Democratic Palestine : 13 (ص 39)

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Democratic Palestine : 13 (ص 39)

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but Jordan wants to limit this to three
years.
Jordan-israeli condominium
dominium
In order to clarify other aspects of
this deal, we will quote what was pub-
lished by another Israeli newspaper
Yediot Aharonot: «The first thing this
plan called for is to abrogate the military
government in the occupied territories.
Civil affairs would then be supervised by
a joint Jordanian-Palestinian council,
the structure and powers of which will be
negotiated between the two par-
ties... The settlers would be considered
explicitly as Israeli citizens; their security
would be the responsibility of the Israeli
army...It is natural that Israeli. military
presence in the West Bank will be
decreased. A joint Jordanian-lsraeli
police force would be established within
the framework of the joint council. Pales-
tinian mayors would replace Israeli milit-
ary governors. Jordanian military forces
will be prohibited entrance to the West
Bank. The borders will be opened and
joint industrial projects will gradually be
established. The detailed = plan
emphasized that this partial solution
constitutes a stage towards an overall
solution...» :
From ‘autonomy’ to joint rule
After the signing of the Camp David
accords and the execution of the first
section, the US administration, ‘Israel
and the Egyptian regime were con-
fronted with Palestinian rejection. This
hindered execution of the second sec-
tion of the accords regarding ‘autonomy’
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. How-
ever, the US and ‘Israel have now
deemed it suitable to reassert ‘au-
tonomy in a new form, encouraged by
the two following factors: (1) the forma-
tion of the Israeli government of national
unity; and (2) the crisis of the PLO, and
the rightist leadership's readiness to
deal with the US proposals, especially
after the signing of the Amman accord.
This renewed attempt is moreover
nurtured by the Jordanian regime's wil-
lingness to participate. This provided
Peres with the opportunity to promote
the ‘Jordanian option’, modifying the
‘autonomy plan so that the Jordanian
regime would have more influence in its
execution.
The right’s dilemma
While ‘Israel’ rules out the PLO
altogether, the US insists that it can only
be a negotiating partner if it makes all
concessions in advance: recognizing
‘Israel’, resolutions 242 and 338, and
totally abandoning armed struggle
everywhere. In this light, it is possible to:
perceive the dilemma which exists bet-.
ween the Jordanian regime and Arafat s
leadership. The regime
Arafat's positive response to the US-
Israeli conditions. The PLO leadership,
however, insists on obtaining US
guarantees for Palestinian self-determi-
nation before conceding to these prop-
osals. The continuation of this hesitation
threatens the settlement process, which
has induced King Hussein to seek alter-
natives to the PLO. Thus, we notice
changes in Jordan's stand on the
Amman accord. Hussein in his UN
speech expressed readiness to enter
into direct negotiations with ‘Israel’ with-
Out preconditions.
On the other hand, it is difficult for
Hussein to go all the way without a suita-
ble Palestinian-Arab cover. Now, with
the Arafat leadership providing him with
a PLO cover, King Hussein is simultane-
ously trying to create an alternative
Palestinian leadership which will be
primarily loyal to himself rather than to
Arafat.
Reliable sources in Amman have
reported that Hussein asked Arafat to
continue with the Amman accord on
condition that Jordan alone acts; if the.
situation arises again requiring a joint
delegation, then moderate Palestinians
such as Freij and Siniora should repre-
sent the Palestinian side.
Lion’s share to ‘Israel’
Looking closely at the terms of the
secret Peres-Hussein agreement, we
insists on.
see that it is an attempt to combine the
second section of Camp David with the
‘Jordanian option which in essence cor-
responds to the Labour party's program.
The source of this combination goes
back to the fact that the Israeli national
unity government will not commit itself to
the ‘autonomy’ plan as it was specified in
Camp David. The Labour party rejects
‘autonomy’, seeing a danger that it will
grow into a Palestinian state. Likud, for
its part, rejects the ‘Jordanian option’
because it would entail partial with-
drawal from Palestinian land occupied in
1967. Peres’ plan for joint administration
thus hits two birds with one stone. It rep-
resents a compromise between Likud
and Labor. At the same time, it extricates
‘Israel’ from the political stalemate by
throwing the ball into Jordan's court.
What makes this dangerous is that
Jordan is taking concrete steps towards
unilateral negotiations with ‘Israel’ on
this basis, in the meantime keeping
other doors open (renewed relations
with Syria), in case things don't turn out
as planned.
What is most noticeable is that this
plan gives the lion’s share to ‘Israel’
which must neither relinquish control
over territory or resources, nor its idea of
a united Jerusalem. The only Israeli con-
cession is agreement in principle to an
international conference, if its relations
with the Soviet Union are restored. This
was made in full knowledge that it is
unattainable, for the Soviet Union has
declared that the reasons for its break-
ing relations with ‘Israel’ still exist. Peres
is also hedging his bets, for the agree-
ment is only tentative. If Jordan backs
out, ‘Israel’ could implement its own
interpretation of ‘autonomy’ unilaterally. @
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