Democratic Palestine : 17 (ص 8)
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- Democratic Palestine : 17 (ص 8)
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US—lIsraeli War on Syria?
Besides intending to topple Libya’s patriotic leadership, the April 15th US aggression was a threat to all
Arab nationalist and progressive forces and regimes. Thus, it is no surprise that the follow-up was an inten-
sified imperialist-Zionist campaign against Syria, whose steadfast position is a main obstacle to imposing
Camp David throughout the Arab world.
On May 13th, Israeli Prime Minister Peres stated that the
chances of a peace agreement with Syria were ‘‘non-existent’’ as
long as President Assad remained in power. Coming after the
US air strike on Libya, this could only be meant as an outright
threat. Rumors spread about an impending Israeli-Syrian mili-
tary confrontation in the Golan Heights or Lebanon. Earlier in
the month, Israeli War Minister Rabin, visiting Washington,
had claimed that Syria organized the attempt to bomb EI Al in
London’s Heathrow airport. At the same time, US President
Reagan and Vice-president Bush named Syria as a possible
candidate for unilateral US military action (Guardian, May
8th).
Clearly emboldened by the apparent ‘‘anti-terrorist’’ con-
sensus achieved at the Tokyo Summit of the seven strongest
imperialist powers, the US and Israeli leaderships once again
escalated their campaign against Syria, attempting to place this
in the framework of ‘‘combatting terrorism’’. However, the
real reasons are related to the current stalemate of the so-called
peace process in the Middle East, and Syria’s prominent role in
opposing this drive for consolidating imperialist and Zionist
hegemony.
OLD—NEW ANTAGONISM
The special animosity of US imperialism and Zionism
towards Syria has both an old and recent history. Syria’s rejec-
tion of imperialist plans and its alliance with the Soviet Union,
have been anathema to the imperialist-Zionist plans for divide
and rule. The Egyptian regime’s definitive move into the enemy
camp in 1977 reduced the US’s need to contemplate a compre-
hensive approach to the Middle East conflict. It turned all
efforts to marginalizing the Syrians and reducing Soviet
influence. This line was further cemented with the advent of the
Reagan Administration which views all regional conflicts in the
context of its global crusade against the Soviets.
Concurrently, the return of the Golan Heights to Syria has
never merited more than diplomatic lip-service from imperialist
circles, even when ‘Israel’ blatantly annexed this territory in
1981 in violation of all international agreements, including UN
resolution 242 which the US claims as a basis for its policy when-
ever this is convenient for excluding the PLO and legitimate
Palestinian demands. The concept of ‘‘land for peace’’ is never
raised in relation to Syria because the Zionist leadership, whe-
ther Likud or Labor, considers the Golan Heights vital for their
military plans and interests. When Reagan presented his ini-
tiative in the fall of 1982, to capitalize on the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon, he did not deem the Golan Heights or Syria worthy of
mention.
Nonetheless, the Israeli-Syria disengagement has held on the
Golan Heights since it was arranged in 1974, following the
October War. By the late seventies, Israeli-Syrian differences
were focused on Lebanon. The presence of Syrian troops in the
northern and central parts of Lebanon stood in the way of Zio-
nism’s expansionist designs. In the spring of 1981, the Israeli
military openly intervened to support the Phalangists’ drive to
expand their influence into the Beqaa Valley, shooting down
Syrian helicopters in the process. For the first time, Syria moved
SAM-6 missiles into Lebanon, which ‘israel’ projected as a
crisis for its security. With Philip Habib’s shuttle diplomacy of
1981 and early 82, the Israelis seemed to back down on their
demand for the missiles’ removal, but they settled the issue in
their own violent way by bombing them in the initial phase of
invading Lebanon. Ensuing events showed, however, that even
massive Israeli violence could not subdue Lebanon or Syrian
steadfastness. Syrian support to the Lebanese national forces
8
was pivotal in foiling the May 17th treaty between ‘Israel’ and
the renegade Lebanese government, and in rolling back Israeli
occupation in Lebanon. ‘‘A segment of Israel’s leadership
community regards the defeat of Syria and the driving of Syrian
forces from Lebanese soil as the great unfinished business of
that campaign’’ (Christian Science Monitor, January 8th).
In view of this historical pattern, it cannot be ruled out that
aggression will again be directed against Syria. The current
campaign dates back to late 1985, when Syria again moved mis-
siles into Lebanon, after Israeli warplanes downed two Syrian
aircraft over Syrian territory on November 19th. The similari-
ties of the scenario to the 1981 ‘‘missile crisis’? make US-Zionist
agression an ever present danger.
ISRAELI ARROGANCE
Throughout December, Israeli officials took turns raising a
fuss about Syrian missile deployment in the Beqaa Valley, and
inside Syria’s own territory. ‘‘Israel requires freedom of flight
over Lebanon,’’ demanded Chief of Staff Moshe Levy arro-
gantly on Israeli television. Rabin threatened ‘‘massive res-
ponse’’ if Israeli population centers were hit by missiles. Cer-
tainly the Zionist leadership was irritated by the necessity of
rerouting its reconnaissance flights over Lebanon, which
afforded them surveillance of Syrian territory as well. Another
Zionist concern is that the long-range SAM-2s, which are sta-
tioned in Syria close to the Lebanese border, rule out a cost-free
Israeli first strike should it decide to wage war on Syria. The
Zionists are concerned by any Arab military strength, but the
actual background for the Israeli threats was the prevailing
political situation. On the one hand, it seemed in December that
Syria had succeeded in sponsoring an agreement between the
opposing Lebanese militias, that would have drastically cur-
tailed possibilities for Zionist meddling in Lebanon. On the
other hand, Hussein of Jordan was visiting Damascus, which
the Zionists feared might block the king’s path to direct nego-
tiations with them.
The Israeli perception was reflected in Peres’ comment on
dealing with the Syrian missile deployment: ‘‘How we do so is a
political decision, not a military one’’ (Jerusalem Post,
December 29, 1985). The same article quoted a senior Israeli
government source who acknowledged that the Syrians don’t
want war, but rather to prevent an Israeli-Jordanian ‘‘peace’’:
‘“We have to see Assad’s decision to deploy these missiles in that
context... Assad had called all the moves until this point. It is
clear around the cabinet table here, that the time has come for
Israel to take the initiative.”’
Itamar Rabinovich, director of the Dayan Center for Middle
Easter Studies at Tel Aviv University, hinted at a further consi-
deration which may govern the Israeli leadership’s decisions
concerning Syria: ‘‘Yet the crisis could also be turned to account
- could provide an opportunity to restore the tacit understan-
ding that once governed the Israeli-Syrian competition in
Lebanon... Naturally, we would prefer to reverse roles and keep
the Syrians guessing about whether and when Israel will attack?’
Yet ultimately Rabinovich cautions against a military response,
noting that if ‘Israel’ were to strike the Syrian missiles, the
Soviet Union might provide a new, eventually better system,
(New York Times, January 14th).
While the Israelis are concerned about Syrian military power,
they assess that they are still able to contain any projected
attack, unless Syria is joined by another country which is unli-
kely. Clearly, the Zionists’ real worry is Syria’s political weight
in Lebanon and the region. This has not, however, prevented a - هو جزء من
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