Democratic Palestine : 13 (ص 24)
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- Democratic Palestine : 13 (ص 24)
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agreement, specifically by Arafat. In the light of this, the PFLP
sent a special memorandum to the Fatah Central Committee,
calling on them to abide by the agreement they had signed.
However, the Central Committee did not abide by the agree-
ment concerning relations with Jordan and Egypt. On the
organizational level, they contributed to the split in the Palesti-
nian Writers and Journalists: Union, and didn't respect the
agreement in terms of PLO offices abroad or financial matters:
the National Fund withheld the sums to be paid to the military
forces.
Not once did the Central Committee issue a statement
condemning the breaches of Arafat. They only insisted on con-
vening the PNC on September 15th. Since nothing was
achieved in terms of overall unity, the natural step would have
been to continue the efforts to achieve this, then hold the PNC.
The date was not sacred, but the right-wing, by insisting on this
date, was striving to use the Democratic Alliance as a cover for
continuing its political course and consecrating the split in the
Palestinian arena.
Problems arose anew in the Joint Leadership and the
Democratic Alliance. Instead of abiding by the Aden agree-
ment, the DFLP abided only by the Aden-Algiers agreement,
regarding it as the platform of the Joint Leadership and Demo-
cratic Alliange. In the light of this, the PFLP began to feel the
danger of being drawn towards the right-wing, because of the
stands taken by the DFLP.
The PFLP called another meeting in Aden between the
Democratic Alliance and the three Arab communist parties.
Almost all those present agreed that convening the PNC at that
particular time would mean negating the Democratic Alliance's
Aden agreement. The PFLP, PCP and PLF stressed the
importance of strengthening the Democratic Alliance and con-
tinuing efforts to unify the Palestinian arena. The DFLP was
adamant about holding the PNC on September 15th. The
meeting resulted in agreement that the PNC should be post-
poned and stressed the importance of adhering to the Aden
agreement. In short, the DFLP was more dedicated to alliance
with the bourgeoisie than to the Democratic Alliance's plat-
form. Despite this, the PFLP continued to consider the Joint
Leadership and Democratic Alliance as the basis for its Pales-
tinian alliances and the point of departure for solving the PLO’s
crisis, adhering to the Aden document.
The suspension of the Joint Leadership
When the right-wing decided to convene the PNC in
Amman in November 1984, strong differences arose in the
Joint Leadership and Democratic Alliance. The DFLP consi-
dered this PNC to be legitimate, while the PFLP considered it
and everything built on it to be illegitimate. As a result, the
DFLP unilaterally announced the freezing of the Joint Leader-
ship on November 20th.
The DFLP’s decision was coupled with a virtual prop-
aganda war on the PFLP. We were falsely accused of revoking
our commitment to the Aden-Algiers agreement and held
responsible for destroying the chance to block the Central
Committee's unilateral convocation of the PNC. By compari-
son, the DFLP’s comments were mild concerning the right's
breaches of the Aden-Algiers agreement and its decision to
convene the PNC in Amman before the achievement of com-
prehensive Palestinian unity.
The PFLP was forced to clarify that we had never swerved
from our commitment to the Aden-Algiers agreement. How-
ever, such commitment never meant abandoning the struggle
against the dominating rightist leadership and its destructive
24
policies, in order to restore the PLO’s unity and relations with
Syria. We pointed out the alternatives we had presented for
having the PNC postponed until overall unity could be
achieved, such as immediately convening the PLO Central
Council. Events showed that the rightist leadership was not at
all interested in such alternatives, for it blocked the needed
quorum for an Executive Committee meeting which the DFLP
was ready to attend in return for postponing the PNC. The real-
ity was that the right-wing had made a political decision to hold
a PNC with whoever would attend, in order to provide a show
of support for its chosen policy. In this context, the right wanted
the Democratic Alliance to provide a cover for its efforts.
Frankly, the PFLP was both surprised and disappointed
by the DFLP’s suspension of the Joint Leadership. The DFLP
thus disregarded tha strategic perspective of this experiment in
favor of a tactical reaction to immediate events and differ-
ences. It was surprising that the DFLP did so without consulta-
tions, despite a prior agreement on a meeting to evaluate the
overall experience of the Joint Leadership. In so doing, the
DFLP not only delayed a strategic task of the Palestinian left.
It also delivered a gift to the right-wing just as the Amman PNC
was convened, by opening conflict among the forces opposed
to the right-wing policy.
The PFLP continued trying to preserve the Democratic
Alliance and calling for the unity of the PLO despite the PNC
session. However, the differences had become very serious.
This situation continued until the signing of the Amman accord.
The PFLP considered the Amman accord a serious turn-
ing point with dangerous implications - a point at which the
Palestinian right had irrevocably determined its final direction.
All organizations in the Democratic Alliance agreed on the
necessity of struggling to annul the accord, but there was hesi-
tation or refusal on the part of some about initiating an organi-
zational framework to this purpose. Nor was there consensus
on the necessity of removing the right-wing from the leadership
as a prerequisite for restoring the PLO’s unity and national line.
The PFLP called for the broadest possible Palestinian front to
confront the deviationist leadership, but the DFLP was of a dif-
ferent opinion. This difference was serious enough to spell the
end of the Democratic Alliance as a coalition of four organiza-
tions. As a result, the PFLP worked for the formation of the
PNSF, including the PLF and the organizations of the National
Alliance.
Prospects
The PFLP remains committed to the unity of the revolutio-
nary democratic forces as a step towards comprehensive left
unity and the formation of a united Palestinian communist
party. Until this level of unity is attained, serious obstacles will
continue to exist and we are required to continue to struggle to
overcome these. These obstacles resulted in the collapse of
the Joint Leadership after less than one and a half years. This
goal will, however, remain as the basis of our work to upgrade
unity between Palestinian left forces. In future unity initiatives,
the PFLP considers all the other revolutionary democratic
organizations as possible partners (DFLP, PLF, PSF) as well
as the PCP and all other progressive Palestinian organizations
and forces. Currently, in the occupied territories, we are
engaged in concrete cooperative work on the mass level with
both the DFLP and PCP. This cooperation may give forms and
ideas-for overcoming the obstacles to left unity. We also hope
that the struggle against the right-wing deviation in the PLO will
generate new opportunities for left unity which is sorely needed
for the continuation and final victory of our revolution. @ - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 13
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