Democratic Palestine : 12 (ص 20)
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- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 12 (ص 20)
- المحتوى
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Tripoli
A War Out of Context
a
Over two weeks of murderous battles in Tripoli, North Lebanon,
ended in early October with an agreement signed in Damascus,
under Syrian auspices, between the warring parties. The nationalist
forces and the Islamic Unification Movement thereby agreed on the
removal of all heavy weapons and the right of all parties to political
activity in Tripoli. Though the terms of this agreement sound reason-
able enough, there are grounds for questioning the motives of this
battle and the implications of its outcome.
There are two distinguishing fea-
tures of the Tripoli war which make it the
first of its kind: For one, it was the first
internal Lebanese conflict where the
nationalist forces were mobilized
against patriotic Islamic forces who, in
principle, oppose the Lebanese fascists,
Zionism and imperialism. From = an
objettive point of view, these patriotic
Islamic forces should be allies, although
their undemocratic positions have made
cooperation extremely difficult. (The
Islamic Unification Movement had previ-
ously attacked progressive forces and
enforced a ban on all others’ political
activities in Tripoli.)
The second distinguishing feature
of the Tripoli war was that the bellige-
rents displayed unconditional determi-
nation to wipe each other out, militarily
and politically. This is an unprecedented
phenomenon which did not even occur
in 1976, when the Lebanese National
Movement was very close to decisively
defeating the Lebanese fascists.
Before the decisive phase of the
battles, Syria broke off mediation efforts,
and the nationalists reinforced their
ranks militarily. Some nationalists
thought this signalled a decision to
totally eliminate the Islamic Unification
Movement after it had rejected disarma-
ment and the deployment of Syrian
troops in Tripoli. (The Movement'’s con-
ditions were that all parties should be
disarmed simultaneously within the
framework of a comprehensive settle-
ment.) Others had previously thought
that if a war erupted in Tripoli, it would be
a limited, passing battle to pressure the
Islamic Unification Movement to accept
negotiations.
The actual events disproved both
these suppositions. Militarily, the Le-
banese nationalist parties succeeded in
taking control of sufficient positions to
20
enable them to exert pressure for negoti-
ations. Yet the fighting continued without
any political efforts being made. It
became a battle of «life and death» on
the part of the Islamic Unification Move-
ment and one of martyrdom and political
heroism for the nationalist forces, totally
out of context with reality. Then, in the
end, a settlement was reached which
preserved the Movement.
Why the escalation?
In the past, there have been recur-
ring battles between the Arab Democra-
tic Party and the Islamic Unification
Movement. This time, however, the
majority of Lebanese nationalist parties
entered the battle against the Move-
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Devastation in Tripoli
ment. This raises questions about the
motives and results of such escalation,
especially if one contrasts with other
developments in Lebanon. When the
war erupted in Tripoli, political efforts
were already well underway for the
National Unity Front to find a political sol-
ution with the Lebanese Forces led by
Elie Hobeika, through Syrian mediation.
Why then was it necessary to sacrifice
scores Of lives and inflict extensive dam-
age on Tripoli which has historically
been a nationalist stronghold?
If the aim was to eliminate the
Islamic Unification Movement militarily,
in order to eliminate it politically, due to
its past wrongdoings, then this was not
in line with the present balance of forces.
If, however, the aim was to contain the
Movement so that it could not hamper
implementation of security measures,
such a military escalation would only
produce the opposite results. Even if the
fighting ceased, the least incident could
spark a new eruption, as is the case bet-
ween the opposing sides in East and
West Beirut. In Tripoli, such a situation
would only serve to distract both sides
from the main battle for abolishing con-
fessional privileges and the lingering
Israeli occupation in the South. The only
beneficiaries would be the Lebanese
fascists and their regional and interna-
tional allies.
In any case, the expectations that
preceded the battles of Tripoli were
overturned. Furthermore, the implica-
tions of this war are not limited to Tripoli,
or to the Islamic Unification Movement in
particular. Notice has now been served
as to what will happen to any force that
does not concede to the plan that has
now been determined for Lebanon, in
accordance with the regional balance.
In contrast, a political solution is
being persistently pursued with the
Lebanese Forces who are steeped in
anti-patriotic policies, fascist terror
against the masses and collaboration
with Zionism. So why was it considered
futile to find a non-violent solution with
forces that are, at least, not pro-israeli?
Continuing antagonisms and _ internal
battles within the nationalist-lsltamic
ranks will weaken the role of the
nationalist forces and have a negative
impact on the situation throughout Leba-
non. Unrest in any area will reflect on
another. The Lebanese nationalist
forces have for along time been defend-
ing the principle that a political solution
should take priority. It would seem logi-
Cal that this was the appropriate time to
put this principle into practice. A political
campaign should have been launched
first, to end the negative role played by
the Islamic Unification Movement. This
would have been in line with resolving
contradictions in the anti-fascist, anti-
Zionist ranks, in order to pool all efforts in
the struggle for a democratic Lebanon,
free of confessionalism, Israeli occupa-
tion and imperialist interference. @ - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 12
- تاريخ
- نوفمبر ١٩٨٥
- المنشئ
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
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