Democratic Palestine : 20 (ص 31)
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The Reagan-Gorbachev Summit
Star Wars Vs. Peace
On October 11-12th, in Reykjavik,
Iceland’s capital, the second meeting
between US President Ronald Reagan
and Soviet Communist Party General
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev was held
amidst US-generated tension. The
summit ended without setting a date for
a full-scale summit in the US between
the two leaders, and without reaching
accords concerning arms limitations,
despite the hopeful atmosphere in the
first rounds of the negotiations.
Disappointment came quickly after the
fourth round, in which Reagan’s insis-
tence on the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI), known as Star Wars, caused the
summit to fail.
During the two days in which the
leaders met, four rounds of negotia-
tions took place, amounting to 11 hours
and 54 minutes. The unexpected length
of the talks was in itself an indication of
how close the two sides came to making
historic decisions which would lessen
international tension, decrease _ the
threat of war and pave the way for res-
toring detente. However, the results of
the summit did not match the hopeful,
early indications.
Despite disagreements on the agenda
and priorities, there was agreement
between Gorbachev and Reagan con-
cerning the principal issues to be dis-
cussed in the meeting. The disagree-
ment occurred in the final round, when
Reagan insisted on continuing Star
Wars’ testing not only in laboratories,
but also in outer space. Te this, Gor-
bachev said that only «a madman
would accept such a request.»
Is it then a surprise ending? To
answer that, one should recall the
atmosphere which affected the relations
between the two countries prior to the
summit. Then, one can conclude that it
was not a surprise ending. The summit
was held as the US administration was
intensifying its aggressive steps which
would damage US-Soviet relations, and
thus bring closer the threat of nuclear
war. One should recall how the Reagan
Administration tried to make a big case
out of the arrest of Daniloff, the Ame-
rican journalist caught spying in
Moscow. The US then expelled 25
UN-based Soviet diplomats, and car-
ried out a nuclear explosion in Nevada,
just one day after approving Gorba-
chev’s call for a summit. Last, but not
least, there were Caspar Weinberger’s
statements about the «Soviet threat».
Recalling these actions is enough to
make one realize that the results of the
summit matched the preparations made
by the US, despite the hopeful atmos-
phere which predominated during the
first three rounds of the talks.
A summit held in such an atmos-
phere, with Washington’s insistence on
Star Wars vs. the Soviet Union’s striv-
ing for peace on earth, could only end
one way. The contradictions between
the two sides were not only on principal
issues such as the SDI. There were even
contradictions concerning the nature of
the meeting itself. While the Soviets
viewed it as a «work meeting» to com-
plete what had been agreed upon in
Geneva, but not implemented, the US
viewed it as a preparatory rehearsal for
the next summit.
The Soviet Union showed great
flexibility and gave major concessions
in order to reach accord on the prin-
cipal issues. The Soviets proposed a
program of three parts, aiming at: (1)
reduction of the strategic arsenal by
50% within five years; (2) elimination
of all intermediate-range nuclear
warheads in Europe and 100 in Asia;
and (3) banning SDI testing in space for
at least ten years. During the negotia-
tions, the two sides basically agreed on
the first two, but Reagan’s insistence on
SDI testing in outer space brought the
summit to a deadend, with no accord
on the first two parts either.
Despite the failure, Gorbachev
expressed his belief that the possibility
for continuing dialogue still exists, as
does the possibility for another summit.
As expected, Reagan tried to blame
the Soviet Union for the summit’s
disappointing conclusion, in order to
escape from the embarrassment his
administration suffered due to its insis-
tence on SDI testing, with no conside-
ration for the world’s safety and peace.
Reagan countered the Soviet Union’s
insistance on eliminating or freezing
Star Wars, by suggesting to «keep Star
Wars, even after strategic ballistic mis-
siles were removed from both arsenals
ten years down the line.» Ridiculously,
Schultz argued that SDI should be
retained as an «insurance policy against
cheating.» However, to the USSR and
the world, it was obvious that the US
was. seeking military superiority
through SDI and that Reagan’s
‘Soviet-to-blame’ theory was just a
pretext for achieving that.
It was not only the summit which
showed how far from each other the
two leaders are on peace issues. The
Soviet Union long ago initiated a peace
offensive with no positive response
from the US. The simplest example is
the Soviets’ unilateral moratorium on
nuclear testing, which started in August
1985, and is still in effect. Another
example is the Soviet proposal to com-
pletely eliminate the nuclear arsenals of
both countries before the year 2000. All
these Soviet peace initiatives were
aiming at a safer world. In a press con-
ference after the summit, Gorbachev
said that the SDI does not «frighten the
USSR even from a military standpoint»
and that the Soviet Union would have
the answer for it without much «sacri-
fice on our part». However, he noted
that this problem has many aspects. It
generates suspicion between the two
countries, and would ultimately lead to
the development of new, sophisticated
weapons and a new stage of the arms
race, whose consequences no one can
know. Gorbachev remarked that it
seemed that the Reagan Administra-
tion, which claims to be the protector
of the US and ‘freedom’, had come to
the summit without precise proposals-
empty-handed in fact. All it brought
were «old proposals which emit naph-
thalene odors» and which complicate
the Geneva negotiations.
Despite the Soviet Union’s flexibility,
the Reagan Administration’s obsession
with attaining military superiority
brought to an end this summit which so
many people were hoping would reduce
the threat of nuclear war. Comrade
Gorbachev and the Soviet Union
achieved a great moral victory by win-
ning the propaganda battle against SDI
in this round, showing clearly that it
caused the failure of the Reykjavik
summit and the efforts to reach accords
on reducing tension and the nuclear
arsenals of both sides. Reagan’s refusal
of the Soviet proposals ruined a great
opportunity for reducing not only the
arms race, but also international ten-
sion. Grasping this chance, by contrast,
might have opened the doors to resto-
ring detente.
Events the first week of November
confirmed the ongoing nature of US
imperialism’s determination to sabo-
tage attempts at disarmament. In
Vienna, at the Conference on European
Security and Cooperation, Soviet
Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze
met with US Secretary of State Schultz
for five hours on two days, reaffirming
the Soviets’ interest in continuing dia-
logue. The meeting was to be a conti-
nuation of negotiations on the outline
accords reached at the Reykjavik mee-
ting. However, as Star Wars did to the
Reykjavik summit, so it did to this
meeting. According to Shevardnadze,
the US tried to «beat a complete retreat
from the high ground reached in Ice-
land» and put forth «a mixed bag of
old mothballed views and approaches,»
including points that the Soviet Union
had already conceded in Reykjavik.
Detente remains far away due to US
imperialism’s striving to attain strategic
military superiority.
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