Democratic Palestine : 23 (ص 31)
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- Democratic Palestine : 23 (ص 31)
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livelihood or decent housing, and star-
ving because of lack of funds for their
welfare?... It has been proven by our
historical experience that unless ge-
nuine land reform is implemented, the
countryside will never progress and...
there will never be a basis and a com-
plement for the development of na-
tional industries and a transportation
industry which will ensure the well-
being and prosperity of the laboring
masses. .»
ELITE DEMOCRACY
The government’s failure to enact
other than surface reforms is due to
pressure from the extreme right and the
US, combined with its own class
nature. Originally, the government was
composed of bourgeois reformers
(representing the big bourgeoisie who
opposed Marcos’ monopoly, wanting
political, but not basic economic
reform), extreme rightists (who
deserted Marcos only because he prov-
ed incapable of ruling), and progressive
liberals (representing the national
bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie, who
took the initiative in the first phase).
The extreme right’s pressure, punc-
tuated by several coup attempts, has
essentially aimed at increasing US aid
to the army’s counterinsurgency, rather
than actually toppling the Aquino
government. Consequently, the
coupists were treated with kid gloves by
the army command, in stark contrast to
the violence directed against protesting
peasants and workers. The govern-
ment’s net response to this pressure was
a trade-off: Defense Minister Enrile,
who profiled the extreme right, was
removed in November, followed by the
ouster of the democratic Labor
Minister. While Enrile’s replacement,
General Rafael Ileto, is just as pro-US
as his predecessor, the new labor
minister is a corporate lawyer! Army
Chief of Staff Ramos, who emerged
as a strongman after the November
coup attempt, is an old hand at close
cooperation with the US. Educated at
West Point military academy, he served
alongside US troops in Korea in the
fifties, and in Vietnam in the sixties.
With the liberal progressive wing
clearly weakened over the past year, the
government has shifted to the right
under the guise of centrist stabilization.
It has come closer to the elite
democracy model cultivated by the US
to replace outmoded dictatorships and
stave off real popular revolution. The
new constitution is also indicative of
this trend. Though filled with beautiful
phrases, it contains no provisions for
drastically reducing feudal or foreign
oppression and exploitation. Still, the
constitution was given overwhelming
support by the electorate, which is quite
understandable since the referendum
was presented as a choice between the
Aquino government or a return to the
fascism of Marcos.
THE GOVERNMENT
THE NDF
The crucial issues at stake, whether
concerning social justice or relations to
the US, converged in the talks between
the government and the NDF for one
simple reason: The NDF with its
backbone, the Communist Party of the
Philippines; its military wing, the New
People’s Army; and its component
AND
Demonstrators hoist red flags, February 1986.
mass federations, is unquestionably the
largest organized force in the country,
that has consistently fought for the
people’s national and social liberation.
Due to sustained guerrilla warfare and
mass mobilization, the NPA _ has
substantial popular influence,
especially in the countryside; in some
areas, this amounts to liberated zones
where elements of the NDF’s national
democratic program are put into prac-
tice. The NDF is active in the mass
struggle throughout the country. Thus,
how the government approached the
NDF tells alot about its real direction.
The NDF boycotted the elections
won by Aquino in February 1986,
judging that such a process was
woefully inadequate for reversing the
fascist dictatorship built up by Marcos,
with US support. However, it soon
became evident that the masses were
rallying around the democratic process
which Aquino symbolized, especially in
the urban areas. This reality elicited
broad discussions and self-criticism in
the component organizations of the
NDF, leading to policy adjustments to
meet the challenge of the new stage
-working to broaden the democratic
process and push for socioeconomic
reforms, while protecting the positions
won in years of revolutionary armed
struggle.
On this background, the NDF ac-
cepted the government’s offer of peace
talks, accompanied by a ceasefire, and
these began in August/September of
1986. The NDF saw the ceasefire as a
political issue, enabling discussions
aimed at a comprehensive solution,
based on agreement as to the economic
and social causes of the insurgency - a
point verbally ascribed to by Aquino.
The government negotiators,
however, avoided a comprehensive
discussion of causes, much less solu-
tions, insisting in the end that the NDF
simply agree to the new constitution.
Meanwhile, the army continued its of-
fensive against the NPA and the people
in a number of rural areas. Fears in-
creased that the government’s real in-
tention was to split the revolutionary
forces, and impose their surrender.
Such fear gained credence from
Aquino’s statement, made while she
was Visiting the US in the autumn, that
she had called for the peace talks to
«lay the moral foundation for setting
aside the olive branch of peace and
drawing the sword of war.» Facts show
that these words were indicative of »
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