Democratic Palestine : 14 (ص 23)
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- Democratic Palestine : 14 (ص 23)
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and Samaria (the West Bank) and the Gaza Strip will partici-
pate in defining their future in accordance with the Camp David
agreement.» These two points reaffirm that Palestinians who
participate in the Jordanian delegation will not be from the
PLO. The 14th clause gives a clear idea of what the present
Israeli government might acree to as a result of negotiations:
«No implementation of any sovereignty other than Israeli in
Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.» There is also a clause
stating that 28 new settlements are to be established in these
areas.
The national unity government, due to its composition, is
unable to agree to change the present status of the occupied
territories;each of the two main parties, Labor and Likud, have
the right to veto any such change. If things reach this point, the
government will be dismantled and new elections will be held,
according to the government document.
In general, it can be said that the present government can-
not take any decision on the question of resolving the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The most probable result of any controversial
political development would be to destroy the present govern-
ment. Thus, the government is not in a position to make any
allowances to Jordan during the present period, but only to
agree on «autonomy for the residents within the boundaries of
the Camp David agreement» which according to the Likud
(which has the right of veto) means «autonomy within the
boundaries of Israeli sovereignty».
Peres maneuvers
Peres’ initiative presented at the UN (autumn 1985) was
merely political maneuvering aimed at appearing flexible
towards Hussein's overtures. During the Knesset sessions
where this initiative was discussed, he said: «|It is important to
be in control of the dynamic situation emerging.»
The initiative itself relies on ambiguous statements. «it is
possible that what results from negotiations are interim agree-
ments which become permanent settlements, as is possible
that they be related to defining borders, provided that Camp
David be the basis for solving these questions.»? (One is
reminded of Sadat’'s statements about Camp David being an
interim settlement.)
Peres did not make any progress with what was proposed
in Camp David and did not clarify the content of the ‘interim set-
tlement’. Nor did he define the borders - the Jordan River? the
middle of the West Bank? somewhere else? The intention is to
draw Jordan into negotiations so as to impose conditions after
cancelling all Jordan's other alternatives. Peres’ statement,
before forming the present coalition government, is well
known: «The Labor Alignment will be generous with words and
appear to be flexible and willing to negotiate. We will expose
our firmness at the negotiating table where we will be generous
with words not territory.»*
This is the Labor position on which those calling for a set-
tlement pin their hopes. Regarding the Likud, one gets a clear
idea of their position from the statement of Moshe Arens in
Afoula on November 3, 1985: «Those who believe that we will
be content with peace in exchange for land are mistaken. The
Likud will never agree to withdraw from Judea and Samaria in
exchange for peace as some may think. The problem of the
Palestinians should be solved in Jordan which is a part of the
land of Israel, and where the Palestinians are the majority, not
in Judea and Samaria.»* (our italics)
In the light of the present situation and the government's
general guidelines, this government will have been dissolved
before ‘Israel’ is ready to enter negotiations. It is possible that
new elections will be held before that time comes. This would
naturally result in a new government with a somewhat different
composition. Thus, it is not easy to predict the results of negoti-
ations between Jordan and the present government in the
existing situation, because they are not probable. What is more
probable is that negotiations will take place, but with a different
Israeli government. Either Labor will form a minority govern-
ment which would also have difficulties in making clear-cut
decisions, or a whole new situation will emerge.
In any case, the establishment of the principle of negotia-
tions will remain an Israeli goal in the context of the Zionist
entity's efforts to establish its own legitimacy on the local and
international level. It is impossible to predict what will result
from negotiations, but it is certain that they will take along time
and probably result in interim settlements which do not touch
on the basis of the conflict, and do not collide with imperialist-
Zionist plans for the region.
On this topic, AJ Hamishmar newspaper of October 29,
1985, stated: « Those who think that the peace settlement bet-
ween us and the Palestinians will be clear-cut and simple, like
the Camp David agreements, are mistaken. Peace on our
eastern borders will be a complicated matter, full of fog. Many
political forces from near and far will participate, as will peoples
and committees of conflicting interests. It will not be possible to
compromise until the very end, or to find a solution to please
all.»
For the Israelis, the matter of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip differs completely from that of the Sinai, because of (a)
Zionist ideology and the claim of historical rights on which this
ideology is based; (b) the Israeli security strategy; and (c) the
Israelis’ excessive sensitivity regarding any form of Palestinian
entity. Concerning the West Bank and Gaza Strip, what the
present Israeli government agrees on is, in short, «autonomy
for the residents on the basis of Camp David.» The Likud has
its own definition of this, as does Labor. The essence of the
Labor's definition is that ‘autonomy’ in densely populated
areas should be tied with Jordan. ‘Israel’ keeps under its
authority the Ghour (Jordan Valley), the area of Jerusalem and
Gush Etzion, the south of the Gaza Strip, and large areas of the
West Bank adjacent to the ‘green line’. Thus ‘Israel’ would rid
itself of responsibility for the Palestinians as Peres made clear
in the following statement: «Those who express readiness to
forego the densely populated Arab areas do so not so much
out of desire to forego these areas as to preserve the Jewish
identity of the state of Israel.»
Conditions for negotiating with the PLO?
It is difficult to say that there are Israeli conditions for
negotiating with the PLO because of the consistent Israeli
stand of not dealing with the PLO at all. Instead we will elabo-
rate on the main indications of this position in this govern-
ment's term. The 13th clause of the government document
states: «Israel will not negotiate with the PLO.» It limits negoti-
ations to Jordan and «Arabs in Judea and Samaria and the
Gaza Strip» within a Jordanian delegation or a Jordanian-
Palestinian one. This position was seen in the Israeli govern-
ment's rejection of any person affiliated with the PLO par-
ticipating in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation which was
supposed to meet with US envoy Richard Murphy in Amman in
the summer of 1985. The government approved only two of
those proposed to participate in the delegation: Hanna Siniora
from the West Bank and Fayez Abu Rahmeh from Gaza, both
non-PLO. A campaign was launched against the US to prevent
any meeting with a delegation that includes persons affiliated >»
23 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 14
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- مارس ١٩٨٦
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
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