Democratic Palestine : 17 (ص 27)
غرض
- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 17 (ص 27)
- المحتوى
-
Sudan
Definite Elections — Indefinite Results
In April, the Military Council in Sudan held elections, as it had
promised the Sudanese masses when they rose up and toppled
Numeiri’s reactionary dictatorship in April 1985. For the first time in
over two decades, Sudanese went to the polls.
In the 30 years of ‘independent’
Sudan’s history, the people suffered 22
years of military dictatorship, 16 of
them under Numeiri. Numeiri’s regime
developed into one of the most reaction-
ary ones in our time. It can only be
compared to the regimes of Duvalier in
Haiti, Marcos in the Philippines and
Somoza in Nicaragua. The regime des-
troyed the country economically.
Sudan, the largest country in Africa,
changed from being the «breadbasket»
of the world into a net importer of food
and a famine-stricken country.
In terms of foreign policy, Numeiri
totally subordinated Sudan to US
imperialist control, offering it as a base
for the Rapid Deployment Force, sup-
porting the Camp David accords, taking
anti-Soviet stands and even playing the
major role in the transportation of
Ethiopean Jews to the Zionist entity.
Internally, political freedom was vio-
lently suppressed. We cannot but
remember the massacre against the
communists in 1971, when thousands
were killed and the top leaders of the
Communist Party of Sudan were hung
-comrades Abdul Khaliq Mahjoub, Al
Shafi Ahmed and Hashem AI ‘Attah.
The regime increased oppression against
the people by introducing Islamic law in
1983. In brief, these conditions were the
basic reasons for the uprising of April
1985, when the masses and liberal forces
in the army toppled the reactionary
regime.
THE ELECTIONS AND THE
PARTIES
The elections lasted 12 days in the first
half of April; 247 of the 301 members of
the General Assembly were elected. The
elections were postponed indefinitely in
37 of the 68 southern constituencies,
because of the war being waged by the
Sudanese People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA). The results in 17 of the remai-
ning 31 southern constituencies were not
declared.
The election results put the two tradi-
tionalist parties in the forefront: the
Umma (Nationalist) Party, headed by
Sadeq Al Mahdi, won 99 seats, while the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP),
headed by Zien Al Abideen Al Hindi,
won 63 seats. The reactionary Islamic
Nationalist Front was third with 51
seats, having benefitted from its abun-
dant finances, its having been allowed to
work openly during Numeiri’s rule, and
the wave of Islamic fundamentalism.
The Islamic Nationalist Front is led by
Hassan Al Turabi and has its origin in
the Muslim Brotherhood. As such, it
represents one of the dangers to the
newly won democracy, especially in
view of its long alliance with Numeiri.
Among other acts, Turabi supported
Numeiri’s proclaiming himself ‘Imam’
of Sudan.
The Communist Party of Sudan had a
weak showing in the elections, gaining
three seats, in contrast to its historic role
in the Sudanese masses’ struggle. This
should be understood on the back-
ground of the 16 years the party had to
function underground, and the severe
blows it was dealt by Numeiri’s repres-
sion. The election results fail to reflect
the true extent of the Communist
Party’s influence, which is especially
strong among Sudanese workers and
intellectuals.
The other parties that gained seats in
the assembly were regionally oriented,
mainly from the South and the Kar-
dafan area. In addition, five indepen-
‘dents were elected.
THE CABINET
Sadeq Al Mahdi became prime
minister and announced a cabinet of 20,
including himself. The Umma Party
holds nine ministries, most importantly,
defense and finance. The DUP holds six
ministries, most importantly, foreign
and interior. The southern parties hold
four ministries. An independent trade
unionist was designated Minister of
Unity and Peace, assigned the duty of
contacting the SPLA leadership to reach
a peaceful solution to the civil war. The
new government is going to face a
number of problems. Most, if not all,
can be traced to the catastrophic legacy
left by Numeiri’s policies:
THE SOUTH
The South represents a historical
problem in Sudan. The roots of this
problem are related to issues of religion,
ethnic origin, language, geography and
British colonialism. Most recently, the
problem of the South resurfaced when
the Numeiri regime decided to redivide
Sudan into eight administrative regions,
three of them in the South, after a period
when the country was administrated as
two regions: North and South.
Although this was clearly intended to
further weaken the southern popula-
tion’s position, opposition was initially
not very clear, because the redivision
also weakened the domination of the
Danka tribe, the largest in the South.
(Tribal identification is strongest in
southern Sudan, but is also strong in
parts of the east and west of the
country.)
Then, in 1983, Numeiri appointed
himself as ‘Imam’ and enforced Islamic
law, banning alcohol and cutting off
hands and feet for minor offenses.
These laws were enforced regardless of
the religion of the person or region
involved. (Most southerners are Chris-
tians or animists.) This, added to the
historical exploitation of the people of
the South, caused a revolt. The revolt
was led by Colonel John Garang who
established the Sudanese Popular Libe-
ration Movement (SPLM) and its mili-
tary wing, the SPLA. It is estimated that
the SPLM/SPLA controls 2/3 of the
South.
This civil war is costing the state one
million Sudanese pounds daily
($350,000). All parties in Sudan now,
with the exception of the Islamic
National Front, view Garang as an
honest citizen and recognize the need for
negotiations with the SPLA. In late
April, the Umma Party sent a delega-
tion, headed by Idris Al Banna, to Addis
Ababa, to negotiate with the SPLA.
Garang was ready to negotiate, but not
to join the government. He wants a
constitutional congress to be assembled
as soon as possible. The SPLA position
is that the South should have a form of
self-rule within a united, democratic
federation of Sudan. In addition, the
SPLA sees the necessity of reconsidering
relations with the Egyptian regime, and
repealing the Islamic laws.
The Umma and DUP see peaceful
negotiations as the solution to the prob-
lem of the South, but they tend to over-
emphasize the role of regional forces,
especially Ethiopia, rather than the
internal causes of the SPLA’s struggle.
They also criticize the SPLA for escala-
ting the war. The Islamic Nationalist
Front sees Garang as a tool of Ethiopia,
with limited popular support. They
demand that he come to the capital,
Khartoum, to negotiate - ‘‘but we
shouldn’t be quiet about his crimes
against the innocent”’ (sic).
The Communist Party has the most
comprehensive position concerning the
South. The Communist Party views the
SPLM as a serious political force and
Garang as ‘‘a serious man in politics,
economics and the military field. We
agree with him on some issues and disa-
gree on others. We call upon him to
play a patriotic role,’’ as Comrade
Mohammed I. Naqed, General Secre-
tary of the party, says. The communists
see the importance of ending the figh-
27
» - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 17
- تاريخ
- يونيو ١٩٨٦
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
Contribute
Not viewed