Democratic Palestine : 18 (ص 13)
غرض
- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 18 (ص 13)
- المحتوى
-
In addition to the deterioration of living conditions, the siege
makes it impossible for us to move and travel. It forces the camp
population to consume food reserves and medical supplies. The
shelling causes the destruction of the houses, water pipes and
electricity network. Therefore, rebuilding the camps has
become a major task to which we must devote attention.
Despite all of these negative effects and the worsening of the
conditions of their life, the morale of our people, both civilians
and fighters, was very high during the battle of self-defense.
This consolidated our steadfastness in the worst conditions.
Could you give an idea about the Palestinian losses,
material and human, and estimate Amal’s casual-
ties?
Tc be objective, we are unable to estimate our casualties and
material losses inside and outside the camps. This needs a
scientific field study, and a complete count of the number of
houses, schools, clinics, etc. that were destroyed, but the losses
definitely toll in the tens of millions of dollars. The human
casualties, as given by the Palestinian Red Crescent, are as fol-
lows: In Bourj Al Barajneh camp, there were 67 martyrs and 460
wounded. In Sabra-Shatila, there were 26 martyrs and 135
wounded. Moreover, there are many detainees, and we don’t
have the exact number. We also don’t know how many were
killed outside the camps. By the same token, we cannot estimate
Amal’s casualties.
What is the Syrian role in this period? Are you satis-
fied with their efforts to end the camp war?
We wish the Syrian officials has used their influence to pres-
sure the Amal leadership into adhering to the Damascus
agreement which was signed with Syrian guidance and guaran-
tees. We wish the Syrians would have stopped Amal’s conti-
nuing siege of the camps, their aggression against the residents
and harassment of people entering and leaving the camps. Eli-
minating these conditions would prevent the continued eruption
of fighting around the camps.
Nonetheless we did feel the Syrian attempts to end the camp
war in this period. The Syrians played an effective role and
made various efforts which involved their top leadership. On
the political level, Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam
helped directly in reaching a ceasefire. On the military level,
Syrian observors participate actively in the tasks of the obser-
vation committees around the camps. Brigadier Gazi Kanaan,
head of the Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, went to
Beirut to observe the ceasefire. Clearly, there is a central Syrian
decision about the importance of freezing the state of war bet-
ween Amal and the Palestinians in the camps.
What is the position of the Lebanese progressive and
nationalist forces and parties towards the camp
war?
The PNSF delegation communicated with the various Leba-
nese progressive and nationalist forces and parties. They all
confirmed their positions against the war and those who wageit.
They all work to end this war and preserve the camps. They all
work to implement the working paper that was approved by the
Lebanese National Work Committee, in the presence of the
PNSF delegation, for organizing Lebanese-Palestinian nation-
alist relations and enabling the Salvation Front to play its role in
leading the Palestinian masses in Lebanon. This is based on
clause 12 of the Damascus agreement of June 17, 1985, which
reads: ‘“The Lebanese National Democratic Front and the Amal
movement consider the Palestine National Salvation Front as
the recognized national political leadership of the Palestinians
in Lebanon. It is so until it is possible to return the PLO to the
nationalist line. This is confirmed in the PNSF’s political plat-
form.”’
How do you evaluate the position of the Palestinian
organizations, that are outside the PNSF, towards
the agreement?
In the light of the contact we had with the local Palestinian
factions, outside the PNSF, in the camps, we were able to con-
firm that all are committed to the ceasefire decision. In fact,
these factions have in practice shown their commitment to all
decisions approved by the PNSF.
What is the relation between the 1985 Damascus
agreement and the latest agreement to end the camp
war?
We want it to be understood by all that the 1985 Damascus
agreement is the basis. We still demand total commitment to this
agreement, and that Lebanese-Palestinian relations be orga-
nized on this basis. The agreement that was reached on June 14,
1986, is not something new. Rather, it represents a decision to
renew the mechanism for implementing the terms of the 1985
agreement. We consider it a decision for implementation, not a
new agreement. It is known that the 1985 Damascus agreement
came about as a result of dialogue between the Lebanese
National Democratic Front, the Amal movement and the PNSF
leadership, with the guidance of Syrian Vice-President
Khaddam. The three forces signed the agreement with Syrian
guarantees.
What about the rumors of the possibility of internal
Palestinian fighting in the Beirut camps?
These rumors are being spread by our enemies. We rely on
political struggle to resolve the political differences which exist
in the Palestinian arena. In its political program, the PNSF
defined its position on Arafat’s trend; it defined the means for
achieving its program for restoring the PLO to the national line.
We differentiate between the leadership of the deviationist
political trend, and the base of Arafat’s supporters in the
camps. We will struggle politically to mobilize our Palestinian
people against the deviationist trend and its leaders. We do not
approve of any other means that would lead to internal Palesti-
nian fighting. This is based on our conviction that the revolution
cannot be eliminated even by the large enemy camp, but it would
be eroded and eventually eliminated if armed violence replaces
political struggle within its ranks.
Do you believe that the recent agreement provides a
permanent solution for the camp war?
Once again, we confirm our commitment to the 1985
Damascus agreement. We demand that Amal make the same
commitment and implement all the terms of this agreement. As
we explained, the recent agreement was a decision to implement
the principles confirmed in the Damascus agreement. We are
determined to reinforce the Palestinian-Lebanese-Syrian
alliance for confronting the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary
schemes. These schemes aim at liquidating the Palestinian
cause, striking the progressive nationalist forces in the region,
and imposing imperialist hegemony in order to continue exploi-
tation and protect the Zionist entity.
With this understanding, we will devote every effort to rein-
force militant relations between the Palestinian masses and the
Lebanese masses and their national and progressive leadership.
We hope that we wil! not be forced, once again, to confront
Amal militarily, in order to defend our people in the camps.
Fighting between two peoples, who are in the same trench,
means a loss to all nationalists and a benefit to our enemies. We
hope that the Amal movement has realized that political dia-
logue is the correct means for resolving differences between
nationalists, and that internal fighting intensifies differences
rather than help in resolving them.
If the Amal movement comes to this realization, we will suc-
ceed in our efforts to unify Lebanese and Palestinian nationa-
lists to confront the fascist scheme on the one hand, and to res-
tore healthy relations between our peoples in the camps and in
T.ehanon. This should be a guideline for all responsible leaders
in order to avoid repeating the bloody tragedy to which both
Palestinians and Lebanese fell victim.
13 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 18
- تاريخ
- أغسطس ١٩٨٦
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
Contribute
Not viewed