Democratic Palestine : 20 (ص 27)
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- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 20 (ص 27)
- المحتوى
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intensification of capitalist exploitation and how the capitalists
throw the burden of the economic crisis on the masses’ shoul-
ders. Class polarization is assuming the following forms:
1. There are increasing uprisings of the popular masses to
defend their interests - workers’ strikes, peasant uprisings and
broad student movements. For the first time in the history of
Egypt, the peasants have begun to organize themselves for
establishing a peasants’ union. The working class is creating
new forms of organizations for the struggle, such as commit-
tees to defend the public sector. Resentment and anger also
extend to middle class professionals and intellectuals. We find
even judges resorting to strikes to achieve their economic
demands, in addition to university staff members. The solida-
rity of staff members and professors with the student move-
ment increased as the students were struggling to remove
guards at the university and to cancel the regime’s control over
the student unions. Resentment is even expressed by the central
security forces, the main repressive organ of the ruling bour-
geoisie.
2. There is increasing harmony between the state authority
and big capital, and intermarriage between big capitalism and
the bureaucratic capitalism. The role of the big bourgeoisie’s
organizations is prominent - the industrial association,the bank
and commercial association. These function jointly with Arab,
US, French and West German capital, and with the American
Chamber of Commerce which includes 350 Egyptian compa-
nies! Most prominent was the role of the businessmen’s asso-
ciation and its interrelation with the authority. All of these
associations are alliances between private capital, the bureau-
cratic bourgeoisie, the representatives of the state and foreign
monopoly capital.
3. The increasing gravity of the class struggle is annoying
national bourgeois circles, even within the opposition align-
ments. The national bourgeoisie started to feel the danger
threatening the capitalist system itself. This motivated it to call
for erecting declared and undeclared bridges with the autho-
rity, and to seek the unity of the bourgeoisie. The national
bourgeoisie called for reconciliation with the regime, and dia-
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logue with the ruling party. It demanded the formation of a
broad front of the five parties, including the ruling party.
4. There is an increase in instinctive hostility towards US
imperialism, capitalism and the US schemes, but the masses’
hostility lacks awareness of the dimension of the class struggle.
Hostility is directed towards an amorphous enemy, represented
in parasitic capitalism and corruption. This confusion intensi-
fies attempts to water down the class struggle against the ruling
big bourgeoisie, instead directing fire against the parasites.
Recently, there was a call for the ‘civic sector’ to ally against
the threats of a ‘military coup’, which in essence aims at water-
ing down the class struggle.
5. The political alignment does not accurately reflect class
interests, since the harsh restrictions on the right to organize
prevent congruity between political and class alignment. The
rule for parties, for example, prohibits political alignment on a
class basis. It prohibits the formation of legal parties on a class
basis. The latest election law consolidated this phenomenon,
and imposed many ‘marriages of convenience’ between oppo-
site forces. A clear example was the Muslim Brotherhood’s
joining ranks with the Wafd Party, and then with the Ahrar
Party, after their compromise with the Umma Party failed.
Where do you place the religious trends on the map
of social struggle? Is there cooperation among these
trends? Is there an objective basis for cooperation
between these trends and the working class in the
struggle against Camp David?
The religious trends are not new phenomena in Egypt. They
became prominent in the political arena during the economic
crisis of the thirties. The Egyptian big bourgeoisie played a
major role in embracing the Muslim Brotherhood groups that
were formed during the government of Ismael Sidqi (one of the
most prominent figures of the big bourgeoisie). Despite their
huge membership, the Muslim Brotherhood groups were
unable to achieve political weight. This was especially true
after the exposure of their relations with the palace and the
governments which represented only the elite. The Muslim
Brotherhood tried to sabotage the national struggle; they
declared their support to Sidqi the day the Egyptian national
movement, led by the National Committee for Students and
Workers, confronted the government and successfully com-
batted the planned agreement between Sidqi and British
Foreign Secretary Bevin. The committee was formed by Egyp-
tian communists, allied with other democratic elements.
During Nasser’s regime, the religious trends went under-
ground, due to the many blows that were dealt to them,and due
to the national and social achievements made in this period.
They appeared again after Sadat’s May 15th coup in 1971.
Sadat tried to rely on them to consolidate his social base. He
released their prisoners and encouraged Muslim groups in the
universities. He gave his blessings to their semi-fascist practices
against Marxist and Nasserite trends in the universities, and
enabled them to control the student unions. He also provided
them with mosques and street corners as platforms for sprea-
ding their ideology. | ;
Within a few years, the extremist Islamic trends had evoked
the extremist trends in the Christian ranks. The religious trends
serve as a reserve for the ruling bourgeoisie. Their policies
serve the interests of the big bourgeoisie, especially the com-
mercial bourgeoisie. This explains the support the religious
trends receive from Arab oil capital, the Saudis in particular,
and from big Egyptian capitalists. Everybody knows how
Othman Ahmed Othman (wealthy, corrupt entrepreneur)
embraced the Muslim Brotherhood when it was in conflict with
the regime. :
The Islamic groups were able to mobilize a broad sector of
the petit bourgeoisie. The vast majority of their membership is
students, professionals, craftsmen, small farmers and retailers.
Tbe phenomenon of the religious groups is a complicated
one which we cannot underestimate. We must differentiate P
27 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 20
- تاريخ
- نوفمبر ١٩٨٦
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
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