Democratic Palestine : 21 (ص 32)
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- Democratic Palestine : 21 (ص 32)
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attackers to back away. On December
10th and 11th, Shatila lived an uneasy
peace, which was occasionally dis-
rupted by sniping, shelling and machine
gun fire. Heavy fighting then erupted
and continued for the next two weeks,
until the date of writing this article.
Heavy, destructive shelling targeted
Shatila and its besieged residents. It was
clear that Amal and the Lebanese Army
Ist and 6th Brigades were making
intensive efforts to enforce Shatila’s
surrender. Reports from Beirut con-
firmed that Amal’s leader, Nabih Berri,
had issued an order to the army and his
gangs to bring down Shatila, regardless
of developments in Maghdousheh,
where efforts were underway for a cea-
sefire. The order termed the operation
to bring down Shatila ‘Operation Al
Fajr’ (Dawn -sic).
BURJ AL BARAJNEH
Although the aggression against
Shatila was the fiercest, Burj Al
Barajneh camp did not escape the
wrath of Amal’s gangs. The camp had
been under siege for over two months,
with daily shelling, sniping and des-
truction. With the intensification of
aggression against Shatila, Burj Al
Barajneh also came under heavier fire.
The first ten days of December, Burj
Al Barajneh lived through a savage
daily routine of artillery and rocket
shelling, sniping, machine gunning,
intrusion attempts, concentration of
attacking troops, etc. On November
29th, a chemical bomb was thrown into
the camp, causing dryness and stinging
of the throat, vomiting and diarrhea
among the people present near the site
of the explosion. On December 6th,
during a funeral for a martyr, a fighter
was killed by a sniper’s bullet, and the
funeral procession and cemetery were
shelled. A message sent out by the
Popular Committee of Burj AI
Barajneh reported that 1,065 houses
had been destroyed, and there were
hundreds of martyrs and wounded
since the siege was imposed.
For the following two weeks, as in
the case of Shatila, Burj Al Barajneh
faced escalating aggression: heavy
artillery, rocket and mortar shelling,
heavy machine gunning and several
intrusion attempts which were faced
with fierce resistance, forcing Amal to
withdraw.
MAGHDOUSHEH
In the first week of December, there
was intense fighting in Maghdousheh
| Broken Ceasefires and War of Attrition
Throughout the recurring camp war,
the majority of Palestinian forces have
stood ready for a ceasefire agreement to
end the fighting on reasonable grounds.
Their top political priority has been
guaranteeing Palestinian armed pre-
sence in Lebanon in a way to enable
defense of the refugee camps and con-
tinuation of the struggle against Zionist
occupation, while preserving good
Palestinian - Lebanese relations on the
political, military and mass levels. The
Amal movement, in contrast, has
repeatedly displayed unwillingness to
make peace among brothers.
Despite Amal’s unwillingness,a cease-
fire accord was reached in the second
week of December, mainly as the result
of two developments. One was the per-
sistent efforts of Iran, Libya and other
nationalist forces to end the dirty war.
Two was the inability of Amal and its
external backers to achieve their goals
quickly on the battlefield, as they had
expected. These dreams were thwarted
by Palestinian unity in the field, and
heroic defense of the Palestinians’
camps and rights. The agreement con-
tained the following points:
1. A ceasefire in Beirut and the South.
2. Palestinian withdrawal from Magh-
dousheh, to be replaced by Lebanese
nationalist and Islamic forces.
3. From the moment the Palestinian
forces begin withdrawing, Amal lifts
the siege from all the camps; relief
supplies enter Rashidiya camp, and the
wounded are evacuated.
4. As the ceasefire goes into effect,
detainees will be released and refugees
return to their homes.
stage. Upon its completion, the second
stage would begin with a meeting bet-
ween the leaderships of Amal, the
Palestinians, and the Lebanese nation-
alist forces, under Syrian auspices, to
These points constituted the first.
discuss an overall political solution for
the conflict.
The agreement was positive because
it did not include terms fulfilling the
condition set by Amal and its backers,
for disarmament of the Palestinian
fighters and camps. Moreover, it
included no clause for having certain
Palestinian factions control others.
Amal and its backers had worked for
such a development in order to incite
inter-Palestinian fighting, so they could
more easily achieve their goal, instead
of facing united Palestinian defense
lines.
This agreement was guaranteed by
Libya and Iran, in contrast to the
Damascus agreement of 1985, that was
guaranteed by Syria. It soon became
apparent, however, that Amal and its
backers had no intention of abiding by
its terms. Rather Amal signed the
agreement to relieve the political and
military pressure on itself, to save face
and buy time.
the lranians in particular exerted
great efforts to make the agreement a
success. Their mediator, Issa Tabtabai,
went to stay in Rashidiya starting
December 10th, saying he would
remain until the crisis was settled. Such
efforts greatly angered Amal as they
served to expose its failure to abide by
the accord it had signed. Accordingly,
the Amal leader in the Tyre area,
Daoud Daoud, called for Tatabai’s
removal, claiming ridiculously that he
was «an agent of Arafat.» (It is well
known that the Iranian government has
always opposed Arafat’s policy of
wagering on US solutions.) Daoud’s
remark exposed only Amal which con-
tinues to claim that it is fighting Arafat,
while in practice fighting the Palesti-
nians as such.
Throughout December, the same
points for a ceasefire were agreed upon
32
a Oo ER RSS TRE
numerous times by the Palestinians, but
never implemented due to Amal’s
repeated violations and sabotage.
Finally, slightly different terms were
worked out towards the end of the same
month. The essence was the same, with
Palestinian withdrawal from Magh-
dousheh made simultaneous with lifting:
the siege on the camps. The forces of
the Lebanese nationalist movement
were assigned a greater role, replacing
the Palestinian forces in Maghdousheh,
and securing the coastal road from
Beirut through Sidon and south to
Tyre. A delegation from the PFLP and
DFLP went from Damascus to the
Sidon area, to make sure that all Pales-
tinian forces, including those of Arafat
suillin Maghdousheh, would implement
the agreement. Yet by the time this was
accomplished, a statement by Nabih
Berri made it clear that neither Amal
nor its backers considered that they had
committed themselves to the new terms.
Amal also rejected the participation of
some Lebanese nationalist organiza-
tions, especially the Popular Liberation
Army of Mustafa Saad in Sidon, in the
joint force that was to implement the
ceasefire in Maghdousheh. At the same
time, the murder of a Libyan diplomat
in Lebanon showed the extent to which
Amal will go to sabotage any mediation
attempts that might be to the interest of
the Palestinian revolution and the
nationalist cause.
Having failed to achieve their aims,
Amal and its backers are not giving up,
because they judge a strong Palestinian
revolutionary presence to run contrary
to their distorted dreams of bolstering
their own power in a new Sectarian
redistribution of power in Lebanon. To
this end, they are willing to turn the
camp war into a war of attrition,
hoping vainly to wear out the Palesti-
nians over time, regardless of the
damage this will inflict on the common
Arab struggle against Zionism and
imperialism. - هو جزء من
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