tions with Jordan and Egypt were vague.
The Aden-Algiers agreement stressed Palestinian
national dialogue, including the Central Committee, the Demo-
cratic Alliance and National Alliance, to arrive at comprehen-
sive national unity in order to be able to convene the PNC.
Under much pressure, a date was set for the PNC: September
15th, 1984. it was also agreed that uniting the Palestinian
arena was a precondition for holding the PNC on that date. The
date itself was tentative. The problem was not that of setting a
date. The document touched on all political and organizational
matters related to unity of the Palestinian arena. The date,
September 15th, was simply to be the inevitable result of the
dialogue efforts.
Three months passed without any development leading to
unity between the three partners to the dialogue. As Sep-
tember 15th approached, the Joint Leadership faced a crisis.
The DFLP understood the date set as a fixed one, despite the
fact that no headway had been made towards comprehensive
national unity. They made the date itself a primary point,
although the clauses pertaining to the Palestinian revolution’s
relations with Jordan and Egypt, and a number of political and
organizational matters, had not been put into practice. On the
contrary, there were repeated breaches of the terms of the >
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