Democratic Palestine : 15 (ص 10)
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- Democratic Palestine : 15 (ص 10)
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the Palestinian people, throwing it on the
PLO leadership. The most dangerous
thing about the speech is that it heralds a
new political stage: The regime has
initiated a new war against the PLO and
Palestinian cause, based on officially
withdrawing from the Rabat summit
decisions, dividing the Palestinian
people and separating the question of
Palestinian national rights from that of
liberating the land. A/ Mithaq denounced
the ‘Jordanized’ Palestinians who were
only too willing to participate in this war
against the Palestinian cause and the
people, and the PLO...The people will
prove to the regime and its puppets that
they are stronger than these new plots.
Palestinian National
Personalities in Kuwait
Yahya Haddad, president of the
General Union of Palestinian
University Professors and Re-
searchers — Kuwait branch
«The king’s declaration of halting
coordination with the present leadership
of the PLO should be a lesson to those
who do not read history, and to those
who chase the mirage of US solutions.
They were betting on being allowed to
participate in the liquidationist solution,
sacrificing Palestinian national unity and
closing their ears to loyal calls to prevent
them from following the deceitful mir-
age...This leadership should admit its
extraordinary mistake, and abandon this
political trend and all the agreements
based on it. It should call for a unification
PNC to reaffirm the Palestinian tenets
and former PNC decisions, so as to seta
plan for revolutionizing Palestinian
affairs and developing collective leader-
ship...»
Basim Sarhan, doctor of political
science and economy; journalist
«King Hussein's stand did not come
as a surprise to me...lt was clear that
Hussein accepted the Arafat leadership
in Amman on special conditions that
converge with those of the US...Thus it
was Clear that Hussein would abandon
Arafat if he did not accept the US condi-
tions. We have no confidence in the Jor-
danian regime...|ts role is known histori-
cally. We demand that Arafat and his
leadership be judged for all political
deviations committed since 1982.»
Joudeh Al Hindi, independent
PNC member
«We were pained by Arafat's sur-
prise at King Hussein's decision, and by
his affirmation of the February 11th
accord and willingness to resume
dialogue with the Jordanian regime. We
still had some hope that Arafat, upon
reaching the end of this bitter experi-
ence, would return to the path of strug-
gle...We are looking for a new stage
where the resistance factions and the
masses take the initiative to upgrade the
PLO’s situation on the basis of the PNC
charter.»
Abdullah Al Danan, indepen-
dent PNC member
«We should absolutely not deal with
our cause using terms such as ‘let us
maneuver and use tactics’...»
Ibrahim Al Khatib, independent
PNC member
«Jordan wants the PLO as its
Palestinian cover, and the PLO wants
the Amman accord as a means of gain-
ing US recognition. The king suspended
relations but has left the door ajar
because he wants a decision (from the
PLO) to recognize UN resolutions 242
and 338...The situation now rests with
the factions and national personalities
who have denounced the PLO leader-
ship. If they can unite their ranks on a
clear political program and rally the
Palestinian and Arab masses, then they
will be able to defeat the deviating trend
and reunite the PLO on a sound national
basis.»
' Assembly of pro-Jordanian notables in 1948,
who approved the idea that the West Bank become
part of Jordan.
2 Agreement of spring 1984 between Fatah’s
Central Committee and the Democratic Alliance. @
Peres and Unilateral ‘Autonomy’
Towards the end of February,
Zionist Prime Minister Shimon Peres
announced: «The Hussein-Arafat talks
were a total failure and we are back at
point zero.» Peres therefore declared
that the next step was to give the Pales-
tinians in the West Bank broader powers
of self-rule. This idea has always been
rejected by policy-makers in the Zionist
state. Recently, after Peres announced
his plan, there was broad opposition in
the government, even among his closest
colleagues. Three of those who
opposed the plan are ex-chiefs of staff of
the Israeli army: Health Minister Mor-
dechai Gur, Police Minister Haim Bar
Lev and Defense Minister Yitzhak
Rabin. Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir
refused the plan. Likud Minister Moshe
Arens went even further, proposing
annexation of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. Gur pointed out that he had dis-
cussed the idea of self-rule with Moshe
8
Dayan at least ten times, and each time
they concluded that the plan was not
practical or easy to implement.
From where, then, did Peres
acquire such confidence to think of
implementing this plan? In the wake of
the Amman accord, between Yasser
Arafat and King Hussein, Peres eyed the
chance for the PLO’s giving conces-
sions that would eventually enable Hus-
sein to enter negotiations on the West
Bank, marginalizing the PLO. The
Zionist leadership is now eager to exploit
the break-down in the Arafat-Hussein
relations, to impose its own conditions. It
is important to remember that when
Peres speaks of self-rule, he means
something more like ‘civil’ administra-
tion which does not tamper with Israeli
control over the 1967 occupied ter-
ritories.
Speaking to the press, Peres said
that he supported handing over some
powers in the occupied territories to the
local population. He proposed appoint-
ing Palestinian mayors, increasing free-
dom of movement between Jordan and
the West Bank, development aid and
opening an Arab Bank in the West Bank.
However, speaking before the Knes-
set's Foreign Relations and Security
Committee, he stressed that he does not
support the idea of evacuating the Israeli
army from the West Bank, because «lf
the forces leave, we may under certain
conditions, have to redeploy them.» This
reveals the real intention of talk about
more powers to the local population and
«improving the quality of life». Such
phrases are primarily a tactical ploy
thrown out to potential collaborators in
the occupied territories, and especially
to please the US administration and their
friend King Hussein. When self-rule is
seen in this context, Shamir’s opposition
is minimal. - هو جزء من
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