Democratic Palestine : 13 (ص 16)
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- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 13 (ص 16)
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National Charter and PNC decisions.
3. The merger of the guerrilla organizations adopting the
same ideology and political thought is a national necessity.
Until this is achieved, each organization reserves the right to
preserve its organizational structure on condition that all its
other institutions are dissolved and merged into the PLO's
institutions.
The PLO legislative bodies and higher executive take into
consideration the principle of democratic centralism, collec-
tive leadership and minority adherence to the decisions of the
majority. Every organization reserves the right to raise its
views again for discussion through the legislative and execu-
tive bodies on condition that they meanwhile remain commit-
ted to the decisions already taken in the PNC. Cadres have
the right to practice constructive criticism concerning all deci-
sions of the legislative and executive bodies.
National work in the Jordanian arena is governed by the
program of the National Front.
4. The PNC draws up a Strategy for the current Stage as
well as political, military, financial and informational strategies
which all are obliged to abide by.
5. An active leadership is formed to take the responsibil-
ity for leading the Palestinian struggle on all levels.
6. A basic condition for unity is abiding by the decisions
of the leadership which is responsible for Carrying out its own
decisions and those of the PNC. The leadership is also
responsible for dealing with cases of violation of decisions
within limits that correspond to the higher interests of the
revolution.
Following this session, the unity of the military forces was
emphasized.
At the 10th session, proposals were passed concerning
the committee of national unity. The 11th session drew up the
practical steps for implementing what had been agreed upon.
The 12th and 13th sessions dealt with important and danger-
ous political issues, the question of a settlement, especially
since the Palestinian right had begun to retreat from a firm
national position after the 1973 war. The right-wing policy
began to have an impact on the decisions and programs of the
PNC, but the 14th session reinstated a clear-cut political and
organizational position, better and more mature than the previ-
ous one. The PFLP, along with the other democratic and
nationalist forces, played a basic role in the formulation of the
final decisions and curbing right-wing influence in the leader-
ship.
Evaluation
However, three things become clear after the passage of
10 years (1971 to 1981, the 8th-15th PNC sessions) with
respect to Palestinian national relations.
One: There was an unrealistic evaluation of the organiza-
tional situation. There was an attempt to jump from a situation
where there were no particular bylaws for internal relations, to
one speaking of democratic centralism and merging the
organizations with the same ideological line and then uniting
all.
Two: There was a departure from all the decisions in this
field. In place of these decisions, the factional domination of
Fatah was imposed. Calls for united front relations were
replaced by neglecting to look for the causes of the problem
and its solution. There was moreover failure to follow up the
execution of decisions.
Three: There was confusion between structure and princi-
ples and concrete measures. Analysis also reveals a distinct
16
duality: At a time when the charter stipulated e/ection of the
Executive Committee as leader of the Palestinian people's
struggle, the PNC adopted the fifth clause of the organizational
program at the 14th session, stating: «A leadership is formed
which will shoulder the responsibility of Palestinian struggle. »
What are the reasons for this?
First is the political and class nature of the prevailing PLO
leadership, which is governed by bourgeois understanding of
national relations and the mentality of special tenure (the polit-
ical counterpart of private ownership in the economic sphere).
Such a leadership strives to weaken its partners during the
national struggle in order to expand its own influence; it prac-
tices methods of domination and individualism, neglecting all
principles of collective leadership.
The second reason is that the establishment of the PLO
and all the resistance organizations was governed in one way
or another by the conditions that have prevailed on the Arab
level since the sixties. This had its effect on the social structure
of the Palestinian society in exile.
The third reason is the predominance of factionalism and
narrow interests at the expense of front work and national
interests. This overshadowed the institutions of collective
work.
Fourth was the absence of the fundamentals of front work
and of any plan for national unity and relations. There was no
process for implementing decisions, not to mention cases of
outright refusal to implement them.
Despite the importance of these reasons, they did not
impede the continuation of the struggle for national unity and
correct relations within the organization. Much more danger-
ous was that the leadership, motivated by its class nature, was
laying the foundation for bringing about a major political step
which would release it from all commitment to the national
program. This would leave it free to deviate and capitulate
while retaining the PLO in form but not content, to be steered
by the policies of Arab reaction. These intentions became clear
after the 1982 war. It became clear that the right-wing intended
to subjugate the PLO to Arab reaction’s capitulationist plans,
despite all the political and struggle gains that had been made
on the Arab and international level. Although the PFLP made
all positive efforts to develop the policies of the PLO,
revolutionize its institutions and organize its work, we find that
all the sessions of the PNC, especially after 1971, foretold the
consequences of the individualistic leadership.
The PFLP also demonstrated a high level of responsibility
in its strivings to unite the revolutionary democratic forces, as
stipulated in the political report of the 4th congress. In this, the
PFLP was motivated by awareness of the importance of
strengthening the position of the left, so it could play a more in-
fluential role capable of enforcing a sound, militant national
program and firm front relations. We are well aware that the
factors of the current political crisis in the PLO, and the extent
of the differences, only makes the going harder. However, the
PFLP still regards the solution to confronting the revolution’s
difficulties to be strengthening and unifying the role of the
revolutionary democratic forces, and rallying all the democratic
and nationalist forces to confront the dangers facing the PLO,
the revolution and cause. This is actually what the PFLP is
doing in its capacity as an organization which enjoys the confi-
dence of the masses. Mass support enables us to popularize
the rejection of deviation, and continue to struggle against the
imperialist-Zionist enemy, emphasizing a unanimous national
program for return to the homeland, self-determination and an
independent Palestinian state. - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 13
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- يناير ١٩٨٦
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
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