Democratic Palestine : 21 (ص 10)

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Democratic Palestine : 21 (ص 10)
المحتوى
principle for us, yet we cannot ignore the tactical differences
that have arisen among the democratic forces. Second, there
are two formulas for the presence of the democratic forces in
the PLO. The first is a formula of real partnership. The second
is the formal partnership which the right wing wants as a pro-
gressive cover for its policies. According to the second, the
democratic forces would bear moral responsibility without
actually participating in drawing up these policies. In the case
of a clear and precise agreement among the democratic forces
on the form of their participation in the framework of the PLO
institutions, the unity of the democratic forces would be very
possible, and soon. Third, the political developments in the
Palestinian arena are pushing for the close relations between
the democratic forces, as mentioned in the question. We in the
PFLP are determined to benefit from these developments.
Why does the right wing still cling to the Amman
accord after the numerous rebuffs it received? Do
you expect the PLO or sections of it to participate
in the US solution? What are the possibilities that
the right will return to the nationalist position?
Certainly, the Palestinian right’s failure to cancel the
Amman accord raises a major question, whose answer would
help us foresee the future of the efforts being made to reunite
the PLO. I raised this particular question in all honesty with
brother Abu Jihad during our meeting... I told him I could
only see two possible explanations for their not cancelling the
accord, One is political, that they are still hoping that media-
tion by Mubarak of Egypt or another would succeed in revi-
ving the Amman accord; in that case, they are still adhering to
the political line that caused the division in the PLO. The
second possibility is organizational... that they do not want to
admit their mistake in signing such an accord, because this
would damage them and their organization, as they see it. In
speaking to Abu Jihad, my position was that in the case that
they will not cancel the accord publicly and officially for poli-
tical reasons,then it is very dangerous to have the PLO reunited
on a weak and ambiguous basis... If the reason is organiza-
tional, I asked Abu Jihad if it isn’t in the Fatah Central Com-
mittee’s favor to do as Abdul Nasser did several times, when he
paused to evaluate a period of the national work and criticized
himself. Nasser received more support from the masses after
such self-criticism. I told Abu Jihad that it is really in their
favor to initiate the cancellation of the accord. I asked him why
he would give a chance for the masses to say that the PFI:-P was
the only one for cancelling the accord as a result of the dia-
logue?...
Concerning the question about the participation of some
Palestinians in the US solution, this solution includes three
parties: the US, ‘Israel’ and America’s Arabs, i.e., Arab reac-
tion. America’s Arabs hope that the PLO will participate in the
US solution because they need a Palestinian cover for their
treachery. ‘Israel’ refuses the PLO’s participation; as Shamir
has stated several times, the PLO is unacceptable even if it
recognizes ‘Israel’ or resolution 242. The US does not reject the
PLO’s participation if the PLO yields to the conditions pre-
sented to it. What is the result of the interaction between these
three positions? Experience has taught us not te make definite
predictions, but the PLO’s participation in the US solution is
unlikely in the foreseeable future. This is not because of the
PLO’s own position, but because of Israeli refusal...
Concerning the possibility of the right returning to the
nationalist position, this is supported by the objective condi-
tions, i.e., the closing of the door to the US solution. This is the
essence of the position we took after King Hussein’s speech on
February 19th. Still, it requires serious and consistent struggle
so that the right can return to the nationalist position, and the
PLO could be reunited on a firm basis, making it the instru-
ment capable of achieving our people’s goal of national inde-
pendence.
For a year and a half, the camps in Lebanon have
been subjected to continuous wars. What are the
goals of these wars and how can they be con-
fronted?
10
It is shear stupidity to explain these wars as the result of
individual incidents... or of the Palestinian armed presence
having returned to its negative, pre-1982 state. It is also stupid
to explain the tragedy our people and camps are experiencing
by saying that they aim at disarming the capitulationist forces
controlled by Arafat. Judging from how these camp wars are
waged, whether the first in May 1985 or the third which started
two months ago and still continues, the only scientific expla-
nation is that this is a war between two opposing concepts
about Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon. Amal’s concept
is to eliminate this, not only the arms of Arafat, but Palesti-
nian arms in general, including those of the Salvation Front.
The other concept is holding on to these arms in order to con-
tinue struggling against ‘Israel’, and supporting the Lebanese
nationalist forces against Israeli occupation; supporting their
goal of a unified Arab Lebanon which is engaged in the nation-
alist battle against Zionism, alongside the Palestinians and
other Arab nationalists.
Why does Amal want to eliminate the Palestinians’ arms?
This is because ‘Israel’ wants that and puts it as a condition for
its withdrawal, as it claims, from all Lebanese territory. We
regret this position and are suffering from it. Naturally, we
hoped that all Palestinian and Lebanese weapons, including
Amal’s, would continue aiming at ‘Israel’ to force its total
withdrawal from Lebanon, and continue the joint nationalist
struggle leading to Palestinian national independence. Of
course, things do not happen due to wishes. For more than a
year and a half, we have been facing a bitter situation in
Lebanon. Confronting this, we find no alternative to standing
firm and defending our weapons; without them we lose our
dignity and our means for achieving liberation. We are proud
of having increased our steadfastness in facing these attacks.
At the same time, we extend our hands in hopes of finding a
political solution that would regulate Palestinian-Lebanese
nationalist relations.
We are fighting a just war in Lebanon. That is why many
Lebanese, Arab and international forces are supporting us. We
hope that by our fighters’ steadfastness and our readiness for a
political solution, and our broad range of allies, we can put an
end to these wars as quickly as possible, based on safeguarding
the Palestinian armed presence and consolidating the
Lebanese-Palestinian-Arab alliance to continue the liberation
battle.
How do you evaluate the semi-united Palestinian
position that has emerged in relation to the current
camp war?
This position will be a source of pride in the history of our
Palestinian national stuggle. Palestinian unity in the field,
whether in occupied Palestine or Lebanon, despite the political
disagreements between the various organizations, is a clear
proof of the masses’ correct nationalist sense, obtained from
the experience of long years of struggle. There are two main
factors in this great unity in the field. First is the disbelief of
our masses and fighters that the goal of this battle is to disarm
the capitulationists. They know that the goal is to disarm all
the Palestinians. Second is the Palestinian people’s and figh-
ters’ view of their weapons. In light of their bitter experiences
since 1948, the Palestinian masses feel that their arms are their
honor, dignity, freedom and homeland until the time they
return to Palestine. This explains Palestinian united steadfast-
ness in the field.
How do you evaluate the Jordanian-Israeli efforts
to divide functions between them in order to
impose their joint rule of the 1967 occupied territo-
ries?
This plan is the most dangerous development facing occu-
pied Palestine since the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. The Jordanian-Israeli efforts are not confined to
the division of functions, but include the attempt to liquidate
the Palestinian cause through the plan that is falsely entitled
‘improving the quality of life’ for the residents of the West
Bank and Gaza. This plan got an okay from the US and ‘Israel’
هو جزء من
Democratic Palestine : 21
تاريخ
يناير ١٩٨٧
المنشئ
الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين

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