Democratic Palestine : 21 (ص 9)

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Democratic Palestine : 21 (ص 9)

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we communicated with Fatah’s Central Committee.
Answering the question about the results of our contact will
be possible after Fatah’s Central Committee discusses the
PFLP’s true point of view. Our talks with Abu Jihad included
many issues, but concentrated on cancelling the Amman
accord publicly and officially, and the many benefits this
would mean for Fatah, the PLO, the Palestinian masses and
our allies. Brother Abu Jihad promised to convey our point of
view to Fatah’s Central Committee in its first meeting, and to
inform us of the results. I hope to hear the results in the radio
before hearing them at the meeting we agreed to hold to find
out the Central Committee’s decision. The whole issue now
depends on our brothers in Fatah’s Central Committee. The
meeting was beneficial in many ways, but politically speaking
it will be judged by the answer to the following question: Will
Fatah’s Central Committee cancel the Amman accord? Is the
Central Committee going to ask the chairman of the PLO exe-
cutive committee to officially cancel it? We are waiting for the
results and we hope that they will fulfill our masses’ hopes:
cancelling the Amman accord and removing this obstacle to
comprehensive national unity.
What is your evaluation of the Palestine National
Salvation Front (PNSF) in the light of the fact that
it has suffered from paralysis since its establish-
ment? There has been no progress towards its main
goal: restoring the PLO to the national line.
In previous interviews I have evaluated the PNSF and
reviewed the problems it faces. Again, I reiterate that the main
problem we have faced is that some of its members wanted the
PNSF as a substitute PLO, or a preliminary to a substitute
PLO. Their analysis was based on the idea that the deviation of
the right wing would end with sitting down at the negotiations
table with the Zionist enemy, under the supervision of impe-
rialism. According to this idea, the role of the PNSF is to speak
and act as the Palestinian people’s national leadership.
The PFLP agreed that in the case where the official PLO
leadership sits at the negotiating table with the Zionist enemy,
under US supervision, we would then say publicly that this
leadership is not the PLO or the Palestinians’ leader. This is
also what we have told our international allies. However, until
this happens, it is our duty to prevent it through broad mobili-
zation of the Palestinian masses, and our Arab and interna-
tional allies, to prevent this deviation from going all the way.
This difference of views was the reason for the paralysis of
the PNSF’s role. When we raised the slogans of a popular
conference and national alignment, we in the PFLP had in
mind that the PNSF would lead the broadest popular frame-
work, an effective Palestinian framework that would besiege
the deviation and isolate it. This would have been a step
towards aborting the deviationist policy so that the PLO could
be united on a nationalist basis. Every time we raised the slo-
gans of a popular conference or national alignment, we were
faced by those who wanted this conference or alignment to
result in a substitute PLO, or as a step preceding the formation
of a substitute PLO. These are the main problems, though not
the only ones, that the PNSF has faced.
The political developments of 1986 have made clear that the
door to the US solution is closed for the PLO leadership,
though we have no doubt that this leadership tried to enter the
US solution. Facing this new development, it became the duty
of all nationalist and democratic Palestinian organizations to
exploit this chance to reunite the PLO on a nationalist basis,
which would mean achieving the primary goal of the PNSF.
The PNSF’s future depends on some of the member organiza-
tions dropping the idea of a substitute PLO and taking a new
stand, utilizing this chance to reunite the PLO. If the political
conditions of 1985 encouraged the idea that the US solution
would be opened to the PLO, and thinking about establishing a
substitute PLO, then the conditions of 1986 should encourage
the dropping of this idea and instead thinking seriously about
reuniting the PLO. Reuniting the PLO does not only depend
on the national alignment of the Palestinian organizations
present in Damascus. Rather such national alignment aims. at
uniting both centers of the Palestinian revolution’s organiza-
tions: Damascus and Tunis. We call upon the organizations in
the PNSF to face these facts, because this is necessary for
achieving the PNSF’s main goal.
As for the experience of the PNSF, I am still convinced that
it has played a positive role, despite some critical moments it
has experienced. In Lebanon, there is a plan to eliminate the
Palestinian armed presence, not only Arafat’s weapons as
Amal claims, but the weapons of the PNSF and all Palestinians
without exception. The formation of the PNSF deprived Amal
of its main pretext and exposed Amal’s real goals, because the
PNSF was formed with a clear political line against imperia-
lism, and repeatedly called for solidifying the Palestinian-
Lebanese-Syrian nationalist alliance. This was a supportive
factor for us in the eyes of the Palestinian, Lebanese and Arab
masses, and our international allies.
Developments have stressed that there are two
trends in confronting the right - the realistic revolu-
tionary trend, and the reckless, nihilist trend. What
are the points of agreement and disagreement bet-
ween these two trends? Moreover, is there a chance
for uniting the democratic forces in view of recent
joint statements and meetings among them?
When talking about tactical disagreements in confronting
the Palestinian right, we should constantly remember that the
conflict in the Palestinian. arena is against the rightist lea-
dership of the PLO. Tactical contradictions between the
nationalist and democratic forces should not be allowed to
predominate over the main contradiction with the rightist
policy which is the cause of the PLO’s dilemma. Of course,
there are several other factors that played a role in the PLO’s
dilemma, such as imperialist aggression, the loss of the central
leadership position in Beirut, the dispersion of the fighters, the
determination of surrounding Arab states to benefit from these
new conditions to contain or eliminate the PLO, etc.
Among these factors, it is necessary to scientifically pinpoint
the main cause of the conflict in the PLO. Maybe the PFLP
bears a degree of responsibility; maybe the democratic and
nationalist forces do. However, if we ask what is the main
reason for the conflict, we should get a clear answer that it is
the policy pursued by the influential leadership of the PLO,
betting on US solutions and consolidating relations with reac-
tionary regimes. This policy ignited the Palestinian arena and
paved the way for the other factors to play a role. I concen-
trate on this point because of my conviction that it is correct.
When we think of how to reunite the PLO, this analysis leads
us to define our positions and tactics correctly.
On this basis, I can answer the question specifically. The
factors of agreement between the two trends are mainly rejec-
tion and confrontation of the rightist trend in order to abort it,
and a clear concept of the Palestinian revolution’s nationalist
and progressive alliances on the Arab and international levels.
The factors of disagreement mainly concern the means of con-
fronting the rightist trend. The reckless trend, as it is called in
the question, thinks that the right can be confronted by scrat-
ching it out of our minds, and creating a new position that
would lead to a substitute PLO, a PLO formed of nationalist
and progressive forces with a clear political line. In contrast,
the realistic revolutionary trend cannot ignore the fact that the
right exists, that it is represented on the popular level, that it
has cadres and bases, and that, unfortunately, it heads the
PLO officially. Accordingly, the scientific, successful way to
deal with the right is by aligning the broadest range of Palesti-
nian, Arab and internationalist forces to besiege the rightist
policy, isolate and abort it. The ultimate success of this
approach is that we would retain the united PLO, the repre-
sentative of the Palestinian people, recognized by the Arab
countries and people, by national liberation movements,
nationalist governments, socialist countries and progressive
forces all over the world.
I will answer the last part of the question about uniting the
democratic forces in brief. (Editor’s note: The PFLP defines
the democratic forces as the DFLP, the Palestinian Communist
Party, the Popular Struggle Front, the Palestinian Liberation
Front, and itself.)
First, we can never forget that uniting the democratic forces
is a concept adopted in our main documents. It is a guiding
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