Democratic Palestine : 19 (ص 17)
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- Democratic Palestine : 19 (ص 17)
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relationship with Syria. The second
trend, represented by Masha’ alani and
backed by the Phalangists, takes a
seemingly more flexible stance towards
Syria. In actuality, therefore, the situa-
tion revolves around overt and covert
attempts to abort having any serious,
tangible relation with Syria, as was set
out in the tripartite agreement (signed
in December 1985 by Walid Jumblatt of
the Progressive Socialist Party, Nabih
Berri of the Amal movement, and then
commander of the Lebanese Forces, Eli
Hobeika).
The agreement has remained unim-
plemented since its inception due to the
many differences and military clashes it
had given rise to in the fascists’ ranks.
The January 15th battles this year
culminated in the ousting of Hobeika
by Samir Geagea. The former had gone
too far in his pro-Syrian leanings in the
tripartite agreement, according to
Geagea and Amin Gemayel. At that
time, Geagea and Gemayel joined
forces to oust Hobeika. Gemayel aimed
to reinstate himself as the sole
strongman in the Lebanese arena, while
Geagea’s motives stemmed from a
desire to reinforce his position in the
Lebanese Forces, once Hobeika - a
strong competitor - was out of the way.
Since then, Geagea has been making
speedy efforts to convert the Lebanese
Forces into some sort of regular army -
the so-called Free Christian Army. The
first class of retrained elements was to
graduate in mid-August. Despite
Geagea’s many declarations of good
intentions, the real reason behind
reorganizing the Lebanese Forces was
to weed out Hobeika’s supporters and
others whose position was not clearly
pro-Geagea in the January 15th battles.
Those who saw their livelihood threa-
tened by these maneuvers rose in armed
protest in the mid-august battles.
On the other hand, the Phalangist
Party loyal to Amin Gemayel, attemp-
ting to capitalize on the conflict in the
Lebanese Forces between Geagea and
Masha’alani, supported the latter
through Elie Abu Nader. However,
when it became evident that
Masha’alani was unable to stand up to
Geagea’s bloody onslaught, the Pha-
langists reconsidered their decision and
assumed the role of impartial mediator
between the two warring sides. The Pha-
langists were able to achieve two things
in the process of engineering the truce:
(a) to have Masha’alani retain his
position within the Lebanese Forces.
Thus, the Phalangists would be able to
keep a foothold within the Lebanese
Forces and use Masha’alani when the
opportunity arises in the future.
(b) to convince Geagea to suspend his
plans for converting the Lebanese
Forces into some kind of regular army
and integrating them into the Phalan-
gist Party structure. The Phalangists
prefer to keep these forces separate,
subordinate and on hand when needed,
rather than integrate them in the party
structure.
Thus the Phalangists emerged from
the August battles with the appearance
of remaining the most qualified and
authorized to make decisions in the
name of the Christians.
However, the truce achieved between
the two warring sides did not bring
about a final solution to the core of the
conflict, which is the power struggle
between Geagea and the Phalangists,
each equally anxious to wrest, once and
for all, the sole right to represent the
Christians. On the one hand, there is
Samir Geagea, a strong opponent of the
so-called privileged or special relations
with Syria. Moreover, due to his strong
Zionist backing, he supports open
cooperation with the Zionist entity, as
well as the division of Lebanon into
cantons. On the other hand, the Pha-
langists loyal to Amin Gemayel hesitate
to openly cultivate their relationship
with ‘Israel’ at this stage. They refrain
from openly colliding with Syria, while
trying to avoid being restricted by a
‘special relations’ agreement.
There were several other factors
which contributed to the rising tension
in East Beirut and the consequent
battles. Gemayel had suffered nume-
rous rebuffs from the Syrians for not
implementing one clause of the tripar-
tite agreement. He was anxious to make
a show of striking at the Zionist-backed
Lebanese Forces, not because of an
awakening of nationalist conscience
however. Gemayel intended to give
Syria the impression that he does not
intend to reconsider the _ tripartite
agreement, but did wish to curb the
influence of the Lebanese Forces and
their efforts to reinforce themselves.
Another factor was the election of
George Sa’adeh to the position of
secretary general of the Phalangist
Party. His position was neither for one
side nor the other. This did not change
the balance of forces decisively, and
thus had the effect of prolonging buried
conflicts instead of deciding them.
Finally, the imposition of new taxes
and new payments of protection money
on civilians by Geagea’s men, the waves
of car bombs and the escalating pro-
paganda war, all indicated the inevita-
bility of the bloody battles in East
Beirut.
Despite the truce, the Lebanese
Forces still retain sufficient military
power to constitute a force which
Gemayel must reckon with. Thus, the
military option for resolving the con-
flict remains open. This unresolved
situation led to reignition of the old-
new battles in East Beirut towards the
end of September. Again it is a new
attempt to trim Geagea’s feathers.
Hobeika’s men, disguised as Phalan-
gists, infiltrated East Beirut and clashed
with Geagea’s men. The latter brutally
and swiftly retaliated. The final toll,
200 wounded and 65 killed, left Geagea
as the still uncontested strongman.
Moreover, unconfirmed rumors are
circulating that Masha’alani, the
Phalangists’ betting chip, has been
kidnapped. And the military option is
still open.
THE DILEMMA OF
DIALOGUE
On another level, the Lebanese
cabinet convened on September 2nd, as
the Committee for Dialogue, for the
first time since October 18, 1985. Glo-
rious aims were declared at the end of
this two-hour session «safeguarding
Lebanon’s unity, stressing its Arab
identity, reforming its political system
and liberating the South.» However,
the main issues of differences remain
and probably will remain unresolved,
e.g., abolition of political sectarianism,
reduction of presidential prerogatives
and defining what is exactly meant by
‘privileged or special’ relations with
Syria. These issues always spark fierce
discussions which never resutl in con-
crete decisions.
In an interview with the Kuwaiti
newspaper, Al Watan, prominent
national figures in Lebanon com-
mented on this much discussed Com-
mittee for Dialogue. Lawyer Sinan
Barraj, head of the Defense Committee
for Democratic Freedoms, said, «What
is needed is a democratic national
system, not sectarian solutions.» The
head of the Arab Cultural Club, engi-
neer Mohammed Qabanni, stated,
«The government dialogue will lead to
a truce... not a comprehensive
solution.» MP Najah Wakim was most
direct: «The government does not
represent the people...»
On the whole, however, with the
events in southern Lebanon now taking
ascendency, the discussions of this
committee have been pushed to the
back burner.
The year 1988 looms ahead as an
important convergence point for three
decisive deadlines - Lebanese presiden-
tial elections, US presidential elections,
as well as Israeli general elections. This
imposes the element of urgency on
‘many forces to achieve some semblence
of stability in certain hotbeds of tur-
moil. Such a semblence of stability
conducive to imperialist designs for the
region, necessitates consolidation of the
pro-US and Zionist elements in
Lebanon, before the whole area is sub-
jected to a political reshuffling. The
prediction of events is impossible, but
one thing is certain: There will bé
vicious attempts to resolve the labyrinth
of contradictions and conflicts in
Lebanon in a form satisfactory to the
US-Zionist-fascist engineers. @
15 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 19
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