Democratic Palestine : 15 (ص 25)
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- Democratic Palestine : 15 (ص 25)
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Egypt
lip of the Iceberg
Opposition to the Egyptian regime, and its ties with US imperialism
and Zionism, recently became more than vocal. The February upris-
ing of the Egyptian people, triggered by the revolt of security police
conscripts, is rooted in the deteriorating economic and social situa-
tion, initiated by Sadat’s ‘open door’ policy. The previous month, the
slogans chanted during demonstrations protesting the brutal murder
of Suleiman Khater, himself a conscript, had indicated that the mas-
ses’ indignation encompassed everything the regime stands for.
Much as Mubarak’s adviser,
Osama al Baz, would wish to dismiss the
February revolt as «isolated incidents»,
all facts point to its being a mass upris-
ing. The government claimed that «99%
of the people were opposed to these
incidents of violence.» Yet gun battles
raged through many areas, indicating
more than a measure of organized resis-
tance. Fighting swept through the popu-
lated area of Giza in Cairo, Ismailia on
the Suez Canal, Sohag on the Nile
River, Asyut, the area of the Pyramids
Road, the industrial area of Helwan and
Madinat al Nasr, east of Cairo. A bloody
massacre was enacted on the road to
the international airport, where an entire
regiment of conscripts (300 men) were
mowed down by the army. In another
incident, one of the largest prisons in
Cairo was stormed by angry militants
who released 300 political prisoners.
Independent reports said that uni-
versity and high school students, as well
as religious groups from Al Azhar,
flowed into the streets to join their
brothers in fighting government troops.
Officials quickly denied these reports.
Nevertheless, universities, colleges and
schools were ordered closed until
further notice. A curfew was clamped on
Cairo and other areas of the uprising.
Only with much wariness was it partially
lifted for Friday prayers.
The people vs. the govern-
ment
Although the official media tried to
downplay the uprising’s significance, the
targets of the people’s anger showed
that their uprising had a genuine class
and national essence. First-class hotels,
restaurants and nightclubs, especially
those frequented by Zionist tourists,
were hardest hit. Damages tolled in the
hundreds of millions of dollars. One
western diplomat commented, «lit is’
not...the police vs. the government, but
the whole deprived group against the
government.» Sadat had offered visions
of a rosy future to the millions of poverty
stricken, but in reality his ‘open door’ pol-
icy delivered nothing but more poverty.
The result was rising discontent among
all sectors of the population and esca-
lated militancy among the poor, erupting
in more protests, demonstrations and
strikes, and then the most recent armed
clashes with the government.
$4 a month
The spark which ignited the uprising
was an order to extend the conscripts’
service from three to four years. Another
factor which played into the events was
the power struggle between Minister of
Defense Abu Ghazala and Mubarak.
Supporters of the former tried to
Capitalize on popular discontent and
harness it in their favor. They did not
realize they were tampering with a time
bomb.
The young policemen who began
the revolt are conscripts assigned to the
Central Security Forces for three years.
They total about a quarter of a million
and are used to supplement the regular
police force which is too small to fulfill all
its duties. The conscripts are drawn from
the poorer strata, usually from rural
areas, and are supposed to be grateful
for the meagre room and board, and $4
monthly, which they receive. Not only
are their families deprived of badly
needed support, but the great majority
actually become a financial burden,
because they need support from their
families to survive in the city.
Economic slump
The social consequences of trying
to swing a public-sector-oriented eco-
nomy to a completely ‘free’ capitalist one
are anything but good — except for a
small elite. Although it is said that Egypt
is the largest recipient of US aid after ‘Is-
rael’, 90% of this so-called aid is spent
by US companies on oil exploration and
services for US investments, not on
bolstering a self-sufficient economy for
Egypt. Thus, for hard currency, Egypt
relies heavily on: (1) remittances from
Egyptian nationals working abroad,
especially in the Gulf; (2) oil revenues;
(3) Suez Canal tolls; and (4) tourism. All
of these income sources have suffered
in the last few months. Due to the inter-
national recession, remittances from the
Gulf dropped by $500 million. Oil reve-
nues dropped drastically due to falling oil
prices and the slash in production. Suez
Canal tolls dropped about $30 million.
Tourism, Egypt's fourth largest source of
income, normally brings in about $1100
million a year. It suffered its worst sea-
son since World War II. Cancellation of
reservations averaged 50% and some-
times hit 75%. Added to this is the 40%
devaluation of the Egyptian pound.
Close the ‘open door’
The only radical solution to these
problems is closing the ‘open door’
which Sadat swung ajar. However, in
view of Egypt's $31 billion debt to
imperialist creditors, it is not surprising
that Mubarak lends his ear to the advice
of the IMF and the US Agency for Inter-
national Development (AID). The IMF
and USAID have long advocated dis-
mantling the public sector and fully
integrating Egypt into the capitalist mar-
ket. This would mean reducing sub-
sidies, expanding the private sector and
curbing imports.
The vast majority of Egyptians can-
not afford to pay world market prices for
food, clothing and shelter. Thus, sub-
sidies are a vital necessity and their
reduction would rock the boat danger-
ously. No less vital is the $8 million worth
of food imported daily. It covers only half
the needs of Egypt's 50 million people.
In view of a population increase of 1 mill-
ion every ten months, curbing imports
would pose a serious problem, espe-
cially in the absence of a national policy
for boosting local production.
Treading lightly?
Mubarak is not at all loath to follow
the advice of his imperialist masters. Yet
he realizes full well that he must tread
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