Democratic Palestine : 27 (ص 5)
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- Democratic Palestine : 27 (ص 5)
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et
We wanted to form a broad national popular front including
all fighting Palestinian organizations. Since we were not able
to achieve this aim due to Fatah’s rejection of this formula, the
ensuing developments, like the Palestine Liberation Front’s
withdrawal and the withdrawal of some independents, served
to advance the idea of transforming the PFLP into a working
class party, and making the PLO the broad popular
framework.
Concerning our aspirations and expectations, we didn’t im-
agine that liberating Palestine would be a short picnic.
Based on our understanding of Zionism, its ideology, prac-
tice and alliance with imperialism, we knew well that the
liberation process would be tough, bitter and historic. Ex-
perience has proved the importance of constantly clarifying
ere. “
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We deeply believed in the necessity of armed struggle as a
method for which there is no substitute in liberating Palestine.
At the same time, we saw the need for coordinating with the
Nasserite leadership, because we could not envision a com-
prehensive confrontation of the enemy camp without a con-
nection between Palestinian action and the Arab national
liberation movement which was then headed by Nasser’s
Egypt... We prepared to start the armed struggle, but at the
same time we understood that this was subiect to coordination
with Nasser’s Egypt.
I remember a meeting with Abdel Nasser in early 1964, when
we as vanguard forces had started to realize the dilemma of
Nasserism despite the masses adherence to Nasser’s leadership.
I had two proposals at the meeting, after presenting a long
analysis of Nasserism’s. The first suggestion dealt with the
armed struggle in South Yemen where the October revolution
had started in 1963. At that time, we did not envision its
triumph without Nasser’s support... I reviewed the early period
of the armed struggle and the need for supporting it. The se-
cond suggestion dealt with the Palestinian armed struggle, the
necessity of initiating it.
Nasser’s response to the first suggestion was that he ex-
pressed readiness to give support; he suggested starting
gradually, after having seen if the conditions are suitable...
Rat ye ¢-
Concerning the Palestinian issue, I still remember his exact
words. He said that «the issue of «Israel» is more complicated
Z
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tnis tact to our masses, so that they understand the complexity
of this process and are prepared to fight a long-term battle un-
cil liberating the homeland.
Do you think that the initiative to form the PFLP
was correct at that time? Did you arrive at a correct
balance between the Palestinian and the Arab na-
tionalist dimension in the Palestinian struggle. Or
did the decision come too late?
I think it came late. We, as the Palestinian branch of the
Arab National Movement had thought of practicing armed
struggle and people’s war against the Zionist enemy since 1964,
as evidenced by the 1964 of the martyr, Khaled Abu Aisha,
whom the PFLP considers its first martyr.
than many people think. As I have said on many occasions, |
don’t have a plan to liberate Palestine, for the battle against
Israel is at the same time the battle against US imperialism.»
The discussion between us was honest, clear and cordial.
Nasser stressed that armed struggle against the Zionist enemy
needs deep and long thinking, and finding suitable conditions.
It was obvious that he was not enthusiastic or approving of my
suggestion to initiate armed struggle against the Zionist enemy.
But to us, this issue was very important, so we arrived at a
formula with Nasser allowing for preparations for armed
struggle.
To us, this meant to start training, reconnaissance, moving
arms, etc.
Over the past two decades, the Front has passed
through several stages. Can you evaluate these?
The first stage was the formative one which I spoke about
when telling how the PFLP was formed as a framework for the
Palestinian people’s movement, not only as a political party,
and how the circumstances following the 1967 defeat gave birth
to this idea.
The second stage started with the withdrawal of the Palestine
Liberation Front, to establish what has become the PFLP-
General Command As a result of their withdrawal, the PFLP
became the Palestinian branch of the Arab Nationalist
Movement, because the remaining component (Heros of
Return) was a secondary organization with origins in the ANM
as well. As a result, a qualitative transformation occurred in
how the PFLP viewed itself. It was no longer a united front of
all the classes and stratas of the revolution, like the Vietnamese
or Algerian models. Instead, this chance receded, and the
Front became mainly an essential organization among the
organizations of the Palestinian revolution. One can ask why
we maintained the same name... In its first year, the Front
succeeded in accumulating a big record of political and
military struggle, and it acquired the people’s trust.
We aspired to maintain this record, but we realized that we >
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