Democratic Palestine : 19 (ص 22)
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- Democratic Palestine : 19 (ص 22)
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Egypt exports strawberries to Europe and imports wheat
instead, which is double subordination. Egypt’s exports are
subject to the vacillation of the European market. The Euro-
pean countries could stop importing from Egypt to exert poli-
tical pressure. They also have the final say in what to export to
Egypt. Egypt was pulled into this circle due to the interests of
the ruling coalition.
According to the minimum estimates, Egypt’s debts reached
$34 billion in 1976. In the next two years, the bulk of this debt
is due. Egypt will have to pay back $5 billion. These are the
loans that were used to cover the deficit. The imperialists and
the International Monetary Fund created this situation in order
to make it more difficult for Egypt to correct the deficiency,
hoping that Egypt will have no alternative but to give more
concessions to foreign capital, without any conditions. The
General Motors deal is the best example of how the Egyptian
economy is entering into the next stage. In the next stage,
imperialism imposes its hegemony on certain economic sectors
as a whole, such as the car industry. The General Motors deal
takes us back to two years ago when Mubarak raised the slogan
of a «100% Egyptian car». A country that barely has bread is
planning to make cars? The regime called for bidders, and
many multinational companies submitted bids. The worst bid
was that of General Motors, yet the government awarded the
contract to this company, because Egypt’s debts, specifically
the military debts, were costing Egypt $600 million a year. The
international interest rate is less than 7%, while Egypt pays the
US 13-14% in interest. Last year, Egypt failed to pay back the
interest on military loans, which alone amounted to $550 mil-
lion, and Washington threatened to cut off aid if the loans
weren’t paid back! How to get out of this trap? In order for
Egypt to pay it back, the US government gave a green light to
some American banks to loan Egypt $550 million at a 20%
interest rate.
The latest US-Egyptian joint military maneuvers are another
example of the concessions the regime gives due to the crisis.
The maneuvers took place off the Libyan coast, while Wash-
ington continues its threats not only against Libya, but against
Syria as well, in an attempt to liquidate what the US considers
the last two bases of resistance. These maneuvers were only
part of the US scheme to subjugate the whole area. Egypt is
going along with the imperialist schemes to impose US hege-
mony on the Arab area as a whole.
The Palestinian question is the central issue that, according
to the US schemes, should be finished. This is why the idea of
self-rule was inserted in the second part of the Camp David
accords.
In an attempt to distinguish himself (from Sadat), Mubarak
tried to make the Egyptian-Israeli relations seem frozen in
regards to the Taba question. This is what is known as the ‘cold
peace’ that was supposed to be turned into a real peace: a
defined relationship with the Zionist enemy - full recognition,
including giving ‘Israel’ the right to have international arbitra-
tion over a piece of our land (Taba). If this principle is
approved concerning Egyptian land, it is possible afterwards to
implement it on parts of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza
Strip), the Golan Heights, Jordan, etc. Warming up the ‘cold
peace’ is connected with the Marshall plan, which is in reality
the Peres-Khalil (Egypt’s prime aminister) plan. The Marshall
plan entails subduing the whole area to the interests of US
imperialism. Israel plays the most important role in imple-
menting the plan, due to its strategic relations with the US. The
Marshall plan aims at liquidating not only the Palestinian
cause and national liberation movement, but also the Arak
national liberation movement in Egypt, Syria and every Arab
country.
There is talk in the Arab political arena of the
necessity of working to return the Egyptian regime
to the ranks of Arab ‘solidarity’ and the Arab
League. There are two main schools of thought.
Some feel that Egypt’s return can only be secured
by pressuring the regime, boycotting and isolating
it locally and on the Arab level. Others think this
could be achieved by lifting the measures taken
20
against the regime. What is your view?
I believe that both means will be useless. What is the nature
of the Egyptian regime? The regime’s class structure consists
of the big Egyptian bourgeoisie - its feudalist, industrial and
financial strata, etc. It has parasitic bourgeois features and
made its fortune through its position in the bureaucracy and by
exploiting the public sector. It is organically connected with
foreign capital, specifically US capital. It is very contradictory
to speak of the possibility of this regime’s getting closer to the
Arabs on an anti-imperialist basis, no matter how much pres-
sure is applied. Everyone who really knows the nature of the
regime thinks that this is a remote possibility.
Such talk goes back to the illusions about making a distinc-
tion (between Sadat and Mubarak). It is often said that Sadat
staged a coup against the Nasserites, although he was one of
them, so why can’t Mubarak stage a coup, although he is part
of Camp David? This is very superficial thinking, because it
ignores the vast difference between the two situations. Sadat
took power at a time when the reactionary forces had already
infiltrated and controlled most of the state institutions, inclu-
ding the army. Despite the fact that the army was very nation-
alistic, some reactionary forces had started to gain control over
it. Nasser was aware of this fact. In 1969, Nasser said, «In
Egypt, there is an organized reactionary party.» Sadat staged
his coup, depending on these institutions. The main problem
was that Nasser only stripped the reactionary forces of their
political influence, without destroying their economic base. In
the absence of democracy, these forces were able-during
Nasser’s regime- to grow up again within the state institutions.
Now, is a coup possible from within these institutions, even
if we assume, for the sake of the argument, that Mubarak is
not part of them? It seems impossible to change the regime
under any kind of pressure. The regime will change only when
all of these institutions change, and when its entire class struc-
ture changes.
However, under the pressure of the growth of the nationa-
list, democratic and revolutionary forces, the regime might
give in and enact some superficial reforms. Reforms in any
capitialist society are a step forward, because they are a partial
concession. Whoever is betting on Egypt’s return to the Arab
arena or to an anti-imperialist position, without getting rid of
the present regime, 1s dreaming.
If we look at the political map of the Arab world, we can see
that it is possible for the regime to return to an Arab League
where the majority of regimes are reactionary. The progressive
regimes within the League are vacillating. The Egyptiart
‘regime’s return will mean further regression of the League,
especially since the mass movement is not yet mature enough to
make radical changes in the area, in the near future.
The time has come to defeat the. slogan of Egypt’s return.
We call upon the forces, who have genuine interests in ending
colonization and liberating Palestine, to take the lead.
The basis for Palestinian national unity has been
hotly debated. Relations with the Egyptian regime
was one of the most hotly debated points. There are
those who now Say that breaking off relations with
the Camp David regime should not be a condition
for national unity, because this requires a long
struggle. What is. your opinion?
The PLO rejected Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem. What is the
excuse for dealing with the Egyptian regime after Mubarak
threw away the fig leaf he was hiding behind, and is repeating
the treason to a greater extent. This is the.line of rightist Pales-
tinians. Since Egypt will not return to the Arab fold for a long
time yet, and will not make a positive contribution to solving
the Palestinian question for a long time either, we should not
wait till Egypt’s situation changes. This defies all logic.
It seems strange to want to preserve relations with Egypt
until a change occurs in the future, yet not want to preserve a
positive and sound relation with Syria. Syria is a country which
shares borders with ‘Israel’ and has a nationalist government.
Why would anyone wish to pfeserve a relationship with Camp
David and ignite a crisis with Syria, converting secondary con-
tradictions to primary ones? This is not because they are con- - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 19
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