Democratic Palestine : 27 (ص 9)

غرض

عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 27 (ص 9)
المحتوى
organizational to achieve the unity of these forces. To that end,
the Front has expended great efforts since the 4th national
congress (1981) to pave the road for the Palestinian Left’s uni-
ty.
The Islamic trend is growing fast inside and outside
the occupied territories. Do you think this trend
will have the chance to control the PLO?
First I would like to express my deepest appreciation for the
phenomenon of the «Jihad Islami» (the Islamic Jihad) in oc-
cupied Palestine for the many painful blows it dealt to the Zionist
enemy. And we extend our hands for cooperation against the
Zionist enemy. I agree with the evaluation that this trend is
growing inside and outside the occupied homeland. And this
phenomenon does not apply only to the Palestinian arena. It is
rather a phenomenon that is extending to many areas in the
Arab world and some developing countries.
The causes for this trend’s growth lie in the problems and
difficulties that face the socio-economic liberation process, the
development problems and the weakness of the working class
parties. This situation forces the masses to turn to any path
they think could achieve their aspirations. During the Nasserite
era, this trend had no chance of growing this fast, because the
masses saw in Nasser’s leadership the mean to achieve their
aspirations. But when this leadership failed to conclude the
socio-economic liberation process, the masses turned to other
trends.
We could add to these factors the victory achieved by the
Iranian revolution. This experience was an inspiration to the
masses, and its effects extended to parts of the Arab and
Islamic world. Another factor was the imperialist and Arab
reactionary encouragement of the fundamentalist forces to
serve their interests, mainly to face the growing influence and
strength of the nationalist and Marxist forces in the area. Saudi
Arabia poured material support to these forces. The Egyptian
regime of Anwar Sadat encouraged the Islamic force’s growth
for some time in Egypt. The Jordanian regime facilitated the
activities of the Islamic Brotherhood and other forces in Jor-
dan. But it is worth mentioning that the Islamic Jihad is dif-
ferent from those other forces. While the other Islamic forces
direct their activities against nationalist and progressive forces
in occupied Palestine, the Islamic Jihad concentrates its ac-
tivities against the Zionist enemy.
In the light of the results of the April 1987 unification session
of the PNC, the PLO should continue the political and
organizational reforms. This would promote the PLO’s role,
status and forms of struggle, namely escalating the armed
struggle. The Islamic trend has the chance to control the
Palestinian scene once the PLO stops the armed struggle and
deviates from its nationalist program. In addition to the work-
ing class inability to be an alternative leadership. Palestinian
masses would undoubtedly turn towards the forces the masses
think could achieve their aspirations.
What is the PFLP’s understanding of the «Palesti-
nian Entity» and «independent Palestinian
decision-making»?
Concerning the Palestinian Entity in this particular stage of
our struggle, the PFLP views that confronting the imperialist-
Zionist-Arab reactionary plan requires emphasizing the in-
dependant Palestinian entity and identity and insisting on
estblishing the independent Palestinian state on our national
soil. The Zionist project is based on negating the existence of
the Palestinian people and to assimilate the Palestinians in the
state of «Israel» to become Israelis, while those Palestinians in
the 1967 occupied territories be assimilated with Jordan. As
for the Palestinians outside the occupied Palestine, they should
according to the Zionist plan, assimilate in some Arab society
or other societies. Confronting this projct necessitates em-
phasizing the independent Palestinian identity and entity.
Despite our deep convictions that our fight against this
Zionist enemy has pan-Arab national dimensions, there re-
mains the peculiarity of this Zionist danger against the
Palestinian people. This peculiarity resulted in the
materialization of a Palestinian national identity and entity.
And this can be clearly seen in the Palestinian masses’, whether
in the 1948 occupied territories, 1967 occupied territories or
elswhere, adherence to the PLO as their sole legitimate
representative. Thus, safeguarding the PLO as _ the
materialization of this Palestinian entity becomes a necessity.
Concerning the slogan of the independent Palestinian
decision-making, it was raised in contrast to the strategy of the
Arab regimes, the classical war strategy and against the Arab
regime’s logic of waiting until preparations for this war are
completed. Despite that, the Palestinian people realize well
that liberating Palestine is a task for the whole Arab nation.
And that the process of liberation could only be developed
through the joint efforts and capabilities of the Arab nation in
this struggle. Therefore, the decision of peace or war is an
Arab national decision that is taken by the Palestinian revolu-
tion in cooperation and coordination with all sincere Arab
forces.
The PFLP is viewed as a hard-liner towards the
Palestinian positions. It is also viewed as an
organization that accepts what has been rejected in
the past. What is your explanation?
As a national liberation movement, all Palestinian classes
and strata, and the nationalist political forces representing
them, join in the battle against the common enemy. But there is
a law that governs the relationship between all these forces. It
is the law of conflict and alliance. Understanding this scientific
law draws to the conclusion that we as a national liberation
movement have our internal differences, but are united against
the enemy.
I agree with your question that the PFLP is a hard-liner
towards the Palestinian positions. The Front attempts by that
to gain the broadest mass support in order to steer the conflict
in a direction that would achieve the minimum level of success.
But after that, the circumstances force the Palestinian forces to
unite. Misunderstanding this law sometimes makes the PFLP’s
positions unclear, and thus questions are raised.
It should be understood, that by joining the unity
framework, the PFLP does not accept those policies it had re-
jected in the past. An example to this is the conflict period that
the Palestinian political arena had lived through from 1983
until the PNC’s unification session in April 1987. Is it true that
the PFLP accepted in April 1987 the policies it rejected before
that? The answer naturally is no. The Palestinian national unity
achieved in April 1987 was based on the cancellation of the >
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هو جزء من
Democratic Palestine : 27
تاريخ
ديسمبر ١٩٨٧
المنشئ
الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين

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