Democratic Palestine : 23 (ص 16)
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- Democratic Palestine : 23 (ص 16)
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ing of the conference; all steps should
be coordinated with Washington.
9. The Soviet Union has to change its
policy towards ‘Israel’ and restore
diplomatic relations as a precondition
for participation.
10. The duration of the conference
should be limited.
Thus, the US—Israeli conference
puts preconditions and classifications
for the conference and the participants.
It would only be a temporary pro-
cedure, leading ultimately to the goal of
bringing the Arabs and Israelis to the
negotiations table. The PLO’s par-
ticipation is refused in advance, offer-
ing aS a maximum a place for the
Palestinians within the Jordanian or
other Arab delegation. The Soviet
Union’s participation is conditioned on
its restoring diplomatic relations with
‘Israel’ and allowing the emigration of
Soviet Jews.
JORDAN’S DELIGHT
Since the political coordination bet-
ween the Jordanian regime and the
rightist PLO leadership was suspended
in February 1986, the Jordanian regime
has rapidly proceeded with its policy of
normalizing relations with the Zionist
state, prior to signing a treaty. At the
‘same time, Jordanian officials have
continued to confirm the necessity of
convening an international conference.
It is by now clear that there is
Jordanian-Israeli coordination in im-
posing their division-of-functions plan
in the occupied territories, as a prelude
to direct negotiations under the
auspices of an alleged international
conference.
Although the Jordanian regime has
always claimed adherence to the con-
cept of an international conference, this
position stems from its attempt to avoid
the consequences of overt, direct
negotiations with ‘Israel’, Sadat-style.
It is most probable that Peres’ primary
motive for finding a formula for a
conference that would ‘beautify’ direct
negotiations, was extracting the Jor-
danian regime from the stalemate it is
facing.
THE PALESTINIAN
RIGHT’S REVIVED
ILLUSIONS
Like Peres’ real aim of bringing King
Hussein to the table of direct negotia-
tions, raising the issue of an interna-
tional conference aims at extracting the
16
settlement from its stalemate. It aims at
reviving the illusions of the PLO’s
rightist leadership that by involvement
in the ‘peaceful solution’, it can over-
come the political stalemate it entered
after coordination with the Jordanian
regime was halted.
After the 1973 war, the PLO rightist
leadership had the illusion that an in-
ternational conference would be held.
However, after the smoke had cleared,
it became obvious that the US planned
to advance Kissinger’s step-by-step
diplomacy instead. A few years later,
the developments in the region had
clarified in practice the kind of ‘peace’
Washington and Tel Aviv were seeking
to impose, i.e., Camp David. More
years passed and the international con-
ference was not held, neither according
to the US concept, nor according to the
PLO rightist leadership’s concept.
Throughout these years, US—Israeli
obstinancy was responsible for
obstructing the possibility of convening
an international conference in which
the PLO would participate on an equal
footing with other concerned parties,
especially as the balance of power was
leaning heavily in favor of the enemy
alliance.
Still, the Palestinian right continued
betting on the possibility of a change in
the US position, whereby it would
recognize the PLO and accept its full
participation in the conference.
Renewed illusions about the possibility
of convening an international con-
ference were seen in the recent political
moves of the rightist leadership on
several fronts: First, relations were
restored with the Jordanian regime, as
seen in Khalid Al Wazir’s visit to Jor-
dan and the meeting of the joint
Jordanian-Palestinian committee. Se-
cond, the right-wing leadership con-
tinues to consolidate relations with the
Camp David regime in Egypt. Third,
this leadership is making extensive
political moves on the European con-
tinent.
Despite all these efforts, facts clearly
indicate that the PLO will not be ac-
cepted as an independent party, on an
equal footing with others, at the inter-
national conference now being plann-
ed, if the conference is to be held at all.
This remains the case even if the PLO
were to accept the US—Israeli condi-
tions. While the Amman accord was the
result of the PLO rightist leadership’s
search for a place in the settlement
process,: the terms of this accord and
the course it charted also prove that any
Palestinian participation would only be
within the framework of a Jordanian
delegation for direct negotiations.
FEASIBILITY
A good number of Arab regimes do
not reject the Israeli-US conditions for
an international conference in essence.
Still, one cannot assume that all these
regimes will find the strength to
challenge the Arab masses and national
liberation movement. One cannot
assume that the Soviet Union will ac-
cept to participate in a conference of
that nature and aim. On the other hand,
it is unthinkable that the two strategic
allies, ‘Israel’ and the US, will volun-
tarily relinquish their conditions, and
accept the concept of an international
conference as the Arabs or the Soviet
Union desire. A rather far-fetched
possibility is that the Arab regimes give
up the peace plan adopted at the Fez
Summit, thus submitting to the Israeli-
US conditions. Otherwise, the chances
for convening an international con-
ference on the Middle East are non-
existent this year, or in the next three
years. (Next year is the US presidential
elections, and the next would be the
new administration’s first year in
power).
Experience had proven that
Washington and Tel Aviv do not seek
an international conference. Rather
what is being sought now is the li-
quidation of the Palestinian cause and
the PLO. The rightist PLO leadership’s
adherence to the Amman accord and
restoring relations with the Jordanian
regime only help pave the way for the
enemy alliance’s plans, offering King
Hussein a cover for his capitulationist
steps in the process.
It is clear that the only road open to
the PLO leadership for getting out of
its stalemate is officially and publicly
cancelling the Amman accord, and en-
ding relations with Cairo. This would
set the conditions for restoring the
PLO’s unity on a clear nationalist
basis, antagonistic to the imperialist-
Zionist-reactionary alliance and _ all
capitulationist plans and projects. This
is the only way to obstruct the Jorda-
nian and Egyptian regime’s maneuvers.
It is the prerequisite for the PLO’s
regaining its position in the Arab na-
tional liberation movement, as a
vanguard fighting the imperialist plans,
whether these are promoted via an in-
ternational conference or without one. - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 23
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