Democratic Palestine : 26 (ص 36)
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- Democratic Palestine : 26 (ص 36)
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government. Its provisions calling for a
multiparty electoral commission, and a
timetable and procedures for new elec-
tions within 90 days, were designed to
force the Nicaraguan government into
sharing power with the contras.
Nicaragua’s president Daniel Ortega
termed Reagan’s plan «a_ publicity
stunt» and immediately called on
Washington to start direct, bilateral
negotiations. Ortega’s call was quickly
rejected by the US administration.
Secretary of State Schultz said that «...
there is no way the United States would
want to sit down with Nicaragua to
decide what is right for Central
America» (International Herald
Tribune, August 7, 1987). This
response clearly exposed Washington’s
real intentions of continuing its war
against Nicaragua. In fact, Reagan’s
intent was to introduce a plan unaccep-
table to the Sandinistas, in order to use
their refusal as a prelude for gaining
congressional approval for more aid to
the contras.
Faced with a Central American con-
sensus, Washington initially seemed to
respond positively to the Guatemala
peace plan. However, Reagan’s August
24th speech which was broadcast on the
contras’ clandestine station, Radio
Liberacion, added new evidence of the
US administration’s intentions. Reagan
said that the US would continue back-
ing the contras until the Nicaraguan
government lived up to its promises
under the peace plan. The US’s real
position on the Guatemala plan was
further revealed by a senior official
who stated that: «The Reagan ad-
ministration has decided that a regional
peace plan for Central America cannot
work unless the United States provides
long-term support for the rebels in
Nicaragua perhaps even months after a
ceasefire» (International Herald
Tribune, August 20, 1987).
BLOCKING US
INTERVENTION
The most significant aspect of the
Guatemala plan is that it establishes a
consensus against foreign intervention
in local conflicts. This constitutes a
major barrier to US _ imperialism’s
strategy in Central America, and a ma-
jor gain for Nicaragua. For years, the
Nicaraguan government has worked
hard to establish reasonable relations
with its neighbors in order to head off
US intervention. It is well known that
without US support, the contras cannot
36
continue their war against the gains of
the Nicaraguan people. Ending the
contras’ sabotage would allow the
Sandinista government to channel more
of its resources into development pro-
jects for increasing the _ people’s
welfare. Due to such considerations,
President Ortega termed the new plan
«a first, great, transcendent and
historic step.» He also noted, «We still
have major steps to take before there is
peace in Central America.»
Though hopes for a peaceful settle-
ment in Central America were increased
by the Guatemala plan, a number of
obstacles remain. Chief among these is
the Reagan Administration’s continued
efforts to overthrow the Sandinista
government. Another problem is
related to the fact that to be lasting,
peace must be just, acknowledging the
political, social and economic realities
prevailing in the countries involved.
Peace has in fact different prerequisites
in Nicaragua and El Salvador, sites of
the two most intense conflicts in the
region. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista
government came to power as the result
of popular struggle against dictator-
ship. It is leading the masses’ struggle
for democracy and social progress.
Democratization does not therefore
necessitate power-sharing with the
contras whose war is but sabotage kept
alive by US support.
The opposition in El Salvador - the
FDR/FMLN - is a completely different
force in terms of its nature and
strength. In El Salvador the liberation
struggle is propelled forward by broad
mass opposition to the Duarte regime’s
political and economic oppression, and
its dependence on US _ imperialism.
Democratization there does require
serious negotiations between the regime
and the FDR/FMLN since the latter
has a legitimate right to demand that
the grievances of the people be ad-
dressed and a government acceptable to
the people be created.
Despite these problems, reaching a
regional agreement on peace in Central
America is in itself a success. It shows a
positive tendency to seek indigenous
solutions related to local needs, rather
than submitting.to US-imposed solu-
tions. This was a very difficult
achievement in view of the fact that
several of the governments that signed
the peace plan were imposed and/or
kept in power by the US. e@
Nicaragua’s president Ortega - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 26
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