Democratic Palestine : 12 (ص 23)

غرض

عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 12 (ص 23)
المحتوى
Sudan
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Tug-of-War
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Sudan's army -
For or against the people's movement?
The mass struggle which overthrew
Numeiri in Sudan has not yet been
calmed; the popular movement con-
tinues. The main reasons for this are
that: (1) The demands of the masses
have not been fulfilled. (2) The remnants
of the reactionary elements who were in
power during Numeiri’s rule have not
been eliminated. (3) Internal reaction
(the Moslem Brotherhood) and the
external reactionary and imperialist
forces, especially Mubarak’s regime,
are still trying to reinstate the Numeiri
era.
In this context, the reactionary
forces continually try to fabricate events
or take advantage of every incident to
undermine the achievements of the
Sudanese masses. As mentioned in
previous issues of Democratic Pales-
tine, the government of Sudan is being
subjected to two kinds of pressures:
(a) the pressure of the Sudanese mas-
ses and democratic forces who strive for
democratic development, unhindered
by political or economic links with
imperialism; (b) the pressure of reactio-
nary elements that still exercise influ-
ence in Sudan and aim at returning the
country to imperialism’s orbit.
The dangerous developments that
occurred the past weeks clearly indicate
that reactionary forces persistently seek
to undermine any possibility of solving
Sudan's problems democratically. They
are constantly pushing for military solu-
tions to the crisis.
The truth about what
happened
In late September, rumors of an
expected coup spread rapidly in Sudan.
This coincided with news about a big
military offensive led by the Sudanese
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)
against the cities of Bor and Nasir. This
rumor stems from the time a clash took
place in the beginning of July in the city
of Kardod. A couple of weeks later, a
group of people marched in the name of
the tribes of southern Kordofan and Dar-
fur, and were received by a member of
the Military Council. This group
demanded that the government arm the
people of southern Kordofan to enable
them to confront «the aggressors» of the
SPLA, although there was no evidence
that the SPLA was involved in the fight-
ing. Aware of the imminent danger
behind this escalation of tribal and sec-
tarian anatagonism, the democratic
forces of Sudan intervened, demanding
that a solution for the problems of the
South be achieved through democratic
dialogue rather than by use of force. This
demand was received positively both by
the government and the SPLA. General
Swareddahab made a secret visit to
Kenya to pave the way for negotiations
with SPLA leader Dr. John Garang. The
latter sent an envoy to Nasir city to
deliver his acceptance of the govern-
ment’s overtures. Of course, these posi-
tive developments were not welcomed
by the internal and external reactionary
forces. The Moslem Brotherhood, led by
Hassan Turabi (Numeiri’s former
advisor), certainly had a hand in under-
mining this democratic process, as did
other pro-Numeiri elements. The series
of events which unfolded thereafter con-
firms this reasoning.
The development of events
On the 19th of September, the
Sudanese defense minister reported
that the city of Bor, 1100 km. south of
Khartoum, was about to fall to the SPLA.
He also added that the army and police
had aborted a conspiracy aimed at
assassinating political figures in Khar-
toum and creating a state of chaos in the
capital. On the same day, the general
command of the armed forces issued a
communique which stated that the
SPLA had launched an attack against
the city of Nasir, near the Ethiopian bor-
der. The communique claimed that the
refusal of the SPLA to withdraw from
around the city prevented the army from
conveying Garang’s message to the
Sudanese government in Khartoum! On
the same day, the National Alliance of
trade unions and parties in Sudan
demanded an explanation from the
Minister of Defense regarding a «politi-
cal communique» issued by the leader-
ship of the army on the problem of the
South. The National Alliance (which
includes trade unions and political par-
ties which played a key role in over-
throwing Numeiri) expressed surprise at
the communique which attacked Dr.
Garang and his supposed supporters in
Khartoum. The head of the National
Alliance, Mr. Salah Abdu Salam, said:
«It is unusual for the army to issue such
communiques.» He also described the
tone of the communique as being in con-
tradiction with the thinking of the civilian
cabinet.
In another communique broadcast
from radio Um Durman, the Minister of
Housing, Amin Madani, stated that the
army had disregarded the efforts of the
cabinet which had intended to involve
Dr. John Garang in peaceful negotia-
tions.
On the 21st of September, the Mos-
lem Brotherhood, supported by fanatical
religious groups and a faction that split
from the Umma party, organized a
march which they called «the march for
the security of Sudan.» In that march
they protested against the SPLA, asking
the government to take revenge on
Garang, «using bullets», and describing
Garang as a communist agent.
On the 22nd of September, the
Sudanese government prohibited all
demonstrations which had so far been
an effective way for the masses to voice
their opinion. On the 26th of September,
orders were given to two military units to
go south and fight the SPLA. These
units, comprised mostly of southern
Sudanese, refused to carry out orders
and clashed with governmenttroops. On
the 28th of the same month, Prime
Minister Jazoli Dafalla declared that the
government had imposed a curfew on
Khartoum, after the abortion of an
attempted coup; he added that military
elements from inside and outside the
armed iorces had participated in this
«attempted coup».
What is happening in Sudan clearly
points to the fact that the country is still
subject to attempts to reinstate the
Numeiri era. Moreover, it is obvious that
internal and external reactionary forces
will not give up easily. A democratic sol-
ution to all of the country’s internal prob-
lems is the only way to avoid further los-
ses and suffering, and to attain results
acceptable by all parties. We believe
that democratic dialogue is the best way
to solve the question of the South of
Sudan; accusations and preconceived
judgements only serve the interests of
reactionary forces which want to turn
Sudan back into an imperialist satellite. @
23
هو جزء من
Democratic Palestine : 12
تاريخ
نوفمبر ١٩٨٥
المنشئ
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

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